A Military Analysis of Iraqi Army Operations

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August has shown that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's army is the premier Arab military force in the Persian Gulf. The attack, led by the elite Republican Guards Corps, took 8-12 hours to cover roughly 80 miles and secure Kuwait City. This performance has led many Western analysts to believe that Iraq's army is unbeatable by any Mideast: army - except the Israelis. Certainly, in an era when offensive prowess by Arab armies has been nearly nonexistent, Iraq looks to be the exception. This analysis will attempt to evaluate the present-day Iraqi Army's operations and tactics, and highlight its strengths and weaknesses. In order to do this, it will look at the Iraqi Army in the Iran-Iraq War during its defensive operations from 1981-88 and its stunning offensive victories during the spring and summer of 1988, victories which brought Iran to the peace table after having the upper hand in the war the previous six years. Though the Iraqi Army of 1988 and later is in many ways more professional and battle-tested than it was during its ponderous 1980-81 offensives,' it has glaring weaknesses which a U. S. armor-heavy force could exploit. Iraqi defenses. The offensive punch of the Iraqi Army is concentrated in the Republican Guards Corps (referred to in some sources as the Presidential Guards). During the greater part of the Gulf War, the corps was merely a brigade/division-sized force, which was held in reserve to spearhead critical counterattacks. This force was expanded in 1987 to three armored divisions, one infantry division and one commando/special forces brigade for the spring 1988 offensives. For the Kuwaiti invasion, the Guards further expanded with three infantry divisions and a special forces division, giving it a total strength of eight divisions and 0,000 troops? The Iraqis also have another seven armored/ mechanized divisions, which are used for operations in support of the Guards. Finding a tactical table of organization and equipment for units in the Iraqi force structure is nearly impossible on the unclassified level? In general, Iraqi divisions are 12,000- 15,000 strong, with each headquarters usually controlling three brigades. The Guards are much more flexible. A division headquarters controls up to four (and possibly more) brigades, with independent helicopter, artillery, and chemical units attached." Iraqi Force Structure Though the Iraqi Army has over 5500 tanks, the majority of its force structure consists of more than 40 infantry divisions, the mainstays of The rapid withdrawal of the Guards units from Kuwait in late August, to a central location near the Iraq/Kuwait border, in exchange for regular army infantry units shows the Guards' importance to Iraqi offensive/counteroffensive plans. 5 Perfecting the Defense: 1981-1 987 After the initial Iraqi territorial gains of 1980-81 against Iran, the Iranians wrested the initiative from Iraq through a series of large-scale offensives. The war became a defensive one for the Iraqi Army, which went on the offensive only to maintain the integrity of the-defense. Tactically and operationally, the Iraqi Army had ample opportunities to practice defensive operations, usually against Iranian human-wave assaults largely unsupported by armor, artillery, or close-air support. The Iranians made up for the lack of supporting arms by using infantry infiltration tactics in attacks conducted at night and across the numerous water obstacles that crisscross southern Iraq near the city of Basra and the Faw Peninsula. Iraqi tactics and operational doctrine for the offense and defense were based on the Soviet model and instruction from Russian advisors. In the 1980-81 offensives, this hurt the Iraqis because they did not learn to execute the doctrine correctly and junior officers and NCOs, though brave, lacked initiative and often waited for higher headquarters to provide direction. Defensively, however, when the Iraqis started to defend their home soil after losing their initial Iranian gains, Soviet-prepared defensive tac- - -

ARMOR - November-December 7990 73

I I I mAhwaz AI Zubalr-0 I (\ ". \ '.

