The Soviet Reaction to a Flank Threat

The Soviet Reaction to a Flank Threat by Sergeant First Class Peter L. Bunce Since publication of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, the military press has discussed, at some length, the proposition of deep attack and counterattack.’ A common tactic examined has been the counterattack aimed at exploiting the Soviets’ “open” flanks. Yet, almost without exception, these same writers have avoided discussing the Soviet reaction to such a threat; indeed, with one or two notable exceptions, the press has not presented what elements the Soviets have behind their lines, or between their echelons, that can significantly affect the progress and success of such deep attacks and counterattacks. That the Soviets are aware of the danger of threats to their flanks should not come as any great surprise; after all, their own preferred manner of attack is the flank attack or envelopment.2 The Soviets have long recognized the danger that their style of warfare poses to the flanks of their forces: The presence of open flanks of podrazdeleniya will be an ordinary phenomenon in the conduct of an attack along axes under contemporary conditions. The flanks of the com- *Podrazdeleniya: A subordinate subunit of a unit (Chat‘), (e&. a subordinate battalion of a regiment). 28 november-december 1985 bat formation are most vulnerable because the main effort of troops in the attack is directed toward the front. In case the enemy moves to the flank of attacking podrazdeleniya, he immediately receives serious advantages and can force them to a hasty regrouping to the flank .a In addition to the use of chemical agents to protect flanks4 - a threat which would require any counterattack force to conduct its operation in a high MOPP level - the Soviets have a number of dedicated units which figure quite significantly in their reaction to a counterattack: The mobile obstacle detachment, POZ, (poduizhnyyotry-adzagrazhdeniy) appeared in the Great Patriotic War and retains its significance at the present time. It is chiefly designed to set up minefields on identified axes of counterattacks by enemy tanks, to d e stroy objectives (bridges, road junctions, defiles, etc.) to the front and on the flanks of the deployed antitank reserve within range of its fire.5 Both the Soviet regiment and the division have a POZ. At regiment, the POZ is formed around the regimental engineer company’s minelayer platoon of three PMR-3 minelayers towed by trucks or APCs.6 There have been some reports that the PMRs are being replaced in maneuver regiments, though, by the self-propelled GMZ minelayer.’ At the division level, the Soviets build the POZ around the minelayer platoon (three GMZs of the combat engineer company of the division’s engineer battalion).8 The PMR-3 towed mechanical minelayer has a capacity of 120 antitank mines and can lay them to a depth of six to eight inches at 4- to 5.5-meter intervals and at a rate of 10 to 12 mines per minute. Reloading time is 12 to 15 minutes. This piece of equipment has a crew of four or five soldiers. The Soviets also have a newer minelayer, the PMZ-4, that has an increased capacity of 200 mines. The vehicle that the Soviets usually use to tow these minelayers is the BTR-152, although BTRBO APCs or trucks such as the ZIL-157 and URAL-375 are also suitable. The GMZ minelayer, however, is self-propelled. The GMZ minelayer is built on a chassis similar to that of the SA4 GANEF air defense missile system and weighs about 25 tons. The GMZ has a capacity of 208 mines and can bury them at a rate of four per minute or can surface-lay them at a rate of eight a minute at intervals of 4 to 5.5 meters. Its four-man crew can reload it in 12 to 15 minutes.9

The Antitank Reserve Like the POZ, the antitank reserve is a force found at both the divisional and regimental levels. It normally deploys behind the first echelon of its parent unit, and its mission is to delay or channelize enemy advances in order for its parent unit to deploy forces for counterattacks. In the motorized rifle regiment, the antitank reserve is built around the regimental antitank missile battery; at the motorized rifle division level, this reserve is organized around the antitank battalion.lO The regimental antitank battery consists of nine BRDM missile carriers armed with the AT-3 SAGGER, although the newer AT-5 SPANDREL appears to be replacing the AT-3 in forward-deployed Soviet forces. Additionally, SAGGERs still in service reportedly have been modified with semi-automatic guidance and are somewhat faster than the earlier models. The missile-carrying