The Soviet T-34 Tank: The Human Dimension

E ARMOR - November-December 7989 The Soviet T-34 Tank: The Human Dimension by Dr. George Windholz The Soviet T-34 was a powerful weapon that contributed significantly to the Soviet victory over Germany in World War 11. Archer Jones wrote that ''for its size the Russian T-34 was probably the best tank of World War 11," and M. K. Dziewanowski stated that the T-34 was "simple to the point of crudity, but, ... ideally suited for the rough Soviet conditions." If it is true that "imitation is the supreme compliment," then the T-34 received its share. The German tank warfare expert, Colonel General Heinz Guderian commented that the Welimtacltt was so impressed by its performance that in 1941 German engineers were asked to consider copying it. The technical specifications of the T-34 and information about the battles in which it was involved are available to Western readers. However, not much has been published about the personal experiences of the people who designed, produced, and operated the tank in combat. This article describes some of their experiences and reveals the actions of people under most adverse conditions. In the late 1930s, the strategic situation the Soviet Union faced 31 was becoming more critical by the day. The Soviet government, facing an expansive Germany and Japan, considered a major war imminent and applied pressure on its armorers. The T-34 was thus conceived in the threatening atmosphere of the Stalinist period. It was designed shortly after numerous senior military leaders were "liquida-ted during the Great Purge (1937- 1938). The designers worked under the ever-suspicious eyes of I. V. Stalin who was prone to confuse lack of immediate success with an act of sabotage. In fact, in 1939, the tank's chief designer, M. I. Koshkin, was charged with unfounded yet grave accusations and barely escaped a terrible fate. Thousands of unskilled and hungry people toiled long hours in unheated factory shops to produce the tank. In combat, the crew had to struggle in a highly restricted space under taxing conditions against such formidable German adversaries as the "Tigers" and "Panthers." Most of the sources I used in this study are memoirs of the men and women who designed, built, and fought in the T-34. By and large, the memoirs were written during or before the 1980s by people nearing the end of their life-span. One may wonder how accurately events of 40 years past are recollected. However, the noted psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett has shown that memories of dramatic events usually tend to stress the important and crucial as opposed to the marginal and trivial. We may suppose, therefore, that these reminiscences describe the more crucial events leading to the development and use of the T-34. In 1930 the Soviet Union's trade organization Ai~iilorg bought two M- 1930 tanks developed by ,the American tank designer J. Walter Christie. Christie sold the tanks, which had a newly designed suspension system, to the Soviets under the guise of tractors. George F. Hofman claimed that these tanks were "the basis of the Soviet BT series which evolved into the famous T- %....'I It is possible that the M-1930s found their way to the Khar'kov plant No. 183, named "Komintern," that had been designing and building tanks since 1928. The BT-5, the T-34's predecessor The letters BT represented the Russian words bystrokhodnyi tank, which means a rapid tank. One characteristic of the BTs was the capability to move on either wheels or tracks. On paved roads, the crew would remove the tracks, and rcplace them when traversing tcrrain. The BT was armed with a cannon, but its armor plate was designed to withstand nothing more powerful than machine gun bullets. In 1930, the designers at the Khar'kov plant produced prototypes of the BT-2 tanks that went inti production a year later. Subsequen improvements and modification lei to the production of the BT-2 which was followed by the diesel powered BT-7M. During the Spanish Civil War, thl Soviet Union provided thl Republican government with BT-5: while the Germans supplied the in surgents with antitank guns. Thei German-made shells penetrated thl armor of the BT-Ss, and the Sovie military realized that future tank must be resistant to cannon fire. I1 October 1938, the Politburo ap pointed a 35-year-old engineer, Iu

E. Maksarev, as the manager of thi Khar'kov plant. His orders were ti develop and produce an efficien new tank. At the plant, Maksare met the 40-year-old M. I. Koshkin the chief tank designer. Koshkin, the son of a poo peasant, participated in World Wa I and later fought with the Rec Army in the civil war. After joinin] the Communist Party, Koshkii studied at the Leningrad Polytech nic Institute and then worked 01 tank designs in Leningrad. EpisheL the party organizer at the plan! referred to him as "highly talented, and others who knew him had on1 words of praise. A. A. MorozoI Koshkin's closest associate, point out that he was both a good or ganizer and a competent leader. Koshkin, in concert with hi closest associates, Morozov and h

A. Kucherenko, agreed that the ne\ tank should have a diesel engine, I 45-mm cannon, be able to withstani the bullets of a heavy machine gum and move on either wheels o 32 ARMOR - November-December 7989 tracks. This model, A-20, became controversial because diesel engines were not perfected enough, and the 18-ton weight of the tank required three motive wheels on each side. Also military experts of the period pointed out that tanks seldom ran on highways, and in battle conditions the crew was not able to put on tracks. Consequently. the designers realized that they had to conceive an entirely new tank. In his memoirs, Morozov insists that this tank design emerged out of the team’s conceptualization of a vehicle that would meet several requirements. Essentially, three parameters determined the design: The armor had to be sufficient to protect the crew, a powerful gun was necessary, and. because this was to be a medium tank, a high de- c gree of maneuverability was required. The difficulty was to reconcile these parameters, and yet make a simple and reliable vehicle. To simplify the design, reduce its weight, and yet allow for heavier armor, the new tank was designed to depend solely on tracks. The tank was also to have a powerful 76- mm cannon. The design was named T-32. In the summer of 1938, the A-20 prototype, in production, and the T-

32. on blueprints, were presented to a panel of military leaders, including Stalin. The military leaned toward the wheel and track vehicle, but Stalin, who initially remained silent, stated that the initiative of the designers should not be restricted. Prototypes of both models should be built and compared. In May 1939, both prototypes were ready for testing, and a commission of experts concluded that both models were satisfactory. K.

