How History Assessed Clarke's Stand at St. Vith

8,500 prisoners. Here we have the classic penetrate and surround maneuver, an early version of the Deep Strike tactic of Airland Battle doctrine. Pre-attack intelligence established the American patrol's ranges and frequencies and the location of boundaries was essential to the initial success of the offensive. The amazing factor in the St. Vith battle was that the defenders were not a homogeneous force. Rather, they were a hodge-podge of battered, in-place units, and relieving units. The leadership of brand-new Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke (he had been promoted only 1 Odays before) not only welded the disorganized units into a cohesive fighting force, it held St. Vith and destroyed the German's timetable and hopes for success. Years later, when questioned as to the principal duty of a general in such a battle, General Clarke replied, "It is to prevent the confusion from becom- ing d isorga n ized." Clarke established a fire base in the St. Vith sector with a tank destroyer company dug in. He set up a mobile counterattack force to be used when the Germans had created a serious situation. The force would counterattack the Germans, then retire to its original positions and prepare for its next foray. Criticized by General Ridgeway for his "hit and retire'' tactics, General Clarke replied in effect that hewas not holding ground, per se, he was delaying the enemy advance at its most tremely difficult for the Germans to move any flow through the gaps they had created..." "... The American soldiers of the U. S. Seventh Armored Division and the 106th Infantry Division stuck it out (at St. Vith, Ed.) and put up a very fine performance. By Jove, they stuck it out, those chaps." Clarke's "hit and retire" tactics were not only successful in delaying the German offensive, they also won him the post-war plaudits of his opponent, General von Manteuffel, who wrote to Clarke on 9 November 1975, "...possession of the ground or capture of ground does not garanty (sic) victory! Loss of ground does not mean defeat - withdrawal is not disgrace, but a method of fighting! Your fighting around St. Vith ist (sic) one of the best model of this method of fighting!" (italics von M's. Ed). The Battle of the Bulge remains the hardest fought battle the Americans knew in Europe in World War It. It epitomizes the bravery of the fighting troops, but more than that, it holds many valuable lessons to the commander of today's fighting troops.

ARMOR Assistant Editor (Ed. Note: Readers desiring a more detailed account of the battle of St. Vith may write to: Mr. J. Coppersmith, Chief, Army-wideTraining Support, Fort Knox. Ky., 40121-5000. and request a copy of "The Battle at St. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December 1944.") 26 A R W m a The German Army is in a poor condition-we will finish it in the early spring. The German tanks have been greatly reduced in numbers and are in a poor state of maintenance. a We know immediately if the Germans move a division, and are able to report it to General Bradley at the next morning's briefing. Before pursuing the battle further, let us consider some questions that may have been raised at the time, but certainly came to light following the battle:

Why did the Allied Army run out of gasoline in September 1944? 0 Was General Eisenhower aware of the problem on 15 September when he wanted Field Marshal Montgomery to push forward and take Berlin? 0 Why did the Allied G2, 12th Army Group, not detect the preparations for the counteroffensive of 16 December 1944? 0 Why was the 106th Infantry Division placed where it was (to the east of St. Vith) without any armor support attached? e What was t account for the condition of the 106th Infantry Division’straining? 0 Why did the lOlst Airborne Division move into Bastogne and make no plans to break out? 0 How effective was the handling of the First Army (where the Bulge was) by General Hodges? 0 Why did General Eisenhower relieve General Bradley of command of the First and Ninth Armies on the evening of 19 December 1944? 0 Why did he give these armies to Montgomery-a Briton? 0 Why did Ike’s Chief of Staff (General Smith) on the evening of 19 December tell Bradley that his relief from command was only for the length of the “Bulge” but, in fact, General Hodges would be under General Montgomery for a month, and General Simpson’s Ninth Army until after the Allies crossed the Rhine? 0 Could the battle of the Bulge, encompassing a great area of maneuver, be adequately directed from Ike’s headquarters which was as far away as Versailles, France?

