The Tank Battalion of the North Korean People's Army

The Tank Battalion of the North Korean People’s by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. Copyright 1986 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Preface

Until quite recently, there has been very little reliable ‘open source’ information available concerning North Korea’s armor force, and what little as been available tended to be highly speculative. However, there are now a small number of reliable documents which allow a preliminary examination of this force. It is this body of information, which provides the basis for the following article. Readers are still cautioned that the information provided here should be regarded as provisional in nature.

Introduction

Despite commonly accepted ideas which conclude that the Korean Peninsula is unsuitable for extended armored operations, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) has long held that armor has a major role to play in any conflict, and has held large tank formations as strategic assets. In fact, the impressive gains that North Korea has made during the past 15 years in increasing its offensive capabilities are, perhaps, best typified by the improvements made to its armor force. In 1970, the NKPA possessed a force of only 1,000 armored vehicles, the majority of which were obsolete SU-100 assault guns and T-34 tanks. Though some armored personnel carriers (APCs) were in service, none were considered organic to tank units. By the end of 1976, this armor force had grown to Army 2,000+ vehicles, with its mainstay being the T-54/T-55/Type-59 medium tank. In addition, a sizable fleet of APCs had been fielded, with the majority of these being assigned to the mechanized infantry units organic to the armored regiments and divisions. Today, The NKPA armor force consists of 3,200+ vehicles, while the fleet of APCs consists of 2,200+ vehicles, which are primarily assigned to armored and mechanized divisions, and the armored brigadedregiments.

Subordination

Within the peacetime NKPA there are primarily three types of tank formations: the armored division, the armored brigadelregiment, and the division level tank battalion.1 The tank battalion within the armored division is first subordinate to its brigade headquarters, and then to division HQ, which in turn is subordinate to the General Staff Department (GHQ). Within the armored brigadehegiment, the tank battalion is subordinate to its brigade headquarters, which in turn is subordinate to either a corps HQ or GHQ. The division-level tank battalion is directly subordinate to the division HQ. Additionally, there are a very small number of light tank battalions (amphibious), which are apparently directly subordinate to GHQ but attached to the I and I1 ‘DMZ’ Corps to support amphibious operations along the east coast and Han River estuary respectively, and the I11 Corps for anti-invasion operations along the western coast.* Organization The structure of the NKPA tank battalion (figure 1) is quite similar to both the ‘standard’ Soviet and other COMCON tank battalions. It is organized into: a. Headquarters Command Element Rear Services Platoon b. 3 Tank Companies Headquarters 3 Tank Platoons The battalion is typically commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with companies commanded by a major or captain. It has a strength of 192 (29 officers and 163 enlisted men) and is assessed as having 31 T-34, T-54/T-55/Type-59, or T-62 medium tanks, 1 APC, and 10-15 trucks.3 The 31 tanks are distributed as follows: one for the battalion commander, and three companies of ten tanks each. Each tank company has one tank for the commander, and three platoons of three tanks each. The actual type of medium tank a battalion is equipped with is apparently dependent upon its parent unit’s type, location, and importance within NKPA operational plans.

Numerous changes have taken place within the tank battalion during the past 15 years. Most significant of these was the receipt of 1 ,OOO+ T-54/T-55/Type-59 medium tanks from China and the Soviet Union, during the period from 1971-1977. This enabled the-assault guns in all armored formations to be replaced with tanks and the stan-10!

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Priority for these changes went first to the armored divisions and regiments, then to the ‘DMZ’ divisions, and finally to the ‘rear area’ divi ~ ion . ~ So, as the number of available T-54/T-55/Type-59-equipped battalions increased, those equipped with the T-34s were transferred to the ‘rear area’ divisions and GHQ infantry brigades (i.e. combined arms brigades). By 1977, approximately 22 percent of the NKPA’s tank battalions were still equipped with the T-34. However, these battalions were now equipped solely with T-34, thereby easing logistic problems. Additionally, 18 percent of the NKPAs tank battalions still had only two subordinate tank companies, or a total of 21 tanks per battalion. This was especially true for the infantry/ motorized infantry divisions within the ‘rear area’ corps. Five years later, in 1982, this situation had changed significantly, with the T-54/T-55/Type-59 and current organization being accepted as ‘standard’ in the NKPA. While the T-62 is believed to be ‘limited standard’, and the majority of the T-34s are now assigned to the Armor Command’s School Bureau, GHQ level independent brigades, and paramilitary units. The structure of the light tank battalion (amphibious) is uncertain; however, it is believed to be similar to the ‘standard’ tank battalion, but has 31 PT-76/Type-63 light tanks and a personnel strength of 20 officers and 132 enlisted men.5 Of considerable interest within the realm of NKPA light tank operations is the fielding of a new, indigenously produced, light tank during the past 2 years. This vehicle is possibly based upon a heavily modified PT-76 chassis, and mounts a variant of the Chinese 85-mm tank gun in a conical ‘PT-76-type’ turret. Mounted above the gun tube (a la’ BMP) is a 9M14 “Malyutka” ATGM (AT-3 “Sagger”).

