Guerrilla Antiarmor Tactics

A - -. Guerrilla Antiarmor Tactics by Captain Raymond W. Levesque One 1966 study showed that 60 to 70 percent of a11 guerrilla combat actions included some type of ambush.' Another 1969 study showed that mines caused 73 percent of all tank and 7; percent of APC losses in Vietnam.- These are guerrilla antiarmor tactics. Guerrillas used these tactics against armor in WWII and Vietnam, and still use them around the world today. Althoush many soldiers don't think of armor as a counterinsurgent weapon, armor has been successful against guerrillas where terrain has allowed. The French used armor as a reaction force to relieve besieged outposts. Such operations became more hazardous as the Viet Minh, "often made diversionary attacks against isolated posts in order to lure armored units into am-bus he^."^ In Northern Ireland, the British use APCs to protect their soldiers against the more common threat - small arms fire and rocks. The Sal-vadorans use homemade armored vehicles for convoy security and route recon, missions which were also important in Vietnam. According to General Donn A. Starry, "The missions universally shared by armored units throughout Vietnam were furnishing route security and convoy escort. Few tasks were more important than keeping the roads safe and protecting the vehicles, men, and supplies that used them. At the same time, no task was more disliked by armored soldiers.'' The South Africans use specially designed armored vehicles in a variety of roles, from convoy escort and route security to offensive operations. Common armored missions in counterguerrilla operations are: route security, convoy escort, reaction force, reconnaissance, and offensive operations. Because each of these important missions leaves the armored vehicle exposed, and because of armor's inherent strength, the guerrilla will attack armor using his favorite tactic - the ambush. Mao Tse-tung wrote, "The sole habitual tactic of a guerrilla unit is the ambu~h."~ George Grivas, who fought for the independence of Cyprus, wrote, "Ambushes and sabotage constitute our two main methods of combat."6 Not only do guerrilla authors emphasize the ambush in their writings, this focus is evident on the battlefield. "Concealed attacks on main supply routes were the most fre- 6 ARMOR - November-December 7989

"El Salvador's guerrillas have taken this lesson to heart. In many cases, attacks are carried out against fixed sites, such as a town or bridge, for no other reason than to draw in the relief force." quent kinds of ambush used in Korea, Malaya, and the Philippines. Of 82 ambushes recorded in 195'1. 62 occurred along main roads, 14 against patrols in hills or jungles, and 6 in small villages."' Cutting LOCs is a basic guerrilla stratem and tactic, whether he's a partisan supporting a conventional force's efforts or an insurgent trying to isolate a town or region. Attacking LOCs damages a country's economic infrastructure, isolates military units, and attrits the government force with little risk to the guerrilla. General Alberto Bavo wrote that a guerrilla unit's first act of war, "is to cut the roads and railroads in as manv places as possible so the enemy cannot use any means of transportation other than their feet." Che Guevara expanded on his teacher, "One of the weakest points of the enemy is transportation by road and railroad."9 This emphasis is reflected in El Salvador, where the FMLNs anti-transportation campaign is one of its more significant operations. The purpose of its periodic campaigns is to attack civilian transportation, primarily business, which helps achieve its strategic goal of attacking El Salvador's economy. Because of this. El Salvador's military has the mission of securing the LOCs. The guerrilla's emphasis on attacking LOCs and the economy, and on isolating areas, requires that the army secure the same. Highly mobile armored units with their firepower are best suited for this mission ill the proper ierraiii. You must realize that in cases where armor has been successful against guerrillas, the terrain has favored armored operations. Armored elements have been destroyed when they've operated in restricted terrain, or without proper infantry support. The first step in defendins an armored unit against ambush is to identifv those circumstances, times, and locations that indicate there is a better chance of ambush. Guerrillas will do their hest to take advantage of each of these factors. A common insurgent tactic is to attack a fiked site and set ambushes along the relief force's likely avenues of approach. Guevara emphasized the importance of blocking reinforcing elements: 'Whenever there are sufficient forces ... all roads should be protected with ambushes in order to detain reinCorcements."'" He was even more forceful when he wrote, "...the arrival of enemy reinforcements at the scene of the fight can be prevented. A close watch over the points of access is ... an axiom never to be forgotten by the guerrilla fighter."" El Salvador's guerrillas have taken this lesson to heart. In many cases, attacks are carried out against fiied sites, such as a town or bridge, for no other reason than to draw in the relief force. On several occasions, the relief force has suffered as many casualties as the defense force on the site. A good example of this tactic occurred in June 1984 when guerrillas captured the Cerron Grande Dam during the night. At dawn, three relief columns started out to relieve the dam, but guerrillas ambushed and stopped each column. Not a single relief element arrived on the ground. An air assault recaptured the dam in the afternoon. (Depending on circumstances, one solution is for the relief element to attack the guerrillas' assault force and not try to reinforce the defense force.) Other opportunities for a guerrilla ambush occur while friendly elements are carrying out offensive operations. In these cases, guerrillas will try to avoid the maneuver units themselves and concentrate on ambushes along supporting LOCs. Another vulnerable circumstance occurs at the operation's end. As units return to garrison, they may be running out of fuel, and the troops may be lax after days or weeks of not finding anything. Guerrillas take advantage of these circumstances. The time of day can also be important. If the counterguerrilla force has good, close air support, is capable of rapid reinforcement, or if the terrain is poor for guerrilla operations. the guerrillas will put more emphasis on night ambushes. The attackers can then use the cover of darkness to escape. George Grivas recommended that ambushes are better, "at sunset to take advantage of the few minutes of light for the attack or, at any rate, during the early evening hours, to allow sufficient time for the guerrillas to make the getaway." ARMOR - November-December 7989 7 think they can carry out a daylight ambush and escape, they will. In addition to the circumstances and times that increase the odds of ambush. terrain is a critical factor. Guevara lists. "perfect knowledge of the ground." as an essential element of tactics before attacking a column.'3 Some of the requirements Mao recommended for terrain are: good cover for the attackers, yet allowing observation of the victim; a site that allows attackers to use maximum firepower: and one that allows the attackers "to leap out rapidlv at one bound from ambush and come to grips with the enemy."" He also prefers spots where the enemy, "cannot use their weapons and where it is not easy for them to manifest their full strength."" Grivas specifically said to attack a motorized column near a bend in the road to slow it down, and where terrain doesn't allow the vehicles to maneuver or for.them to use their weapons. Effective use was made of terrain for ambushes in Malaya and Korea. 8 ~~ ARMOR - November-December 1989

