The Soviet Mechanized Corps in 1941

Reprinted from MILITARY AJFALRS, April 1983, with permission. Copyright 1983 by the American Military Institute. No additional copies made without the express permission of the author and the editor of

MILITARY AFFAIRS.

Animportantchapterinthehietory of Soviet m o r - the reintroduction and deployment of mechanized corps in 19401941 - remains incomplete1 This article is an attempt to tell the confused hietory of the development of the mechanized corps in the Red Army and to point out some of the reasons for ita dismal performance during the Summer of 1941. The Soviet Union’s current heroic image of the Great Patriotic War makes it d S d t to examine all the fadors involved in the catastrophic defeata of

1941. The thrust of this article is a historical survey of the development and deployment of larger armored formations in the Red Army and an assessment of the technological and leadership factors that played so large a role in its performance in the early months of the war without being unduly involved with questions of military doctrine. In regard to the latter, it seems that despite their pre vious inconsistencies by mid-1941 the Sovieta had finally come to accept the independent role of armor in modern Warfare. The mechanized corps were firet formed in the Red Army in 1932, and the first two of these, the 11th and 45th were assigned to the Leningrad and Kiev Military Districts. In 1933 and 1934, two more mechanized corps were formed. Each consisted of three brigades with a total strength of 500 tanks, 250 armored m, 250 trucks, and 60 artillery pieces. In 1938, the Soviets reorganized their four mechanized corps into tank corps, but the change was largely semantic. The new tank corps fielded a rifle and two tank brigades with a combined strength of 12,710 troops, 500 tanks (mostly T-26s and BTs), and 118 artillery pieces. The four unita were stationed in the following military districts No. 10 in Leningrad, No. 15 in Belorussia, No. 25 in Kiev, and No. 20 in Transbaikal. In July 1939, the Main Military Council established a commission to study the role of m o r in the Red Army. The chairman of the commission was Marshal G. I. Kulik, who has since been blamed by Soviet writers as one of those responsible for the Red Army’slack of preparedness in

1941. Other members include S. M. Budennyi, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. K. Timoshenko, K. A. Meretskov, L 2. Mekhlis, D. G. Pavlov, M. P. Kovalev, and B. A. Shchadenko. This commission considered the armor question from 8 July to 22 August. Pavlov and possibly Kulik, arguing h m their experiences during the Spanish Civil War, suggested that the tank corps be disbanded, an idea rejected by the commission. In fact, in September 1939, two tank corps (the 15th and 25th) took part in the invasion of Poland. This was, however, the only occasion in which tank or mechanized corps as such were used in combat by the Soviets before 1941. None were deployed either at Lake Khasan (1938), or Khalkhin Go1 (1939) against the Japanese, or during the Winter War against the Finns. In November 1939, under circumstances that remain unclear, the Main Military Council (or poseibly november-december 1983 19

