The Guns of the Cavalry

WWll Innovation Gave Cav Commanders An Indirect Fire Advantage?@ i WWII-Era M-8 Assault Gun *,.ln 3, The Second Regiment of Dragoons, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and the Blackhorse Regiment conjure up historiesrich with tradition, bravado, and chivalry. The Indian Wars, Mexico City, Vera Cruz, Luzon, Northern France, Rhineland, and the Gulf War are but a few of the glorious battles and campaigns fought by determined cavalrymen. Yet, despite the richness of the legends, stories, and historical documents, the artillery support is not mentioned. When did the cavalry receive its first artillery piece? What has been the evolution of regimental cavalry artillery, known affectionately as “Cavarty?” What role did Cavarty play in Operation DESERT STORM? And finally, what is the future for Cavarty? The Beginning The separate howitzer batteries within the three current armored cavalry regiments can trace their origin back to World War 11. LTC (Ret.) Preston Utterback, former commander, 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, was one of the primary advocates of organic cavalry artillery. He modified the role of the M8 assault gun and turned it into the cavalry’s first organic piece of artillery hardware. The following excerpt is his account of the origin of what is now Cavarty: “In the summer of 1943, I attended the Mechanized Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Our tactical instructors werc fresh from combat in North Africa. ull former cavalry squadron commander in North Africa told us then (among other things) to teach the assault gun troops how to fire indirect fire, ifpossi-ble. Upon assignment as the S-3 of 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, I learned that our assault gun troop had a few ex-horse cavalry officers and NCOs who had absolutely no concept on training in artillery fire methods. They had only been instructed how to fue direct fire with their 75-mm howitzers mounted on an M2A1 tank chassis. I gained the cooperation of the com-ARMOR - November-December 7997 9 manding general of afield artillery brigade and was assigned several artillery officers and NCOs for training in indirect fire procedures. During an intense three-month period, E Troop, 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, tnns-itioned from horse cavalry soldiers to artillerymen. “We were committed tocombat in August 1944. I shall never forget our fmt encounter with dug-in German 88 guns and tanks. We countered with frontal fire, called for indirect fire from our assault gun troop, and sent a recon troop around the left flank. They dropped those 75-mm HE shells with pinpoint accuracy and destroyed enemy equipment and personnel far beyond our expectations. We used this strategy time and time again in the next nine months we spent in combat. “To my personal knowledge, our assault gun troop never fired direct fire at the enemy. We thought of them and used them as artillery only, and we used them constantly. They were artillery, used to influence battle objective and were always there when = needed them.” The First Transition During the postwar years, the Army extensively studied the wartime opentions of the mechanized cavalry groups. The military leadership determined that the cavalry structure was not adequately equipped and organized for offensive or delaying operations against a superior force. The reorganization in 1948 structured the armored cavalry into regiments, self-sufficient tactical units capable of operating independently over a wide area and at great distances from other units. In order to accomplish their new misson, the armored cavalry regiment consisted of three armored cavalry reconnaissance battalions, each composed of three reconnaissance companies, a tank company, a headquarters and headquarters company, and a howitzer battery. This restructuring was the official birth of Cavarty. Since the new reconnaissance battalions operated at extended distances from supporting artillery units, the organic howitzer battery furnished internal fire support. The battery had six self-propelled M52 105-mm howitzers, which were built on a tracked chassis. The howitzers were capable of matching the tank’s cross-country mobility, and had a range of 11 kilometers. With new equipment and anew structure, the modem armored cavalry waited to test its strength. Despite Korea, the armored cavalry regiment, complete with its Cavarty, was not battle tested until the deployment of the 1 lth ACR to the Republic of South Vietnam in early September 1966. Vietnam When the 1 lth ACR went into combat in the Republic of Vietnam in 1966, the howitzer battery was an integral component of the squadron structure. The batteries primarily supported squadron-level operations out of fire bases in the Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Binh Duong Provinces. The squadrons used their battery fires primarily in suppressing and interdicting enemy activity. Occasionally, the fires were augmented by units from II Field Force Artillery. The most significant field artillery improvement made within the Cavarty during Vietnam was the creation of the Regimental Fire Support Element (RFSE). Theartillery cell’s role was fire support coordination and clearance of fires. Rotating field artillery battalions had previously provided those functions for the ACR. The new RFSE thus enabled the 1 lth ACR tobecome independent in artillery operations. The cavalry bond to its artillery in Vietnam was as strong as it was during WWII. Once again, the artillery was the squadron commander’s immediate asset to influence the cavalry battle. In Operation FISHHOOK, MONTANA RAIDER, and others - time and time again - the howitzer batteries responded with accurate and timely fm when the cavalry troops needed it. As COL (Ret.) Don McKnight, a squadron commander with the 1 lth ACR in Vietnam, summed it up: “It was the classic combined arms team. The battery was able to fire more missions in a timely and accurate manner than other non-organic artillery assets. The howitzer battery was MY artillery.”