tics were critical to success by providing a strong "crust" to protect Baghdad. If the Iraqi Army lacked anything for the defense, it was strategic depth and manpower reserves. Because Baghdad is about 150 kilometers from the Iranian border, trading space for time was out of the question, and any battle with losses less than three-to-one was considered a defeat (Iranian population in 1980 - 45 million, Iraqi - 15 million). Iraqi defenses usually consisted of three dug-in defensive bands about 10 kilometers in depth. Each band had platoon- to company-size, triangle-shaped strong points, which provided all-around protection through the use of alternate firing positions and tanks dug in to hull defilade. Strong points had interlocking fire, and were covered by massed artillery and close air support. Iraq maintained air superiority throughout the war! The Combat Engineer Corps, one of the great assets of thc. Iraqi Army, construclccl concrctc fortifications. mincliclrls, and othcr obstaclcs. It also built lateral roads IO rcposition forces. Iraqi units had shown an inahility early in thc war to reinlorcc and redeploy once their positions had been outflanked due to poor coni-mand and control. 7 Despite Iraq's great technological, mobility, and firepower advantages, Iranian human wave assaults, on several occasions, nearly succeeded through numbers alone to break open the front, with penetrations up to 16 kilometers. Thc lack of mobile reserves prevented the Iranians from exploiting their successes, and the massive use of Iraqi air support, including Mi-24 and Gazelle attack helicopters, in conjunction with local counterattacks, usually restored the line? defense, Iraq tu weapons. The fir 1982-83, when I gas to disrupt nignr numan-wave assaults, and became necessary whenever the Iraqis were greatly outnum-... The geography of the 1981-88 war between Iran and Iraq. The Shati AI Arab is the waterway that empties into the Persian Gulf just east of the Faw Peninsula. Ixrcd or defending an important position (thc Iriiqis later used Tabun and Sarin iicrvc gases and cyanotic agents). Chemicals were not usually decisive in and of themselves, however, because the Iranians developed countermeasures and weathedwater effects reduced their impact." Tank vs. Tank: The Battle of Susangerd The battle for Susangerd, the only ma,jor tank battle of the war (and the largest since the 1973 October War), gives a rare look at Iraqi "mohile" defensive capabilities. In January 1981, the understrength -. -.... _... As a last line 01 Iranian 16th Armored Uivision irned to chemical (equipped with 300 British Chief-st use occurred in tains and American M-60s) sup-raq used mustard ported by the 55th Paratroop 1. 1 n - r - - > - --->---.-^I - _____.---..--I- migaue, conuucieu a cuunicraiiacn near Susangerd, Iran, in order to open the road to Ahwaz and lift an 14 ARMOR -

Iraqi siege on Abadan to the southeast. The attack, forced prematurely by political reasons, occurred during the rainy season. Tlie Iranian avenue of approach was a sea of mud, which inhibited Iranian maneuver and resupply. An Iraqi armored division equipped with 300 T- 62 tanks had come to a halt, with brigades on line across the proposed avenue of approach. On 5 January, the Iranian forcc slowly niovcd from thc northeast ovcr thc wct ground. with tlic thrcc tank brigaclcs leading single file and tlie paratroop Iwigadc following behind. Iraqi helicopter reconnaissance de-tcctccl the niovcmcnt. and the Iraqi commander responded quickly by concentrating his three armored brigades based on thc village ol' Achnicd Abad on [he Kharkheh Plain.'" O n 6.lanuary, the lead Iranian armored brigade ran into tlic center Iraqi one. Thinking ir was only;I light Iraqi covering force, tlie Iranians pushcd forward as the Iraqis withdrew, and entered a prepared kill zonc. As tank-to-tank engagements raged, most between 200-1000 meters, the Iraqi commander moved his two flank brigades up lo form a three-sided trap and faced his units inward. The first Iranian brigade was soon destroyed, losing more than 100 tanks. The second and third Iranian armored brigades, unsupported by their infantry, blundered into the trap on the 7th and 8th of January, respectively. The battlefield had become a morass, and the fighting was at such close range that aircraft of both sides were unable to intervene. The third Iranian brigade, realizing its precarious position and running low on main gun ammunition, withdrew." Both the losses and lessons of this battle are open to debate. Each side began with about 300 tanks, and the Iraqis claimed to Iiavc dcstroycd or captured 214 Iranian tanks. though the Iranians only admitted to losing

