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ARMOR · November-December 1953

INTERVIEW

CAnAIN WU C. HARMON
pp. 15–24Features1953

Article

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An by CAnAIN WU C. HARMON chain, made up of one link after another. Rather, it is In a triangular farm, link at the smaller links to eacb of which is attached several still d e r link. R&tondomtothsm?lleJt Iam the big link at the top; the next links are my &&n; then the noacommis- S i o a e d olficas follow according rn their job% right on down tothe quad leadas and the smakt links are the wrrinthesquads. Each W'' is reqcmsible that the linL aaached to him carry out the orders he issues But more than that, he is respwsible that his Iinh know holo to carry out his orders-and that know you can't take a new nmn and expart him to autDmarically know all about his duties he must be taught metbods and procedurrs. If hedoan't know, he must be enmmged to ask questkms and hirpuations must be ~ ~ a a d ~ b e ~ fully a n d ' d y mnmrsd. ,If one of my links asks me a quatioa, I fed tbat I must give him tbe answm if I don't know it, it is my p b as the company commadr to get it. so !mu see I Mt usc the chain of mmnrpnd just as a means of dis- r e m i n n r i n g a d a r m d ~ - 1 use it to ionm that e p ~ v man bows hisjobandhowtodoit. Ifaman doesn't know this, I consida dmt it mast likely is tbe faadz of his immc diate superior, who hasn't seen to it I ' m r f r a i d w e s a w t i m c s k a pasedeach machainrrtoldd up tbe €inks under it-- to exert PcpSrmmtb-Rcpata: Thu sends be, but it aLovrurrdrimpaeiMctomc Tbe w"p pou put t every link in your indudes doing their everyday pba I that the rrrm was properly taught. t e n d m c V m 3 b h q r s i n p l r - chain of commvrd must know every thing.about the jobs of e\.- man under him, and you have to know everything about every man's job. From what I have seen of the .+my of today, I'd say you can't achieve that standard. Copt. Wth: I don't claim to know everlrthing about every job in my -unit, n a do my links know in detail the job of all the men under them. But we must know enough about the jobs o€ &e men under us to be able to tell whether they are doing their work right, and we must be able. to tell them where to get the answers to their quertions if we can't answer the quesths in detail ourselves. That takes a be of studymg of manuah, rrguhtians, etc., but it pays OfF. R -

That seam plausible. and I can see bow your methods tend to inauc that ,your mea are competent -&at tby have the abiliv to do their work. But how do you inspire them to wmu to do their pbs well? That's what a difhdt to me. GspAZzwe4 in any job my campany bas to &whethe it is ing in a &e fight with an enemv-l want my men my side." I find that I don't have to baby them oc coddle than to get rbem on my side; in fact, my arperieaa is that nrcb mabocL don't get pod results at all. But I do want my men to respect w, md to fd that I am fair and jua 1 a y t o ~ t b . v paving that I can and will work just as hard as I ask thm that I have no favorivs and that I don't have it in for any- d tbebnksinmychainofcommand Speaking 4 fairness and justice, I 6nd dm it is abrdutelp necesary for p o w g the company area or engag- 7 my pb, that e. n e u J l r y t o r m k e w e t h a t q#luethSalllCWay. . 1 So far is knourr, tbis intnview did not actually t a k place and tbe cbrr-acters are Fitious; Houwver, M o w o&ers, aspiring to command responsibilities, wiU do utrU to emulate t h e + u s of outstading katkrsbip as evinced by tbe results obtained tbrougb tbe continn-ing and untiring eflorts of t& Cornpuny Commander, C a p i s S d b . me to have &bite policia on how to deal with acItzia SnuriODs pmb 1- and events M y "policy 6kw im't elabora~ it QILlsists of a few in my potcbool, aada lad it E y i n r n y t m d I-ttbinLit is esential thu my mm know exax- 1y what all mg policies prr; ht I do want them to fed that I am taking action accordbg to a plan, and not just mmrding to b w I fecl t b b y . F a cnmpk I try tobe at least some what codscent in the matter of nonjudicial puduutnt, and not to give olle man two weeks excn duty for M &ense Whik anotber maL% with a similar rrrmd, only a rrpi-mandforaz;m;kr&arse. my men infarmcd, as much as p- s i b s about what is ping an. h y a ~ who has ever hcar in a command p a s i h knows how easy it is to attend a *& be it fa an attack then unthinkingly camebac tohlsunitandsrvti%u- ing orders witbout ever explaining why tbac olden are bang bud or whattheirraultisexpectdtobe. I findthatbyallingm mencogcha han& I get moLT eaichcy kcaure they' m in position to take intelligent laianifJomethingdaa'tgortord-ingto k s - b e C a ~ r l w p ~ W h a t Another tbing I tIy to do is to kep Or "F"" andgoingo.ccwith %m thejobat t h e Q B d t i s asan amcmg my men wbea they know what we are aiming &-which is only M d . and 1 are in Bmwnsik. Y Z g is 10 miks away, over a 'vt you a small package and Perhaps I can illuseace thk. s u p steep ridge; thae are no rods between tbemplrqorhproughfoa b q ? . I t is W y that pou d take say, tniklE T a this to Dr. Doe in Jones- I -- 1