Stalin alone) ordered the tank corps disbanded. About this same time new instructions were given to form four motorized divisions (anew designation), and plans were made to form 15 more of these in 1940 and an additional seven in 1941. In the Summer of 1940, having observed the resulta of the German blitzkrieg in Poland and in the West, the Soviets seem to have panicked, with the result that there was another dramatic change in policy. On 9 July 1940, the Minister of Defense, S. K. Timoshenko, ordered the reforming of mechanized corps on a truly gigantic scale.* The inconsistent policy reflected in the deployment of armor was influenced by political as well as military factors. The earlier purge of M. N. Wachevskii and others who had been ident5ed closely with armor development made advocacy of inde pendent armor potentially dangerous. It is quite possible that Pavlov and Kulik, the alleged culprita in breaking up the large armored units, interpreted their experiences of the Spanish Civil War in accord with the contemporary political climate - a very commonplace practice during the some of the lessons of the blitzkrieg must have b m e clear to Stalin and his chief military assistants. Therein-troduction of the mechanized corps as an independent force would seem to support this contention. The Soviet mechanized corpe of 1W1941 was the largest armor formation created anywhere, larger even than any of the six tank armies ally had fewer than 700 tanks. The 1940 mechanized corps consisted of 37,200 men, 1,108 tanks, 208 armored cars, and more than 300 artillery pieces. In 1941 the number of tanks was reduced to 1,031 and personnel to 36,000. Each corps had one motorized infantry and two tank divisions. It was several times the size of ita suo ce8sor in name which was to appear in 1942 when armored farces were once again reorganized. Incidentally, although in 1942 the name mechanized corps was reintroduced, the titles of ‘Yank” and “motorized” divisions were only revived during the postwar period. In 1940, nine mechanized corps were formed, and in February and March of 1941, another 20 were added to the Red Army. These corps included in their total complement at least 61 tank and 31 motorized divi- s i o n. Each tank division in 1941 consisted of 375 tanks (63 KV, 310 Stalin era By mid-1940, however, formed during 19421945, which USU- T34, 102 T-26 and BT), 95 cars, 85 pieces of artillery, and nearly 11,OOO men. Each motorized division had 11,600 men, 275 light tanks, 51 armored cars, and 158 artillery pieces. (Another source gives respective fig-urea of 11,650,275,48, and 98.) T h e retically, on the eve of the war the Red Army had a strength of over 30,000 tanks. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, German intelligence estimated Soviet armored sbrength at 15,000 tanks, while other sources cite 24,000 as a more accurate figure.4 Most motorized and tank divisions were assigned to corps organizations, although there were also a few independent divisions. German tank strength numbered fewer than 3,000. The Soviets, who have shown a reluo tance to reveal their total armor strength on the eve of B a r b a a, admit to the following fads: from January 1939 to June 1941, 7,000 tanks were bdt, including at least 1,860 T34s and KVs. The motorized divisions were also only about half-strength, while the tank divisions had a strength of 68 percent. Many of the mechanized corps were considerably understrength, some having no tanks and others as few as 98. In some unita only 27 percent were combabready, and spare parts were always scarce.5 The main question which remains is why the Soviet forces, enjoying such clear numerical superiority, fared 80 poorly in the field. In their writings, some Soviet writers, including Chief Marshal of Tank Troops, P. A. Rotmistrov, have tended to ignore the early tank battles of the war.6 Others offer unsatisfactory explanations for failure: that the mechanized corps were not up to strength, that some of the unita were in the Far East, and that there was an insufficient number of new 2‘-34 and KV tanks, even though the older Russian tanks were not much inferior to the German Mark III tank, which was the mainstay of the German armor at this time. Even in the face of Russian excuses, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that the Russians enjoyed a threebone superiority against the enemy, and that they had at the very least 1,500 combat clearly superior to anything that the Germans had at this time. In view of these qualifications to various argu-menta, it is difficult to question the dissident General Petr Grigomnko’s claim that in 1941 the Red Army was superior to the enemy both in quantity and quality.7 ready T-34 and KVS - weapons 20

Then why did the Soviet armor fail so miserably in the Summer of 1941? The element of surprise and early confusion must have played apart, as well as the defeat of the Russian air force by the Luftwaffe, but other considerations obviously extended to the inexperience and incompetence of Soviet commanders who were simply no match for their German counterparts. The typical Soviet mechanized corps commander owed his position to the rapid promotions of the purge years and under other circumstances would scarcely have been qualified to command a regiment. Leading a force of 1,OOO tanks, however, was simply beyond him. The average age of six mechanized corps commmanders for whom birthdates are available (Korovnikov, Leliushenko, LE. Petrov, Riabyshev, Rokossovsln, and Vlasov) was about 41. Facing them were German panzer division commanders, each of whom commanded about 300 tanks. A random check of eight contemporary commanders - Kirchner (l), Von Veiel(2), Model (3), Land-graf (6), Hubicki (91, Hube (16), Von Arnim (17), and Nehring (18) - shows the average age to be about 53. Soviet commanders included such men as N. V. Feklenko, a failure with the 57th FWle Corps in Khalkhin Gol, and I. N. Khabarov, whose leadership of the Soviet 8th Army during the Winter War merited a court martial. A few of the Soviet commanders had fought in Spain, in the Far East and against Finland, but their limited experience, usually at very junior levels, could not match their German opponents. To reach the heart of this issue, one must go beyond the general histories of the war which are laden with p m paganda, inaccuracies, and omissions. Our best sources, although far from adequate, are the memoirs of the men who commanded or who were associated with the mechanized corps in the early days of the war. Partim-larly useful are the pre1965 memoirs written during a brief period when frankness was not a cardinal sin in Soviet historiography.8 It is obvious from these memoirs that the atmosphere of command in the early days of the war left much to be desired. In the midst of combat, watchdog com-missars questioned the proletarian geneology of the commanders, while Order of Bank. soviet Mechanized Corps, Summer 1941 uln # 8.r - -- 1 Baltic Special Military District MG of Tank Troops. 'Elesswnyi podvig (Northwest Front)

