The Sword of Saddam, An Overview of The Iraqi Armed Forces

"lIier@ore I say: Kiiow your enemy arid know yourserf;. in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. Wien yoti are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself; your chances of winning or losing are eqtial. If ignorant both of your enemy arid of yotirself; you are certain in every battle to be in peril. ff Siiii Tni, 500 B. C. In the early morning hours of 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Army executed a successful coup de main over the country of Kuwait. Kuwait's defense forces consisted, on paper, of 20,300 men, 275 tanks, 190 armored cars, 330 armored personnel carriers, 86 self-propelled 155-mm howitzers, 70 combat aircraft, and 18 armed helicopters.2 Achieving strategic surprise, Iraqi forces launched a coordinated attack across the virtually unguarded Kuwaiti border, and Saddam Hussein's military machine rolled through Kuwait without serious opposition. The Kuwaiti Emir fled moments before Iraqi forces captured Kuwaiti City. By 3 August 1990, Iraq controlled the exitire country along with its portion of the world'soil reserves, and threatened Saudi Arabia. defend against further aggression bj Iraq. Only time will tell whether this conflict escalates into a shooting war for America or is miraculouslj settled by peaceful means. The bottom line remains that American soldiers and Marines may now be involved in a major land war in the deserts of the Middle East. It is im American forces deployed on 7 August 1990, and, as of this writing, are poised in Saudi Arabia to 7 3 r I perative that we understand our adversary and learn how he fights. 8 ARMOR - I Vovernber-December 7990

During defensive operations, the Iraqis proved inflexible in reinforcing and redeploying forces once their defensive lines were breached. To make up for this inflexibility, Iraqi units sought greater survivability. by digging in their armor whenever they stopped. This article, developed from entirely unclassified sources, provides a quick overview of the Iraqi military, how it is equipped and how it fights. The Iraqi Military Machine Iraq possesses the fourth largest army on earth. With a population of 16,278,000, she has fielded a military of more than 1 million men. Iraq generates this force through conscription, and it is the duty of every young male Iraqi to serve a term in the armed forces. Exceptions from military service are rare. The terms of service in the Iraqi military are 21-24 months, but these terms can be extended during times of war. The Iraqi Air Force has more than 500 combat aircraft, consisting mainly of modern Soviet fighters, tighter bombers, and bombers. The Iraqi Air Force is organized into 13 squadrons of fighter bombers, 16 squadrons of fighters, two squadrons of bombers, and two squadrons of air transport aircraft. The Iraqi Navy is primarily a coastal defense force. Its main bases are at Umm Qasr, at the mouth of the Persiail Gulf (Arabian Sea), and Basra, inland along thc Shatt el Arab outlet to the Gulf. The Army is the mainstay of Iraq's military power. Consisting of 955,000 active duty personnel, and possibly an additional 480,000 reservists, the Iraqi Army is clearly the largest military force in the Middle East. Even the Iranians boast an army of only 305,000. With this intimidating force at his disposal, Saddam Hussein wields immense prestige among his Arab neighbors. The Iraqi Army The Iraqi Army is an impressive force composed of many units that have been battle testcd in the long eight-year war with Iran. The Army is organized into scvcn corps hcad-quarters, with seven armored/mechanized divisions, 39 infantry divisions (including the Peoples Army militia), four Presidential Guard Force divisions (three armored, one infantry, and one commando battalion), and 20+ special forces brigades. The Iraqi Army in Action, Lessons of the Gulf War On 23 September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched five Iraqi divisions in a quick drivc into Iran to seize the oil-rich Khorramshar and Abadan regions. His intent appears to have been to conduct a limited war to grab the Iranian oil fields before Iran - weakened by revolutionary turmoil caused by the Ayatollah Khomeini's bloody rise to power - could react. The Iranians, however, rallied to the defense of their homeland and fought Hussein's forces to a standstill. Iraqi tactical mistakes and poor logistics were largely the cause ol the failure of Saddam's units to achieve a quick victory in