Combat Operations NKPA armor doctrine is based primarily upon their limited Korean

- ‘Fatherland Liberation’ - War experiences, with additional influence being exerted by Soviet WWII experiences. They have blended these experiences to meet their own unique requirements. Additionally, it is believed that the role of armor in NKPA combat doctrine is currently undergoing revision, due both to the increasing size and capa- ~ Type 62 light tanks Armor of the NKPA

Type 63 light amphibious tank -Type 63 armored personnel carriers bilities of the armor force, and sibly due to the study of ar employment during Soviet op tions in Afghanistan, the Syi operations in Lebanon, and Iran-Iraq war.6 Offensive Operation: Dui offensive operations, the tank talion will be employed either single unit, or in companies, tc ploit any breaches; establis breach through which infar units can penetrate; or providc rect support to attacking infai units.

Tank assembly areas will typi ly be 10-15 km from the FEBA, 1 the ‘line of departure’ for an at1 being 1-4 km from the FEBA. 1 ing movement to combat, t speeds will be highly depenc upon terrain conditions and tactical situation. Approxin daytime speeds of 15-30 km/h be achieved while traveling roads, and 10-20 km/h when n ing cross-country. Night-time m ment rates will be approxima one-half that of the daytime ra Standard NKPA operational trine calls for the employmen three echelons (first, second, ai reserve). This three-echelon org zation provides a tactical dt that allows for a fair degree of fl bility in exploiting any pent tion. Depending upon the tact situation, the tank battalion ca employed in any of these echell When attached to an infai brigadelregiment, the tactical ployment of the tank battalio determined by the infantry gadelregiment commander, acc ing to the tactical situation terrain conditions. The comma1 will typically detach a “resc force” consisting of approxima one tank company (-) and one fantry company (-). This ‘rest force’ is used for rear area and fl protection, to repel counteratta for penetration and exploitat and to intensify the attack. remainder of the tank batta will be employed in company-s elements, in support of the : echelon infantry battalions. Prior to an attack, ‘clearance teams’ of combat engineers, equipped with mine detectors and probes, will clear a path in front of the lead tanks. These teams will also conduct engineer reconnais- “...During the Korea War, the NKPA was able to employ small tank units in terrain considered to be impassable.. . I. sance, and seek out enemy troop dispositions, warning devices, or obstacles. Upon receipt of the attack order, a tank company will advance with a frontage of 200-400m, a depth of 200-1,000m, and a distance of 30-50m between each vehicle. The main body of infantry will then advance 300-500m to the rear of the tanks. If instead, the attack is supported by mechanized infantry, the APCs will advance 100-200m behind the tanks. The tanks will attempt to suppress enemy forces while the infantry maneuver to the flanks and envelop the enemy position. As an alternative, the infantry will first advance 500-1,000m, and then tanks will come on line, taking up ‘hull down’ positions. From these positions, the tanks will provide direct fire support to the attacking infantry. During the attack, tank crews will typically fight “buttoned up”. Additionally, it is believed that a tank battalion/company will not “breakdown” its platoons, as was frequently done during the Korean War.

When operating as part of a armored brigadehegiment attack, the tank battalion will typically be employed as a single unit. Its mission will be to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and exploit all breaches to the maximum. The tank battalion will normally be supported by elements from the brigadehegiment’s mechanized infantry battalion. One of the primary missions of this supporting infantry will be to suppress and destroy enemy antitank teams. A tank battalion, or company, will advance using “fire and maneuver” tactics. With one company/platoon being assigned to provide “covering fire”, while the remaining two move to attack a flank. It is believed that “fire and maneuver” tactics are not usually practiced below company level. It is presently unknown to what degree the NKPA intends to engage in traditional armor vs. armor operations. Nor is it known to what extent they train for such eventualities. It is probable that the current doctrinal developments will address this point.

Defensive Operations: During defensive operations with the infantry division, the tank battalion will be employed as a mobile reserve or for counterattacks. It will not normally be tasked with the static defense of terrain. The battalion will be fully integrated into the division’s defensive fire plan, both in the direct and possibly indirect fire support roles. The tank battalion within a rear area infantry division is usually garrisoned at a single installation, with site selection evidently being based upon access to good roads for flexible commitment, and on proximity to the main threat area within the division’s area of operation.