RECENT ARMOR

DEVELOPMENTS

Oh1 time to til.?.. mt, pieces of equipment are entire vehicle, ir ;t .,’vehicle being .+Iayed. will be new. On the ot: r r d,.::d it might be an adaptation to be instalied on a 1’ ;c.e) .I ,quipment already in use. Here we have depicted ’ ,thb - \ w. One type is a brand new British tank and thc .)th, .hree are new adaptations for standard American n . : ~ c h In the upper left-hand +.. is the “Caernarvon,” the new heat? tank of the Bri::.h. tilcial details on this vehicle are scarce, but the British Infori::.ition Service. who supplied this photo, state that it h.:. ‘xt:. : .+mor and a more powerful engine than the “Cen:urioii. This new tank will + ably complement the alredv t t - 1 ~ 4 **Centurion” rather dran replace it. The “Caman I In ’ . ’. :i! won undergo exhaustive trials both in England ami Ab1 I ,A!. In the h v e ~ left-hand , I ~ r n : I- depicted the &I48 Medium Tank tilth a blister-t:pe rnxhinegun mount which was designed by the Detroj’r T.inl, .M and a p v e d by Anny Field Forces to reduce :hc casualties in the ranks of tank commanders. It permits opcr3tion of the gun without exposing the gunner. This new turn-type mount pmrides for all around battlefield aurwilimce, aiming, firing, dear-ing jams. reloading, and even I’or replacing the gun or si ht without requiring the commandrr to expase himself. $he mount is operated manually. In the upper right-hand cocncr. the T141, pN”Jy. an Antiaircraft weapon, is shown for the 6, time. It cdnsists of twin Somm guns (the .Gnericanized Bofon), mounted on the chassis of the Walker Bulldog light tank, the M41. Each gun.6res twepound projectiles at the rate d 120 rounds per mtnute to a range ut‘ three miles. This weapon is one of five ordnance items built on the same chassis. It exemplifies the effort of the Ordnance Corps to reduce the variety of engines, aansmissi m. etc., in order to simplifv the production, transportatioJ.ind supply problems of thk Amy. In the lower right-hand co8nc.r the T51 recovery vehicle is shown. The TSI, our lar9-t recovery vehicle, was conceived as a means of saving hc,th a disabled tank and its crew under fire. It consists of d n SI48 tank body carrving a power boom capable of h~ndling our medium and &vv tanks in recovery operation.. It is powered by an ordnan& Continental engine, air coc~lcrf. .uper charged to 1OOO hone-power. The load hoisting C ~ ~ K X Y is u) tom. THE

EDITOR.

re~eakd to the ,I 8 ’ public. On OccaSiOn the !’ ‘‘‘~--Crnrtemy d BIS a d C I A m ) ‘4 by BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL M. ROLUNE77 A&qua& engineer support ir eurenticrl to the maintenance of Annor's mobility. To keep abreast of constat changes ia a continuing cli&nge to Armor and Engineer personnel.