1980. The Iraqi armored tactics were rigid and inflexible, and the Iranians made good use of restrictive terrain and built-up areas to wreak havoc on Iraqi armored for- ARMOR - November-December 7990 mations. "Iraq consistcntly failed to concentrate its armor in the initial stages ol' the war and consistent1 lost advantages of time and space." The overly rigid command slyle of the Iraqi Army was a major factor in preventing the Iraqis from using their reserves effectively. During defensive operations, the Iraqis proved inflexible in reinforcing and redeploying forces once their dcfensive lines were breached. To make up for this inflexibility, Iraqi units sought greater survivability by dig- c cing in their armor whenever they stopped. "According to one report, this... has consistently led to Iraqi tanks digging in so wcll that thcy could not dig out, and thcir being outflanked and outmaneuvered by Iranian infantry."' The biggest failing of the Iraqi Army during the early stages of the Iran/Iraq War, however, was the inability to employ combined arms. Y By 1982, Iraqi forces had been driven back to their own territory, and it appeared that they would soon lose the war. Hussein immediately sought peace with Iran but was rebuffed by the Ayatollah, who demanded Hussein's removal Iraqi Forces Branch Personnel Air Defense Artillery 10,000 Air Force 40,000 Navy 5,000 Army Active 955,000 Reserves 480.000 1,490,000 Total Note: In addition to these regular forces, Iraq has a Peoples Army (paramilitary militia) of 650,000 men and 4,800 Frontier Guard Security Troops. Figure 1 9

Iraqi Military Inventory Combat Aircraft Mig 23 Mig 21 Mirage F-lECX Mig 25 su-7 Tu-22 bombers SU-25 Tu-16 bombers Armor T7p (500) Chieftain MK 3/5/ M-6O/M-47 (1 50) T54/55/62 (4,500) M-77 (60) T59/69 ii (1,500) PT 76 (1 00) Meahanized Infantry

EE-32 Jararacas

M113 MOWAG Roland Panhard M-3 EE-9 Cascavels ATGMs AT4 Sagger (Soviet) SS-11 Milan (possibly) AT4 Spigot French HOT (possibly) Artillery* s8lf-plopelled 2S1 122-mm (Soviet) 253 152-mm (Soviet) 155-mm Howitzer (US) 130-mm M46 TOWd 122-mm D-74, D-30, M-1938 Mortars 120- and 160-mm MBRLs BM-21** 'The attlil.ry conslai of mom than 5,500 piece& moatly towed soviamade artillery. **The Iraqis el80 h a n 'in excess ot xx) multi-banel rocket launchers including awemi baterim of the tero ci0t.n Wet 122.mrn. 40banel BM-21, cfipable of clearing a map grid par battery volley...'4 Ses sidebar story on page 12. Air Defense Weapons* B m r n ZSU 234 SP zsu-57-2 SP 37-mm M1939, twin 57-mm various 85, lo&, and 130-mm guns

