The Syrian Tank Battalion

The Syrian Tank Battalion Although Syria’s use of armored units has been a major factor in past Arab-Israeli struggles, most recently in Lebanon in 1982, little has appeared in the Western press about Syria’s armored forces, how they are organized and how they fight. This situation is puzzling because much information is available in open literature on Syrian armor doctrine and organization and even more can be gleaned from open sources in both Syria and Israel. In addition to these published sources, which range from military journals to newspapers, there are hundreds of first-hand sources: Living in the New York area, for example, are many Israeli and Syrian veterans of the Mideast wars, some visiting relatives and others who have emigrated here permanently. Subordination The tank battalion is the basic subunit within Syrian armored and mechanized divisions. It is subordinate to a brigade headquarters that, in turn, is subordinate to a division headquarters, then a corps headquarters (if the division is attached to a corps) and ultimately to General Headquarters (GHQ) in Damascus, the capital.1 Tank battalions belonging to independent brigades are subordinate to that brigade headquarters that, in turn, is subordinate to GHQ. In the case of an independent brigade attached to a division or corps, the brigade is subordinate to that headquarters and then to GHQ. An exception is a subunit called the Armored Defense Force (ADF) a reinforced division-size combat unit, also known as the Republican Guard or the Assad Guard.* This is in a reference to its major role of protecting Syrian president Assad. Stationed in and around Damascus, it receives administrative support from the Damascus Territory Command and is subordinate to an internal security force called Seruy@uh ul-Difa (defense companies) or Defenders of the Regime. This security force is under the direct control of Rifaat al-Assad, the president’s brother.3.4 , Last March, Colonel Maan Nassif was appointed deputy commander of the ADF. Nassif is Rifaat al-Assad’s son-in law. by Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. While most Syrian tank battalions, including the ADF units, operate as part of the brigade, there are several exceptions, including a small number of GHQ-level independent tank battalions. Additionally division commanders have, on occasion, detached tank battalions for specific missions under their control. Organization The tank battalion is organized into headquarters, three companies, and a technical support group (figure 1). The tank battalion organic to the tank brigade of a tank division has 31 tanks, 10 per company, plus a command tank. The battalion strength is about 182 men. A tank battalion organic to an infantry or mechanized infantry brigade or an independent tank brigade has 40 tanks, 13 per company, plus a command tank. Its strength is about 226 men, (or 163 if the unit is equipped with T-72s) The organization and strength of the training battalions and the reserve independent tank battalions is unknown. The strength of the infantry and mechanized infantry brigades is either 40 or 44 tanks. U.S. intelligence sources state that there are 41 tanks (the 40 organic to the the tank battalion plus one for the brigade commander), while Israeli sources, including the chief of the Israeli Armored Corps, Major General Moshe Bar Kochba,s claim that there are 44, the additional three tanks assigned to the headquarters company of the brigade. Although it is not a tank battalion, the division-level reconnaissance battalion has armor assets (figure 2). It may have a company of 10 PT-76 light tanks and three trucks with a strength of 36 men, or 10 T-55 medium tanks, three trucks, and about 46 men. Until recently, the Syrian Army comprised six divisions: two armored, three infantry or mechanized infantry, and the ADF, plus six to nine independent tank and infantry brigades. Now, two additional armored divisions have been formed, possibly from the independent brigades and reserve assets. These two units, the 10th and 11th Armored Divisions, are still considered by the IDF to be only marginally ready.