E. Voroshilov, the People’s Commissar of the Red Army, saw the T-32 in September 1939 and stated that he had never seen a better tank, and the army needed it. On December 19, 1939, the Soviet government ordered the construction of two prototypes with another modification: armor that was 45-mm thick. The prototype was named T-34. Early in the morning of March 6, 1940, two T-34s left Khar’kov enroute to MOSCOW, a journey of about 400 miles. Upon their arrival at the Kremlin on March 17, the Politburo, led by Stalin, inspected the tanks. Stalin was enthused: “This will be a swallow in our tank forces.“ The tanks then moved to the proving ground where they were tested. Fired on by a 45-mm gun, no shells penetrated the armor, yet the turret was immobilized. But Koshkin, who accompanied the tanks, +e- came ill and died on September 26, 1940, in the Khar’kov plant’s sanitarium. Morozov replaced him. In June 1940, the T-34 was tested on the partly destroyed Mannerheim Line. which had fallen to the Soviets during the Russo-Finnish war. The tanks successfully crossed an eight-meter-wide ditch studded with concrete piles and a barricade of trees piled a meter high. This was also a period of major trouble-shooting. Hundreds of modilications had to be made. The turret was enlarged and a five-speed gearshift box replaced the four-speed one. Although the T-34 did pass the basic tests, the designers and engineers continuously encountered problems that required immediate solution. The Power Plant The development of the T-34’s power plant started in 1932 when a group of engineers headed by Ia. E. Vikhman designed a diesel engine suitable for powering a tank. There was no precedent for constructing such a tank engine, but they thought that a diesel engine would have certain advantages over the conventional gasoline power plant; the diesel was considered more economical, fire resistant, and reliable. In 1936. the first prototype of this engine, the V-2, was built, and by 1938, the Soviet government approved the design for mass production. However, the engines were deficient because cylinders, shafts, and ball-bearings broke during tests. A team of engineers was assembled to make the necessary corrections but its efforts were futile. S. N. Makhonin, an engineer, was given the task of mass producing an efficient engine with a two- or three-week deadline. We may presume that failure to achieve the assigned task would have been ominous. Makhonin went to the assembly shop and found sand and dirty oil clogging the engine’s parts. No quality control existed, unskilled and inexperienced workers wasted time. Makhonin called for a general meeting. He had workers clean up and instituted quality control measures. Work then proceeded slowly but smoothly, and soon functioning engines were delivered to the general assembly plants. The concept of slanting armor to increase the barrier to shells ap- ~ ~~ ARMOR - November-December 7989 33

"The Soviets feared that the re-tooling might slow production. To avoid this, the designers worked round the clock and slept in beds put in their offices." proaching horizontally and to increase the chance that shells would ricochet, was the brainchild of the efficiency expert N. F. Tsyganov. In 1935, Tsyganov arrived in Moscow with a plan to improve the BT tanks. He brought along a pencil drawing of a tank in the shape of a tortoise. Tsyganov had pressed his ideas so persistently, that some very prominent officials had recommended him for a position at the Khar'kov plant where his ideas were taken seriously. Koshkin gave instructions to a team headed by A.

