Failure of Israeli Armored Tactical Doctrine, Sinai, 6-8 October 1973 I I

M-51 Super Sherman with French 105mm gun. Short and intense, the Yom Kip pur War of October 1973 tested the doctrine of Israeli tank warfare and pronounced a serious verdict. Not only was the tactical doctrine wrong, it was fundamentally unsound. By incredible luck and improvisation, the Israelis were able quickly to reverse their approach to armored warfare organization and tactics. The culmination of their very quick combined arms metamorphosis was the crossing of the Suez Canal with elements that were a tailored mix of combat arms and support elements. A number of issues evolved from 1967 to 1973 to cause the Israelis to fail miserably during the initial battles in the Sinai. One of the most significant doctrinal problems was the fmed organization of the armored units, from battalion to brigade level, in "pure" formations instead of task organized units. The cause of this reorganization was the result of a number of influences. In this article, I will describe how the Israelis suffered one of their worst defeats in modern history as a result of improper analysis of the tactical lessons of previous conflicts. Specifically, I will discuss the implications of the tactical failures of the Adan armored division 6-8 October 1973. Finally, I will cite the changes to IDF armor doctrine and organizations as a result of those actions. On 6 October 1973, the Israelis were defending in the Sinai well-forward. They planned to use the Suez Canal, a series of forts, and forward-deployed armored reserves to halt any attack until the arrival of the reserves that provided the bulk of their army. A reserve armored division was stationed in depth, with battalions situated several kilometers behind the canal and forts. Using its mobility and firepower, the armored division was to thwart Egyptian crossing efforts at the canal and, if necessary, counterattack the Egyptian forces that might penetrate Israeli static defenses. MG Avraham Adan was commanding his reserve division (162nd) stationed in the north-central Negev at Beer'sheva and was in excellent position geographically to deploy into the Sinai.' The division consisted of three reserve armored brigades and was further reinforced during time of war under the "Ugtah (division task force) concept.- The brigades were of varying strengths, but began the war in the triangular organization standard to most of the Israeli Army. One brigade began the war by detaching a tank battalion to the Northern Command. By the close of the war, Adan's division had collected remnants of units destroyed in the Sinai, the Uzzi Paratroop Brigade, and three separate paratroopheconnais-sance battalions? The 162nd Division was alerted between 0600-0900 hours on 6 October and, along with the balance of the Israeli Army, began mobilization:' Already deployed forward as part of the Sinai reserve division of the Southern Command, the 460th "Gabi" Brigade of the 162nd "Adan" Division was already situated to deploy to the battle area from Bir c;ifgafa. S The other two brigades of Adan's division moved forward that evening, designated as the "131st Operational Group" for security. The 131st Operational Group closed to about half the distance to the battlefield by the next morning! The majority of the Nir (212th) and Aryeh (500th) brigades road marched from Beer'sheva to the front as soon as they were considered ready, despite the lack of tank transporters and the seriousness of the military situation.' The 131st Operational Group (-) was strung along the Beer'sheva-Romani coastal road when it was ambushed carly in the morning of 7 October. Lacking infantry to provide close-in security, the tank units were susceptible to attack by Egyptian antitank killer teams. The Nir Brigade suffered several losses, including a tank and several halftracks. Despite its setbacks, the Nir Brigade was able to reach the front shortly afterward! The Aryeh 28 ARMOR -

Brigade did not arrive until late morning of 8 October? Already a serious problem had developed in the Sinai; which left the Israeli commanders with few alternatives. The Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal in strength and were pressing the defenders' units back along abroad front with high losses. Adan's situation demanded one of two courses of action. Adan could either attack immediately with available forces, or wait, concentrate, then attack with massed forces. MG Adan decided to attack immediately. At 0700, 1000, and 1500 hours on 7 October, Colonel "Gabi" Amir sent battalion-sized, tank-pure counterattacks forward beginning with Battalion 76." The attacks were conducted with no artillery support, virtually no CAS, and no accompanying infantry. The Israelis repeated this pattern of actions along the entire Sinai front. What resulted was a debacle of the first degree. Approximately 150-200 Israeli tanks (two brigade equivalents) were lost during the first 14-16 hours of these uncoordinated attacks along the entire Sinai front." Losses attributed to the 131st Operational Group during the initial fights of 7 October are difficult to ascertain. However, of the two brigades available for battle on 8 October, Adan cites that 170 of the 192 tanks authorized were present for combat that morning. I2 This would indicate a loss of 22 tanks for whatever reasons, which might include combat losses. With the poor maintenance record of the reserve units and normal breakdowns, combat losses were, therefore, fairly light on 7 October. The battles on 8 October were very dif-YrUANTARA

