Company D (Moblle Combat Range)

Company D (Mobile Combat Range) by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Roman Introduction The contingency operations (CONOPS) battlefields of the future may be emerging as a “new base case” for Army thinking and planning. The recent Southwest Asia (SWA) crisis might have been our first experience with this new orientation. Deployment of substantial forces to a theater with minimal training support infrastructure may be typical of these future operations. If the forces deployed have significant heavy force elements (armored, mechanized, or motorized forces with organic large caliber weapon systems, such as direct fire missiles and guns), and initial commitment to the theater of operations is followed by a prolonged presence before combat begins or political solutions are found, how does the deployed force sustain gunnery proficiency to battle standard? Lacking live fire ranges for guns and missiles might compromise readiness. But even when there is ample and available land for gunnery in the theater, lack of targets and instrumentation to obtain critical performance feedback could result in expensive ammunition going down range with little training value. The mobile combat range (MCR) might offer a solution, using existing and emerging technology and hard- w m. This article discusses how such an asset might work, using the device of a hypothetical MCR unit and a CONOPS scenario. The scenario assumes use of gunnery training strategies that are part of the Army’s Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), and assumes that a significant portion of any projected gunnery sustainment training employs a COR-like simulator with a performance gate that must be met before allowing soldiers to expend expensive ammunition on a range. Ideally, the simulator would be mobile and, in future, would be embedded in the weapon system. Combining the mobile ranges and the simulators to support any CONOPS gunnery sustainment training would provide a powerful readiness multiplier, but even the MCR by itself might provide an 80 percent training solution. Its only drawback would be added consumption of spare parts and petroleum products, which might be scarce or limited in theater. Scenario: Operation SOUTHERN CALM The UN military response followed a deterioration in the political stability of an African region vital to the United States and other industrial powers for its resources and markets. The appeal for UN help came from several smaller states in the region, each major sources for the world’s reserves of a number of essential industrial resources. They saw a threat to their temtorial integrity when a group of neighboring states became increasingly bellicose in their pronouncements regarding their smaller neighbors and the disposition of their valuable raw resources. The crisis worsened when forces from two of these states entered a border zone that had been created as a demilitarized buffer region. The occupation was carried out by a force of about two divisions of armored and motorized forces, backed up by more than four infantry divisions. This combined force was now ideally positioned to invade and occupy the temtory of the militarily weaker neighboring states. Both of the offensively poised armies had been involved in active operations in recent years, though not against competent heavy or mechanized forces. Their ability to operate such forces effectively and sustain these operations was questionable. However, during the months preceding overt military activity, as the political situation deteriorated, both countries had made extensive efforts to bring their forces to a high state of efficiency. This was particularly true of the armored and motorized elements, and there was good reason for this: much of.the border zone was ideal tank country, consisting of flat or rolling grasslands. The situation was beginning to exhibit an eerie simiIarity to previous situations, most notably the initial stages of the Kuwait-Iraq experience. There were other similarities - the unanimous U. N. sanction response in the form of an embargo, and the formation of a force to assure border integrity. As in the previous situation, the U. S. provided a significant part of that force. The deployment and subsequent operation was termed Operation

SOUTHERN CALM.

The Genesis of Moblle Combat Ranges Operation DESERT SHIELD had demonstrated the importance of preplanned sustainment training. This need developed because deployed forces spent along period in Saudi Arabia uncommitted to combat opera-ARMOR - 23

J. - A problem in Saudi Arabia was range space close to unit cantonments. Here, tankers of the 82d Airborne practice on an improvised range early in the deployment. tions. Effective sustainment training to maintain a high level of combat readiness and troop morale became critical. Few ranges were.available in Saudi Arabia, especially ranges convenient to unit cantonments. Units could, and did, obtain Saudi approval to work out areas in the desert as ad hoc ranges, but with no targetry or instrumentation, such ranges did not provide effective feedback to crews, platoons, and companies. Returning to the SOUTHERN CALM scenario, Central Command and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) jointly developed a solution to the requirement. It took the form of a mobile range complex, organized as a company-size unit, capable of deployment to any anticipated CONOPS theater. The necessary technology, hardware and software to build such a capability had been maturing through several earlier TRADOC and Army Material Command initiatives, one of which was the Prime Range Project. The DESERT SHIELD experience had given the Army a focus for these efforts. Through an expeditious development program, the Armor and Infantry Schools adapted their CATS baseline gunnery training strategies to create a modified CONOPS version that provided a requirement definition for the mobile range. In cooperation with TRADOC’s combat development community, the first experimental unit was formed a year and a half after

DESERT SHIELD.