During the post-Vietnam period, the ACRs went through another bansition. The AirLand Battle Doctrine brought the realization that the cavalry regiments needed additional artillery support from a direct support FA battalion while in the covering force area. In some cases, such as in Europe, the relationships between the cavalry regiment and its DS FA battalion were immediate and survived the test of time. However, with the 3rd ACR, the formal link-up with a direct support FA battalion did not occur until 1990. The 3-18th FA Battalion, a general support battalion from 111 Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, was designated the 3rd ACR’s direct support FA battalion for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Both units werep-paring for a mutual NTC rotation when Operation DESERT SHIELD began. When the two units linked up in Saudi Arabia in mid-October, the 3-18th FA Battalion came under the control of the 212th FA Brigade. Under the DESERT SHIELD OPLAN, the battalion had the mission to provide direct support to the 3rd ACR only in the covering force area. The 3-18th FA Battalion was attached to the 3rd ACR under the OPLAN for DESERT STORM. Under the attached relationship, the DS battal- 10 ARMOR - November-December 7997 ion commander became the regimental FSCOORD. One of his first actions as the FSCOORD was to by to assimilate the Cavarty howitzer batteries under his command and control, a move vehemently blocked by the squadron commanders. Based upon the diversity of cavalry missions, the regimental commander agreed on the following artillery relationship. During fast, fluid, and long distance offensive operations, the Cavarty howitzer batteries would remain organic to their respective squadrons. The FA battalion would move behind the lead squadron of the regiment and provide supportive fires for those targets and missions too large for the separate batteries and one squadron to attack. The howitzer batteries would remain OPCON to the battalion on short offensive operations and when massed fires were planned to prep an objective and close limits of advance were established. In the defense, or when massed fires were critical, the Cavarty howitzer batteries would be OPCON to the FA battalion. The regiment and the 3-18 FA Battalion would always keep the cavalry howitzer batteries operating in their respective squadron’s zone of operation. The problems that arose were immediate and difficult to resolve before DESERT STORM. First, the Cavarty battery FDCs were not familiar with TACFIRE and wereuntrained in 3-18thFA Battalion operations. Second, the three separate Cavarty batteries had their own different SOPs and standards. Third, being fiercely independent, the Cavarty batteries resisted any change or attempt at standardization. Fourth, the fire support structure for calls for fire was changed to fit the new relationship. Finally, the field artillery suffered from training distractions from separate higher headquarters,resulting in a lack of combined training. This was kept to a minimum... - M52 105-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer Despite these problems, the 3-18th FA Battalion and the Cavarty howitzer batteries worked out most of the problems by the time DESERT STORM began. Multiple live-fire exercises (LFXs) in November and December helped work out some of the inherent problems. During these LFXs, the battalion TACFIRE team assisted each Cavarty battery FDC, and the entire fire support net was reconstructed and confirmed. In addition, SOPs were standardized across all six firing batteries for the first time. During the initial phase of DESERT STORM, the three batteries remained OPCON to theFA battalion. The3-18th FA Battalion followed the lead maneuver squadron and traveled in a battalion wedge formation. The Cavarty howitzer batteries moved with their respective squadrons. Under the movement plan, the 3-18thFABattalion would fire from a battalion-sized “hip-shoot” configun-tion if enemy contact occurred. Our action began as the regiment turned east and became the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division. Several close objectives were selected, each with limits of advance. The maneuver forces would consolidate on the objectives. As the regiment attacked the third set of objectives, the 3-18 FA Battalion had just completed a 4-36 counterfire mission and was in the process of moving all of the batteries forward to range well beyond the established limit of advance when the aviation squadron requested immediate targets considerably forward of the limit of advance. The RFSE quickly determined that all available artillery assets to the regiment were on the move. An earlier decision not to shoot a prep, due to the large number of pipelines with unknown gas, required all guns to be prepared to mass fires on the objective as the squadrons closed on targets of opportunity. Luckily, the maneuver elements never requested actual fire missions during that critical period until the guns were positioned well within range of the targets. As the 3rd ACR continued its movement to the east, the batteries reverted to their organic status. Because the regiment moved with two squadrons abreast, the 3-18 FA Battalion moved centered behind these two squadrons, with the third line