88. The Iraqis probably lost 100 destroyed or damaged tanks, but hc-cause thcy retained the battlefield they were probably recoverable." In the following days, thc Iraqis put more than 100 Iranian tanks and armored vehicles on display in Basra and Baghdad, and a trip by journalists to tlic Kharkheh Plain revealed some 40 tanks still stuck in the mud, along with masses of empty shell casings and three destroyed helicopters. It is obvious that the Iranian commander was incompetent, feeding troops piecemeal in an attack at 3- 10-3 odds at tlic point of attack. This makes it difficult to judge the real qualily of the Iraqi force. though the Iraqi coinmandcr docs c gct high marks for his ability to react to the situation as it developed. The battle does demonstrate, liowevcr, that both sides were technically deficient in tank-to-tank engagements. Most of the Iranian losses occurred because their tanks got stuck or could not be supplicd and maintained, and were abandoned. Tlie lead-computing sights on Iraqi tanks were seldom used, thus lowering the accuracy of tlie T-62 main gun to World War I1 standards. Reliable reports indicate that both sides often had to close to within boresight range to be effective. I3 It is unknown whether the Iraqis have corrected these training deficiencies with thcir T-72 crews, though they have tried to improve the fire control systems on the tank by using Wcstcrn rangefinders and computers." It is doubtful, without a legitimate Iranian armor threat, that Iraqi armored units were able to expend the ammunition and time necessary to improve thcir tank gunnery skills, wilh the Guards as a possible exception. Back on the Offensive: 1988 After more than six years of stalemate and the primacy of the defense ovcr offensive action (reminiscent ol World War I), most gulf analysts bclicved that neither side would gain the upper hand in the war. Iran was expectcd to conduct yet another "final olfcnsivc" to takc Basra in the winter or spring of

1988. onc of thcir niajor gcographi-cal obicclives since 1982. However, two subtle yet important actions werc taking place in both countries. Iran was suffering from mobilization problems in the winter of 1988. Political problems in Iran due to the "War of the Citics," and a shortage of volunteers for the front prevented the expected winter offensive, and may have caused thc Iranians to thin their lines. 15 Iraq began to modify its force structure in late 1987, expanding the Republican Guards as previously noted. These highly seasoned rorces practiccd offcnsivc combined arms operations beforc being committed to a successful counterattack against an Iranian salient in Kurdistan in March 1988 in order to hone their skills.lG Under these conditions, Saddani Hussein decided to launch a niajor attack to seize the AI Faw (or Fao) Peninsula west o l the Shalt-a1 Arab waterway, which dividcs Iraq and Iran and allows access to tlie Iraqi ARMOR - November-December 7990 75 -