It was organized with the following characteristics:. A company-size unit of forty personnel.. One hundred percent air and ground mobile (all elements mounted on trucks).. Reusable, mobile targetry (both static and “mover” targets designed to support precision laser and full service gunnery, and subcaliber gunnery. Targetry had a laser shoot-back capability.. Mobile range control systems.. Mobile instrumentation system.. Mobile power source.. Organic spare parts and mainte-. Necessary software. The experimental unit spent one year working through a series of tests, deploying to combat training centers and Reserve Component sites and providing “instant” ranges on various kinds of terrain. Results showed that the experimental unit could successfully nance capability. move by air, rail, or mad, deploying with other units, and quickly begin supporting on-site gunnery sustainment. The facility proved, time and again, that it could provide a level of support equal to the best fixed site facilities. In the case of units that deployed to locations with less capable ranges during the tests, the measurably improved performance of crews and platoons supported by the MCR was significantly better. From these results, ’the Army decided to form and equip 15. MCR companies, based on a best assessment of projected CONOPS needs, anticipated peacetime employment, and competition for Scarce funding in a constrained fiscal environment. Company D was part of this program. Activation of Company D and

Company D (Model Combat Range) was activated on 1 June 1994, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The company, with two sister companies, immediately began supporting units of the 24th Mechanized Division. For the next year, the division and the companies experimented with and refined training strategies, deployed to different austere locations, and tested the MCR concept. The division learned that the MCR companies offered a flexibility that improved the quality of gunnery training for all gun and missile systems beyond anything previously known. The companies’ ability to go virtually anywhere and reconfigure into almost infmite target arrays with unmatched feedback, were adding an edge to the 24th’ battle readiness. Much of this enhanced training was due to the mobility of the system and its precision laser capability. Units were able to make use of virtually every available training time window. Expedients, like a local range set up in the company area for platoon gunnery using the precision laser capabil- 24 ARMOR - November-December 7997 ity, had become almost a division standard. Thanks to this capability, the division’s gunnery proficiency had reached a level previously unknown, and the ability of the division to deal more effectively with schedule dynamics and personnel turmoil had also significantly improved. As upcoming events were to show, the pioneering work accomplished between the 24th Mech. and its supporting mobile range company was to repay the investment tenfold. They had worked out the basis for a flexible, deployable gunnery sustainment training system and established the essential elements of a significant combat multiplier. Deployment to the Theater of Operations The 24th Mech. deployed to the SOUTHERN CALM theater of operations as part of a two-heavy-division contingency corps, replacing initially deployed light forces. Company D (MCR) deployed shortly after the division as part of its in-theater support package. Because of various political initiatives, there was a standoff of several months between the U. N. forces and the forces of the threatening states. During this period, the 24th ID capitalized on the earlier work it had done with sustainment gunnery training, supported by Company D (MCR). The result was a smooth transition into orderly and systematic gunnery sustainment, and gunnery proficiency remained at a very high level. During this period, the division adapted its sustainment training in light of intelligence assessments of the forces of the two threatening states, their tactics, organization, and equipment, and the terrain along the &on-tier. Company D’s flexibility proved particularly useful. With its capability to locate on almost any terrain and reconfigure, it was able to represent virtually any anticipated threat tactical display. The shoot-back capability further enhanced realism. As a result, crews and units reached a particularly high state of effectiveness in the unique conditions of the theater. When the two threatening states later began military operations across the frontier, the initial engagements proved too costly to continue. The first two engagements, involving two armored brigades, were disasters, both brigades suffering losses in excess of 70 percent of their main battle tanks within two hours of contact. This led to a reopening of negotiations and a subsequent withdrawal of aggressor forces to within their borders. Subsequent talks paved the way for more substantial diplomatic initiatives to restore an effective peace in the region. Conclusion The preceding piece of fiction may strike some as a blinding flash of the obvious. However, it is interesting to note that the histories of most major armies are replete with rapid deployments to new theaters where early combat operations were anticipated but did not develop. Sustainment training during the resulting prolonged periods of non-combat before hostilities takes an understandable third or fourth place in planning priorities. But in today’s world of complex weapons, it goes without saying that the battle efficiency of these weapons is vital to success. These systems imply extremely fast and large-scale losses for both sides, once engaged, so gunnery sustainment training strategies are essential. We should anticipate a sustainment gunnery training strategy requirement as the rule, rather than the exception - and plan for it. Planning for deployment must concentrate on the perennial first order of business - getting there “fastest with ARMOR - November-December 7997 the mostest.” But deploying armies have too often found themselves sitting for long periods with inadequate or nonexistent sustainment training capability and support. With older weapons systems, this was not an insurmountable obstacle. But our new, more sophisticated systems m less forgiving. We must plan to sustain training, particularly if the theater has minimal infrastructure. This article discussed one possible approach to this requirement, the mobile combat range. In future contingency operations, we are uncertain who our foes will be. But unless we can put “steel on target,” we will not kill the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Rozman is currently assigned to the Collective Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Before this assignment, he served on the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force, Department of the Army; as Chief, G-3 Training Resources, 1 st Armored Division, U. S. Army Europe; Executive Officer, 1 st Battalion (Mech), 46th Infantry, and 2d Battalion (Mech), 6th Infantry; and Commander, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mech), 58th Infantry. He has also served as infantry platoon leader in Korea and S3 Air of an infantry battalion at Fort Benning. LTC Rozman is a 1970 graduate of USMA, and holds an MBA from the University of Massachusetts. He is a 1983 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College. 25