squadron following behind, bringing with it the Cavarty’s third howitzer battery. Due to communication constraints and distances involved with the movement, that third howitzer battery acted as a reserve, which is not a normal artillery role. When hostilities ended, and the regiment stopped moving, the 3-18th FA Battalion was in a position to provide fires in the entire regimental area of operations, while the Cavarty’s third howitzer battery was still with its squadron but in position to augment fires in support of the two lead squadrons. That is how the situation remained until the 3rd ACR was ordered out of Iraq and moved back into Saudi Arabia. As the two units left Saudi Arabia, the 3-18th FA Battalion went in one direction, and the regiment another. The field ARMOR - November-December 7997 11 artillery officers shook hands and vowed to continue working on the relationship that had started in the desert. However, people rotate, the budget gets tighter, and the distance between Fort Sill and Fort Bliss remains a constant 620 miles. Future NTC rotations will undoubtedly continue to highlight the DS FA battalion/cavalry relationship as an atea of weakness. The Future of Cavarty Without detracting from the need to provide fire support to such an important maneuver element, let’s examine artillery support options. I propose three viable options and include the conflicting viewpoints from previous cavalry commanders and FSCOORDs. I also list the strengths and weaknesses of each of the proposed options. OPTION 1: Maintain status quo (separate Cavarty howitzer battery) Advantages This option has the full support of the cavalry commanders whom I interviewed for this article. COL Robert R. Ivany, the current 3rd ACR commander, summarized the maneuver perspective, “Organic howitzer batteries that always move with the squadron have proven to be the best solution.” The most important advantage to this option is that it provides the squadron commander with his own organic artillery asset. When an artillery battalion becomes direct support to a squadron or to the regiment, the howitzer battery, in turn, becomes OKON to the battalion. The squadron commander retains positioning authority over his battery when within his maneuver area The squadron commander uses the artillery to directly influence his battle. The organic Cavarty battery is more timely in its responsive fires, and is more knowledgeable of the peculiar needs and methods of its supported cavalry squadron. In addition, an organic Cavarty battery establishes an habitual relationship between maneuver and artillery, a relationship not seen anywhere else in the Army. The organic battery is larger than most other firing batteries. It has its own survey section, as well as an enlarged maintenance/recovery capability. The howitzer battery commander works independently of an FA battalion, and therefore becomes a more self-confident FA officer from his experience. Disadvantages Without an FA battalion, the FDCs of the separate howitzer batteries do not have the opportunity habitually to work with a TACFIRE system. As a result, they lack the training and equipment necessary to mass fires with a direct support. FA battalion. The Cavarty howitzer batteries do not even have the capabilities or the training to mass fires with the other regimental batteries. If the offensive movement technique calls fortwo squadronsabreast, thecavarty’s third howitzer battery moves too far behind the battle to engage, and is delegated to a reserve status. Throughout an armored cavalry regiment, the three howitzer batteries have three different SOPS for doing things, and usually three different standards. Regimental standardization among the batteries is impossible because the artillery is divided among three squadrons. The fast paced cavalry scenario usually forces the battery to operate from the “hip-shoot” configuration, or to operate in the split-battery mode. These movement methods either detract from timeliness of fire response or massing of fires. Additionally, field artillery officers do not usually occupy squadron-level staff officer positions. The only FA officer positions available within the ACR are found in the Cavarty batteries or in the FSE at regimental and squadron level. The lack of available FA staff positions adversely affects FA officer transition and development within the Cavarty. OPTION 2: Reorganize the organic squadron batteries into a direct support FA battalion within the ACR force structure. Advantages A command and control headquarters consisting of an organic FA battalion commander and staff would provide the regimental commander a higher level of expertise and training in artillery matters. A regimental FA battalion could position and move assets faster to allow continuous fire support to eithera single squadron or to the entire regiment. It would create the ability, in most cases, to mass fires from three batteries. All three howitzer batteries’ training in artillery matters would be coordinated, resulting in standardization throughout the regiment. The regimental FA battalion would also be responsible to coordinate the logistical support required for three howitzer batteries. Finally, habitual relationships, such as those currently used with aviation assets, would ensure familiarity with specific squadron operations. Disadvantages The squadron commanders and the regimental FA commander may disagree on field artillery utilization at the squadron level, causing disharmony. The squadron commander would lose artillery. Personnel changeover within the firing batteries could become more frequent due to the increase of possible job assignments within the battalion. 12 ARMOR -