The Iraqi Army has a lot of experience on the defense, and has excellent engineer support (both offensively and defensively). It has never been subjected to a large, combined-arms assault. port of Basra. Faw, on the Iraqi gulf coast, had been captured by Iran in 1986 and was their only major gain since 1982. Its recapture would give a psychological boost to Hussein's military. This battle would also be just the first in a campaign of five attacks (two are covered here), which would push the Iranians out of Iraq. The peninsula was defended by only 5,000-10,000 Iranian regulars and Revolutionary Guards bccause it was such an exposed and untenable position. The attack, titled "Blessed Ramadan," would be launched on the first day of the Moslem month of fasting and would come as a complete surprise to the Iranians. Part of thc surprisc was duc to Iraq's ability to conccntrate its forces quickly before the attack. Using excellent interior lines of coni-munication (both road and rail) covered by air superiority, Iraq moved the Republican Guards from a training area near Basra to its jump-off positions on the gulf coast northwest of AI Faw, 150 kilometers to the south. Thc Iraqi Army has 1500 tank transporters, which can movc armored vehicles at speeds up to 65 kilometers-per-hour. This reflects a lesson of the 1973 October War, when Iraqi tanks sent to Syria to fight Israel drove on their tracks on rough roads and arrived in poor shape. 17 Its commander, Major General Maher Abd al-Rashid, planned the Faw attack as a 4-5 day operation with three phases: breakthrough, exploitation, and mop-up. Starting on the morning of 17 April, the attack was launched with almost 200.000 troops on two axes down the Faw Peninsula. The main attack, launched by T-72-equipped armored units of the Republican Guards, assaulted 35 kilometers southeast across the relatively dry salt Ilats of Manilaha from positions around AI Zubair and Umm Qasr. The Iraqi VI1 Corps, located 10 kilometers north of Faw City, launched ii supporting infantry attack south along the west hank of the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq also apparently launchcd an amphibious assault of unknown size on the western side of the Iranian positions using the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan. I8 A short bombardment of Iranian positions, which included the use of poison gas. most probably a nonpersistent nerve agent, preceded the attack. Undcr covcr ol darkncss, Iraqi commandos cut paths through Iranian defcnsive barriers and minefields, rollowed by armor, supported by inrantry and attack helicopters. Iraq claimed fightcr-bombers and hclicopters llcw more than 318 sorties. helping to prevent Iranian rcinforcemcnts from rcach-ing Faw. The attack, which was expected to last 4-5 clays, ended in 34 hours. Iraq rapidly followed up its Faw victory. On 26 June, again taking ad-tl c Vantage o f thcir superior mobility, he Republican Guards and I11 Jorps retook the man-made, oil-:.. L hi..: -..- /..- ni,.: -....- \ r,1....,1, rlr;ll I V I J I I U I I [IJI I V I I I U U I I iaimiua north of Basra in nine hours. At 0330 hours, the Guards launchcd the main illtack, this time an amphibious one, storming the islands and surrounding marshes lrom small boats (which both sides commonly used in the war) and amphibious tractors. This was I'ollowed hy bridges and bullclozers to consolidate thc gains won. Thc 111 Corps. with 2000 tanks and 000 artillery pieces, against [ewer than 60 Iranian tanks. cleared thc area east of the islands. Suppvrted by a brigade ol paratroopers (possibly a commando brigade) inserted inside Iran as;I blocking force. the 111 Corps advanced 32 kilometers into Iran hefore withdrawing to the international border.'" It is unknown if the paratroops were dropped or air-assaulted into their objective, though Iraq has enough transport aircraft and helicopters for either stylc insertion (films of the Kuwait invasion sliowcd an air-assault into Kuwait City in support ol the attack). On 20 August 1988. Iran and Iraq agrced to a U. N.-sponsored ccascfirc, Iraq having recaptured all land lost to Iran. Common thrcads run through these attacks: 0 Olfcnsivc actions werc cxtcnsivc-Ip rehearsed and had a set-piece quality about them (i.e. little frec-whecling maneuver covering limited dist anccs). 0 Iraq built up odds, which easily exceeded 6-to-1, and prepositioned all logistics. 76 ARMOR - November-December 7990