A. Moloshtanov to make a conical turret on a slanted hull. Time was so precious that Moloshtanov could not even make a model, but had to proceed directly with the production. The Turret The turret design created unending problems and required continuous modifications. The original turret design, which consisted of welded plates, required highly complex calculations, but time was short. When, in 1943, the Germans produced tanks that had armor so thick that the 76-mm gun of the T- 34 could not penetrate, an 85-mm gun had to be installed. This made it necessary to increase the size and strength of the turret. The Soviets feared that the rc-tooling might slow production. To avoid this, the designers worked round the clock and slept in beds put in their offices. In this manner the T-34-S5 was produced in record time. Production Until the outbreak of the war (June 22, 1941): only 1,225 T-34s were produced. In addition to the Khar'kov plant, hvo other plants manufactured the tank. One of the plants was at the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and the other was a shipbuilding plant in Gor'kii on the Volga, named "Krasnoe Sormovo." Soon after the war's outbreak, Khar'kov was the target of air raids. In the beginning, the workers would take cover, but the interruptions slowed production. It was decided that work had to continue during bombardments and that the administrators had to stay in the shops with the workers. As the Weltnitacltt approached Khar'kov. the government decided to evacuate the plant to Nizhnii Tagil in the Urals. Nizhnii Tagil was an old and important metallurgical center. In 1834, its serf-mechanics constructed Russia's first railroad and steam-locomotive. In 1939, the town had about 160,OOO inhabitants, many of whom were skilled in metallurgy. The evacuation of Khar'kov was orderly and systematic with priorities established for the movement of various sections. Workers dismantled machines and accompanied the equipment on trains. Workers took with them a few personal possessions, including food and fuel. The journey was about 1200 miles and took a month or more to complete. They rebuilt the tank plant on the grounds of a factory that had made railroad cars. To speed up production, machinery from other evacuated plants was incorporated into the site. Unloading and reassembling the equipment in mid-winter was a formidable task. Two months later, the plant, now called the Urals Tank Works No. 183, Komintern, went into production. The Kremlin closely watched it; Morozov received frequent inquiries and orders directly from Stalin. The technical problems they had to overcome were prodigious. The Urals iron ore differed from that found in Ukraine, and the equipment had to be adapted to the variations. The hull of the T-34 consisted of wclded steel plates. Originally, skilled personnel did the welding, but they were difficult to find, and work was slow. A team headed by the academician, E. 0. Paton, proposed to build an automatic welding machine, using the electrical arc and flux technique, which unskilled labor could operate. In 1941, Paton was able to weld plates of low-carbon steel, but not the special steel plates used as armor. During the welding process, cracks and pores formed along the seams. The desperate and starving team made continued attempts to improve the process. When it solved the problem, it realized that the plant administration was not interested in the process. Paton appealed to the responsible official, who agreed to take a look. Hostile welders watched as the automatic welding machine was set up. Someone (among people professing atheism) said: "With God's help," and a girl pushed the button. The machine worked well, performing the work of 10 skilled welders. Working Conditions In 1941, Nizhnii Tagil lacked resources to integrate a large influx of workers. The newcomers found conditions frightful; the temperature reached minus 45 Celsius, the 34 ARMOR - November-December 7989 housing facilities were strained to the limit, and families lived in dugouts. Morozov was lucky, because he and the six members of his family shared a single, unfurnished room. People did not have adequate clothing. Diseases, such as pneumonia, scurvy, and dystrophy spread. Dystrophy made it necessary for each worker to drink a hitter broth made from fir trees. The food supply was grossly inadequate, and authorities improvised by growing yeast in sawdust. Many people died. Thousands of teenagers and older men toiled in the shops. Some teenagers were the children of the Khar'kov workers who had been evacuated with their plant, while others came from diverse parts of the Soviet Union. One day, the designer V. D. Listrovoi saw a group of 16- to 18-year-old girls who had come from the Mari Autonomous Republic (located on the Volga). They stood. in their native costumes, in a tight group, and looked with fear on the flashes made by the welding equipment. Youths arriving from blockaded Leningrad were so exhausted and weak that it took them some time to recover before being able to work. Teenagers constituted the bulk of the semi-skilled work force of the plant. The lathe operator, V. M. Volozhanin. recalls that in his section, which consisted of over 100 workers, only five to eight were adults. The elderly Paton referred to the youngsters working in the shops as the "mechanized kindergarten." The life of the older men was especially hard. Many were peasants whom the military had drafted. The Uzbeks. brought from Central Asia, were not used to the cold and were poorly dressed. They fell on ice and would not eat a supplementary diet, which went against Islamic law, and many became sick. The workers toiled hard, were poorly fed, and suffered from the cold. The bread they were issued was a soft mass that looked like dark clay. Loss of a ration card had disastrous consequences because no replacement card was issued. Many youngsters could not control their hunger; they ate up their ration before the end of the month, only to starve later. The work day was 11 to 12 hours, on many days, longer. The shop was so cold that hands stuck to the metal. The work was so exhausting that some workers went to sleep in the shop after the end of the shift. Others, as soon they returned to their barracks, would fall asleep ' fully dressed. The hastily-erected barracks were poorly heated, and in winter, the temperature inside was slightly higher than the