BRDM is quite mobile, for it is basically a scout car and is not overloaded like the SA-9 GASKIN. The carrier can emplace and elevate its missiles, ready for firing, in one minute.” The divisional antitank battalion, found in Soviet and most Warsaw Pact motorized rifle divisions, consists of three batteries of T-12 100-mm antitank guns. Each battery has six guns, towed by MTLBs, a light, tracked armored vehicle. The division commander almost never parcels out the antitank battalion to his subordinate regiments. When deployed, the guns are spaced 200 to 500 meters apart and often on reverse slopes. The guns are usually about 1,500 to 2,000 meters from the minefields that they are assigned to cover. We have very little information about how long it takes to emplace a T-12 battalion, but a battalion of 122-mm D-30 howitzers, that are about the same weight as the T-12, can be prepared to move in 11 minutes (14 at night), march a kilometer in three minutes, and emplace in 23 minutes (32 at night).12 This implies that the T-12 battalion can displace over a distance of twenty kilometers (the distance between the first and second echelons of the division) and be set up to fire in about an hour and a half. In addition to the antitank units available to the Soviet commander, he can use his maneuver reserve: The reserve is usually created when deploying the combat formation in one echelon. It is designed to accomplish missions which arise unexpectedly in the course of an attack (repulse of counterattacks (my emphasis) ....) The combat mission is assigned to the reserve as it is committed.13 Ideal for the reserve in the Soviet motorized rifle division is the Independent Tank Battalion. It has five tank companies and a total of 51 tanks. (These are British figures; American estimates are of 41 tanks in four companies.) Normal Soviet practice is for a reinforced tank battalion to be used as a reserve and as a counterattack force deployed behind the second echelon. This “spare” unit, the independent tank battalion, is already larger than normal Soviet tank battalions and would be a natural candidate for that mission.14 The Operational Level The use of POZs and antitank reserves at the operational level (armies and fronts) is less clear than at the tactical level. There is some question as to whether Soviet combined arms armies still have antitank gun regiments, a legacy of WW II.15 However, the Soviets have been showing a great deal of interest in the “operational-level interchangeability between helicopters and tanks,” and have been discussing “the replacing of antitank reserves in which there are tank units with regiments or brigades of combat helicopters.”l6 The Soviets have had the capability, for some time, to surface-lay antitank mines from HIP helicopters,17 and the Soviets may be placing both the POZ and antitank reserve functions with army aviation at the operational level. In addition, Soviet armies may have available a remote mining capability in the new BM-27 220-mm multiple rocket launcher which is “reported to have minelets similar to the US 155-mm Area Denial Artillery Munition.” BM-27 battalions are found in brigades subordinate to front-level artillery divisions’* and, therefore, could be made available to subordinate armies. Planning Considerations If we assume that a POZ or regimental antitank battery can be prepared to move in under half an hour and that an antitank battalion can do the same, their controlling headquarters still need some warning time if they are to be able to react effectively to a counterattack. The Soviet planning figure for marching is 35 kilometers an hour.19 Add to that time the time for movement preparation, and it would still take nearly an hour for the reaction forces to arrive at the location from which they desire to defend against a counterattack. The POZ would require at least another 30 minutes to lay its first 500-meter strip of mines. Guardsand Recon Elements Those readers familiar with Soviet march formations will remember “flank guards” of roughly platoon size. These are hardly a “guard” in the US/NATO sense of the word “guard.” What they must be is a form of “tripwire.” As an entire battalion is on the same command net, any transmission made by the flank guard platoon can be (theoretically, at least) monitored by the battalion commander, and this transmission would give him a few kilometers’ warning. Because the Soviets practice a “two echelons down” command and control system, the battalion commander could (theoretically, again) be able to pass the warning on to division quite easily.20 More important