Anon-persistent nerve strike on front line troops, and mustard gas attack on logistics, command posts, and reserves preceded all attacks." 0 Iraq had overwhelming air-superiority. 0 Iranian defenses were thin, with almost no reserves. Every battle was a forgone conclusion before it even began, and except for the chemical strikes, this scenario seems to fit the recent Kuwait invasion quite well. It is difficult to predict how the Iraqi Army would I'are against the United States, based on its performance in the Iran-Iraq War. For most of the war, Iraq faced an opponent who had thc majority of its air and armored forces dcadlined due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance. By the cnd of the war, Iran's greatest resource, manpowcr, had also been drained in senseless human-wave attacks against strong defcnscs. However, several salient points can be drawn about the Iraqi Army: 0 Iraq's elitc Guards units have seen a significant amount of combat and have been baptized in a chcmi-cal warfare cnvironment. This gives the Iraqi lcaders conlidcnce in troop performancc under degraded conditions. Non-Guards units and People's Army reserves are of uneven quality.. The Guards units are good in set-piece attacks over limited distance, when they have been able to rehearse extensively. Non-Guards units may be incapable of performing offensive combincd-arms maneuvers due to a lack of training. Tank gunnery skills are probably still poor across the army.. The Iraqi Army has a lot of experience on the defcnse, and has excellent enginecr support (both offensively and defensively). It has never been subjected to a large, combined-arms assault, though the Iranians had success with night attacks and infiltration tactics. Due to poor e', Iraqi defenses may be slow to react to a mobile situation. Iraqi troops have always enjoyed friendly planes and helicopters overhead. ADA assets are based on older Soviet missiles, and have not been tested against a legitimate threat. This makes combat troops vulncrablc to CAS. 0Due to the depth of the theater and Iraqi air-superiority. thc logistics system was rarely taxed. Initial press reports from Kuwait indicate that Iraqi troops on the KuwaWSaudi border are going hungry, pcrhaps rcilccting a lack of Iraqi logistical experience and capability. As General Colin Powell stated after the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis arc not "ten-feet tall." U. S. armor-heavy forces could best exploit Iraqi weaknesses by flanking preparcd positions (avoiding kill zones) and engaging Iraqi armored forces in reservc in a free-wheeling mobile battle. Taken out of a setpiece environment, it is likely, as in the Iran-Iraq War, that Iraqi deren-ses and C3 will be incapable of responding to such a threat, and denied air-superiority, would fold under pressurc. Defensivcly, US. forces will submit an Iraqi offcnse to a volumc of tank lire, ATGMs and CAS much greatcr than what they faced from the Iranian Army in the Gulf War. It is unlikely that Iraq could sustain an attack for long against U. S. forccs. Obviously, heavy divisions are the best force to challenge Iraq in a c ground war, becausc forces made up of light infantry and airbornc troops without extensive anti-armor support are in dangcr or hcing ovcr-run quickly hy armor-hcavy lraqi forces. The wild card is Iraqi chemical capability, though desert conditions are unfavorable to chemical employment.2' Hcrc, too, the niobility and protection offered by a heavy force against such an attack will help ensure SUCCCSS. Notes 'Several works are available concerning the initial Iraqi offensive and why it failed to defeat Iran. See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strateaic Survey 1980-81, (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 49- 52; Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War. (London: Brassey's, 1988); John Laffin, War Annual 1, (London: Brassey's, 1986); Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," Armed Forces Journal International (AFJI), April 1982, pp. 32-47, and "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part II - Tactics, Technology and Training," ANI. June 1982, pp. 68-85; and William 0. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., The Iran-lraa War: New Weapons. Old Conflicts, (New York: Praeger. 1983). 'Michael Evans, "Saddam's Military Strategy Causes Surprise in West," The Times, 25 August 1990; see also John Broader and Douglas Jeal, "Iraqi Army: World's 5th Largest But Full of Vital Weak- - ARMOR - November-December 7990 77 nesses," Los Anaeles Times, 13 August 1990; Stephen C. Pelletiere, lraai Power and U. S. Securitv in the Middle East, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, 1990), p.

16. Pelletiere and Cordesman contend that Iraq's 20 Special Forces Brigades come under the Guards control. Cordes-man's figure for the size of the Guard is 240,000 with a further 80,000 support troops, to include the Iraqi Chemical Corps.?he best sources on Iraqi force structure are International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Militarv Balance 1989- - 90, (London: IISS, 1989) p. 101; Anthony

H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the West, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p. 82; Mark Heller, Dov Tamari and Zeev Eytan, The Middle East Military Balance, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University; Aharon Levran and Zeev Eytan, The Middle East: Militarv Balance, 1987- 88, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 4Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham

R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: u, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1990), p. 355; also Pelletiere, op. cit., p. 16. 'Reuters, "Iraq Pulls Elite Troops from Saudi Border, NBC News Says," 23 August 1990; also Michael Evans, op. cit. %lliam

0. Staudenmaier, "Iran-Iraq (1980- )," The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World - Vol 11, Robert Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, eds., (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 225. 7Helen Chapin, ed., Iraa: A Countrv w, DA Pam 550-31, HQ, Dept. of the Army, 1990; and Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI, p. 73. 'David Segal, in "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreian Affairs, Vol 66, #5, Summer 1988, pp. 956-957, claims that after 1984, the Iraqis abandoned their static defense in favor of "a more flexible defense." He claims that Iraq used setpiece battles where they regularly and deliberately allowed the Iranians into kill zones and then counterattacked with combined arms forces to cut up and annihilate the penetration. He also claims that the Iraqi Army "handily won nearly all the defensive battles of the past six years," p.