outside. To keep warm, the women workers slept in pairs and covered themselves with their meager possessions. Yet, even in these terrible conditions, the quest for culture and human companionship manifested itself. Women workers managed to go to the movies. In one barracks, 22 girls shared four presentable dresses, and took turns dating. The government organized leisure activities? such as an amateur theatrical group, choir, and dance ensemble, a regular monthly evening for the young, sports activities, and excursions to the mountains. The *conditions in the other tank plants were no better. In September 1941, Colomel M. E. Katukov was forming an armored brigade in Stalingrad. Katukov observed that workers who produced the T-34s at the Stalingrad Tractor Works had inadequate food, yet, without regard IO their health, would stay at their posts for weeks. First Battle Soon the T-34 was tested on the battlefield. Its performance did not disappoint the soldiers. In September 1942, Stalin asked General Major Katukov what he thought about Soviet tanks. Katukov replied that the T-34s fully proved themselves in combat and that the crews had confidence in them. Katukov spoke from personal experience. As a colonel in command of a brigade, in October 1941, he was ordered to stop the advance of Guderian's forces on Moscow. The brigade's position was on a road near the town of Mtsensk. As the Germans attacked, Katukov ran toward the command post. Through binoculars, Katukov saw German tanks entering the positions held by Soviet units. Fearing envelopment, Katukov ordered his T-34s to counterattack. Suddenly the tanks emerged from behind bushes, barns, and haystacks - fired a few shots, then changed their positions. The battle lasted three hours, but it seemed to Katukov that it was only a few minutes. The Germans were temporarily halted. The late Marshal of Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov described the participation of the T-34s in the bat-ARMOR - November-December 7989 35

"The T-34 used its speed to advantage When attacked by an airplane, 1 maneuvered. On confronting obstacles, 1 picked up speed and ran over them." tle at the Kursk salient. It took him three days to move his tank units to the village of Prokhorovka. On July 12, 1943, at 0600, Rotmistrov and his staff stood on a hill overlooking a field and a forest. The Germans held the forest. Silence reigned. At about 0700. the Ltiffivafle launched a bombing attack that was met by the S o h Air Force. Then artillery went into action. Suddedy. Rotmistrov, through binoculars, saw the T-34s emerging at his left and right. Then he saw the German tanks. Both sides attacked simultaneously. Rotmistrov saw the Soviet tanks tearing into the German tank formation. T-34s cruised as though caught in a gigantic vortex. The tanks became a tangled mass. The T-34s shot at the enemy Tigers and Panthers, and their fire was returned. Dust and smoke obscured Rot-mistrov's vision. The earth shook as the explosions merged into a continuous din. On the radio Rotmistrov heard Russian and German commands intermingled with obscenities. A short time later, Rotmistrov traveled with Georgii Zhukov over the battlefield in an American car, a "Willys." Nikita Khrushchev and their body guards piled into another. The earth was scorched; here and there fires still smoldered. Twisted tank remains cluttered the landscape. Adversaries lay .in deadly embraces. Everywhere, there were burned out machines, crushed guns, piles of cartridges, and pieces of tracks. Zhukov looked on the battlefield, and then, quietly, as though he were talking to himself, said: "So that is how a tank encounter looks." The memoirs of the men who fought in the T-34s are filled with praise for the weapon they drove. Theirs is a declaration of love that fails to relate the full horror of battle. V. V. Kalinin, who began the war as a lieutenant in an armor unit, recalled that he felt safe behind the T-34s armor. D. A. Dragunskii who commanded a tank unit, reported seeing a tank that fought from the river Dnieper to Berlin. On its armor it had about 20 dents left by enemy shells. but not a single one penetrated. Only a direct bomb hit could take out a T-34. So stable was the tank that nearby explosions could not topple it. The T-34 used its speed to advantage. When attacked by an airplane; it maneuvered. On confronting obstacles, it picked up speed and ran over them. Nevertheless, it was not a comfortable vehicle. During the summer it was very hot inside, and the crew had difficulty breathing. In winter, the crew froze. In cold weather the engine had to be warmed up before starting. For that purpose, stoves were used. The diesel engine reduced the possibility of the tank catching fire. To work smoothly, the T-34 had to be carefully maintained by the driverhechartic. One of them, V.

G. Savchenko, recalls the care he gave to the engine, changing oil and cleaning the filters periodically. He filtered fuel through a silk handkerchief. The engine ran for 350 hours between regular service periods. There were service units organized by the Soviet Army, which followed the tank columns. The simplicity of the construction allowed specialists to quickly repair the damaged tank and send them back into combat. Morozov, writing about the T-34' designers, claims that they were na geniuses, that none of them at tended a prestigious school no showed unusual talent. They werj common men, and their effort il lustrates Edison's maxim that geniu is one percent inspiration ant ninety-nine percent perspiration Their memoirs show people whc working under extreme environmen tal stress, used their slende material resources to construct , machine that their fighting me] were able to use to great advantagt in combat. Commitment, coopera tion, and perserverance were thi human dimensions essential ii making the T-34 one of the bes tanks of World War 11. Acknowledgments I thank M. K. Diiewarrowski, J. A Kirppers, arid D. G. Wacltowiak fo their sligyestions and editorial assis tairce and librarians B. J. Lisertb arid A. A. Cobb for their help ii providing me with the sotim inaterial. George Windholz is an associate professor of Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He received his doctorate at Columbia University. His major interests are in the history of Russian psychology and German psychiatry . 36 ARMOR - Novernber-December 7989

