Kentucky Windage

Kentucky Windage by Colonel Michael A. Andrews The U.S. Army War College includes a block of instruction titled "Leadership of the Army and Management of Army Systems." It is nicknamed, "How the Army Runs." The course focuses on the Army Force Integration model. Instruction and practical exercises increase student understanding of the model's systems: 0 Determine future Army require- 0Conduct research and develop 0 Conduct force development 0 Provide resources 0 Acquire, train, and distribute ments ment personnel. The course also enhances understanding of the specific documents and procedures used within the systems, such as the Basis of Issue Plan, Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information, the Structure and Composition System, and others. It is a somewhat humbling experience for some students, reinforcing the fact that the military profession has become an extraordinarily complex business. One of the final classes in this course is titled "A Systems Fix." Students identify a flaw in a system and recommend a corrective action. This is a well-intentioned exercise, with the objective of soliciting ideas and encouraging analysis. It is also a humbling experience. Many students who were critical of the institutionalized procedures during previous instruction find that the opportunity to recommend "a fUr is surprisingly difficult and frustrating. The systems are interdependent. A change in one procedure may cause an unanticipated reaction elsewhere. But the student recommendations are generally good. A frequently discussed problem deals with the Automated Data Processing (ADP) systems that have evolved in a stovepipe manner through the years. Systems seem to have developed their own ADP to deal with their unique requirements. But sometimes, their ADP systems cannot "talk with each other. The result is that they are not very interactive, and therefore do not always respond well to change. A change in one system is not quickly brought to the attention of supporting systems. The process of acquiring, training, and distributing a soldier, for example, may be in progress for a position that has changed since the process began. A round peg may be enroute to a square hole. The result is an incompatible "space" and "face." Students discuss possible solutions to this problem, such as a mega-system, an interactive mechanism for existing systems, or other approaches. In a similar manner, officers in the course discuss and recommend internal improvements within the subsystems. The most frequenl general criticism, however, seems to be that the materiel acquisition process is too long, too slow, and too cumbersome. Once an equipment problem is identified, it becomes obvious that users, program managers, combat developers, contractors, Congress, and Department of Defense agencies all have their own perspectives. Checks and balances lengthen the process. There is sometimes a perception that inappropriate or inadequate equipment may continue to be justified because of sunk costs and time. There is sometimes a perception that the process takes so long, and that so many requirements change, that the final product may no longer be needed. The conclusion is that, somehow, we must shorten the process. When I was a boy, my grandfather took me hunting on his farm one Thanksgiving morning. He explained the fundamentals of basic rifle marksmanship that day, and mentioned during the discussion that one must lead a moving target. He described the concept of "Kentucky windage" in terms of time and speed. By the time the bullet reaches the target, the target will be in a different place, so aim ahead of the target, in the direction it is moving and in accordance with its speed. The aiming point should not be where the target is now, but where it will be by the time the bullet gets there. Yes, the materiel acquisition process IS too long, and internal im- 46 ARMOR - November-December 7989 provements undoubtedly CAN be made, but the magnitude of current proposals for change is much too small. Given the phenomenal rate of change and increased knowledge, we are simply failing to apply sufficient Kentucky windage. Our materiel acquisition process takes longer than the time for technology to make the new product obsolete. The final product is therefore sometimes ill-advised - a result of the requirement or threat being poorly defined at the outset. The "fur" is not simply to shorten the process. Perhaps that is needed, but it is not enough. To limit our focus to that fur is like hoping the target will slow down or not move until we can shoot it. The real problem is not the long process, but the original aiming point. We fail to aim far enough ahead. Our business is future war. The history of war is a series of countermeasures. Since the first Neolithic fighter found a bigger club, military equipment, organization, and doctrine developments have been of critical importance to all societies. Survival may depend upon who counters last. History is replete with examples of technological innovations changing the balance of power - the longbow, breech-loading musket, machine gun, gas, airplanes, radar, lasers, bigger guns, and thicker steel. There was usually resistance for a variety of psychological reasons, to include allegiance to the status quo or a Pollyanna-ish hope that there will not be another war. Today, the danger of defeat because of technological stagnation is greater than ever before, because of two conspicuous conditions. The first is the very nature of our time and world. Knowledge, information and discovery are geometrically increasing at unprecedented rates. Simply keeping abreast of "what is" - the state of the art - is a difficult task. Discerning what will be, or could be, seems almost incomprehensible, a whimsical, frivolous luxury best relegated to philosophers and visionaries who do not deal with what we have, as things are now. The successful man is the operator, today. He is valuable to this watch. But the entire Force Intcgration System is predicated upon how well we anticipate future requirements. The second condition that endangers us is our system itself - the way our government and the Department of Defense operate. It is a here-and-now system. Military equipment is complex and expensive. The procedures established to conduct research, develop, and provide resources are cumbersome and time-consuming. Egalitarian, parochial considerations and interests are involved. Productions that will soon be obsolete, or cost much more than were anticipated, are sometimes the result. The Army's Force Integration System has evolved over many years and is basically a sound, logical and effective sequence. Improvements could be made, of course, in its components. Computers