954. He does not state the sources of his information or site any specific instances. 'R. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on Chemical Arms," Washinaton Post, 10 August 1990; see also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-lraa War and Western Securitv. 1984-87, (New York: Jane's, 1987), pp. 19, 63-64, 97. '?he best account of this battle is in OBallance, The Gulf War, pp. 60-63; see also Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI, p. 70; Efraim Karsh, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Adelphi Paper #220, (London: IISS, 1987), p. 35: and Anthony R. Tucker, "Armored Warfare in the Gulf," Armed Forces, May 1988, p. 226. The tactics used in this battle sound similar to those mentioned in Segal's article (footnote 4), but they were the exception in the war, not the rule. "lbid. "These numbers are from O'Ballance, who was one of the journalists who viewed the aftermath of the battle. Staudenmaier, in "A Strategic Analysis," The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons. Old Conflicts, p. 40. claims that 300-400 tanks were involved, with the Iraqis losing 50 T- 62s, and the Iranians losing 100 Chieftains and M-60. These numbers were also used in Strateaic Survev 1980-81. p. 50. '%taudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," The Iran-lraa War: New Weapons. Old Conflicts, p. 40: Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI, p. 74. 14Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol II, p. 440. '?he War of the Cities was an ongoing contest between the Iraqis and Iranians to launch bomb and missile attacks against each other's major cities. It turned decisively in Iraq's favor in the spring of 1988 when modified Iraqi Scud-B missiles began to reach Tehran. Upwards of 150- 200 missiles were fired, devastating Iranian morale. "Bernard

E. Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive: Victory Goes Beyond Battlefield," New York Times, 20 April 1988; and IISS, The Military Balance 1989-1990, (London: IISS. 1989), p. 101. 17Karsh, op.cit., p. 44; Laffin, War Anp. 78; Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part 11," AFJI, p. 74; Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol 11, p. 356. Television footage of the Iraqi "withdrawal'l from Kuwait indicates the importance of these transporters. "The chronology of this battle is pieced together from four accounts: James Bruce, "Gulf Battle Lines Continue to Shift," Jane's Defence Weeklv (JDW), 30 April 1988, pp. 838-839; John Laffin, War Annual 3, (London: Brassey's, 1989), pp. 107-108; Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq Launches Offensive on Faw Peninsula," The Washinaton Post, 18 April 1988, pp. A17, A22; Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive: Victory Goes Beyond Battlefield," New York Times, and Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol 11, pp. 373-375. The best consolidated account of the spring offensives are in Pelletiere, op. cit., pp. 25-40. 'gYoussef M. Ibrahim. "Iraqi Troops Recapture Big Oil Field," New York Times, 26 June 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq Recaptures Strategic Marshes," Washinaton Post, 26 June 1988, pp. A22- 23; "Iraqi Paratroops' Key Role in Majnun Victory." JDW. 9 July 1988, p. 14; Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol II, pp. 388-389. %. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on Chemical Arms," Washinaton Post, 10 August 1990, pp. A25, 27. "Brian Duffy, et al., "The Guns of August," US. News and World Report, 20 August 1990, p. 24. This article claims that the infamous gas attack against Halabja in February 1988 killed only 200 unprotected civilians in a city with a population of 45,000. Casualty claims for this attack range as high as 4000. Aaron Danis formerly served as S2, 4-64 Armor and plans officer, G2, 24th Infantry Division (M). He is currently an intelligence analyst in Washington D. C. and an Army Reserve captain with the Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (AITAC). He is a graduate of Norwich University and will soon receive an M. A. degree from George Washington University. 78 ARMOR - November-December 7990