Organization of the Syrian lank Battalion Figure 1 Equipment The main battle tanks of the Syrikn tank battalions are Soviet-built T44/ 55s (all versions), T-62s (standard, “M” and “K” versions), and the T- 72M. In general, the type of tank assigned depends on the type of division the tank battalion is organic to. The T-54/ 55s are assigned to infantry and mechanized infantry division while the ADF, the armored divisions, and the majority of the independent tank brigades are equipped with the T-62 and The equipment used by training ahd reserve independent tank battalions is unknown, but it is probable that these units use older T-34/85s and T-54/55s, according to the Syrian reservists. This would coincide with past experience: in the 1973 war, the reserve tank battalions fielded a variety of obsolete equipment, including the T-34/85. IS-3 and the ISU-152. (Among the tanks captured in that struggle were WW 11-era German Pzkpfw I V d Conversations with Israeli armor officers indicate that the only units equipped with the T-72Mwere the 73d Tank Brigade (3d Armored Division) and the elite ADF unit. The IDF has estimated that the Syrians had approximately 400 T-72s in June 1982, and about 600 by May 1983. The IDF has estimated that there are now about 600-800 T-72sin Syrian armored units. T- 72M. november-december 1984 17

Command The Syrian tank battalion is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel or a major, with companies commanded by captains, platoons by lieutenants, and individual tanks by either a lieutenant or a sergeant. The Syrian Army now suffers a shortage of qualified junior officers, due to inadequate training, slowness of advancement, or political reasons. All officers must be considered politically reliable by the Assad regime and if one aspires to high rank, he must be an Alawite Moslem, like president Assad and the majority of senior officers. Alawites represent only about 11 percent of the Syrian population. U.S. sources indicate that an effort is being, made to broaden the experience base of the Syrian Army “by rotating leadership jobs so that even the newest recruit gets to lead his squad. . . (platoon or company). . . at least part of the time.. .”6 The Syrian style of command gives the tank battalion commander and his company commanders little opportunity to interpret how they will follow an order. Individual initiative is not encouraged and orders are commands. This is clear in reading Jesh-AI-Shah the Syrian equivalent of Military Review. However, there have been exceptions. In one well-documented incident during the 1973 war,’ the commander of a reinforced tank company (composed of 15 T-55 tanks and three BTR- 60 armored personnel carriers) of the 452d Tank Battalion showed great initiative while conducting a reconnaissance mission. His unit encountered Figure 2. Organization of the Syrian Division-level Reconnaissance Bn. and bypassed Israeli defensive positions, managing to penetrate 14 kilometers into the Israeli rear before being stopped. The unit was finally halted within six kilometers of the critical Arik Bridge, one of three strategic bridges across the Jordan River. Control of this bridge could have significantly affected the outcome of the battle, if not the war. Because training of the individual soldiers is usually inadequate and because Syrian doctrine discourages individual initiative, a heavy load falls on battalion and company commanders. They are critical to the operation of the battalion. They are expected to be with their units during all phases of combat operations, providing positive examples, insuring effective command and control, and overseeing the completion of the mission. As a result, many junior officers were killed in action during the 1973 war and in the 1982 fighting.8 This doctrine also apparently extends up the chain of command. There are significant examples at both brigade

UNIT

OFCS

MEN

1-55/62

BTR-50/60

RPG-7

TRUCKS

HQ 6 16 1 2 2 1 Tank Co (3) 12 108 30 support svc 4 36 9

TOTAL

22 160 31 2 2 10 Notat: Trucks could possibly include BTR-40/BRDM. Figure 3. Tank Battalion organic to a Tank Brigade. ~~ ~ ~