could interface with one another more effectively - identifying changes, for example, in a more timely manner. But the most fundamental shortcoming is one of spirit, philosophy, and direction. We need to institute a change in focus at the very beginning of the entire process - Determine Future Army Requirements. The "fm" is to look farther into the future. Progress in all endeavors involves stabilizing the here-and-now and establishing future direction. We need to look well beyond present requirements, just as we do in our battle doctrine. The problem is analogous to the AirLand Battle's "deep attack." Despite a desperate situation at the Forward Line of Troops, (FLOT), we should use precious resources to look beyond the immediate requirement and see deep, then disrupt the enemy second echelon. That ultimately is in our best long-term interests. It will eventually reduce FLOT pressure and provide counterattack opportunities. In a similar way, we need to be more visionary in our approach to determine future Army requirements. We need to accept more risk NOW for greater gain later. We need to commit a formidable force behind the enemy first echelon. The real enemy is time itself. The first step in this effort must be to emphasize that the lessons of history clearly demonstrate there will indeed be another war. Preparation for it requires operating on the foremost threshold of change, for the stakes are very high and the target is moving. We must accept the historical premise that superior weapons favor victory. We are in a hardware business. New technology usually drives doctrine and organization. There are many examples of inappropriate responses to new weapons. We must reverse this trend. Future doctrine and organization should fvst determine what equipment we will need. We need a major effort, to conceptualize and develop high-technology weapons for long-range goals, Our doctrine should be more revolutionary, not ~ ~~ ARMOR - November-December 7989 47 evolutionary - dependent upon each year's equipment appropriation debates. We need to anticipate and emphasize future equipment needs and possibilities even if they exceed our current state of the art. Although the military has served as a laboratory for science and industry, the focus has been wrong. It has too frequently been, "Here is a better widget. Determine how to use it;" or, "Make a widget to counter this current threat, right now." We need to envision future war and what we will need then. The next war is almost unimaginable. Even the intensity of today's weapons systems in an all-out war make the devastation and complexity of command and control procedures taxing to the most imaginative and competent professional soldier. Unprecedented technical expertise and emotional stability will be required. The physiological and psychological impact is beyond our understanding. Already we speak of "smart bombs," laser guns, energy beams, neutron bombs, electromagnetic fields, satellites, hovering command modules, biocybernetics, and extraordinarily maneuverable vehicles; of reaction times in minutes, and total resolution in hours. Yet we proceed in a direction that is already too little, too late, investing tremendous amounts of money, time, and effort into today's technology to counter yesterday's threat. We then seem to justify sunk costs and production time looking for ways to employ obsolete equipment, stagnating our most important product - our minds. Our antiarmor efforts are an example - they are as archaic as medieval jousting. We continue to improve steel and ways of physically punching a hole through it using simple chemical or kinetic energy. That is as primitive as it was in the Middle Ages. Surely there is a different, better way, another dmen-sion, another kind of energy, perhaps one that does not physically bore a hole through the steel at all, but passes through it. Reportedly, the Soviets have invested considerable effort examining military applications of parapsychology - telepathy, extra-sensory perception, telekinesis, and clairvoyance - to include inducing illness and conducting long-range reconnaissance via some type of "out of body" experience. Although that direction may seem eccentric, remember that the concept of a tank was also discarded as impractical and unattainable not very long ago. There is undoubtedly a better way of incapacitating a lank. Today's eight-dollar hand calculator cost $100 ten years ago and was 10 times as big. Some discriminating consumers did not buy the home computer their children wanted last Christmas because they believed it would soon be obsolete, replaced by one that is better, smaller and cheaper. They will get more for their money with the next generation of equipment. Current Life Cycle System Management Model and Force Integration procedures take longer than the time required for a better way could be discovered. That is the problem. The process probably can not be shortened enough to compensate for that. Better foresight and vision could produce cheaper and more effective products. I Initially, the frx should be one of philosophy. While being wary of the capricious innovator, we need to regard the conservative bureaucracy that we have become as ominously ironic. The military profession, above all others, should be adaptive and flexible. We need to identify, utilize, and reward futurists, and incorporate their ideas into every dimension of our profession, transforming vision into substantive application. Thinkers are ultimately more valuable than operators. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a good example. We disengaged from escalating more and improved weapons of the same type and stopped depending upon a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction for deterrence. A different strategy, using new technology, could drastically change the entire concept, making present assumptions and in-process equipment developments obsolete. Unquestionably, the experimentation will also discover other techniques not yet even conceived. Another example is development of the light infantry division. Lighter forces are better than heavy forces. Future forces need to be flexible and mobile. Power is not power if it can not be projected. But the most glaring deficiency in our current organization is the absence of a light antitank weapon. Critics use this to question the utility of light forces. The real problem is to make light forces more formidable and sustainable. We should develop a handheld antitank weapon. We should not permit today's limitations to be the cause of ignoring tomorrow's obvious requirement. The aiming point should be the future requirement, not current capability. We need to transcend our current em- 48 ARMOR - November-December 1989