A 4RMOR'S ENGINEER PROBLEM

achieved Anmr at otan Was the stimuhrJneedcdto~theprobuc-tion o f a Bsct of landing ships tank within a new sbipbddmg id-that was eslablished lbDg tk AmeIi-caninlandtlouawlp.Itwasthac ships that faturrd in many amphihi-ous landings d tbe world a d made the great invsion of E- datively easy to aacmplish. Water-waslJSDpaked. Standard kdk for acb rype vehicle and all maintaupce personnel trained in their use. But it must be wtcd that the plvrncrs hd not en+ the ~ c o m p k x i t y d the problem of landing armored equipment over the beaches before the Afxican o p t h ~ began. This knot wdaen in criticisn but only to point out the challenge posed for the plannas. Even though supim in Boating b r i w the United States was behind in 6xed bridges piat to World War II. In this field the British Bailey bridge was superior to anydung h e r - ican engin-had developed. It was enormom contributions in all the many lessex ones including the African Campaign. But again will Amcri-can planners always be so fortunate as to receive ready-made an answer to theirproblem? . road building equipment wassuperior from thewrykginning. It did extraordinaq senice on dinant shores around the warld But the R 4 h e x which was much 000 d quickly adapted, h e v e x , and made great operacians in Europe and in initial equipment iacluded the 5- cep the p t o n bridge, was inade-pertain to the d engineen 11- cause the mere bandling of heaw m a t d such as tan4 is fi.cquently an engineer: problem. During the bat equiplent. bu this was only If-quate for the purpose. In addition, all tank recovery equipment was indc quate. This last equipmmt did rrot though it probably should have b e course of the war p a t impnwaaeLlts were made and the engineer quip ment caught up with the heavy com-ter trial and emx. r r m o v a l o f m i n & M i p a p I c ~ a menace to an armored command tending as thcy do to d v mobilie -one of the most important p of ru& an organization. As the war progrrssed the engineers i n t d e d the study of the problem and brought andeliminlrianofmines Someof this equipment, notably the detector, proved SUCCeSSful. But ocher items such as the *?mlLc." the Mine Ex-plodcr TIE3 and the 'plow." for =- ample, were not notably SUCCeSfUl. bs had a tendeacy to id back up03 just another piece of +bk may be OCCadOllS where tbe wholesale expediihueoftanLmreducinga mine6eld may be justikd, but re-snurces must be great and rh antici-aproceduecankjusafiedOnone occlsiaa io Afiica a Brifish brigadier expeded 30 tank in breaking a minckld which held up his advance totheeast. HeaKlcccdedingctting out equipment for both detection T o o v a ~ o m e r n i n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ d - e x p e d i a K y a n d d d a t h e d a s equipment Witbautdueregard to the principkof ecarromy of IrEaDS. The!re patedmJaequlllpgratbdacnrch through the mincficld but rcomtion have &plaed-che en& p b Ian to the ultimate limits at human ingenuity. netr & or mops were available. Experimentation at that institution was therefore. resnicted m the field tions& this order were mde by in-diiidwk but no bmed and thorough attack of the en@neering problem was at that time. No doubt there ve been improvements since then, aware af the engineering aspect of theirproblemJ and seek to bring into the mobile arm those Engiqne~ who are keen to expkue the question of iweadng crosunmT mobility. This d d help to ovaonne icy in-aria that othawise will eventually freezegnnrndcomstostlticwaff~~ Itkapsycbologicalfatxtbattbeaver-age human being is defeasivtminded and lika to € m m e dW in 6ned situa-thinking wn canfurm to the paarm of th average -and this faa is one oc tbe fmlda- d reasons why the defensive k belieped by many to be smmger rban theo&nsivc I t a l s o c x p ~ w h y a U tbt~captaimhavebeenmobile-mhdsdandd-mthirthink- *lrrdrting.Tbeywacncwr willing p undrmLe the ddrnsive of impmisation. Many fine Contribu-but annor * should always be rive defense or, if'& were not pas-sibk & by COyntaanarLing the opposing force after it had become disoqpize& Mobility should not be ovcrempha-sized, even in the mobile arm, until it becomes a handicapping catchword. Mobility must be pined to power and direaed on vital objectives if it is to be truly decisive. Armor must. &errfore, embody in proper proportions all &e powerful means of de-It is tbe combined mobility and firepower encased in thebest possible poxrive covering that make Armor the arm of decidon when employed in suirabk terrain by a great oom-arm. Without this support the power ment would be sacrificed and its cost @neem nor armor pnsonnel should be ~tis6ied with the prognss so far made. Both should saive for greater mobility in all types of terrain. Im-ment and engineer support must Jtill hutba 6 the rrtarding inheace to mobility under aU climatic and watbac~ndirioas ThisisoneoF fUtuN2. mander. Adequate engineer support is esencial to the mobility of such an inhercntinbeavycnwcountrpequip could be Wfied. Neither en-povcwntJ in cru-mlntrp equip Of M d aad laanarade Obstacks the modt important cbalknga to the Anny Engineers of today and of the