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefiel Captain Anthony Paternostro You can hear almost everyone in the Army today using IPB language. Terms like situational template, named area of interest, and decision support template are thrown around like chicken feed. This, of course, is encouraging to a man like me, who learned IPB when IPB wasn't cool. The thing, however, that distresses me is that only a small percentage of those "urban 1PBers" understand what the terms really mean, and even fewer know how to apply 1PB doctrine to tactical situations. I will try to clarify the steps of the IPB process and discuss some common mistakes that S2s and their commanders make regarding IPB. Although I will use some examples from the National Training Center, I stress that the following is applicable to any situation. The IPB process can be as involved as one has time or assets to devote to it. I am going to focus on the battalion or task force S2. The battalion S2 has a real problem; he has the least resources to devote to IPB, and sometimes (due to improper planning by brigade and division) the least time. Yet his product must be detailed enough to show how (in some cases) enemy platoons will attack and where individual vehicles will he located within the enemy defense. So we see that quite a lot of weight has been placed upon the shoulders of the least experienced staff officer in the battalion. During a deployment to the National Training Center, the S2 suddenly becomes an important man in the staff. The commander and other staff officers expect him to show them how the enemy will attack and to provide options. In wap time, the S2 will be even more valuable, and his analysis can either save or endanger the lives of the soldiers in his unit. The IPB process, done correctly, will enable the S2 to answer the above questions and convey the information in a clear and usable format. The current five-step IPB process was developed at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School in 1980 to support the emerging AirLand Battle Doctrine. It was designed to standardize those things that intelligence officers do to convey enemy, weather, and terrain to their units. Not only is this standardization necessary to promote understanding of IPB products, but it also will allow for possible automation of IPB work. Current IPB doctrine is outlined in FM 34-130 (May 1989); you should become familiar with this manual. However, in its current form, it is unwieldy and complicates the process for the novice. Now let's go through the steps of the IPB process in a logical sequence. 1 will discuss preparation for a defensive mission and then explore the differences in preparing for the offense. The Steps You should first begin some preliminary analysis of the area of operations. The following steps will prove useful: .Acquire any maps and aerial photographs available. 0Have your Air Force weather representative supply you with climatological data on the area. 0 Try to talk to personnel or POWs that have been in the expected area of operations. 0See if you can get area studies from either the CIA or DIA. The above requests should be funneled through your higher by way of ~ ~ ARMOR - November-December 7989 37 a collection plan. This should be an ongoing process targeted to areas where your unit has contingency missions. Step 1: Battlefield Area Evaluation. In this step, you should divide the battlefield into sectors. The battlefield can be divided into an Area of Interest and Area of Operations. Area of operations is simple to ascertain; it is defined by your unit bounddries. Area of interest is not so easily defined, but normally it extends fonvard and reanvard to your higher’s front and rear boundaries. Laterally, your area of interest is basically half of your frontage added to each of your lateral boundaries. In other words. if your frontage is 8 km. your area of interest would cover 16 km laterally. Thus. your area of interest is basically the same as your higher’s area of operations. Of course, physical aspects of terrain or commander’s intent may cause your area of interest to vary in size. In these circumstances. use common sense. ensuring that your area of interest encompasses all terrain that you will need to analyze for both your current mission and for preparation of contingencies. such as a friendly counterattack. Step 2 and 3 Terrain and Weather Analysis Now that you know your area of interest. you must analyzc the terrain and weather in that area. You must analyze these two battlefield characteristics together. Terrain and weather analysis is probably the most time-consuming part of the IPB process, however, you will receive help from division and brigade through their analysis of the area of operations. This usually comes as part of the division - or separate brigade - OPLAN. If you do not receive this before deployment, you need to start tweaking the system ASAP. When you receive this document, you will see that you must tailor its scope to your unit‘s specific area and mission. In rapid deployments, or when your higher headquarters is flat on its you know what, you must start from scratch and build your own. The correct format for the terrain and weather analysis is described in FM 34-130. The IPB graphic associated with this step is called the Combined Obstacles Overlay. Unfortunately, the component parts are not well described in the textbook. so let me list them here. The Combined Obstacles Overlay is basically the OCOKA factors in graphic form. 011 should cover the entire Area 0 No-Go terrain: greater than 45- 0 Slow-go terrain: 30- to 45-de- 0 Key terraiddecisive key terrain 0 Obstacles, man-made and Your unit boundaries *Avenues of approach with Legend *FM 34-130 shows these values in per-of Interest. degree slope’k Fee slope” natural mobility corridors cent slope. The Combined Obstacles Overlay may also include information on vegetation, soils, or waterways, depending on your mission or area of operations. Once you have completed the Combined Obsttacles Overlay, enemy or friendly avenues of approach jump right out at you. Wait! Stop right here! Do you need to do a Combined Obstacles Overlay? The answer is no! If pressed for time, an experienced S2 can skip this step on paper and do it in his head. Commanders, if given the opportunity to do a leader’s recon of the ground, make sure you don’t leave your S2 to do a terrain analysis in the TOC with a