Synchronizing Mobility Support

At left, German combat engineers closely supported rapid river crossings in the Ardennes during the 1940 drive into Belgium. By 1944, few experienced engineers were left, and even small streams hindered mobility. At right, the present bridge over the Ambleve River at Trois Ponts. The Belgians blew a bridge here in 1940; the Americans did the same in 1944 to slow the Germans. Synchronizing Mobility Support by Major Dominic Ino Introduction Synchronized, violent execution is the essence of decisive combat.’ The division piles on combat power using combat multipliers. The sapper or engineer combat multiplier generates enhanced mobility to permit unimpeded maneuver. Heavy forces synchronize mobility support to maintain the initiative, preserve freedom of action, and maneuver decisively. Good organization and repetitive combined arms training engender the superlative command and control necessary to synchronize mobility support. Wehrmacht Mobility Support In the Ardennes The Germans launched two offensives through the Ardennes in World War 11. The first, in May 1940, quickly penetrated the difficult terrain of this wooded, mountainous area and lead to victory. The second, in December 1944, stalled in spite of complete surprise and local superiority in tanks and infantry. The differences in German mobility support in the two Ardennes offensives are relevant and often overlooked. The panzer spearhead crossed the Meus: River almost in stride in 1940‘, but was stymied in 1944 by smaller rivers like the Salm, the Ourthe, and the Ambleve? U.S. engineers rendered yeoman service blocking the way in 1944, while dispersed and worn-out German Pioniere could not clear the way for a lightning advance of heavy Tiger and Panther tanks. What was the difference between 1940 and 1944? In the 1930s, Heinz Guderian, the father of the German armored force, had preached synchronization of the combined arms team during the formation of the panzer arm. His mechanized force was like an orchestra, which only plays in harmony if every instrument plays its part? Guderian included sappers, combat engineers, in his mechanized, combined arms force. In 1940, well-trained sappers were a part of the combined arms team that made blitzkrieg happen. Synchronized mobility support explains the impressive ability of Wehrmacht armored formations to maneuver in the early years of the war. Sappers - pioniere -synchronized with tanks and infantry, crossed rivers, cleared obstacles, and reduced fortifications in Poland, France, and Russia! By 1944, however, the Wehrmacht sapper corps was bled white, more so even than the infantry. Losses in trained leaders, armored vehicles, and specialized equipment were not made up. In November 1944, Germany was able to mass tanks, infantry, artillery, and logistics for the Ardennes offensive, but could not mass enough sapper companies to maintain the initiative gained by their surprise attack? More damaging was the failure of the German 7 ARMOR - November-December 7989 27 leadership in 1944 to get mobility support, scarce as it was, to the critical point. Again and again. leading panzer units lost valuable time trying to bypass seemingly insignificant obstacles? The result in 1944 was a stm, a traffic jam, instead of the blitzkrieg of 1940. The Divisional Sapper Brigade Experience at the National Training Center, and in field training exercises, shows that getting sappers to the right place at the right time is a problem. Engineer command and control often does not keep up with changing operations. The divisional engineer platoon leader, today doctrinally the task force engineer, is overwhelmed." The brigade staff engineer, once thought to be the solution to the sapper command and control problem, often cannot integrate non-divisional engineer units quickly enough. The time factor has become compressed in the years since

WWII .

Engineer command and control systems currently need more reaction time than is available on the battlefield. The sometimes-applied analogy of mobility support from sapper units to fire support from artillery units oversimplifies the problem. The synchronization of sappers with maneuver forces is significantly more difficult. For example, the teamwork necessary be-Above, an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge

(AVLB)