UNIT

OFCS

MEN

T-54/44

BTR-50/60/152

RPG-7

TRUCKS

HQ 6 16 1 2 2 1 TankCo(3) 15 141 39 SupportSvc 4 42 11

TOTALS

25 201 40 2 2 12 Notes: Trucks could possibly include BTR-40IBRDM. Figure 4. Tank Battalion organic to an Independent Tank Brigade, Infantry or Mechanized Infantry Brigade. and division level of the death or capture of higher-ranking officers while leading their units, including the capture of a tank brigade commander in 1982. During the 1973 war, Brigadier General Omar Abrash, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was killed on the forward battlefield when his tank was hit by Israeli fire. He had been in the process of rallying and regrouping his division, which had been badly battered during its previous assaults against the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade. The attack which he was preparing was subsequently launched by his second-in-command, Brigadier General Said Berakdar, and failed. The death of General Abrath significantly affected the fighting capabilites of the 7th Division. Foreign Advisors Since its earliest agreements with the Soviet Union, Syria has made extensive use of Soviet - and later, Cuban - advisors. During the period 1967- 70, Soviet advisors were normally attached to Syrian division and brigade HQs, but would typically work at the battalion level. Following the abortive Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, the Soviets began a massive reequipment and reorganization plan which saw Soviet advisors attached at the battalion level and the introduction of Cuban advisors at the army level.9 With the Syrian defeat in 1973, the numbers of both Soviet and Cuban advisors increased dramatically. In fact, during 1974-76, an estimated 500 Cuban military personnel were directly attached as advisors to the 47th Tank Brigade (Independent). Since then, the number of Soviet advisors has continued to increase so that by January 1983, there were 4,000, of which 500 were working with the Syrian units in Lebanon. In October 1983, this number had risen to 7,000, and by December of that year to 8,000. It is presently estimated that there are one to three Soviet advisors per Syrian battalion. Through the years, there have also been small contingents of advisors from other Warsaw Pact countries, although their contributions to Syrian tank battalions have been minimal. Battalion Headquarters The tank battalion consists of the following sections: Headquarters; Communications and Intelligence and Security. The tank battalion headquarters is equipped with a T-55 or T-62 tank for the battalion commander (usually a “K” model), two personnel carriers 18

ARMUR

(either BTR-50s or BMP-I-PUS) and a GAS-69 truck or BRDMscout car. During offensive operations, the battalion commander is mounted in the tank so he can participate in the attack. During defensive operations, the commander’s tank and the other headquarters vehicles are colocated for security reasons.10 The commander may be the battalion commander or a tank commander specifically designated by him.11 The two personnel carriers, under the control of the battalion chief-of-staff (normally a major) are considered the nerve center of the battalion. The first APC carries the headquarters and intelligence and security sections, including the deputy battalion commander,lz the battalion chief of staff, the operations officer, intelligence and security officer,13 two intelligence sergeants, vehicle driver, radio operators, and artillery forward observers, if any, are attached. In the second APC are the communications officer, radio operators, the driver and commander. The truck or scout car, manned by a driver and commander, is used primarily for communications and for liaison between the battalion’s subunits and its brigade headquarters. Evidence gathered in the Lebanon fighting indicates that a third and possibly a fourth APC are being added to the tank battalion headquarters. Articles have appeared in Bamachane and Maarchot, two IDF publications, of this speculation and the IDF has declassified a photo and information that seems to suggest that the added vehicle or vehicles are intended to integrate antiaircraft and artillery more effectively and possibly to carry equipment to negate the Israeli’s increasingly intense electronic warfare efforts. Technical Support Group This group includes the supply and maintenance platoon and the medical section, mounted in nine trucks of various types and an armored recovery vehicle, either the BTS-I, based on the ISU chassis, or the T-54/55 -based The supply and maintenance platoon is responsible for supplying the battalion with all its ammunition, fuel, lubricants, food, and non-technical supplies, in that order. There are supply points located at battalion, brigade, division or army levels. During combat operations, ammunition resupply is carried out when required under cover of artillery fire or during lulls. Refueling is done during battle lulls, with tanks pulling back 1-2 kilometers to a central fueling point.

B TS-2.

This Syrian T-62, of the 91st Tank Brigade, 1st Armored Division, was knocked out near the village of Sno-bar in the southern Golan Heights, the furthest Syrian penetration of the 1973 conflict. Both Syrian and Israeli accounts of the 1973 conflict indicate that the Syrians had difficulty resupplying combat units. Apparently, there were also shortages of supply vehicles. There were several instances of tank companies running out of either fuel or ammunition. In several instances, the Israelis managed to ambush and destroy Syrian companies only to have elements of the supply and maintenance platoon arrive shortly after at the same ambush site. According to comments by the Israeli Air Force chief of staff, reported by Cheyl Havair, the IAF journal, Syrian supply columns are particularly vulnerable to air strikes, having suffered heavy losses in both the 1973 war and the most recent fighting. But by 1982, the Syrians had apparently made progress in correcting their resupply problems. According to Israeli reports from Lebanon in 1982, “massive amounts of ammunition and equipment” were found in overrun defensive positions. Said an Israeli brigade commander after the capture of Ayn Zahlta:

B M P

UNIT

OFCS

MEN T-72M BTR-BO/BO RPG-7 TRUCKS

ARV

HQ 6 17 1 2 2 1 TankCo(3) 12 78 30 support svc 4 46 1 11 1

TOTALS

22 141 31 3 3 12 1 Notes: Trucks could possibly include BTR-40/BRDM. The HQ tank is a command version (possibly a T-62K). There are some reports that there is also an ARV in each battalion; however, these might be from brigade or division. The ARV is either an ISU-TC, D, or E; or a T-54/55-T. Figure 5. T-72M Tank Battalion ~~ PRO J ECTl LE T-54 T-55 T-62 T-72* HVAPDS-T or 20 (50%) 20 (50%)

APHE-T

or 11 (32%) 15 (35%)

HEAT-FS

6 (1 8%) 7 (16%) 6(15%) 6 (1 5%) Frag-HE 1 7 (50%) 21 (49%) 14 (35%) 14 (35%)

TOTAL

34 43 40 40

HVAPFSDS-T

APC-T

*Estimated Figure 6. Syrian Tank Ammunition Basic Load.

november-december 1984 19

I‘. . .The Israelis captured large numbers of tanks from the Syrians, many abandoned with only minor mechanical malfunctions.. .” “We moved into the village where there were at least two Syrian battalions, a commando battalion and an armored battalion. They were organized and deployed like an army in every respect. They had modern uniforms and equipment, RPGs, ,Saggem, machineguns, tanks and .a massive amount of ammuni- , tion. . .”I4 The supply and maintenance platoon has a very limited capability to perform maintenance and minor repairs on the battalion’s equipment. Normal repairs are carried out at division level, while major repairs are performed only at the major armor centers located at the Syrian bases at A1 Kiswah, A1 Qutayfah, or Qatanah. Evacuation is necessary for two reasons: repair personnel are scarce, and the bases are relatively close to the fighting front. The base at A1 Qutayfah is 120 kilometers from Beirut and the other two bases are within 45 kilometers of the Golan Heights.15 Vehicle maintenance and repair has always been a problem within the Syrian Army and the efforts of Cuban and Soviet advisors have only had limited success in changing this situation. To bring up the level of unskilled or semiskilled maintenance personnel, the military academy at Homs expanded its motor vehicle maintenance course after 1973, yet it is still a very basic course. The battle record reflects these d8i- culties. During the 1973 war, Cuban technicians were attached to the maintenance bases at A1 Kiswah and Qanta-nah.16 And in both the 1973 and 1982 conflicts, the Israelis captured large numbers of tanks from the Syrians, many abandoned with only minor mechanical malfunctions, indicating a low level of crew maintenance. The medical section provides basic fmt aid and casualty evacuation to a division-level clearing station and from there, if necessary, casualties are transported to a hospital at army level. This is possible because of the short distance to the front lines from Damascus, and because there are not enough qualified medical personnel to station them closer to the front. A wounded Syrian tanker can expect to receive basic first aid quickly, be treated by a doctor within one to three hours, and be admitted to a hospital within four to 12 hours. But the level of Syrian medical treatment is significantly lower than similar treatment in the U.S. and Israeli forces. Communications The Syrians use Soviet communication equipment and methods of opera-Footnotes U.S. Army Humon Engineerlng Laboraro~ Mcmommbm 11-79; IDF spokesman. ZAlthough mme sources continue 16 refer to the ADF as a brigade, it was reorganized into a division-size unit in 1979-80. AI-Nahur Alantbi Wa 13.1980, May22,1981, and April 16,1982. )Middle East Journol, Summer 1981. “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance,” by Hanna Batatu: Middle East Journol, Spring 1982, “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria,” by Michael VanDusen. 4Al-Majallah (in Arabic), March 1984. 51nterview with MG Bar Kcchba, DAYAR. (in 6Israeli press reports and declassified DU re- 71nterviews with members of the IDF. Focaond Documents on the Tmrtment of POWs in the Yom Rippur War, Syrion Front, Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1977. 8DIA Rep& Vkh to the Syrian M i l l w Acodc- w, IR 6-891-0075.75 fU); also interviews with Syrian and Israeli vetcRu1s. 9DlA Report, Order of Bottle Sumnoy, Ground Forces, Syria, DDI 1100-SY76; Foreign Report, March 8, 1978; London Times, December 6,1973; JerumlemPost, April 2,1974. ‘OJesh AI-Shub, the Syrian equivalent of M l l m ~ Review, has carried numerous articles on these AI-DUWIL Jan. 28 and Feb. 3,1980; Ha-Amk, Jan. Hebrew), Sept 3,1982. part. IIR 6-891-0061-75. doctrinal points, which M confirmed in Israeli unit histories. l*The crew that maas the battalion common-der’s tank is usually the best in the battalion, amrding to interviews with Syrian veterans. 121, some cases, the deputy battalion commander and chief-of-staff positions are held by the same person, veterans say. 13Almost all intelligence ofnan have a ararking knowledge of either French, English or Hebrew in addition to Arabic. The intelligence officer also functions as the internal security officer and in this role reports directly to the General Intelligence Section of the General StafT. Facts and Docwnenrs on the Tmmvnt of POWs in the Yom Kippur War, Sy&n Front Also, author’s interviews with IDF members and former members of the Syrian armed forces. l4tkrmochonc, 7 July 1982 (in Hebrew). lSFinancial Times, March 16, 1983; Am-to both Western sources (New York Times, Washington Posh etc.) and Middle Jht Periodids (AI-Worm, AI-Arabi), numerous convoys of tank transporters and lowbed trucks were observed hauling tanks and APCs from Lebanon to Syria along the Beirut-Damascus highway in the week following the June, 1982 fighting. 16By January, 1977. all Cuban advisors had left Syria, according to the unclassified DIA Report l7 US. Army Human Engineering Laboratory TechnlcalReport 11-79, p46.