Roland (60) Additional Frog-7 (30) Modified Scud B (capable of launching either conventional or chemical warheads) Surface-to-Air (SAMs) SA-2 (120) *Iraqi air d.hm system am prlmarity Sudd manufsctum COndMng of somb 4,000 alr w e a p o n s. Helicopters* Mi-24 Hind w/AT-2 Swatter missile (40) SA342 Gazelle, some with French HOT missile (50) SA321 Super Frelon, some with Exocet air-to-ship missile (10) SA-316B w/AS12 air-to-ship missile (30) 80-105 w/AS11 ATGM (56) Huahes (861 - 53O-F 126). 50C)-D (30), the employmant of hdkoptws and is rsported tc via and European manufacture. Mi4 (20) Mi8 (100) SA330 Puma (10) Frigates (4) Patrol/Coastal Combatants (38) *W ot these cmfl am sovia ddgned and Iim saA.1 styx shlpto-. Mp miadla. Figure 2 as a condition to any peace agreement. Unwilling to let Hussein get away with his aggression against Iran, the Ayatollah ordered Iranian forces to invade Iraq. Six bloody years of seesaw attrition resulted. Iraq was propped up with a huge influx of military supplies and weapons from the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and several Arab states. The war now began to resemble the trench warfare of the First World War, waged with World War 111-type weapons. In 1985, the Iraqi High Command began to use more flexible and mobile tactics. It was learning how to fight a modem war. At this time, Iraq began using chemical weapons, mainly mustard gas and nerve agents, against the Iranians. These weapons were usually delivered by aircraft and proved very effective against the largely unprepared Iranian forces. The Iranians were unable to strike back effectively with chemical weapons of their own. Unable to protect its Revolutionary Guards from chemical agents, the Iranians took tremendous casualties trying to break the Iraqi defenses. By 1987, the new tactics used by the Iraqi Army began to turn the tide. The Iranian drive into Iraq culminated during the vicious battle for Basra, Iraq's second largest city. Iran prepared for the offensive for over a year, threw every available resource into the fight, and failed against a staunch Iraqi defense. Iran's army bled to death in front of the defenses of Basra, losing an estimated 50,000 men killed or wounded in two months of fighting. Iran had lost the initiative to Iraq. Seizing the initiative, Saddam's High Command employed elite - 70 ARMOR - November-December 7990 units of Presidental Guards to spearhead several offensive operations to drive the Iranians out of Iraq. Iranian will was flagging, and the Iranians were desperately short of supplies and equipment. "For the first time in seven years, the Iranians did not mount a winter offensive in 1987-88. They were unoffensive operations during the Gulf war. The operational mobility of the Iraqi Army beyond 1 150 kilometers, therefore, has not been proved. This is a vulnerability that an adversary can exploit with air superiority. The Iraqi soldier is a An Iraqi APC lost during a 1985 offensive in the Iran-Iraq War. tough and resilient foe prepared for the Iraqi assault of April 1988 to retake the Faw Peninsula. This offensive marked anew Iraqi policy - a change from static defense to hard-hitting ffense." Five big Iraqi offensives in 1988 frnally brought the Iranian Army to its knees and forced the Ayatollah Khomeini to bitterly accept the United Nations ceasefire terms. With little armor and practically no air force left, Iran was no longer capable of serious military action. The end result made Saddam Hussein the prominent power in the Persian Gulf, with anew, battle-tested, modern equipped military almost five times the size of his 1980 force. The Iraqi Army of 1990 Before the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Iraqi Army was organized as follows: The First Corps (on the Kurdish or northern front), the Fifth Corps (south of First Corps, assigned to the northern front), the Second Corps (assigned to the north central front), the Fourth Corps (central and south-central front, covering Baghdad, 70 miles from the border), the Third Corps (southern central and southern fronts), and the Seventh Corps (southern front, or Basra to the Gulf). An Iraqi corps usually consists of four divisions, with each division consisting of approximately 10,000 men. An Iraqi corps, therefore, normally consists of between 40,OOO and 45,000 troops? The Presidential Guard units play a vital role in the tactical employment of the Iraqi Army. The Presidential Guard is an elite "mini-corps, with 30,000 men, commanded by General Hussein Rashid."' Consisting of 16 brigades of the most politically reliable troops, equipped with the best and latest weapons, the units of the Presidential Guard forces will act as the shock troops of any major Iraqi operation. An analysis of the Gulf war points to a demonstrated inability to integrate close air support and to integrate artillery fires with maneuver. This trend shows the greatest weakness of the Iraqi Army: employing combined arms tactics. The Iraqi army also demonstrated the lack of a solid combat service support organization to maintain the tempo of who is equipped with modem weapons and capable vehicles. The average Iraqi unit, according to observations during the Gulf war, is capable of an awessive and dogged defense, while the more elite units will be reserved for counterattacks and offensive operations. The Iraqi command system, tested in the Gulf war with Iran, has improved over the years, and has proved capable of directing mobile operations against Kuwait. The Iraqi Army has expanded rapidly in a short time. The state of training of the average Iraqi unit is still a question for debate. The Iraqis' most recent enemies, the Iranians and the Kurdish rebels, were predominantly foot-mobile and generally outclassed by Iraq's modern armored forces. The Kuwaitis, surprised and overwhelmed in hours, did not even slow the Iraqi columns down. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated a ruthless ability to apply military force. The Iraqi military has proved its skill against its neighbors in the Persian Gulf. Iran and Kuwait both underestimated Iraq's capability to wage modern war. It ARMOR - 11 would be foolish for the United States to underestimate Iraq's military potential. The Iraqis, no matter how good they look on paper, have critical tactical vulnerabilities that can be exploited. How well the Iraqis will hold up against a modern combined arms force, equipped with close air support, remains to be seen. As Sun Tzu said, over 2,500 years ago: "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."" It is vital to understand the sword of Saddam, in order to take advantage of Sun Tzu's wise advice. Notes 'Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith. New York (Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 84. 'The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militarv Balance 1988-1989, Director Francois Heisbourg. Great Britain. (The Eastern Press Ltd., 1988), p. 101. All figures on Iraqi military strengths were derived from this source. 3Brian Duffy et al., "The World's Mos Dangerous Man, U. S. News and Worli Revort, June 4,1990, p. 38. 4Mark Uoyd, Modem Combat Gear, Hong Kong: (Longmeadow Press, 1988), p. 181. 12 5Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two, Tactics, Technology, and Training," Armed Forces Journal International, (June 1982), p. 73. 'lbid., p. 74. 'John Laffin, The World in Conflict,