Let’s keep all the good points that we now have with Cavarty and pick up the additional good points associated with an FA battalion (Le. expertise, standardization, greater massing capabilities, more available tubes at all times, etc.) OPTION 3: Deactivate the organic squadron batteries. Advantages It simply saves money at a time when the budget is getting tight. Disadvantages No habitual relationship would exist, and mutual training would not occur frequently enough to ensure proficiency. Cavalry operations are unique enough torequireconstant mutual training. As a corps asset, the cavalry would have to rely on slow moving and unfa-miliarartillery units forits vital support. Most corps artillery assets do not have the equipment or personnel needed to support cavalry operations. Conclusion DESERT STORM demonstrated the awesome capability of the modem ar-moredcavalry regiment with the MlAl Abrarnstankand the M3 BradleyFight-ing Vehicle. Today’s armored systems easily can outrun their current organic artillery at the squadron level. The Army Seems committed toward keeping the current fast paced role of the armored cavalry regiment intact. Now, more than ever, the regiment cannot afford to operate without the continual protection of artillery support. Slow moving vehicles such as the FIST-V and M109 howitzer are not being upgraded to match the speed of the cavalry; therefore, the structure of Cavarty must adapt in order to keep pace with the modem battlefield. The ACR must continue to have its vital organic artillery, but it needs to be from a regimental artillery battalion. Specific missions that require only one squadron to operate independently can be supported by an habitual battery or batteries from within the battalion. The permanent artillery adviser to the regimental commander would be a more experienced and qualified FA officer, a lieutenant colonel vice a major. The battery FDCs become better trained in battalion and TACFIRE operations. Field artillery officersandNCOs would have a greater opportunity for career progression and branch training. Finally, in future campaigns and battles, supporting artillery to the regiment would fall under typical artillery roles such as reinforcing and general support reinforcing. In a recent interview, LTC James Rowan, the 3rd ACR FSCOORD during DESERT STORM, gave his opinion of the future of Cavarty. “Afield artillery battalion organic to the regiment, would provide better fire support to the regimentbquadron. The battalion would have greater flexibility, more cohesion, and better mined field artillerymen. It provides the best for the cavalry and the field artillery.” The current armored cavalry regimental fire support structure is by no means completely broken. However, Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that modifications are needed. After every armed conflict, the cavalry has made slight adjustments to its methodology and structure. The period following DESERTSTORMis the propertime for critical examination and the proposal of minor changes. Let’s keep all the good points that we now have with Cavarty and pick up the additional good points associated with an FA battalion (i.e. expertise, standardization, greater massing capabilities, more available tubes at all times, etc.) As the U. S. Army slims down in the future, the cavalry may not be afforded organic artillery at the squadron level. It may sound ironic, but an organic artillery battalion at the regimental level may better survive the impending cuts. To a budgetary examiner, the FA battalion represents a complete, intact, and recognizable military entity. Three separate howitzer batteries may appear as “excess or unnecessary” to anon-cav-dry potitician or bureaucrat. The slight modification proposed represents a complete artillery support organization to the cavalry now. Cavalry commanders, former as well as current, may resist and challenge my proposal. I am not advocating stripping the cavalry of its organic artillery. I am merely recommending a restructuring for futurecavalry campaigns. Successes of the past do not guarantee success for the future. The armored cavalry regiments need to reorganize the separate batteries into a regimental field artillery battalion. I hope that 1 may once again serve with a distinguished armored cavalry regiment, but more specifically, in a Cavarty Field Artillery Battalion! Captain Michael J. Reagor is a current student of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Fellowship Program for Leadership Development at the United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y. His tours include two with the 3rd ACR, including Operation DESERT STORM, and one with the 6th Infantry Division (L). He was commander of C Battery, 5-1 lth FA at Fort Wainwright, and the 2/3rd ACR Howitzer Battery at Fort Bliss. He is a 1982 graduate of the USMA. ARMOR - November-December 7997 13