“... A major lesson of armored warfare was demonstrated 0 Did the false report pervading Eisenhower’s headquarters on 18 December, that Clarke’s command had been destroyed at St. Vith, lead to the replacement of Bradley (an infantryman) by Montgomery (a tanker)? Their opponent, General Manteuffel was the top German Panzer general, with a distinguished reputation in the armor field. To what degree did Patton’s Third Army affect German operations after it relieved Bastogne on 26 December 1944? Had the Allied Army not been delayed in the fall of 1944, and then subsequently surprised in the Battle of the Bulge, would the Allies have overrun a greater part of Germany before the Russians got there? Would Germany have necessarily been split in two and would we have needed to keep some 200,000 Army and Air Force personnel in Germany for the last 38 years at great expense? There are other questions. It may require that these questions be considered in another article or book. It would involve a lot of research. This is difficult since Eisenhower would be 93 now if still alive and his senior commanders generally of the same age. There are few who have experienced high command in the battle to be able to discern the correct answers to these questions. The greatest defensive battle fought by American forces in Europe had some unique moments to it: It was commanded by a British general after the third day. While all U. S. commanders from corps level and above were all infantrymen, the officers of the 7th Armored Division and its attached units (“CC B”, 9th Armored Division) were afield artillery division commander (Hasbrouck) and two engineer combat commanders (Hoge and Clarke). It was no small achievement in military history that a small force of 8,020 American soldiers had warded off over 87,000 enemy troops and had prevented them from controlling St. Vith and the vital area east of the Salm River for a period of six days.5 Throughout this ordeal, the 7th Armored Division, with 28 novernber-decernber 1984

- 1 9 9 at St. Vith... the 14th Cavalry Group and “CC B” of the 9th Armored Division attached, sacrificed nearly 3,400 officers and men either killed, wounded or missing. Colonel Clarke’s plan of action during this engagement was to cause maximum delay of the German advance, and at the same time, prevent the destruction of his combat command. A major lesson of armored warfare was demonstrated at St. Vith: that an armored unit can stage an awesome mobile defensive action if required to do so by force of circumstances. By the aggressive employment of small unit counterattacks, an armored task force can harass an enemy and confuse him as to its actual size and composition. This example was witnessed in more A

With tho pressure easing, U. S. Intan-trymen trudge through snow-covered Belgian fields in the wake of the Bulge fighting. T h e German attempt to sweep through the Ardennee to the Channel was stymied. recent times during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. To stand and defend every inch of ground does not apply in all situations. By the time the last of Clarke’s troops pulled out of the St. Vith salient, the German offensive was eight days old, and General Patton’s Third Army was counterattacking along the entire s o u t h e r n flank of the G e r m a n “Bulge.” From the German point of view, St. Vith was far more important than Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge.5 The main German effort was tc bypass Bastogne and turn north. What, in effect, was accomplished by the Ardennes Offensive of 1944 was to delay the Allied offensive operations by only about six weeks, but with a loss to the Germans of nearly 250,000 men, 600 tanks and assault guns, and about 1,600 Lufmufle planes. Furthermore, the offensive had caused a serious reduction in war materiel stocks and the depleted state of German supply reserves precluded any further largescale offensive. Allied victory, therefore, was guaranteed. The Ardennes, in a very real way, had been the birthplace of German 1940 lightning tactics. Now, four years later, the town of St. Vith became the burial place where the once potent German blitzkrieg came home to die. Footnotes 1WilIiim Donohue Ellis and Colonel Thomas J. Cunningham. Jr., (Retired), Clark of St. Vith: The Sergeant’s Genera/. Dellon. Liderbach, Inc., Cleveland, 1974. p. xi, Introduction. *Peter Elstob, Hitler’s Last Offensiw. Maanillan Co., New York, 1971. p. 39. 3Anhur Bryant, Triumph in the West Doubleday & Company. New York, 1959. p. 239. (In fact, in the middle of November, General Eisenhower was forced to broadcast an appeal to the American people for more ammunition.) 4Brigadicr General Bruce C. Clarke and Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams, The Princip/es of the Emp/oyment of Armor. US. Army Armor School, Ft. Knox, KY. p. 5. Written whileGenera1 Clarke was assistant commandant of the Armor School and Colonel Abrams was working under him as the command and staff director, U. S. Army Armor School, 1948-49. SHistory of the Seventh Armored Division and the Seventh Annored Division Assodotion. Taylor Publishing Co., Dallas, TX, 1982. p. 103. 6NORTHAG videotapes, reel no. 8, the meeting of General Hasso von Manteuffel, German Army, retired, and General Bruce C. Clarke, U. S. Army, retired, was conducted as part of a Department of the Army project entitled the “NORTHAG Terrain Study” on 12-15 June 1976. The discussions on the battle of St. Vith, Belgium, 16-23 December

1944. were recorded on videotape which is in the posession of the author.

ROWS is a 1976 graduate of Virginia Military Institute and was a candidate for a masters degree at the University of Louisville in 1983. He was an instructor and military historian at Command, Staff and Doctrine Department, U S A A R M S. Fort Knox from 1980, to

1981. He is a graduate of the airborne and ranger schools and the F r e n c h Command School No. 4. H e served as a tank and cavalry platoon leader, a brigade headquarters company XO, an armor battalion assistant S1 and assistant S4, and an AIT company commander at Fort Knox in 1982 and 1983. 30