M. L. Chemiavskii 2 Odessa Military District MG Iu. V. Novose(skii "Bessmertnyi podvig" (South Front) 3 BaMc Special Military District MG of Tank Trwps. "Elessmertnyi podvig" (Northwest Front)

A. V. Kurkin 4 Kiev Special Military District MG A. A. vlasov 'Kiev. g o d geroi." (Southwest Front) (executed 82-1946)

E. Dwingrer. "Vlasov" 5 Western Special (Belorussian) MG of Tank Troops. "Bessmertnyi podvig." Military District (West Front)

I. P. Alekseenko (executed?)" "Voenno istoricheskii zhumal." 7-1971 6 Western Special (Betmian) MG M. 0. Khatsilevich 'Bessmertnyi y g. " 7 Western Special (Belorussian) MG V. I. Vinogradov 'Bessmertnyi podvig." Military District (West Front) Military District (West and Central

I. V. Boldin. "Stranitsy zhizni"

V. I. Kazakw. "Na perelome" Fronts) 8 Kiev Special Milltary Distnct (Southwest Front) 9 Klev Special Military Distnct (Southwest Front) 10 Leningrad Military Distnct 11 Western Special (Belorussian) 12 BaHic Special Milnary Distnct (North Front) Military Distnct (West Front) (Northwest Front) 13 Western Special (Belonrmsn) Military Distnct (West Front) 14 Western Special (Belorussian) Military Distnct (West Front) 15 Kiev Speclal Military Distnct (Southwest Front) 16 Kiev Special Military Distnct (Southwest Front) 17 Western Special (Belorussian) 18 Odessa Military Distnct (South Front) 19 Kiev Special Military Dtstrtct (Southwest Front) 20 Western Special Military Distnct (Belorussian) (West Front) 21 Baltic Special Milltary Dish113 (Northwest Front) 22 Kiev Special Milltary District (Southwest Front) Military District (West Front) '23 Western Speclal (Belotusstan) Military Distnct (West Front) 24 Kiev Special Milltary District 25 Western Special (Belotussian) Military Distnct (West Front) 27 North Caucasus Milltary District? 28 Transcaucasus Milltary Distnct 30 Far East Front LTG D. I. RiabVshev MG K. K. Rokossovskii. 7/19/418/9/41. MG of Technical Services A. G. Maslov MG M G Mostovenko MG N M Shestoplw. (dted as a POW 8/6/41) MG I T Korovnikov. MG P N Akhliusten M G S I Obonn MGI I Karpezo COLG I Ennolaw KomdwA D Sokolar MGM P Perm (to 7/25/41) MG I N Khabarw (executed 19419) (wounded 7/26/41) MG of Tank Troops N V Feklenko MG A G Nikitin from mKeJuly

1941. MG of Tank Troops N D Vedeneev MG D D Leliushenko MG S M Kondrusev. (KIA?) MG V S Tamrushi (6/25/41) MG V N Simvolokov MG M A Miasnikov MG V I Chistiakov (KIA 1941) MG S M Knvcshein MG I. E. Petrov MG V. V. Novikov" "Bessmertnyi podvig."

N. K. Popel'. 'Natiazhkuiu pwu" "8essmertnyi podvig." K K. Rok-kii. "Soldaskie dolg" "Beswnertnyi podvig."

I. V. Boldin. "Stranitsy zhuni" "Bessmertnyi podvig."

A. A. Sharipw. "Chemiakhoskii" 'Elessmertnyi podvig" 'Elessmertnyi podvig." L M. Sandalov. "Perezhitoe" "Elessmerhyi podvig."

