An Estimate of the Armor Situation

An Estimate of ihe Armor Siruation by General Bruce C. Clarke (USA, Ret.) I believe that today’s Regular armor officer career structure still suffers from the pre-WW I1 ‘branch clubs’ that characterized Regular officer career structures of that era. There is no place, no requirement, in today’s armor force structure for such career structure imprudence. The need in today’s armor force is for armor generalists, not armor specialists (armor, cavalry). Allow me the privilege of telling you how it was; how we faced WW I1 without proper staff training; how we overcame those difficulties in the midst of war - and how things have reverted since that war. During my tenure a a student at the Command and General Staff School from 1939 to 1940 (our class was graduated early because of the war in Europe), our entire training syllabus focused on the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine (i.e., defense of the Western Hemisphere with that of the Philippine Islands thrown in as a sort of an afterthought). There was nothing in our curriculum that encouraged - or even countenanced - the study of the role of armored forces of that day or in the future. We studied armor as it had been used in WW I

- solely as an infantry support arm. As good as those tactics were in 1918, Hitler’s panzer divisions were writing a whole new book as they stormed through Europe. We largely ignored that book. In 1940, General Marshall reorganized the U.S. armed forces. He created an Armored Force, the Army Air Corps, eliminated the horse as the prime mover, and took armor away from the infantry. Each of these changes had a profound effect on how we fought WW 11, but none was so dramatic as the creation of the Armored Force that served with such distinction in all theaters of that war.

In 1948, I was selected to chair a board to recommend a new Army branch. We-called it Armor-and devised the distinctive insignia still in use - the tank and crossed sabers.

The post-WW I1 decades saw our country become a part of the NATO defense structure of Western Europe. We also became committed to the defense of South Korea. Today, our potential military commitments range from Central and South America to the Mediterranean and southwest Asia, in addition to our European and Korean agreements. We maintain an Army of more than 300,000 troops in West Germany alone, and have substantial forces in South Korea.

These forces now require extensive sea and airlift support facilities, and that requirement will be vastly increased in the event of war.

My immediate concern, however, is our armor force - how perceived global situations will affect its on-site operations and how we will fare in providing logistical support. A close look at some presumed scenarios may well prevent a recurrence of the shortcomings in planning and organization and the near-disastrous early armor battles we fought in WW 11. The key, of course, lies in the training of armor generalist officers and not in ‘branch specialists.’

While the foregoing represents a very broad estimate of the global situation, let me focus on how it applies only to armor. It is obvious that strategic transportation problems are magnified by the size and weight of armor weapons and equipment, and the modern mechanized force’s tremendous requirements for fuel, maintenance, parts, and logistics. But, how should training, logistics planning, tactics, research and development, and our school courses - especially at the Armor School and at the Command and General Staff College - address the situation confronting us? These general considerations seem applicable: Our laws, policies, and severe penalties for failure require us to be prepared to receive and cope with an enemy offense in strength -heavy in armor in NATO, especially.

The situation which found our Armored Force pursuing a defeated enemy across France in 1944 will not soon be repeated (i.e., we are commmitted by policy to the strategic defensive).

These specific questions need consideration: Is it probable, or even possible, that an armored division will be employed in Korea?

Will it be employed in the Mediterranean area, or in Central America?

Will armor continue to be the backbone of NATO’s defense? Will the Warsaw Pact Forces continue to be strong in armor? Can a Warsaw Pact attack be halted and defeated without NATO strength in armor?

How effective will AirLand Battle tactics be against a first-class enemy?

Will we be able to quickly augment and support our troops in NATO in face of a first-class enemy naval threat?