't'sMAn'A

Key locales in the 1973 Sinai Campaign ferent and heralded a disaster for General Adan's division and the Israeli armored corps. The Israelis marshalled a sizable tank force to counterattack the Egyptians on the third day, 8 October. Remarkably, this large force was rushed into sector despite the numerous problems encountered by the Israelis - poor maintenance, missing equipment, mixed tank crews, understrength units, and a major two-front war. The Sinai was, and always has been, considered the most important front. The main ground effort has generally been devoted initially to operations there. In 1973, however, air operations were initially apportioned to support the front on the Golan and only later switched to the Sinai, a change from past wars. 13 By 8 October, MG Sharon's division had arrived and was employed to the south of Adan's sector. Sharon's arrival allowed Southern Command to thicken the light in all sectors by concentrating tanks. During the night of 7-8 October, Adan was directed in a confusing sequence lo send the 131st Operational Group into the attack parallel to, then toward, the Suez Canal to link up with the bypassed and surrounded forts in sector.14 At. 0759 hours on 8 October, the 160th "Gabi" Brigade attacked toward the Suez Canal between Quantara and Ismailia into elements of the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division. The Egyptians had been waiting for this rash act by the Israelis, who expected the Arab soldiers to quit and run at the sight of the Israeli tanks. The Israelis did not even try to close by maneuver, instead, they charged." Instead of assaulting by moving forward under the cover of overwatching tank fires, the Israelis arranged their brigade in column, battalions in-line and moved at speed toward the Egyptian infantry, which was dug in and armed with numerous antitank weapons.16 Very much unlike past wars, the Israelis had numerous vehicles hit. Six tanks of the lead battalion were left on the battlefield, with others hit and damaged. Undaunted, Gabi's brigade withdrew to reorganize and attempt a breakthrough again. ARMOR - November-December 7990 29

Adan planned for another attack by both Gabi'sand Nir's brigades at 1430 hours in a coordinated push to the canal. Through poor communications, misunderstandings, and factors that might be characterized as the "fog of war," the brigades failed to attack jointly.17 Nir's brigade attacked with two battalions in line, brigade on line. Again, without any supporting artillery and without mutually supporting infantry, Nir's units deployed and "charged."18 The Israelis did not have the benefit of the sun to their backs this time, and the Egyptians took a massive toll of the attacking tanks. Eighteen of 22- 25 tanks in one battalion were hit. The brigade ended the engagement with only ten operational tanks to fight the Egyptian counterattack that afternoon." What happened to the Israelis is an interesting lesson in arrogance. I g' ti tc g t1 B tl fi d "1 I! U 0 11 s1 S' V d d P n a fi S the successes they had gz d with armor in the Sinai in both 1956 and

1967. They generally dismissed the actions on the West Bank and in the Golan because they did not fit into the Israeli model of mobile warfare. Fighting in both of these other locations required larger numbers of infantry on more restrictive terrain. Tanks played a supporting role instead of a lead role in the advance through the Judean hills, up rthe slopes of the Golan and through cities like Jerusalem?' Additionally, a number of the influential armor corps commanders had served in the Sinai in both 1956 and 1967 and were products of their experiences. From 1956 onward, the influence of the armored corps commander played a larger role in the promulgation of tanks in the IDF." During this time, the armor branch gained preeminence over the other branches and services. had additional machine guns mounted on the turrets, and tankers were trained to assault infantry trenchlines with their own suppressive fires.25 General Tal, an extremely successful and influential tank commander, was the major proponent of the "all tank unit organizations. While not all Israeli leaders agreed with the concept, enough influential officers did, and it became the doctrine of the IDF between 1967 and 1973.26 At the same time, infantry antitank weapons like the RPG-7 and wire-guided antitank missiles with increased lethality were increasing in numbers on the battlefield. Israeli tactical doctrine did not account for this major difference. Misreading the reasons for their successes and elevating the dependence on the tank to the point of almost virtual exclusion of the other. I. I. I -1... 3 of the mounc gaining arms.24 Tanks that the Israelis had changec'. " " v - 30 ARMOR - November-December I!