map. If you include the S2 on leader’s recons, he will become keen to terrain effects on enemy formations, and he will be able to come up with avenues of approach just by looking at the ground. The Combined Obstacles Overlay is useful to teach intelligence officers what they should be looking for when doing a terrain analysis, but when short of time, preparation of this template is needless. Another good technique when short of time is to have the Battlefield Intelligence Control Center (BICC) or intelligence sergeant prepare a Combined Obstacles Overlay while the S2 is out on the recon, or engaged in other IPB steps. This helps take the strain off the S2. When the S2 returns to the TOC, he can quickly discuss differences between the ground and the map, and add avenues of approach and mobility corridors. Next, you must analyze how weather in your area of operations could affect those avenues of approach. For example, clay soil and steep grades would be easily trafficable when dry, but would become impassable during rains. Sandy soils, on the other hand, can be a problem when dry, but trafficability improves when wet. In the desert, 38 ARMOR - November-December 7989

“Wherever you may be deployed, and whoever your enemy might be, you must study him.” rain can mean disaster for troops or vehicles using desert washes for cover. In the Arctic, warm summer temperatures can turn once trafficable roads into quagmires when permafrost thaws. Now that you have the enemy avenues of approach and mobility corridors into your sector, and have considered the effects of weather, you must put them to paper in your para 2. These will become portions of your written and oral order. Remember, you should have others in the S2 shop help you. When writing a para 2b, you must look at the OCOKA factors. In observation and fields of fire, you must look at your unit’s observation and fields of fire from ground and air and both direct and indirect fire systems. Consider cover from enemy direct and indirect fire systems and concealment from their air and ground platforms. List obstacles, both natural and manmade, key terrain, and avenues of approach. Step 4 Threat Evaluation This step, like terrain and weather analysis, is ongoing and you should start as soon as you know who your enemy is. When preparing for a European deployment, documents such as the DL4 Secret 77treat Fact Book, USAREUR Order of Battle Guides, and the FM 100-2 series are absolute necessities. Wherever you may be deployed, and whoever your enemy might be, you must study him. What you need to know is the ranges of his weapons systems, where those systems are deployed on the battlefield, how they organize for combat, what are the indicators that will tip his intentions, and what are his vulnerabilities. All of these things can go into doctrinal templates, which you can prepare at home station on butcher paper, and later use them to brief your unit, or to analyze the best places to look when collecting intelligence or preparing to target the enemy. Remember, doctrinal templates are not something that some other organization must prepare for you. Prepare them yourself using all information known about your potential enemy. For some examples, look at FM 100-2-1, p. 5-5, which shows a doctrinal template for a motorized rifle regiment in march column. The only problem with this example is that it used Soviet symbology to represent the units. I do riot recoiltriterid ilsc of Soviet qnrbologv. I have seen it confuse consumers and, in many cases, those who use it. Use U.S./NATO symbology so that our personnel will understand what is presented. You can template any phase of enemy operations, but if you are a battalion S2, as a minimum, you should template: 0 Regimental march formation 0 Regimental advanced guard 0 Regimental attack against the defending enemy 0 Platoon, company, and regimental defensive positions 0You should show how he deploys from battalion columns to platoons on line (see FM 100-2-1, p. In all doctrinal templates, you should show not only the major maneuver units, but also where command posts, scouts, and artillery units will deploy. Deployment of air defense assets are also useful, especially if you are planning a JAAT or other air missions. 5-12) Now that w-e have developed doctrinal templates, we can go on to the next step, but remember the following: 0 Doctrinal templates should be a part of the intelligence portion of the operations order briefing concerning enemy formation. 0They can be used to provide focus for collection assets. 0 Threat evaluation also includes the preparation of a data base, including enemy equipment, strengths, personalities, supporting assets, and all other portions of para 3 of the Intelligence Estimate. 0 Prepare doctrinal templates at home station and bring them on all operations. They are necessary for briefing purposes and to train others in the unit on enemy formations. 0 Doctrinal templates are also used to build situational templates in the next step. Step 5 Threat Integration Now we must use everything we have done so far in forming our conclusions of what the enemy is going to do, and how he is going to do it. We must also develop the enemy3 timetable for movement, and turn doctrinal templates into situational templates. Simultaneously, we must prepare the rest of the written intelligence estimate for use in our oral orders brief. The BICC and the intelligence NCO should be trained to assist in the preparation of written portions of the order and brief so that the S2 can concentrate on the Decision Support Template (DST). Before we get to the DST, let’s briefly discuss turning doctrinal ARMOR - November-December 7989 39 templates into situational templates. Prepare doctrinal templates on acetate at the appropriate map scale. They should illustrate the smallest doctrinal frontage to ensure that you present the worst case for the size unit that could fit on a given AA. This means that if a division covers 10-15 km, you should make your doctrinal template at 10 km frontage. Then apply the doctrinal template to a given AA and move units according to actual terrain features on the ground. The result is a situational template. The Decision Support Template, as we used to teach at the Intelligence School, is the Intelligence Estimate in graphic form. The DST is our conclusion of how the enemy 6 1 1 attack, and is a tkal element necessary for the staff in the