FROM THESE PAGES

A TANKER'S'APPROACH

TO AN INF'ANTRY PROBLEM

GROUND MOUNTED LIGET MACHINE GUNS

CAPTAIN NORMAN F. mm details that are quite often overlooked inaregulartacticalunit. Wbenthe and&? out, they soon reach a stature portance. Such is the case of the light machine gun. It is a superior, versatile w e a p that has spoken well for itsclfinthreewars Iiowever,we must anraantly be seeking improve wnt, not only in ourselves, but in OUT weapons and all the tools of our profusion. This is the story of one of those small mining problems and a recommended solution. The problem of light machine gun accu~iry first came to this tanker's attention when it was noted that very few of the trainees were rbooting a qualifpingraeon thelight machine smrtion was sound; the range was dcsirr todoagoodpbwasuppamon in tbe mind of each iodividu?l an-caned. Finally, on a mtine walk down the firing line it was diocomsd that abaut5CE6ofthefxont~ tshad same small problems arc faced day in out of pmpartion to their "r"' im-cannot always rest on ouf laurels, but gun ansiaon CoIPse. whp? Th in-run acading to the book and the V i b t e d b o o + w h L h ~ t t t h u gunsweTenobngcrImwd. Tb?t's k. TelltheIKeicrantinrPrrtrns 3 tocaqasQcwdeimandkeep tbefrontgghtstight N0,thatiSittbe anrwa~~t€qanlyvibcatebose again. w b a t ~ p c y c l g o i n g to make on a mansition range to zero every gun each time this mechanical failure occurs? There xems to be no ready, praaical solution to this prob tarwatch every tracer care- "Kartu+ Windage'' is applied to movc the suaxeding ball rounds into the tatget. Let us analyze the front sight and see what brings on all of this trouble. Right away we see that its engineering is not as mechanically sound as pomible beuuse its vertical adjustment depends an a friction screw through a dot type hole. The lateral adjustment depends on a friction With furtba study we note that the heads of both SQCWS are susceptible W h y is it neceavy to put up with a sight that is not as superior as the gunitainn? Theremustbeabetter way to mnnufacturr a front sight. This problem doe not exist on the ner has two simple link click-rppe adjusting knobs with which he a d j j H e doer not have to depend on an assktant witb a screw driver and can easily adjust his sight any time he feek that it needs attention. h"T fully an bope the proper mount of wedgcheldin p k by another SCTew. to damage by any impper tool. tanLmrhinegunbecausethegun-the aekrcapic dght W h n he ZQOes. F a y e 4 R b - smallarm5 gineer4click~rrusights. The k hod apceilcnt, mdy. well-- wh& he sets a given range on his rear sight. he is going to d V shoo< that range. modi-ficaaon is too big and b u h to be nactical and iuts out in frunt of the But, a& \.ou e v this c all true, but the idea is there, and it does work. Tbere is no reasno why this idea cannot be built into a front sight that isno larger than the present one, and then we will have some thing. very recently, ordnaace has made type ekv?tio9 a d j j s but no astart in the right dimxion b. cam-ing out with a right that has a screw lateral adjustment. This is mc the answer beuuseit d rrquima ssc- d man with a screw driver and f& requim ktaal zero adjust-men0 to be mdc on the windage LnobdtbemrsightThereisa di&rarcbenrsmlarazladjuamcnt f o r z c n , a n d ~ a d j j f o r wiad Onebebqsoathefrootsight and the aba on tbc rear +t. If the tide d rbb ntide has kd tbcInfiDtrprrdartobdievethu tbe wrim, bang a tanker, is out of ada,pkastrrmcmbathuntoo smctimatigbtdirmaurtaLButb m?in point i s h in thkdrp dam-biwdums.te?rm.aurpoMcmsuc m u d