team moves forward to breach a tank ditch in conditions similar to the Ardennes winter. Below left, a Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) moves out after breaching a tank ditch. The CEV's power equipment and armament can breach obstacles and destroy fortifications. Below, mechanized engineers in M113s clear a minefield. 22 ARMOR - November-December 7989 tween sapper and maneuver units for an in-stride breach is harder to orchestrate at task force level than the tire support that goes with it. Synchronized mobility support requires intensive combined arms training at brigade and task force level to achieve the necessary degree of command and control. A divisional sapper brigade could solve this problem by providing a sapper battalion headquarters to support each maneuver brigade, under a concept the Engineer School calls E-force. E-Force does not change the total number of sappers in the corps." E- Force moves sapper structure from the "corps slice" into the division to improve command and control of the mobility combat multiplier and institutionalizes combined arms training. Eight conventional line combat engineer companies will be reorganized into nine smaller, more leader- and equipment-intensive E- Force sapper companies. These nine sapper companies will form three E-Force sapper battalions. one per maneuver brigade. This reorganization is in the spirit of changes in the tank and infantry battalions which have increased the leader ratio in the last few years. More important, E-Force provides a battalion headquarters in routine direct support of each maneuver brigade for improved planning, control of additional non-divisional sappers, and improved logistical support of sapper units. If nothing else, E-Force will improve the combined arms training of the current non-divisional combat engineers by bringing these sappers formally into the division family. Students of mechanized warfare may contend that another brigade makes the division too unwieldy for effective command and control. The The E-Force Division Engineer Organization concept of a larger sapper organization in the division is not novel,12 but has been criticized as too cumbersome.13 Opponents argue that task-organizing corps battalions to the division, as needed, provides the multiplier effect without creating a "fat" division. However, engineer command and control for the sapper battalions that doctrinally work in the division is now broken. In fact, the habitual association and combined arms training necessary for adequate command and control argue for a divisional sapper brigade if we are to have effective, synchronized mobility support. Habitual Association Theoretically, commanders can synchronize operations in small divisions more easily than in larger ones where the span of control, and therefore the friction of war, is greater. However, the real size of a division changes as non-divisional units are attached for specific operations. Doctrinally, the heavy division will have two mechanized corps sapper battalions in support, in addition to its divisional batta1i0n.l~ U.S. divisions in Europe today have at least one battalion habitually associated. As part of the "corps slice," the non-divisional sapper battalion trains with its division regularly." In M I , "habitual association" often led to engineer combat groups - sapper brigades - becoming de facto divisional units." Thus, the perceived flexibility of assigning these battalions to the corps troops is a mirage. If the sappers have not joined the division in habitual association, then the friction of war makes synchronization difficult to achieve at best. To have an effective habitual association, non-divisional sappers must train with the division regularly. This means the non-divisional sapper plans all his training around combined arms training with the division. Essentially, the non-divisional sapper battalion's entire operations revolve around the division. Making the battalion part of the division just streamlines the process. Clearly, problems with SOPS, battle drills, codes, and logistical support take critical staff time and training to sort out. The corps engineer slice and the division need to "cohabitate" before operations to establish working relationships. On the human level, sappers must learn ARMOR - November-December 7989 23 to interpret the maneuver commander’s intent. How much cohabitation. and how many training exercises are necessary h r effective synchronization is a vexing question for training managers. But the teamwork required for real synchronization does not happen overnight. Operation Schmidt, a WWII attack over difficult terrain north of the Ardennes, is an example of unsynchronized sappers and a devastating failure in mobility support. Sappers at Schmidt The Huertgen Forest in 1944 was a foot soldier’s nightmare. The 28th Infantry Division (28th ID) employed the equivalent of a sapper brigade to support its attack to siezc the town of Schmidt on 2 November 1944.” In addition to the 1171st Engineer Combat Group, 28th ID had a dozen artillery battalions, a tank battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, and hundreds of aircraft to support its attack. The division mission was to break through the Siegfried Line, seize the Roer River dams, and secure the right flank of VI1 Corps for an upcoming offensive into the industrial heart of Germany. The Germans repulsed the attack with bloody loss. In spite of the mobility support available, the attacks of the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments did not break through fortifications and obstacles defended by exhausted, third-rate German infantry. The 112th Infantry made the main attack and captured Schmidt, but was cut off and overrun because the Kall Trail, the only road across a deep, wooded gorge leading to Schmidt, was not kept open. The 1171st did not provide adequate mobility support to 28th ID, although the engineers distinguished themselves in close combat. The 146th Engineer Combat Battalion, for example, conducted a counterattack, which restored the division’s front line at a critical point. Poor synchronization of mobility support was a factor in the failure of the attack at Schmidt.18 There were enough engineers, but they did not get to the right place at the right time. Infantry soldiers were unable to clear the way alone. The available tanks and tank destroyers, as well as the desperately needed combat service support, could not get forward in the required quantities. The battalion assigned to clear the Kall Trail was not synchronized with the main effort of the 112th Infantry. The sappers did AVLB ... 