What will be our losses in personnel and equipment during the first month of a Warsaw Pact attack? Can we replace these losses? Can we sustain the fight? The following is a brief history of how my armored commands in World War I1 dealt with the problem of sustaining combat. I offer it as food for thought to today’s planners and organizers: When General Chaffee issued his directive for the TO&E of an armored division in 1940, he specified that there be two combat commands and a reserve command. He visualized that there needed to be a rotation of tank and armored infantry battalions from combat commands to the reserve command after two, three, or four days of continual battle, to do vehicle maintenance, personnel rehabilitation, and such things. The reserve command could be employed rather promptly in case of an emergency, but was not normally used in this manner.

The 4th Armored Division was organized, trained, and operated in battle along the lines of General Chaffee’s concept. It was highly successful. When I went from the 4th Armored Division to the 7th Armored Division on 1 November 1944, General Hasbrouck and I replaced generals who were relieved, reduced to colonel, and ordered home. We found a division that had been under the command of a former infantry officer who did not understand this employment of armored forces. He had three fixed combat commands (CC “A”, CC “B”, and CC “R”). Their composition was never changed. All three were normally engaged in an operation in the classic “two up, one back” formation. There was little flexibility and the battalions were poorly maintained, physically and mentally depleted, and about 50 percent effective. Both General Hasbrouck and I had served in the 4th Armored Division in training at Pine Camp, New York. General Hasbrouck reorganized the unit to operate under the Chaffee concept of organization and deployment. This served us well in the Battle of the Bulge at St. Vith six weeks later.

When Montgomery replaced Bradley in command of the 1st and 9th US. Armies at noon on 20 December 1944, he is reputed to have said at once: “There comes a time in any battle when you take time out to tidy up the battlefield.” In other words, he was ensuring long-term success of his operations by bringing some organization to the confusion of the battlefield. Montgomery had learned well the lessons of armored combat from his experience defeating Rommel in North Africa. Today, our armored divisions are organized for training and for battle as was the 7th Armored Division on 1 November 1944. Is it the correct way to do it? Does it facilitate sustained operations in a prolonged battle?

The inexperienced do not understand the effects of claustrophobia on troops who spend long hours in battle inside of an armored fighting vehicle.

How would the problems differ if the Russian main effort is against NORTHAG instead of CENTAG? When we begin to employ the air-ground concept early in the fight, what support from the Zone of the Interior will we need at once to sustain the level of intensity necessary to win?

Will not our armored cavalry units in Germany have to fight defensively at first? Are they equipped to do that? (During the first two days of the Battle of the Bulge, the 14th Armored Cavalry Group was destroyed as an effective fighting force by an enemy whose mobility, equipment, tactics, and intensity was strikingly similar to the enemy we now confront.) What is the likelihood of using tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO? Will we be the first to use them if enemy success with chemical weapons threatens to break our resistance? Can we secure their release from national command authority in a timely manner?

Undoubtedly, we expect our attack helicopters to play a key role in defeating the Russian attack on NATO. Will the Russians be able to defend against them?

Logistics will play an even more important part in the next war -especially in armor units. Do our planners incorporate realistic logistics requirements into contingency plans.

0 Early warning in Korea and NATO is especially important. Will our intelligence branch be able to do that? Conversely, will our commanders and staffs put too much reliance on these G-2s at the expense of their own judgment? The battlefield of any future war will be fluid. It will call for leaders and commanders, at the battalion level and below, to exercise initiative and imagination and to act quickly in a crisis. Command and staff operations must be able to cope with those situations. The main job of a commander in modern battle, especially in a defensive one, is to prevent the confusion from becoming disorganized. Does our training encourage young leaders and commanders to do this? Is our school system functioning in a manner to promote this? (Please read my article on the purpose of our Army school system in the May 1986 Military Reuiew.)

When I was a student at the Command and General Staff School in 1939, its motto was: “Staffs talk while soldiers walk - do not slow them down.”The tempo of modern battle may be many times the speed of marching soldiers. Can our modern commanders and staffs in battle cope with the modern tempo of operations? Can we really operate in an efficient enough manner to work inside the enemy commander’s decision cycle?

I found as a brigade commander - in both offensive and defensive battles in World War I1 -that command and staff actions could not keep up with a speed of movement of 15 mph.