"Although much can be gained from reviewing the principles, leadership techniques, and decision-making processes used at Gettysburg, that baffle will bear little resemblance to the intensify, complexity, speed, and horror of the ned war. We need to prepare for future war." phasis on chemical and kinetic energy physics - biger bullets and thicker steel - and think more in terms of beams, rays, waves, and electromagnetic shields. We need to develop an antiarmor technique that does not require boring a hole through steel like a medieval jouster. Emphasize high technology. We have an advantage over our potential enemies in this area. We should exploit it. We can determine direction and philosophy without precise specifications for every piece of equipment. Our present material acquisition system does not respond in a timely manner. We therefore need to anticipate better. We need to look beyond this generation of equipment. We need to transcend incremental evolution. We must encourage &@native, innovative thinking that challenges the way things are. We must encourage a search for, and an appreciation of, the way things might be, or ought to he. We are really a people business, of course. We tell lieutenants that the human dimension of war has not changed, and we spend considerable time attempting to learn lessons from past battles. Although we can gain from reviewing the principles, leadership techniques, and decision-making processes used at Gettysburg, that battle will bear little resemblance to the intensity, complexity, speed, and horror of the next war. We need to prepare for future war. Some well-selected science fiction should be added to the predictable history books in Officer Professional Development programs. How will it be? What do we need to get the job done? The astronomical rate of technological change may never again give us the luxury of responding after we find out. We need thinkers well versed id the lessons of history, the nature of man, and science. We need to attack deep in all our endeavors. As General MacArthur once said, "The next war will be won in the future, not in the past." Colonel Michael A. Andrews, a 1967 graduate of West Point, currently serves as secretary to the combined staff, HQ, ROWUS Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea. He was a platoon leader and company Commander with the 25th ID in Vietnam; S3, assistant 63, and troop commander in cavalry and mech infantry units in the FRG; XO of 1-66 Armor, Fort Hood; commander, 2- 66 Armor, and brigade S3. He served as an instructor at West Point; as senior training evaluation officer for TRADOC CATA, Fort Hood; force develop ment officer at USASSC, Alexandria, Va.; and at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in Washington; and staff officer at USA ELM, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also served as assistant division commander of the 2d AD (FWD), in Garlstedt, FRG. Recog nit ion Quiz Answers

1. BTR-70. The BTR-70 is simflar to the BTR-GOPB but has a gap between its front and rear set of road wheels. It also has no rails on the sides.

2. T-72M1. The T-72M1 has a thicker upper glacis with three, rather than four, transverse ribs in front of the driver's hatch; increased frontal turret armor; and applique armor on the turret roof. 3. Bradley M3A2. Reactive armor blocks on the hull sides and front slope distinguish this model from the original M3. Note improved armor between final drives. This model also has an upgraded power train and interior spall liners for improved crew protection.

4. T-80. The T-80 has a new type of rubber-tired road wheel. These are larger than the T- 643, but slightly smaller than the T-72's. The road wheels are mounted in noticeable pairs.