than the role played by the flank guard is that played by regimental and divisional reconnaissance. The regimental reconnaissance company is organized into a number of small patrols of scout cars, BMPs, and motorcycles that operate up to half a day’s advance (15 to 20 kilometers) in front of the regiment. Divisional reconnaissance is organized in a similar manner and operates up to a day’s march (35 to 40 kilometers) ahead of the division. Soviet tac-november-december 1985 29 tical reconnaissance depends on infiltration, and its patrols and groups operate purely as scouts. They are trained to do no more than observe and report.Z1 The Division Chief of Reconnaissance and Intelligence controls all reconnaissance patrols in the division. What the regiment sees, division headquarters learns quickly through channels independent of normal command channels.22 A Scenario I n a counterattack scenario, where a US task force is attacking the flank of a Soviet regiment that has pulled ahead of one of its neighbors by about 15 kilometers, the counterattacking task force is sweeping-through the area covered by a neighboring regiment’s reconnaissance company, even if the task force is moving behind friendly lines. If the neighboring regiment is from the same division as the attacked regiment, the reconnaissance information need only be passed to division to get back down to the concerned regiment. If the neighboring regiment is from a different division, the information must be passed to army headquarters to be passed down to division. This sounds time-consuming and cumbersome, but the Soviets are expressing great interest in the use of automatic data processing equipment and computers in their centralized command and control structure down to division and perhaps regimental levels. With this sort of equipment, commanders would be able to pass warning information very quickly.23 If we pursue our counterattack scenario, the counterattacking task force will first know something has gone wrong when the lead platoons encounter neat furrows in the ground across their intended axes of advance. If the lead platoons fail to notice those furrows, the platoons will soon realize the danger as the lead vehicles begin to detonate mines. As the lead platoons begin to take actions to avoid or clear the mines, the Soviet antitank elements should then begin to fire their 100-mm APFSDS rounds. With the task force slowed or stalled, the regimental reserve, perhaps a reinforced tank company, will attempt to counter-counterattack on the task force’s flank. Should the task force fight its way through into the divisional area of responsibility - or attack behind the lead regiments -the entire response pattern could begin all over again but against larger forces with more advanced systems (ATGMs). Summary The purpose of this article is not to discourage counterattacking a Soviet enemy on his flank, but rather 30 november-december 1985 to inform the reader as to what to expect should he launch such a counterattack. We have seen that an elaborate tactical mechanism exists within Soviet units for pursuing their doctrine of deep attack and fast advances with “open” flanks, while retaining an acceptable degree of protection for those flanks. What should be also obvious is that to put that mechanism into effect takes time. If we can “turn inside” that time cycle, we can be successful in our counterattacks. Therefore, speed and initiative, combined with planning to counter probable Soviet reactions, become necessary allies in any counterattack against a Soviet flank. Once the commander identifies the counterattack axis, for example, he should then reexamine it for bottlenecks or areas where a minefield could channelize the task force into a good killing ground. The commander should plan linear artillery targets in areas of potential enemy antitank weapons positions, and he should plan smoke targets between logical antitank positions and possible obstacle locations. Task organization of the task force should permit retention of momentum. Attached engineers, for example, must accompany the lead elements of the task force and be equipped to perform minefield breaching and to provide emergency bridging of antitank ditches or blown bridges. What will kill a counterattack quickest is the old “hang-on-the-edge-of-the-minefield-until-the-engineers-arrive” routine. Mine rollers, although cumbersome, are a good means of minefield reconnaissance, and a limited means of breaching. Once the lead elements of the task force encounter obstacles, the lead teams should execute drills to pop smoke and quickly take