1 944-Style Tank bridgelaying vehicle, based on M3 tank chassis, was used to set treadways across antitank ditches. Photo below shows treadway sections being placed. Above, the vehicle crosses the ditch. The cannon at left of the hull is a dummy - the mantlet hinged forward and acted as an entry hatch. 24 ARMOR - November-December 7989 not provide 28th ID the mobility support to maneuver decisively and fulfill the commander's intent. The Americans lost the command and control contest to the Germans. Although 28th ID initiated the attack, its sappers took longer to clear the way than the Germans took to counterattack. The 116th Panzer Division marched some 50 km and attacked before the Americans could organize effectively to clear the way to the 112th Infantry in Schmidt. Without synchronized mobility support, the 28th ID failed. The Huertgen Forest is similar to the Ardennes, the Thuringerwald, and many other heavily wooded areas throughout central Europe where we may have to fight. 2%h ID enjoyed superiority in artillery, aircraft, logistics and engineers. The 28th ID, in fact, had more engineer support at Schmidt than U.S. divisions in Europe have today. Clearing the way for decisive maneuver of today's heavy divisions, with more and heavier vehicles than the WWII infantry divisions, will demand first-class command and control to synchronize the sapper effort in the division and keep the lead tanks moving. Conclusion To synchronize mobility support, the division requires an agile sapper organization. The E-Force mechanized sapper brigade, organized from the current assets of one divisional and one corps battalion, will do the job. Corps combat engineer battalions have often been de facto divisional units, due to habitual association. E-Force legitimizes the marriage and ensures synchronized mobility support for decisive maneuver in division operations. Notes 'FM 100-5, Operations 2Liddell-Hart, B.H., ed. The Rornmel Papers. Rommet describes this campaign from his viewpoint as the commander of the 7th Panzer Division. His depiction of crossina the Meuse is Darticularlv inter- T s , The Damned Enaineers, Houghton-Mifflin, 1970, describes the fight of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion in the path of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Heck, Bortz, Lynch, Maya, and Weld, The Corps of Enaineers: The War Aaainst Germanv, Chapter HI, USACMH, 1985, describes engineers in the Ardennes. pp. 461-488. 4Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Marsch! ed. Oskar Munzel, Munich, 1955, p.152. 'During the 1940 campaign in the West, a German airborne sapper platoon was the key to the fall of Fortress Eben Emael in Belgium. 'Wilhelm Willemer, Enqineer Attacks on Fixed Fortifications, MS P-0600, USACMH. 1952, describes German sapper assault techniques in three actions in Russia. 'Petter, Dietrich, and Bernhardt, Harri. Pioniere: Entwickluna einer deutschen Waffenaattunq, Darm-stadt, 1963. 'Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Baffle of the Bulae, The United States Army in World War II, Washington, DC, 1964, p.77. 'Cole, op cit, pp. 316-322. The turning of the 116th Panzer Division away frap the Ourthe River on 19 December 1944, and consequently the reorientation of the LVlll Panzer Corps attack from west to north was one fateful decision caused by lack of mobility support forward. gineers in the Combined Arms Task m, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Washington, DC, 1986 (also published as TC 5-71-2) describes this problem in detail. MG Richard S. Kem, LTC J. Richard Capka and MAJ Houng Y. Soo, in "E-Force: an Update," Enaineer, Volume 18, July 1988, state unequivocally that the engineer system is broken in the heavy division. "Nahas, Albert J., and Deter, D.E., l1 Kem, et al, op cit, p.6. 12Coll, Keith. and Rosenthal, The Corns of Enaineers: Troops and EauiDment, OCMH, Washington, 1958, pp.10-11. The U.S. infantry division of World War I had an engineer regiment. l3Ibid, p. 43, LTG Leslie J. McNair kept the divisional engineers to a battalion In the WWll division to keep it easy to control. Similar arguments from the German WWll experience are in Hans Joachim von Hopfgarten, "Aufgaben eines PzPiBtl innerhalb einer Panzer-division," Wehrkunde, Vol 2, p.21,

1953. Von Hopfgarten states that a sapper regiment was advocated for the panzer division, but the idea was rejected because of the size of the division. 14FM 5-100, Enaineer Combat Operations, 22 Nov 1988.

TFM

25-100, T m , March 1989, describes Corps Slice Training. 16House, Jonathan, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, USAC&GS, 1984, p.107, describes how engineer groups often became part of a division during WW ll. Division commanders did not want to give them up. "MacDonald, Charles B., and Mathews, Sidney T., Three Battles: Amaville. Al-tuzzo. and Schmidt,

OCMH,

DA, Washington DC, 1952, describes the battle in detail. 18Taylor, LTC Benjamin G., "Operation Schmidt." Militant Review, August 1954, p.10, attributes the failure to seven factors, among them the difficult supply route, and the failure to get sufficient armored support across the Kall River on the Kall Trail. Major Dominic luo, a 1974 graduate of the USMA, is executive officer of the 237th Engineer Battalion, 7th Engineer Brigade, VI1 Corps, in Heilbronn, FRG, having previously served as the battalion S3. He served in a number of company positions while assigned to the 12th Engineer Bn., 8th Infantry Div., and commanded the 58th Engineer Co., 11th

ACR.

ARMOR - November-December 1989 25