Command and staff inertia is the cancer that eats away at the effectiveness of a command. It is bad in times of peace, but it is often fatal to the command in war.

The Chief of Staff and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 staff organization was originated in World War I when there was little mobility in trench warfare. It is not particularly efficient in operations at 2% miles an hour, and is inefficient in mobile warfare at 15 miles an hour, or faster. ~ I found that the use of an Operations Section (containing G-2, G-3, and the commander) and a Logistics Section (under the Chief of Staff with the rest of the staff) provides a prompt and balanced action organization for handling the requirements of battle. We had no trouble coordinating the two. In the Battle of the Bulge, all of our corps, Army and Army group commanders were infantry officers trained in the old school. They had never considered armored divisions in Army schools and colleges, and were not aware of its tactics, organization, command structure, logistics, and mobility. This cost the Army dearly in casualties the first few weeks of the battle. Do we continue to provide education for our general officers throughout their careers? Even 4-star generals have things to learn.

A general officer in command of troops must be a general officer (little g) and not a general of a branch if he is to handle his military unit as a balanced team. This also applies to general staff officers of division and higher units. Have we worked to eliminate the “branch clubs” from our general officer ranks?

If we have to repel a Warsaw Pact attack as a part of NATO, our enemies will have many advantages. Only a very high order of commandership, generalship, training, morale, motivation, leadership, and logistical support will win. We cannot afford to be mediocre in any of these. Are we emphasizing these aspects of successful units today? The proposed division and troop basis of the Total Army is planned as 372 combat battalions organized into 28 divisions (15 infantry or mechanized infantry divisions, five armored divisions, one airborne division, one air-assault division, one cavalry division (actually an armored division), and five light divisions - counting Regular Army, Reserve and National Guard forces). Is this spread what we need as a result of our estimate of the 1990 situation?

We now teach that the basic combined arms combat battalion consists of a tank company or companies, mechanized infantry company or companies, an armored engineer platoon or company, and a field artillery battery or more, with some air support. The battalion commander of this composite battle unit will be an armor or an infantry lieutenant colonel. The tanks and mechanized infantry must be coached in close teamwork. Is this being done in our armor and infantry schools? In our units? The Payoff If we can successfully address each of these specific considerations, the payoff will be success on the battlefield with fewer American casualties. The American people have been conditioned by the media to scrutinize all military operations closely, and will demand striking results with low casualty lists. We can deliver this only if we have correctly estimated the situation with respect to our forces, and then act accordingly. We must have the courage to do this.

The Disadvantage of Two “Branches” in Armor I recently received a letter from Fort Knox stating that it was the Home of Armor and Cavalry. This followed a letter from a major of armor who signed as a major of cavalry.

This indicated to me there is a concept at Fort Knox, and in our armor units, that there is - for all practical purposes - a split in armor into two branches.

Some checking of the careers of Regular Armor officers indicates that they often have a series of repeat experiences in only tank or only cavalry units. Many have been assigned to only one of these types of armor units in their career. This, I firmly believe, is a detriment to the careers of Regular Armor officers, and to the Army in case of expansion upon mobilization. In such an event, the Regular Armor officer should be able to perform with distinction in a tank unit, a mechanized reconnaissance unit, or on the staff or in command of an armor division. He should be qualified to be on the staff of a corps or to be a corps commander. He should be qualified to be on a high level planning staff. The Army at that time will need and promote armor generalists over armor specialists.

G E N E R A L B R U C E C .

CLARKE was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers upon graduation from West Point in 1925, but made his nameasan Armor commander in an illustrious 44-year career. Clarke is best remembered for his valiant stand at St. Vith, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, when units under his command deflected and then stopped German spearheads racing for the Channel. General Clarke commanded at every level of the Army, including CG, USAREUR; CG, Continental Army Command; CG, USARPAC; and CG, Seventh Army. He now resides in McLean, VA.