N. K. Popel'." "Na tiazhkuiu poru" "Bessmerhyi podvig" "8essmertnyi podvig- "ROMI Blikkriga" -Bessmermyi podvig"

A. E. Eremenko. 'V nachale voiny." L. M. Sandalov, "Na moskovsko napravienni" "Elessmerhyi podvig." D. D. Leliushenko. "Laria pobedy" 'Bessmerhy podvig" Voenrm istoricheskii zhurnal. 5 7 4 S M K r m h n. 'Ratnam byl'." A I Eremenko. 'V nachale voiny" Voenno storicheskir zhurnal. 9-66 A I Getman. Tanka tdut M:orps, only to end up mired in swamps. He eventually committed suicide.10 Not all mechanized corps were involved in combat of uniform intensity. Some, such as Numbers 8, 9, and 15, took part in several pitched battles. Others, such as Numbers 6, 16, and 23, were apparently wiped out at the same time offering medals for in their first engagements --in the success and fjring squads for failure.9 case of the 6th Mechanized Corps, on One fanatical commissar, N. N. the second day of the war. On 25 Vashugin, lacked any armor com- June, the 22nd, 19th, and 9th mand experience; nevertheless, he Mechanized Corps were respectively took it upon himselfto lead into battle reduced to 33,35, and 66 tanks. Still elements of the 8th Mechanized others, such as Numbers 10, 18, 24,

- and 27, never saw combat as complete unita and were probably broken up and sent piecemeal to threatened areas. For instance, the 18th Mechanized Corps was attached to the South Front, and yet it was not deployed as a complete unit. On rare occasions when the Soviets used their superior tanks with imagination the results were quite impressive. Such an instance occurred in Mtsensk on 5 October 1941, when the German armor was smashed and Guderian was ahnost captured.11 But such sue cessea were indeed quite rare, and by 21

. destroyed. Now the largeat tank unit operating in any army that had pia-neered large armored formations was the tank brigade. These were used almost exclusively in defensive positions in support of the infantry. During the Summer of 1942 the Soviets slowly began to reform mechanized and tank corps, and eventually anew designation -tank army - appeared-These usually consisted of three corps (in the beginning with additional rifle divisions) and were about twa-thirds the size of the 1940 mechanized corps. These h 3 t tank armies profited the Soviets little because the lessons of previous defeats had not yet been learned. In July 1942, the newly formed and splendidly equipped 5th Tank b y was in perfect position to stop the German advance towards Voronezh and thus frustrate Hitler’s entire Summer campaign, but it was deployed haphazardly and without adequate air and artillery support.12 Consequently, the 5th Tank Army was annihilated at the gates of VOID-nezh, with its commander, Major General A I. Liziukov (one of the early writers on armor), seeking death on the battlefield, although Stalin preferred to believe that he had defected to the enemy.13 Farther south, two other tank armies, the 1st and the 4th (named German advance toward Stalingrad. The excuses of 1941 could no longer be applied to the failures of armor in the Summer of 1942, and Soviet infantry paid with blood for continued short. comings in the use of armor. During the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the new 5th Tank Army of the Southwest F’ront was hampered by the slowness of its accompanying rifle divisions, and in the Spring of 1943, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein easily routed the Soviet 3rd Tank Army and the “Popov Armored Group,” which formed the main Soviet armor units in the South. Only at Prokhorovka, during the battle of Kursk in July 1943, did the Russians finally begin to demonstrate mastery of the art of modern armored warfare, at least during those occasions in which they enjoyed numerical superiority. At Prokhorovka the Soviet 5th Guard Tank Army, ably led by the Russians’ best armor commander, P. A. Fbtrnb trov (Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps in the beginning of the war) managed to hold ita own against the crack II SS Punzer Corps. In reviewing the military career of the surviving mechanized corps commanders, we discover that most of them did not again command purely armored forces. Further, of the six tank armies that formed the back-Refwenma 1 For a survey of So*. histqical literature see A. Davidenko, ‘‘Istonograiim tankovykh voisk,” Voenno istorichkii zhurmcrl, 10 (1980), 81-03. 2 A. F. Ftyhakov? “K v o p o Sp4itel”Btve bronetankovykh vmk Krasnoi Arrrm v 303 gody,” Voennoistorichakii z h d, 8 (1968). 107-108. 4 “The Development of Soviet Mobneed Infantry,” Born in Battle Magazine, 12 (1980), 43. 5 For.estimates of the atrength of v&m. Be v. A. M o v, Bessmertnyz m T k “ $ E m e n k o, ArdcroLls Begilming, $$:%I E” nckmn, Road to Stalmgmd, 63,143 163, L M. Sandalov,. “Omnitel’naia operataii 4i armii v nachal’nyl penod voiny,” Venn0 isb richeskii rhurnd (7-71). 22; V. Butkov, “Kon-trudar 5gO me vanno o korpusa na le l’skom n a p r W G l 1 ii&a 1941 g w d%no istoricheskrr z h d (91971), 60.61; and