ARMOR ASSOCIATION

-U-llkur The annual meeting is ocbtdukd to be held at The Armored Center, uary 29, 1954. G e n d Matthcw B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of th Army. bas been invited to be the principal speaker. It is sincerely bopad that a maximum number of our membenhip Fat KMur Kent+. oo Friday, Jan-pLLoGIA#OFEvporsFoB'IHEA#wIJIIl,~G The program of events for the annual meeting to be held at" Fort b o x on tbe 29th of January is arranged tentatively as follows: T k Place O f X l HeadquanasBuilding, os30 Thaterso.1 Tbe .Gmorrd center 0630 TheaterNo. 1 OEM5 TheaterSo.1 0850 Theater so. 1 0910 Tham so. 1 loo0 .\llinLopngc, Brick Club 1030 ThtpterSo.1 1215 CwuryClub 1345 Dorrer'sRun 15 15 SadoasLi Fwld House 1615 TheaterSo. 1 1645 TheaaerNo.1 1900 BrickQub Erent Honors for all visiting .-\ddrrss of welcome by Maj. Gen. J. H. Collier. CG. The Annored Center .+ddress b. Lt. Gen. F. L. Parks, CG. general Omcers second Ann? otscialopeningof Confcrenceby Lt. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger Initial address by .\Iaj. Gen. E. S. Hannon Assxiation business meeting conducted the seactarp Break b. Lt Gen. crittenberger, d e d by Continuation of meeting LunChon Demonstration: .+mor in the Attack Principal address by the Ann! Chief of Staff, Gen. .\I. B. Ridgm-a? Of6cial c h n g of the conference by Meeting of the newly elected EoIlllcil Rccepion and Dinner Lt. Gen. crittenberger