In Malaya, the few roads were winding, hilly, and cut through thick vegetation and narrow gorges. Most ambushes, "occurred while they (the vehicles) were moving through dense jungles where the attackers had the tactical advantage of ,con-cealnient and close-range firing. 16 "In Korea, ambushers used the same tactics. Although there wasn't as much vegetation, there were plenty of boulders and rock outcroppings for concealment. "Convoys and patrols were frequently ambushed in mountain passes where the road was through rock defiles."" In examining guerrilla writings and how they apply their tactics, you can identify a number of common ambush characteristics. cape. Overall, guerrillas are outnumbered, and weapons and people are not expendable. They don't have the government's strength, or ability to recruit large numbers. For this reason, a heavy emphasis is placed on withdrawal routes, and ensuring the government force cannot react quickly enough to block that withdrawal. Guerrilla ambushes generally follow the same pattern. North Vietnam's General Giap described "four quick phases of the ambush: quick concentration, quick attack, quick clearing and securing, and quick withdrawal. Other guerrilla writers address an important first step - one General Starry called "one slow." This step is planning. Guerrilla writers describe several different ways guerrillas can ambush a column, but they all use three basic principles. The first is surprise. As with our own principles of war, surprise is required for a successful guerrilla ambush. Sometimes the victim's force outnumbers the ambusher's. Or, the victim's capabilities to reinforce or to call in artillery are significant. In either case, guerrillas want surprise to negate those advantages. The second principle is violent attack. For the same reasons, guerrillas want to ensure that the victims' return fire, if any, is ineffective. Reacting to shock and casualties, the victims should not be able to return lire. Also, a quick attack allows the successful execution of the last principle. This last principle is withdrawal. It does no good for guerrillas to have a successful ambush if they can't es-The concept of guerrilla planning for any military operation, including the ambush, is important. Guerrillas - both in practice, such as in El Salvador and Vietnam, and in writings - emphasize deliberate planning, intelligence and rehearsal before carrying out operations. Mao emphasized the importance of intelligence on the enemy column when he wrote, "But first we must understand their plans, the direction in which they are advancing, and the time it will take them to pass. We must also reflect in detail on the location ...." 18 Guevara goes into more detail on the planning factors. Essential elements of guerrilla tactics must always be kept in mind: perfect knowledge of the ground, surveillance and foresight of escape routes, vigilance over all the secondary roads that can bring support to the point of attack, intimacy with people in the zone for support, numerical superiority at a chosen point, total mobility, the possibility of counting on reserves."19 This list shows the amount of planning guerrillas put into a deliberate ambush. The first "quick of the phases of the ambush is quick concentration. Because guerrillas are usually dispersed to avoid detection, they must come together for the attack. They must do it quickly to reduce the likelihood of detection and subsequent counterguerrilla action. Guerrillas usually spend little time in the assembly areas or at the ambush site for the same reason. Mao recommends not to lie in ambush too long because of the increased chance of discovery, and because the vigilance of the guerrillas begins to drop. Also, "...if we have already been discovered by the enemy, we should immediately either launch our attack or withdraw."20 Next is qziick attack. This carries with it the element of surprise and the coordinated use of firepower. A quick attack reduces the possibility of the enemy's ability to react, to reinforce itself, and to use artillery or close air support; yet it allows the guerrillas to follow through on success. Grivas emphasized a few times that the attack should only last a few minutes. "Most important of all, the duration of an attack was very short, only four or five minutes, in which case the party or convoy attacked had not time to recover from their surprise and act."" A typical guerrilla antiarmor attack can include antiarmor fire and the simultaneous detonation of mines. This is followed by a quick firefight during which Molotov cocktails or other explosives can be used at close range. ARMOR - November-December 7989 9