5. GepardKA-1. Based on the Leopard 1 chassis, the Gepard hnrin 35-mm self-propelled antiaircraft gun is in service in German, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The peculiar shape of the gun barrels and flash suppressors on the Oerlikon side-mounted guns are distinctive.

6. M60 AMB. Based on the M60 chassis, the AVLB - capable of crossing 18+-meter obstacles - is distinguished by the wedge-shaped aluminum bridge sections and the T- shaped launcher assembly at the hull front. ARMOR - November-December 7989 49

I 1 I I All 12 tank platoons from 4-34 Armor, based In Mainz Gonsenheim,

FRG,

earned "distinguished" ratings in their first Level i gunnery on Tank Table Xii, Range 301, Grafenwohr, To eam this rating, each tank platoon had to hit at least 38 of 42 moving or stationary targets at ranges between 1200 and 2400 meters. Scoring criteria required platoons to engage targets at the greatest distance, and to call for indirect fire if targets were beyond 2800 meters. The unit had to overcome very limited home station training facilities - a -by- 200-meter training area, UCOFT, and mini tank range. Prior to firing, the battalion evaluated each platoon with an ARTEP stressing fire distribution in the defense, conducted force-on-force MILES exercises, and tested each platoon in a Fire Coordination Exercise (FCX) on the mini tank range, using the Brewster device on their 120-mm guns. One commander improvised miniature thermal targets by taping small heaters - a paper clip across the terminals of a 4 volt battery - to the rear of the targets on the mini range. The battalion also qualified 58 tank crews on TT Vlll with 80 percent target hits on the first round. Eighteen crews shot "distinguished." Engineers Work On Fix For M1 Sighting Glitch The Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory is trying to improve the Ml's ability to track and hit evasive and moving targets by modifying the link between the gunner's primary sight and the azimuth turret drive. The problem has been under study since 1982. BRL's analysis revealed that the action of the servos controlling the sight and the gun have slightly different response characteristics. in tracking a moving target, the system has to frequently update the target lead solution. Because the servo characteristics differ slightly, a momentary "phase lag" may ailow slight differences between the gun's point of aim and the gunner's sight. BRL's design modification, called "decoupling," reduces the mismatch between the two servos and improves the responsiveness of the turret drive. The change also shortens the amount of time the ballistic computer needs to compute lead, eliminating substantial delays, according to the BRL The MlAl program manager approved a proofof-principle test of the new concept last April, and testing was continuing this fall. Regimental Honorary Positions Army Regulation 600-82, 1 May 1986, explains the U.S. Amy Regimental System and provides Information on regimental honorary positions. The honorary positions of the regiment include the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment (HCOR), the Honorary Sergeant Major of the Regiment (HSGMOR), and Distinguished Members of the Regiment (DMOR). These positions are ceremonial and do not conflict with the chain-ofcommand. These soldiers must have had prior service in a unit of the regiment or in the chainofcommand above regiment. The tenure for HCOR and HSGMOR is a three-year renewable period. There can only be one HCOR and one HSGMOR at Silencer Developed for Bradley Cannon After residents living near the Wildflecken training area complained about noise from the 25-mm cannons on Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the Army is developing a silencer. The 13.5-pound device, developed at the US. Army Laboratory Command's Aberdeen Proving Ground, reduces noise from the Bradley's gun by 12-19 decibels, according to the command, and allows firing on the move. I! is made of stainless steel. ~~

CUTAWAY VIEW OF BRADLEY SILENCER

50 ~~ ~~ ARMOR - November-December 7989

M5 Tank with Cuiin Device Fort Knox Building Named For Ingenious Jersey Guardsman Fort Knox Building 9244, the Ground Mobility Division's instructional facility, has been named in honor of SGT Curtis G. Culin ill, who invented a field expedient attachment for tanks that permitted greater mobility in the Normandy campaign of 1944. Moving inland after the Normandy landing, tanks were unable to move from fieid to field because of thick hedge fences, called bocaae. Tanks were unable to bull their way through these hedges, and were vulnerable when they remained on the roads. SGT Cuiin, a mechanic in the 102d Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron ('Essex Troop," NJNG) used scrap steel girders and a cutting torch to fashion a four-pronged row of "teeth" on a girder frame. (According to some accounts, Culin used girders salvaged from the German beach defenses to make the Rrst versions.) These devices were attached to the lower front of the hull of a tank. When the tank approached a hedgerow, the teeth embedded in the hedge roots, giving the tank leverage to uproot them, push them aside, and pass through to the next field. The devices were called "Rhinos," and later "Culin Devices." Culin died in 1963. The Fort Knox building was, renamed in a ceremony in late September. Considering SGT Cufin's crucial contribution to getting Allied tanks moving,