formation of its execution matrix. This means that the S2 must have a draft DST prepared when the staff conducts its initial planning session. So, upon receipt of a mission, the S2 must immediately sit down with the S3 or S3 air and ensure that as they prepare a timeline for order development, it allows the S2 time to analyze the situation prior to that initial staff conference. In some cases, this may give the S2 only an hour to go through his higher headquarters’ intelligence products, scan the terrain, and decide the enemy’s most probable courses of action. This sounds like a tall order. but I have done it, and seen several S2s do it who have done their homework ahead of time. In order to do this. the S2 must have his personnel trained to do most of the stubby pencil work, while he concentrates on analyzing enemy intentions. In extreme cases. S2s may have to do all of the work preceding the DST in their heads. The draft DST should show enemy avenues of approach, probable objectives, and the various courses of action that the enemy could adopt. These should be limited to only the most probable, and the S2 should “bet his bars” and outline one as most likely. Once this is done, the rest of the staff can begin its planning. The S3 can start looking at engagement areas. These will become Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) and will be placed in avenues of approach outlined by the S2. The engineer, in concert with the S2, can begin planning how to support the defense by slowing the enemy within the EAs or canalizing him into our kill sack. The FSO can plan fires to support the mission, ensuring he covers deadspace, as well as planning FASCAM to support the engineer obstacle plan. The S2 and FSO discuss preplanned fires that become TAIs. The commander and S2 can formalize commander’s intent and begin to plan how to execute at Decision Points (DPs) to counter enemy courses of action. (Remember the S2 does not create TAIs and DPs in a vacuum; they are put to paper only after affected staff members have made their input. The S2 should merely recommend these measures, based on expected enemy actions.) The S2 must be able to quickly provide staff officers with what they want to know; what will attack (size of formation), where it will attack (AAs), and wlten it will attack (timelines). After the initial staff planning session and commander‘s guidance, the S2 can plan for collection to provide the commander requested information on the enemy. This means turning commander’s questions into Primary Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and preparing a collection plan designed to answer those questions. The S2 will now build the IPB template that supports collection, the Event Template. In this graphic, the S2 will pick Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) at areas where he expects enemy activities to occur and times when he thinks they will occur. With avenues of approach and enemy objectives also templated, this product will be necessary to produce a collection plan designed to focus collection assets at the appropriate time and place. The Event Template is also invaluable in the formulation of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan, oral order, and the finished DST. The DST is the only template of the IPB process that must be briefed and reproduced for the written order. The finished DST contains the following elements: 0 Friendly unit boundaries 0 Avenues of Approach with 0 Enemy objectives 0 Target Areas of Interest Decision Points 0 Timelines 0If applicable, the DST may also contain a situational template or series of templates portraying a critical portion of the upcoming battle. mobility corridors 0 Legend Now that we have finished our DST, we must forward any new information about the enemy to the other staff members and funnel it out to the subordinate company areas. When everyone assembles for the operations order, they should have a good feel for the enemy situation. The S2 should now give them the specifics of the enemy plan, using the intelligence estimate as the format for his brief, and the DST, with either Sit Temps on the 40 ~~ ARMOR - November-December 7989

"The last, Step 5, is where we see the majority of mistakes. First, many S2s are unprepared to develop lPB templates." DST or Doctrinal Templates on butcher paper, to show expected enemy formations. During this briefing, the S2 should talk to the company commanders, letting them know what they will face in their respective sectors. This, of course, means numbers of vehicles and formations. The S2 should emphasize how the enemy will look in the engagement areas. Offensive IPB Offensive IPB is a suhject that we used to leave to common sense. But more and more, I see that battalion S2s are missing the point when it comes to planning for the offense. The key is to tailor IPB to your mission. Basically, the steps are similar, but we must now look at our avenues of approach and template enemy defensive doctrine and deployment. In Step 1, we may have to enlarge our Area of Interest to include possible enemy counterattack routes. Steps 2 and 3 are virtually unchanged except now the A A s are ours, and we discuss OCOKA factors based on their effects on our movement. And we must pick routes that afford us the best possible cover and concealment from enemy defensive fires and observation. Step 4 again finds us making doctrinal templates, however. we now portray the enemy defense. It is also important to analyze the enemy's capability to reinforce or counterattack, as well as his artillery and air support. The 5th step is still situational, event and decision support templating. If your unit is fragged into the attack, then the only thing you may have time to formally produce for the offense is the DST. The DST for the offense contains the same elements as the defensive one, with the following emphasis: 0 Friendly and (templated) enemy boundaries 0 Avenues of Approach (friendly) 0 Friendly objectives 0 Target areas of interest (along enemy C/A routes and within the enemy defense) 0 Decision points (keyed to where we might enter enemy kill sacks and at the entrance of enemy C/A routes into our sector) 0Timelines (on enemy C/A routes) 0 Situational template of enemy defense including: -Indirect and direct fire range fans -Air defense range fans -Obstacles The Event Template focuses on enemy C/A routes. Common Mistakes In my experience, as