"Another step that dominates guerrilla thinking in the ambush is the quick withdrawal. There is probably no other point repeated as often as this by a variety of guerrilla writers and practitioners." The next "quick" doesn't receive as much emphasis as the others, but if the guerrillas have neutralized the column and are sure they can escape, they will quickly clear arid seciire the area. Often, ambushes have the major objective of acquiring weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other supplies. Clearing the area also means collecting their own casualties to prevent assessments of guerrilla casualties, or the capture and interrogation of wounded personnel. Another step that dominates guerrilla thinking in the ambush is the quick withdruwal. There is probably no other point repeated as often as this by a variety of guerrilla writers and practitioners. In fact, this phase is so important that guerrillas usually will not execute a deliberate ambush without a good possibility of escape. Both Mao and Guevara emphasized the importance of planning good escape routes. Mao said, "...we must carefully select in advance the route for our own withdrawal."2' Grivas also wrote, "Generally speaking, the question of our retreat after the engagement should be studied from the moment we set the ambush. A path of escape must be constantly borne in The reason for this emphasis is that guerrillas are usually tactically outnumbered - and they don't like useless casualties. The importance and use of an escape route is exemplified by a Viet Cong ambush against the 11th ACR in October 1%. The Viet Cong escape route was planned along a trail under a heavy canopy of jungle. They built defensive bunkers at key locations to defend the route, and additional bunkers along two kilometers of trail for shelter against close air attack. This preparation proved to be key because the relief units quickly moved into the area. Yet, despite the relief forces getting to the ambush area in 35 minutes, "the squadron failed to trap the main force of the enemy."24 It's important to remember that the guerrilla's capability to attack armor can vary from group to group or even band to band. Only by knowing the specific threat in your area can you anticipate how he will attack an armored force. However, keep in mind the principles and phases of a guerrilla ambush. Expect surprise. Remember the am-hush will be a short, sharp firefight at close range. Anticipate his escape. Notes 'American University Special Operations Research Office, *rets of Underground Oraanization and ODerations. (Washington D.C., American University, 1966). p. 213. *Dorm A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies (Washington D.C., Department of the Army, 1978), p. 79. 3Simon Dunstan. Vietnam Tracks: Armor in Battle, 194575, (Novato, Calif., Presidio Press. 1982). pp. 13-15. 4~tarry, p. 106. 5Ma0 Tse-tung, Basic Tactics (New York. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 6George Grhras, General Grivas on Guer- -- rilla Warfare (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962), p. 99. 7 ~ e r i c a n University special Operations Research Office, Secrets of Underground Oraanization and Operations, p. 214. 1966). p. 102. 8~tmrto hyo, aestions tor a Guerrilla, (Boulder, Colo. Paladin Press, 1975), p. 30. 'Che Guwara, @errilla Warfare (tin-coln, University of Nebraska Press, 1985).

p. 63. "lbid., p. 105. "lbid., p. 66. 12Grivas, p. 61. 13Guwara, p. 64. 151bid., p. 103. "American university Special operations Research Office, Secrets of Underground Oraanlzation and Operations, p. 14~a0, p. 104. 215. 171bid. 18Mao, p. 103 "Guevara, p. 64. 20Mao, p. 105. 21Grivas, pp. 63-64. =Mae, p. 103. 23Grivas, p. 100. 24John Albright . and Allan W. Sandstrum, "Convoy Ambush on Highway 1," in Seven Firefiahts in Vietnam. ed. John A. Cash, (Washington D.C.. Office of the Chief of Military History, 1985). p. 57. Captain Raymond W. Levesque has served as the 52, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Armor), 1st Cavalry Division; editor, Military Intelligence Magazine; officer-in-charge, El Salvador Analytical Cell, U.S. Southern Command; and as an instructorlwriter in the Low-Intensity Task Group, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He recently commanded F Company, 2d MI Battalion. He is currently assigned as

J2, USSOUTHCOM.

10 ARMOR - November-December 7989