Notes

  1. The quali6ataps for wm-benhip are as f o b : a. .+ctive members: All p- era1 &ers of the Regulv Army or . b y of the United States; and all &en and warrant officers assigned to, detailed in. or w i n g with Armor shall be eligible. Excepting general any change in 086da status from any one of the above describd conditions will serve to terminate .*rive membership on the last day of the calendar month within which the change has OCcurred, and the individual concerned shall assume the status of .kociate member. b. .-ate I J H U ~ ~ K : Those transferred from M v c membership and all otha v t and former commissioned officers, / warrant &en and noncommissioned otticrn of honorable record in the military. naval or air service. shall be eligible. to:
  2. The qualifrcrions for membership are as fdbws: d. Active Members: AU . . F- ent and former camnusgoned and warrant &CUS of hononbk &ord in the Army, Navy. hla-rine Corps and Air Force of the United State dull be eligibk. This incIudcJ Oecm d either regular or civilian a~pamnts. b. Associate Members: All present and f- enlisted p- srmnel of honorable record in the Ann!. Saw. hlline cotps and Air Force d the Unitd stat-shall be eligible. This includes members of eitha regular or civilian components. It should be nooed that this does not alter the othr two dvsificatiom of members which are: Honorary and Junior members. The second amendment to the constitution increases the number of elected members of the Executive Council from twelve (12) to aghteen (18) pm0"s. To accomplish this, the following amendments must be made to the constitution: Change paragraphs 1.2 and 3 of A R M O R - N O V O ~ W - ~ ~ , 1953 ;Ltide v from twelve :12: elcaed sary members chvlga to eighteen arc iolicired: (182. The ne~es- l . T b e ~ o f C t K A m c i , * &dl as fdkrvs: President, First, sscond and Third Vice-Prrsidart, SeCrrrarg-Trr~s- urer, Editor and d g h w (18) elected members of the Loccu-tive council. 1 The President. the three Vice-Pmidrnt~, ad the dght-een I 18) ekacd members of the Executive . Council shall be elected by secret wTinen ballot at the annual meeting of the ASsociation. A pluralin of the votes cast shall be requisite for eke tion.
  3. The Executive Council which initiallv shall caosist of Presidents and eighteen ' 18 I tbe P&t rbc three vicc-elected membcrs rhll e t Editor before th C k s c d the ~thinwhichtheanndmcct-the Editor -q-T- &dl k u n c members ud the d the sccrClu).-Trra~rrr rod the ing is held Upar appoinancnt. the Executi\r CaUKil. Both of these prOPOYd cllanga will be acted u p at the annual meeting in January. MmmmsmPDBNE As we approach the end of the year and the annual meeting, we he-lieve that it is time to institute a sustained membership drive- Letters have already been drspatcbed to the chairmm of the oversas a d v i e boards. One Armored Unit. a Sational Guard agmiutioo, has initiated an intensive &jve toappise 111 -of tbe + bcacSt gone to most stateside . h r r0mmUrdCrS asking heir support in this efFon. We believe that commeacmg with this issue all ;Lma &ums will not want to miss any of the articles Brigdicr (;rncnl Hamilton H. Howre on the training of an Annaed Division. This writs at artick as a supplement to o&bl pukrioar h l d prove amst helpful to any comma&r more +lty armcued unit d. to be derived from their membership m this .- . Letters have It is also suggested that you check the status of your oum membership in order that - might be .eligible to attend the annual meeting. .\lembershipr have shown a @ incmasc all year but the gap ti tween the number of Annorrd c i t l k s on acdve dun. and the numbcr Thisdoes not& intorcount theSationalGuudsar?n a ksm-ist. but we fed that their interest in the art of mobile w& can be increased t h g h membership. As Qatcd maup times bfore. all pro60 are rrnrrned to tbe rmgyine: hence the larger the membership the better the end p d m - a larger and better maguine. During the past year we a c k d a pal of a minimum of6.)pagesperiwre. andm oneaxasion p~blishaI80pages. We would like to move up to a minimum of 80 pages but this w w k l require a largc~ circulation than we hare at present. w h o are members of the Asooclation is d l too krgc. 41 ROTATION of ASSIGNMENTS reason, branch material assi Cvea hkna t cdntrok the should continue until an OfEZz asipmentof G p n thir grad-completed the branch advanced uatnm from the branch advanced course and is fully branch qua&&- course. Consistent with militarv However, in certain individual cases upon completion of three years SCIII-ice, o&m may enter certain special-itation pmgrams. After an o l k a indicates a desire to speciaize, he mav expect at lean one-full tour in tb; selected field in order that the . b y may extract full value ~IUXI its investment. .Mtional tours may be &- tated by requirements. where pes-sible. assignments to speciaued duties ace interspaced with branch assignments so that the o6i-r will remain fully branch qualified. The molding of the futurr bigh level commander and M &ccr be gins the day an oE6cer is commis-the appropriate branch'rbool for graduation. he is a s q d to troop duty for the 6rst few yeas of his ~ervice. it is during this period that the 'commander has great respansibility for indoctrination in the duties attendant to rroops, command, supplv, vehicular maintename, teaching and the man? other additional duties that jp with nodp assignmrnts. 