both an id-structor at the Intelligence School and an intelligence trainer at the NTC, 1 have seen hundreds of company grade officers wrestle with the problems of IPB analysis and its graphic portrayal. The more S2s I see, the more often I see the same mistakes. In Step 1, battalion S2s often receive graphics from their higher headquarters that include the headquarters' area of interest. Instead of tailoring this to the battalion area of interest, some merely copy the brigade product. The brigade area of interest is usually too large for the battalion S2 to effectively analyze. Remember, the area we call our area of interest should be roughly the size of our higher's area of operations, add half the width of our frontage to each flank, doubling our frontage. The front and rear boundary of our area of interest should extend to our higher's front and rear boundaries. For cavalry units or any unit forward of the FEBA, their forward boundaries will extend forward as far as necessary to accomplish the mission or contingencies. In the next step, we do our terrain analysis on the entire area of interest. Common mistakes in Step 2 include: commanders not affording their S2 the opportunity to personally recon the terrain during leaders' recons (or the S2 not expressing a desire to go), not effectively using S2 shop personnel to assist in portions of the terrain analysis, and not providing a proper para 2b of the intelligence estimate. This para 2b is necessary to provide subordinate commanders a narrative from which to study the terrain's effects on his operations. Step 3's mistakes include simply not paying attention to the effects of weather. Prior to deployment, the S2 should study area climatological data and prepare his unit for possible extreme weather effects common to the period. These should be bounced against actual forecasted weather and weather effects on a Weather Effects Matrix. Analyze these weather effects to predict effects on enemy and friendly courses of action. In Step 4, the major problem is that S2s wait until they deploy to ARMOR - November-December 1989 41 produce doctrinal templates. Produce them in garrison for all possible tactical situations employed by appropriately sized enemy forces. Unit symbology for all templates should be U.S./NATO symbology. The last, Step 5. is where we see the majority of mistakes. First, many S2s are unprepared to develop IPB templates. They understandably have not memorized all components of a given template, so they either leave out important portions or spend precious time looking through their manuals. I recommend preparing checklists to ensure that important points are not missed. The three so-called control measures of IPB are also often mistakenly mixed. NAIs, TAIs, and DPs are all distinctly different and should not be mixed up. (Review Step 5.) NAIs are on the Event Template because their only use is for collection. TAIs and DPs go in the DST. NAIs, TAIs, and DPs are often numbered incorrectly, so users can’t distinguish between them. S2s at all levels should ensure that the numbers assigned distinguish their control measures from those of their higher unit, or the supporting artillery unit. In cases where they have adopted an NAI (etc.) used by their higher, they should adopt the number also. This is done so that, when one TOC talks to another and mentions NAI 5, they all know what NAI they are discussing. Ground rules for numbering of control measures should be discussed with the higher unit S2. Another area where S2s often have problems is in the determination of enemy speeds, and in the monitoring of that speed. Timelines should be based on enemy doctrinal speeds, factoring in terrain and weather effects. The end result should be an estimate of actual enemy speed. This, however, is only an estimate. Yet some S2s stick with their estimated speeds throughout the battle. The minute the enemy activates the first NAI H-hour, times become real time. Monitor enemy speed to the second NAI. The S2 should then calculate real speed and adjust his remaining timelines. This is extremely important to the success of execution matrices and collection management. The last common mistake I will discuss is found on the DST. S2s in the defense often analyze enemy avenues of approach up to their battle positions and no farther. Analyze enemy avenues of approach to the enemy objectives or the rear of the area of interest. You may find, when analyzing enemy AAs in depth, that your battle position may be one that the enemy bypasses in reaching his objectives. Summary The IPB process is the nuts and bolts of the tactical intelligence officer’s duties in the field. It is closely intertwined into the operations, lire support, and mobilitykounter-mobility portions of the operations order. The S2 should never do IPB as a one-man show. The IPB process can be adapted to any tactical situation or enemy force (I have, in fact, used it for pro-active analysis of terrorist threats), but should always follow the doctrinal checklist of elements that are included within each template. Other elements within the staff cannot effectively prepare their portions of the operations order without a staff conference, convened early, to discuss and modifv the S2’s draft DST. Commanders and operations officers must allow the S2 the opportunity to personally recon the terrain, if possible, and allocate him the time necessary to analyze enemy possible courses of action before the initial staff planning conference. Collection management should be keyed to the IPB process, and collection should start as deep as possible to give the staff and maneuver elements time to react to enemy courses of action. Our potential adversaries should fear units that correctly use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. This tool allows us to know our enemies and concentrate our firepower at the most advantageous time and place, ensuring victory. Captain Anthony Pater-nostro has served in Alaska as a battalion S2 and deputy brigade G2 for the 172nd LIB (Sep); in Berlin, FRG, as the chief of the Berlin All Source Analysis Center; and as deputy G2 and G2 Berlin Brigade. He has been a tactical intelligence instructor at the Intelligence Center and School and was an intelligence trainer for the livefire team at the National Training Center before leaving active duty in April. He now resides in Montana. 42 ARMOR - November-December 1989