cover to avoid casualties from enemy missiles or antitank guns. Aggressive action by breaching elements, combined with suppression of known or suspected enemy positions, are then a requirement to maintain the momentum of the counterattack. Hence, logistics planning should provide counterattacking forces with extra smoke grenade rounds for their launchers and an increased load of smoke rounds for the mortars and artillery supporting the counterattack. Counter-reconnaissance is also crucial. All of the task force elements must be alert to the odd vehicle or vehicles attempting to avoid contact and bypass the task force. If neighboring task forces have elminated all or most of the Footnotes For example, see: Doerfel, John S., “The Operational Art of the AirLand Battle,” Military Review, May 1982, pp. 3-10; Holder L. D., “Maneuver in the Deep Battle,” Military Review, May 1982, pp. 55-61; Barbara, James C., and Brown, Robert F., “Deep Thrust on the Extended Battlefield,” Military Review, October 1982, pp. 21-32; Lnncaster, Michael S. and Clemens, Jon, “AirLand Battle Defeat Mechanisms,” Armor, Jan-Feb 1983, pp. 35-37; Franz, Wallace P., “Maneuver: The Dynamic Element of Combat,” Military Review, May 1983, pp. 3-12; Peters, Ralph, “Attacking the Attacker, Armor, May-June 1983, pp. 30-33; Hewitt, William D., “Thoughts on Counterattacks,” Armor, SepOct 1984, pp. 30-32. 2 Franz, Wallace P., “Maneuver: The Dynamic Element of Combat,” Military Review, May 1983, p. 7. Sidorenko, A. A., The Offensive (A Soviet View), translated by the U.S. Air Force, Moscow: 1970, p. 93. Hemsley, John, Soviet Troop Control, London: Brassey’s Publishers Limited, 1982, p. 139. 5 Sidorenko, op. cit., p. 107. Isby, David C., Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, London: Jane’s, 1981, pp. 327-33 1. 7 “GMZ Tracked Minelayer,” Jane’s Defence ,Weekly, 11 August 1984, p. 187. Isby, op. cit., p. 331. Zbid, p. 336. 10 Zbid, p. 137. l1 Zbid, pp. 138, 145, 146,153. l2 Zbid, pp. 138, 154, 185. 13 Sidorenko, op. cit., p. 99. Isby, op. cit., pp. 72,80; Hemsley, op. cit., p. 124. l5 For instance, when showing typical armies, Isby (p. 23) and Hemsley (p. 122) do not show any antitank units at the army level, while Richard Simpkin (Red Armour, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1984, p.

237) shows an antitank regiment; however, Mark L. Urban (Soviet Land Power, London: Ian Allen, 1985, p. 46) shows a 36-gun antitank battalion as part of a front-level artillery division, while Isby (p. 24) has artillery divisions with 18 antitank guns. “Combat Helicopter Emerges as Major Battlefield System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 April 1985, p. 583. Pass, Arthur J., “Minelaying Helicop ters,” Review of the Soviet Ground Forces, May 1980, (RSGF 3-80) p. 4. “Soviet Counter to NATO’s MRLS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 Jan 84, pp. 110-111. l9 Simpkin, op. cit., p. 128. 2o Zbid, p. 79. Isby, op. cit., 274. 22 Hemsley, op. cit., p. 160. 23 Zbid., pp. 174-175. enemy recon patrols in their sectors, the approach of the counterattacking task force behind friendly lines is more secure, and the enemy will be less likely to receive early warning. Once the counterattack jumps off, however, enemy recon patrols encountered by the counterattacking task force must be eliminated as quickly as possible to avoid radio transmissions which will give the enemy commander more time to prepare his flank defenses. An enemy flank guard, if encountered, should obviously suffer the same fate. Soviet tactical organizations and doctine provide Soviet tactical commanders with specialized units to afford a degree of protection to their flanks and enable these Soviet commanders to fulfill doctrinal expectations of deep thrusts with 66 open” flanks. NATO units seeking to take advantage of these open flanks, during the execution of counterattacks, must be aware of these specialized units and how they operate and interreact with each other. Then our units must practice countermeasures in order to succeed without excessive casualties on the AirLand Battlefield.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS

PETER L. BUNCE is an intelligence analyst and Battlefield Information Coordination Center NCOIC for 4th Battalion, 69th Armor, having previously performed the same function for the now-inactivated 4th Brigade, 4th ID(M) in 1980-1984. Sergeant First Class Bunce previously served in Germany with the 7th Cavalry, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 10th Cavalry; and in Vietnam with the 1 l t h Armored Cavalry Regiment. november-december 1985 31