tactics and were using artillery and infantry in concert with the tanks?* Additionally, the tankers began to return to the technique of "position improvement," using the terrain and moving by bounds under the cover of other tanks, instead of wildly "charging."29 This resultant change, remarkably initiated in a period of just a few days, made the difference between success and failure in further armored operations. The changes capitalized on a major Israeli strength - the ability to improvise. Armor losses dramatically decreased in subsequent operations. The crossing of the Suez Canal was the epitome of combined arms action. The cost of relearning the combined arms lesson was staggering to the Israeli Army?' The Israelis appear to have relearned the major lessons of combined arms warfare well. As a result of the 1973 war, the number and quality of self-propelled artillery has increased, making it more available and responsive to armored corps units. More important, infantry is now organic to every tank battalion and brigade. Every tank battalion has one organic infantry company, and tank brigades may have one infantry battalion. While infantry still maintains a second place, the Israelis recognize the problem and are attempting to solve it. Notes 'Martin Van Crevald, Command In War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 219. 'Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the &, (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 7-8. 31bid., flyleaf inside cover. The Infantry formations were only attached before the crossing of the Suez Canal 16-17 October. 41bid., 9. %an Crevald, p. 205. *Adan, p. 152. 7Van Crevald, p. 219. Based on the shortage of tank transporters in 1973. Israel invested a large sum to purchase transporters from European sources. I personally observed about 50 in a large motor park in the Negev which appeared to have been fairly new in 1981. 'RB 100-2, Vol. I, "Selected Readings In Tactics, The 1973 Middle East War," (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., USACGSC, 1980), p. 40. 'Adan, p. 135. "Edgar OBallance, No Victor. No Van-auished. The Yom KiDDur War, (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 114 (Map 6). "Col. T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victorv: The Arab Israeli Wars, 1947-1974, (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), p. 419. 120Ballance, p. 117; Adan, p. 112. Magan states there were 180 tanks in the division on the morning of 8 October, a minor difference. 13RB 100-2, Vol. I, p. 45. 14Van Crevald, p. 212. 15Dupuy, p. 419. "%B 100-2, VOI. I, p. 63. '70'Ballance, p. 116. "Stan Morse, ed., Modern Militarv Powers. Israel, (New York: The Military Press, 1984), p. 42. '%an Crevald, p. 224.

Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr. Course Notes, Israeli Armored Corps Commanders Course. The Israelis firmly believe that the way to destroy enemy armored formations is with the tank. Tank versus tank engagements at extended ranges are stressed. Precision gunnery, though different from U. S. standards and procedures, is considered the foundation of the "tank versus tank" battle. "David Eshel, Chariots of the Desert, (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers Ltd., 1989), p. 181. "Ibid. 23Dr. George W. Gawrych, Kev to the Sinai, The Battles for Abu Aaeila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, Research Survey No. 7, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: USACGSC, 1990), p. 24. ARMOR - November-December 7990 24Sam Katz, Israeli Defense Forces Since 1973, (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1986), p. 6.

Edwin L Kennedy, "Israeli M113s," Infantrv, (Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, 1984), pp. 6-7. =Eshel, pp. 26-30. '70Ballance, p. 156. '?bid. =Kennedy, Course Notes. The technique of "position improvement" used by the Israelis is essentially the same as bounding in US. tactical doctrine. The bounds are conducted, however, during the simultaneous engagement of the enemy at long range. Positions are "improved" while continuously keeping the enemy force under fire, and the range is closed on the enemy's location. The contrast between this and the "charge" is quite evident because the exposure time to enemy return fire is significantly lowered by use of the terrain, hull defilade positioning, and mutual support. 30Dupuy, p. 609 (Table F). The Israelis lost in excess of 1200 tanks during the conduct of the Yom Kippur War. Some 400 were repaired immediately and returned to units. Some 840 tanks required more than one day's maintenance and may, or may not, have returned to their units. The Israeli predilection with security prevents accurate figures from being published in the open press. Major Edwin L. Kennedy has served as commander, C Company, 1-18 Infantry (Mech), 1st ID; G3 operations officer, 3AD; S3, 1-36 Infantry (M2 Bradley), 3AD; a tactics instructor, and in the Tactics/Doctrine Department, U. S. Army Infantry School. He attended the Israeli Armored Corps Commanders Course while assigned to the Infantry School in 1981. He is currently assigned to the Center for Army Tactics as an instructor at the CGSC. Major Kennedy has had articles published by Armor, Army, and Infantry magazines. 37