1990. War Annual 4, London: (Brassey's UK Ltd., 1990), p. 99. 'Richard Jupa and Jim Dingeman, "How Iran Lostllraq Won the Gulf War," Strategy and Tactics, Cambira, Calif., (Number 133, March-April 1990), p. 51. 'lbid., p. 51. "Sun Tzu, p. 77. Major John F. Anta1 was commissioned in Armor in 1977 from the United States Military Academy. He has served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, battalion motor officer, tank company commander, assistant brigade operations officer, battalion S3, G3 training officer, and as the SGS for the 1st Cavalry Division. A 1990 graduate of the Command and General Staff College, he is currently the S3 trainer for the Brigade Training Team

Operations -Group, NTC. Iraq's Modern Artillery Assets - In assessing Iraq's military capabilities, a lot of attention has centered on Saddam Hussein's very large tank force and his past willingness to employ chemical weapons. But Iraq's interest in acquiring modern artillery systems also poses a threat to forces deployed in the Mideast. Attention was focused on this interest recently when authorities in Britain and Italy discovered that Iraq had contracted for the manufacture of the components for a "supergun" in their countries and attempted to import them. The project was apparently based on the theories of Dr. Gerald Bull, a Canadian-born ballistics expert who was mysteriously assassinated in Belgium last March. Among Dr. Bull's more conventional projects were improved heavy artillery systems. After South African weapons imports were embargoed, he helped advise that nation on the design of the G5 towed and G6 wheeled 155mm systems. His concepts were also used in several very modern 155-mm guns developed in Austria, China, and Belgium, where his firm was based. According to Jane's Armor and Artil- a all of these systems greatly outrange the US.-standard M109 family, which is now about 30 years old. The maximum range of the Austrian GH N-

45. the Chinese WAC-21, and the South African G5/G6 is 30-39+ km depending on whether standard or enhanced range rounds are fired. This compares with the 18-24 km range of the M109 and 17-24 km range of the Soviet standard 152-mm gun. Jane's notes that the G-5 is "in service with Iraq" and that Austrian GH N- 45s were shipped to Jordan and re-shipped to Iraq. The Austrian arms deal also led to a scandal in Austria, according to a recent story in International Defense Review, Brazil, which supplied billions of dollars worth of armaments to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, is also licensed to produce the 155-mm design. The Italian military magazine, Italiana Difesa, noted that a G6-type system and a larger 210-mm wheeled, self-propelled system, called the "Al Faw," were on display at the Baghdad arms exposition in April 1989. -ARMOR Staff ARMOR -