V. I. Kazakov, Nu perebme, 5. 6 P. A. Rotmistrov, Vremiu i tanki. 7 P. Grigorenko, Staline et la deuieme gwrm mondiale. E V. I. Kazakov (cinc Artille 7 MC), Na pew+ lome (1962), S. M. Kri’uoshein YCinC 25 M u, Rat Mia byl’ (1962). N. K Popel’ (commissar 8 MC)! Nu tiuzhkuu poru (lp59), K. K. Rokossovslo (cine 9 MC), Soldutskz dolg (1968), D. D. Lelju-shenko (cinc 21 MC), Moskua-Std&-&rllingmd-BerIm-Prago (1971). Zana pobedy (1961). Io I. Kh.!am, Tak nnchinalae’ voina. 144. I ’ M. E. Katukov, Naostnkglavnogoudara,ldarcS28

32. Heinz Guderum, Ennnerungen e k s Sol-daten, 21@211. ’2 For two diametrically opposing vim of 50 let Voonuhennykh Si1 SSSR, 236. N. K. Po jel, In schwere z i t, 161. this disaeter 88e (by Marehal A. M. Vaailmlrii and General M. L Kazakov) “Na vomnezhskom napravlenii letom 1942 goda,” Voenno istoricheskii zhunurl, 10 (I%),

34. Ale0 the respective memoirs of the m&olllsts Del0 user rhizni and Nu kratai bythh sreknii. l3 Iu. Zhu ov, lrudr 4G.x goabv, 225, D. Rodinskii and N. Tsar’kov. Powst’ o bmt’iakh. 50. I4 Roy Medvedew, Let Hietory Juige, 466. 15 Besides the aforementioned memoirs the E. ary source for additional readings are the nes of the border Mhtary Districts. These are Krasnoznamennyi Belorusskii voennyi okrug (1973), Krasnoznnmmnyi Odesski (1970), Istariia pribaltiiskogo wennogo okruga (I*), and Kievskii Krasnoznammennyi (1969). There are, however, some gape; for example, the history of the Odessa Military District says nothin about the deployment of the 18 M e c h d Corps even though this umt w a attached to this district. The history of the North Caucasus Military District also says nothing about mechanized corps deployed there. 16 The histpry of the Kiev Military District blatantly omta Vlasov’s name and lists the 4 Mechanized Corps under ita chief of staff Colonel A A. Mar’ianov. See Kievskii Krasnoznamme-nyi, 192.

A. I. E r p d O in ‘Y nachale voinf’ (497) gives a detded biography of Alekseenko but omita any mention of his fate after June 1941 which hints that Alekseenko must have falld victim to Stalin’s firing squads. In Jul 1941 the 28 Mechanized Corps wan dissolved. &l ita ’ base on the borders of Iran, the 47th Army was formed. This unit took part in the invasion of Iran before being deployed in the north Caucasus. See “Sovetskaa voennaia en& syklOpedii&“ VOl. 7, 449. commanded by a former mechanized corps commander, D. D. Leliushenko. The most distinguished career, of course, belonged to the former commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps, the future Marshal K. K. Fbkossovski, who later commanded regular armies and fronts, but never purely armored units. Among the other commanders,

A. A Vlasov, N. V. Feklenko, and

I. N. Khabarov commanded regular armies, the first a defector and the last two leaders without any particular distinction. The commander of the 15 Mechanized Corps, I. I. Karpo, was so badly wounded that he never returned to combat. A. A. Vlamv was of come executed in 1946, a fate which may also have befallen General S. I. Oborin, commander of the 14th Mechanized Corps in 1941.14 The strangest career belonged to D. L Riabyshev, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, who started and finished the war as a corps commander, but who also managed to command several armies and for a time the entire South h n t without ever receiving a promotion. At a time when a great deal is being written about advances in Soviet weaponry, perhaps it is advisable to remember the lessons of the Summer of 1941 as well as American experiences in Viet Nam, to say nothing of the recent Russian clif6dties in Afghaniatam powerful weapons in superior numbers do not necessarily guarantee victory. MICHAEL PARRISH is director of the Indiana University School of Public Affairs Library (1973) and professor in the same school. A graduate of Indiana University, he is author of numerous publications on Soviet military history and historiography. His two-volume study USSR in World War II was published in 1981 by the Garland Press. 22 novernber-december 1983