LTC

Robert C. Mitchell, chief of the Ground Mobility Division, thought it fitting that the building would bear Culin's name. "There has never been a more appropriate soldier for this building to be dedicated to," LTC Mitchell said. a time and they must be retired. The HCOR must be in the rank of colonel or above. The HSGMOR must be In the rank of SFC or above. The tenure for'the DMOR is Indefinite. There is no limit on the number of DMORs. They can be retired or active duty members and can be officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians (non-retirees). By appointing MOR, units are able to reward and rewg-nize service of those who have contributed to the greatness of the Regiment both past and present. The honorary members of the Rsgiment give units a link to the past. All three positions can assist in building Regimental esprit de corps, tradition, and morale. They help foster pride and unity and keep the great history of their Regiment alive. The activities of the HCOR, HSGMOR, and DMOR are outlined in AR 60082. Some of those activities Include attending command ceremonies, speaking on Regimental history, and assisting in historical professional development. Learning about the history of your Regiment helps build unit cohesion and a sense of teamwork - past, present, and future. it is important for today's soldiers to know and understand the Regiment's history and honors. With this knowledge comes a greater appreciation of the Regiment and a basis for how Armor tactics, doctrine. and equipment have evolved. Learning about the proud and glorious history of our Armor and Cavalry Regiments can best be accomplished by having an active Regimental program and allowing our honorary members to actively participate in unit programs and functions. Learning from the past can improve all soldiers' professionalism and commitment. Information and assistance on how to appoint an HCOR, HSGMOR, and DMOR can be found in AR 600-82, or by contacting CPT Lucier or SFC Hartzeil in the Office Chief of Armor, ATTN: ATZK-AR, Fort Knox, KY 401 21 -51 87, AV 464-51 55/31 88. Strix "Smart" Mortar Projectile May Join Swedes in 1991 Sweden's M Corporation is completing development of the Strix 120-mm guided mortar projectile (see "The Mortar Versus Armor," Page 11, this issue. -Ed.) Test firings from a l a m mortar tube took place last year and deliveries to the Swedish Army are expected to begin in 1991, according to Jane's Defence Weekly. Trials demonstrated that the HEAT warhead will penetrate explosive reactive armor and 50 mm of steel armor and still have good behind-armor effect. Battle Data Disc Is Available Free A computer data file on 257 battles between 1937 and 1982, abstracted from the data base of historian COL Trevor N. Dupuy, is available free to government agencies. For each baffle, there are statib tics in 45 categories, such a8 number of casualties, tank losses, weapon counts, tactics, and geography. The 5-114-inch floppy disc can be read by using the Lotus 1- 2-3 spreadsheet software.. Send reguests to Robert McQuie, US. Anny Concepts Analysis Agency, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, Md.. 20814. ARMOR - November-December 7989 51

Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, by Major Mark Adkin. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 392 pp., $24.95 (hardbound). "Perhaps the most serious handicap, aside from the conspicuous lack of good intelligence on all aspects of the operation, was that nobody had a map. To plan a military operation without a map is a sure way of ensuring participants are confused and unclear about their objectives." - Uraent Furv, p. 133 There are a lot of goad reasons why American military officers and NCOs ought to read Uraent Furv, and the fact that it is such a wonderfully well-written book Is only the most obvious. Major Mark Adkin, a retired British infantry officer who worked on the planning and execution of the operation, has put together an exciting account, packed with detail, sharp characterizations, and shrewd analysis. Not to overstate the case, this is Tom Clancy without the fiction. Adkin, an outsider, also offers refreshingly objective opinions on an invasion which has assumed a very symbolic importance in recent American political history. Many Americans, not the least President Reagan, saw Grenada as a turnaround in the nation's military progress, a chance to "stand tall" again in the aftermath of the Vietnam defeat. For the first time, a Communist regime was uprooted and democracy restored. In this flush of jingoism, truth, alas, was again the first casualty. The uncomfortable details of a horribly botched adventure were glossed over and buried in history's back pages, no match for the story on the front pages, with their photos of American medical students kissing the ground in thanks for their rescue. Adkin is no apologist for the loony regime that had taken over this most peaceful of islands. And he doesn't downgrade the possibility that, given more time, the Cubans and the Russians might have posed a real strategic threat to the Eastern Caribbean, a crucial U.S. trade route. What he's concerned about is the performance of the elite American military units that invaded the island and the tremendous friction and confusion they experienced once the operation began. If Adkin's facts are even half right, not a hell of a lot went as planned. 01 course, no one expects a miliary operation to follow a plan once bullets start flying, especially one put together this hastily, but the degree to which this pian stumbled along far exceeded random chance. Grenada was a massive intelligence failure at many levels, Adkin argues. And people died unnecessarily because of it. Applying the METT-T yardstick Mission - The invasion force was to safeguard the medical students believed to be at one location. Less than half were actually there. If the Grenadian goons had decided to take the other 400 hostage - and ciearly they had no plans to do so - we might have faced a far more serious situation. We were lucky. Enemy - How many Cubans were on the island? Would they fight? Would the huge Grenadian militia take up arms? How many were there? What kinds of weapons did they have? There were no answers at H-hour. We were lucky. Terrain - Long before the invasion, Grenada was a concern. But when Urgent Fury was planned, the most recent aerial reconnaissance phofos of the island were six months old. There were no CIA agents on the island. Despite the fact that thousands of tourists visit the island each year, there were no maps available. The Navy based its planning on a 1936 British naval chart. We were lucky. Time - The original plan called for a predawn attack and the securing of the island in about two days. The Rangers were delayed, lost the element of surprise, and landed at Salinas at daybreak, the drops spaced Over an hour and a half. The Cubans who controlled the high ground near the runway were ordered not to shoot unless fired upon. We were lucky. Troops - Adkin argues that a major US. problem was the seeming need to get as many elite formations as possible involved in the action: "None of them could afford to miss out," he says. "Inevitably, this led to a task force composed of units and staffs that did not know each other, had never trained together, often did not properly understand each other's procedures, and were forced to plan in isolation and ignorance of what others were doing." Although the author does not make a point of it, readers with a heavy force background, and a bias against "fighting light," wiii note how the presence of even light armor in inexperienced hands could threaten or emn stymie elite light units. One BTR-60, 20 militiamen, and an 82- mm mortar team dislodged a SEAL unit from a radio transmitter building and forced them to hide for the remainder of the day and swim back to a destroyer after dusk. Three BTRs and 24 troops were part of a counterattack on the Rangers: they caused some tense moments before the Rangers dispatched them with light AT weapons, but the fact that the counterattack force arrived too late and the BTR drivers tended to bump into each other helped. The Rangers were lucky. Unlike many books on military operations that focus on the tactics and strategy of the battle itself, this one sets the stage brilliantly. In roughly the first third of the book, Adkin explains the politics of Grenada, the coming of the Bishop regime, the militarization of the island, the murder of Bishop, and the Reagan administration's increasing concern about "another Cuba." Most of these events were public and easily accessible in regional newspapers or by talking to people in the Caribbean. Access to the island was not difficult, and given the level of U.S. concern, it is appalling that 60 lit-tie was known of the situation before the military planning started. If revolutionary Grenada really threatened this nation's interests, one would think we would have 52 ~ ~~ ARMOR - November-December 7989

-

BOOKS

followed these events more closely, but despite the massive national intelligence budget, apparently we didn't. And in the flush of victory, apparently no one asked why.