When deployed in defensive positions along the DMZ, an infantry division’s tank battalion is garrisoned at a single installation along a route leading into North Korea. Previously, it was believed that these tank battalions were garrisoned in company echelon near the infantry regiments they were likely to support. However, this is no longer the case, though some ‘DMZ’ divisions do have one or more tactical armor sites which are temporarily occupied by a tank company each, from time to time.7 These sites include the heavily fortified ‘Type-400’ and ‘Type-500’ bunkers for storage, and specially prepared firing positions (see NKPA Bunkers).

When conducting defensive operations as part of an armored division or brigadehegiment, the tank battalion will be deployed as a mobile reserve, or counterattack force. Camouflage and Movement: In light of the North’s deep concern over ROK/US air preemptiodair superiority, and the proliferation of ROK/US antitank weapons, NKPA tankers will make extensive use of night movement (using secondary roads and trails), and camouflage. Although the employment of tanks in Korea is heavily dependent upon road and terrain considerations, it should be remembered that during the Korean War the NKPA was able to employ small tank units (1-3 tanks), in terrain considered to be impassable to tanks. Camouflage methods employed are likely to follow the tactics developed during the Korean War. During that conflict, NKPA tanks employed camouflage in 84 percent of all tank vs. tanks battles; and available evidence suggests that in terms of camouflage techniques and discipline, the North Koreans were the equal of the very able German Army of World War 11. When aircraft approached, the tank crews lit smudge pots or oily rags near the tanks to give the impression that the tanks were burning. Tanks were crashed into a house, or thatched roofs were used as concealment. Tanks were parked beside destroyed trucks or tanks. And some tanks were painted with US. markings. Additionally, NKPA commanders will fully utilize the extensive network of underground bunkers to conceal and protect their tank assets. , Conclusions The NKPA tank battalion is well organized and apparently well trained in sound combat doctrine. Whether employed on the offense or defense, its mobility and firepower endow it with the potential to be one of the principal NKPA instruments for influencing the course of battle. Whether the tank battalion will fully realize this combat potential is difficult to predict. Possible shortcomings include a rigid command structure, and the age and effectiveness of its equipment. The age of its equipment will become more evident with the deployment of the new South Korean XK-1 tank. However, with regards to these shortcomings, it should be pointed out that during the Korean War, NKPA commanders allowed subordinates a certain degree of flexibility in achieving their objectives, so long as the objectives were achieved. Additionally, the age of its equipment may not be that significant a factor, due to the tactical restrictions imposed upon all armored combat by the terrain.

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bunker through one entrance and towed out the other. This position is not usually interconnected with any other bunker, but may be located near such a defensive position. A ‘Type-500‘tactical bunker (figure

3) measures 5 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3.5-4 meters high. lt is completely lined with concrete, air-tight, and designed for the emplacement of tanks and special-type artillery (antitank weapons). The position includes sealed, steel protective doors, spaces for placement of tanks or artillery pieces, firing embrasures, and a pit extended outside to remove exhaust. This position isalways interconnected with another bunker system.

Both these bunker systems arefre-quently combined with either obstacles such as barbed wire fences, or anti-vehicle barriers such as ditches or ‘dragons teeth’.

Footnotes

‘Medium tank battalions also exist within several GHQ level independent brigades, most notably the ‘Combined Arms Brigades’. ‘The western sections of the I11 Corps are characterized by extensive rice paddies and the Taedong River. The amphibious capabilities of the PT-76/Type-63 light tanks would be of great value in such terrain. :’The T-54 and T-55 are Soviet-manufactured medium tanks while the Type-59 is essentially a PRC-produced copy of the T-54. Due to the close similarities in the physical and performance characteristics, the three types are lumped together throughout this report. The T-62 is believed to have entered ‘limited’ North Korean production in 1978. ‘In this report ‘DMZ’ refers to any division deployed within the I, 11, IV, or V Corps along the ‘DMZ’, while ‘rear area’ refers to all other divisions with the exception of those located within the I11 Corps.

5The Type-63 is essentially a PRC-produced copy of the PT-76, mounting a 85-mm gun in a new turret.

GNorth Korea has both sold weapons and had advisors/observers in these countries for a number of years.

‘While no specific pattern has been discerned, the more likely explanations for ths type of deployment include: a. A defensive precaution triggered by a perceived increase in enemy activity.

b. Phase of the moon ‘stand-to’.

c. Training related mobility exercises.

d. Area familiarization.

JOSEPH S. BERMUDEZ.

JR. is a computer programmer and managing director of MEEG Research Associates. He has also written widely on Mideast and Northeast Asian military affairs, with articles published in Jane’s Defense Review. International Defense Review, and ARMOR, among others.