DDI-IIOO-SY- 76.

tion almost exclusively. They rely greatly on land-line communications in addition to radios, probably because they are aware of the Israelis’ considerable sophistication in electronic warfare and signals’ intelligence. Land lines are laid as soon as possible during an operation and are frequently put in during the operations. In Lebanon, for example, there was extensive use of land lines between units from battalion level up. The importance of communications security is stressed at all levels with the battalion communications officer and securityhntelligence officer responsible. But in both 1973 and 1982, Syrian COMSEC started strongly but deteriorated rapidly under the strain of combat operations. During operations in Lebanon: “Syrian lines were frequently tapped by the Christians, and Syrian personnel did not seem particularly concerned about security, as the lines were strung quite visibly and with little apparent attention to their vulunera-bility.. .”I7 Communication equipment in the Syrian tank battalion includes two models of receiver-transmitters, the R-112 and R-123, and the R-311 receiver. The R-112, used on armored vehicles, is an AM instrument transmitting and receiving in the 2.8 to 4.99 megahertz range. The R-123, also used on armored vehicles is an FM system operating in the 20-to-51.5 megahertz range. The R-311 is an AM-band receiver only used on antiaircraft and fire-control nets.

JOSEPH 5. BERMUDEZ,

JR., is a computer programmer and managing director of MEEG Research Associates. His strong interest in Middle East military history led him to learn Hebrew and to begin studies in Arabic in order to read original sources. He has also interviewed many of the combatants, Arab and Israeli, who have emigrated to the New York area. The author of articles for Jane’s Defense Review, AFV-G2 and other publications, he is now writing a book with Jerry Asher, on the 1973 Golan Heights battles. 20 AR-november-december 1984