JON CLEMENS

Armor Staff The Bridge at Dong Ha, by John Grider Miller. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1989. 186 pages. $16.95. At a time when Hollywood is using Vietnam to portray the American fighting man as either a sadist or a dilettante, it is refreshing to once again read about courage, loyalty, and duty under fire. John Miller's new book, The Bridge at Dong Ha, is such a story. The book tells the true story of U.S. Marine Captain John Ripley's efforts to blow up the Dong Ha bridge in advance of a major North Vietnamese Army attack in 1972. The author Is a retired Marine colonel who also fought in Vietnam through two tours. He is currently the managing editor of the U.S. Naval Institute's magazine, Proceedings, and has authored one other book on naval history. Since American servicemen who fought in Vietnam provided more examples of heroism and steadfastness than we will ever know, Mr. Miller has taken one such incident and brought it to life 17 years later. The book is well-written, smooth, and fast-flowing. The action moves rapidly, creating vivid images of combat, fear, courage, uncertainty, and surprise. The book reads quickly; you will finish it in one sitting. And when done, the reader will be thankful we have such men as Captain Ripley. Captain Ripley was the US. Marine advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps' Thlrd Battalion at the outbreak of the NVAs Easter offensive in 1972. Ordered to Dong Ha to blow up the bridge over the Cua Viet River, Captain Ripley and the South Vietnamese Marines faced an NVA division and 200 enemy tanks bearing down on the bridge from the north. While the book focuses on Captain Ripley, he was not alone in this battle. There was a US. Army major named Smock who was with Ripley throughout the ordeal; Major Binh, who was the battalion commander of the South Vietnamese Marines; the loyal radioman, Nha; and of course, Three Finger Jack. Thls Is a story of guts and the warrior spirit, of a unit esprit which would not waver, even with only 52 survivors out of a 700-man Marine battalion after the battle was over. 01 Incredible tank gunnery by ARVN crews in M48A3s, six hits with six shots at maximum ranges at moving T-55's! Of unbelievable indecision and hesitation by the NVA tanks and infantry in failing to take the bridge intact when they had over three hours of opportunity to do so. Of the loyalty and comradeship which only fighting men can know. Captain Ripley won the Navy Cross for his heroism. You will wonder why it was not the Medal of Honor. No further mention is made of Major Smock, who is certainly deserving of equal recognition. Captain Ripley is now a colonel, commanding the 2d Marine Regiment, a hero among us when we have so few today. This book should be read by everyone who searches for the warrior spirit.

WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL

LTC, US. Marine Corps Fort Knox, Kentucky The Raiders: The World's Elite Strike Forces, by Richard Garrett. New York: Sterling Publishing, 1980. 270 pages. Unlike most books about elite forces, this work does an excellent job of tracing the use of raiders in military history in twelve concise and well-written chapters, each covering a specific organization and military action. Not limiting himself to ground elite forces, Garrett shows how in nearly all successful raids there has been a necessary coordination of ground and sea operations in eaily military actions, and later, a required synergy of air, ground, and naval forces as a prerequisite for success. The books covers both the well-known and the not-so-well-known special operations forces and their actions. For example, the reader expects to see (and does) a discussion of the Israelis' raid on Entebbe Airport and the US. attempt to rescue POWs from Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam. However, Garrett also treats us to excellent narratives and informative discussion of not-so-well-known raids, such as the British operation against the Belgian port of Zeebrugge in 1918, and the Confederate raid by Mosby to "snatch" Union Brigadier General E. H. Stoughton (responsible for the defense of Washington, D.C.). For the reader interested in special operations and their relationship to both national strategy and operational art, The Raiders is an excellent book. Garrett knows his subject and puts It across in readable and enjoyable prose.

LTC G. PATRICK RITTER

Erlangen, FRG What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam? by Bill McCioud. The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1989. 155 pages. $17.95. This is a good question, but Bill McCloud, a teacher and Nam vet, found out there is no definite answer. At his school in Oklahoma, he surveyed junior high students and teachers and found that the students knew little to nothing about the war and unrest in the States during the '60s and O OS, and that the teachers felt there was a need to teach more about Vietnam. Bill McCloud wrote to the people who directed, fought, protested, and reported on the war: politicians, POWs, nurses, military officers, protesters, soldiers, refugees, scholars, writers, and parents of soldiers who died. He asked the question, "What do you think are the most important things for today's junior high school students to understand about the Vietnam War?" The responses poured in. From all these responses, Bill McCloud selected 128 letters for his book. Some of the people whose letters appear in the book are President Bush, former President Jimmy Carter, General Alexander Haig, General William Westmoreland, Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Irene Faught (whose son was killed in Vietnam), Pete Seeger, Country Joe McDonald, and MG George S. Patton, to name a few. While I was reading this book, I became very interested in what these people said, and what they felt was the most important thing to tell the students. Everyone had a different opinion, but they basically said the same things. Before you read this book, ask yourself that same question. See how you would answer. What were the lessons learned - the reasons, ideas, and thoughts behind this war? Then read it. You will be surprised by what you ftnd. This is a great reference book for parents and teachers. It gives you the ground work to tell today's children, and generations to come, about the Vietnam War, the unrest back home, and the politics surrounding the war.

SFC ROBERT TORSRUD

Ft. Knox, Ky. ARMOR - November-December 7989 53