'shed. career hlanagement assigns the newly commisbned lieutenant to basicpaininginhisbranch. upon needs, an a&er upon graduation &J expsct to be ani to one of four staff, CiViliaD COmpoIKIlft or Speciali-tation. Th Direned and Recommended MOS, one of the masf &ective tools of career Management, was su4- pended sborcly after the outbreak of the Korean con8ia. If either or both are reinstated the net result \vi11 be more c&ers qualified to seme in more fields. Career Management, following closely the d i c e i s development, de-and will be most beneficial to the &- & Oeim who has not attained full bcne6t from his previous troop duty, either due to poor local assignments OT assigned for additional troop duty in fied. Then again there may be an urgent requirement for experienced troop of6cm in some particular unit. Garaany, an a&er upon completion of the branch advanced course broad 6elds. ad? %mal troop duty, termines the type of assignment that will meet Fequirrments of the Armp cer. unfortunate circumnances may be re-ordet to become fully b m h qua- , "The rotation of o&m for tbrir irrdit+dd deadopment is possibk I#- der almost aU c o d t i o m . In gcrrcta3, tbe rotation impover tbe mg&- tion to wbicb ofiers are assigned, for tbe work perfonred is by 1 ~ f i uitb greater perspective. * * * Career Management uitb cooperation of tbe c o m d s can prepare an o@er in peacetime for bis u*artimc mission." . -MAJ. GEN. J. C FRY, chid, CMD. allieddutiasuchd l&gthed%- m with a supply &ground in G3 the duty of all of us who am responsible for assignments to avoid too fre quent repetition of a type of sgfl dthepMnnclrmoinG4. Itb cer may have to wait several yeas for FOR ing an o k a th type duty necesaqr inhi;carea. The imporrance of rocative assignments 1essmsconsideraMp for an & cb who has atnined the gradeof cob nel, provided his earlkr years have been monitored pmperly. At this stage of his career, tbe abk o&er will be qualified to perform well in man)- 43 PARTTWO The Revolution: American Military Policy Emerges from the Crucible of War* c. 1. BERM-, M.D. ~ n d EUGENE n. ~ACON, %.D. throughout the course of the War. In tbese circumst;mces, British admirals moved o+ with the greatest of caution, aknvmg the herjcam plentiful oppormnities to exploit their enemy. and unfettered by 086Cial cor-mption, the .tnerican Savy depicted a tivid connast by tbe vigor of its leaders and by June, 1775, could baast of asuperiority on Lake Cham-By the suuuner of 1775. every State had l e g a l d its owll I E I W . ~ ~ ing on his own initiative, czeated tbe . h e r i c a n N a ~ ~ b y p l a c i n asection ~f the . h y * o n ship& with the commission to cruise and seize ships of the SIinisterial Naw, to or from Boaon,laden withddiers,arms, ammunition, or provisions.m The NC cess which attended this expehent pointed the way for additional cam-missions from Congress to private in- &duals as well as State authorities tbaeb placing upon the sea lanes a formidable Beet o€ privateas* But the dilsculties which bext tbc advantages. unhindeffd b p h phill.~~ on September 2 Washgtm, act- . h y also posed great probkms for the Na\y. Each State entered into a spirited competition to fit out ships of every description from quam rigged brigantines to topsail rhoon-ers and small boats carq-ing mna-ment as varied as the number of men who manned them. Priwteering, like d c e in the militia. had a great appeal because of the allurements of increased pay and prires: but unlike the militia, tenn of service was not limited to short periods. But while men were plentiful for tliis senice. the Naw went begging for recruits to fill the ships' complements.61 The stimulus for a stronger Sap-, like that for a strong A m y in 1775, tame from New England. -After several petitions from that section, Congress 011 November 2, 1775 Resolved to build, at Continental ezrpense, a Beet of four armed vessels "for the protection of these colonies. . . .-'2 Tbk was followed on November 25 by the publication of a set of regulation~~~ to govern tbe new Sat? in the same manner as the Articles of War, laid down by Congress in June, If the patriots could not build a govemal the Army.- z: zs c l f t h i s ~ h a d ~ BcctItroDgcnaugbroQsttbe Naw, tbeg CaJd briug to ky littie' fa^ hd rvith tdlipg e6Sb; llIaadhismin;.rm v e r y k n g t o w a i t TLcv?kKofthe d l but && &mican Nrw and its contdn~tioa 10 thc 6nal out-comedtiedi0kdttodaamiw. But certain it is chat ritbact its SCXV-ices vital supplies 4 not have been okaind; and, the Britbb ia-ability or inapocity to with t k wasps and bolnets d the sa. paved the way far tbe k h and Spanish inta~mtion. F m tk former. America d d direct and tangibk aid in men, anus, and ships from the latter. the utility of dispas-ing British ~ e ? power from tk M& terranean to the Caribbean." F m 1780 on, the pressing need for a strong M V ~ ceased to be a ma+ problem for the Congress. The cam-tezpoise to British &time supremacy had been established with the F r a n c e m a n rUIiax~e.~" Unfor-tupately the same happy c' Ircum-stance did not visit the h y and Washington's dikkulties multiplied as time wore on. h l f d i W - i T m t b 6 k The story of remodeling and reenlisting the Army is a drama & picdng the almost superhuman &om of Washington to cope with the multitude of difkulties which beset him from every uarter in and out of In a letter to the President of Congress on NoPember 11, 1775, while complaining d the sekh motive exhibited by some of his o&- cea, he described the situation. The prs~nal motive, he was sure, added '0 hp" blem of 6xing tk orgarha-tion regiments, especially when would not "enlist until they know their colonel, lieutenant~lonel, hfa-jor. and Captain, so that it was nec-Ei t days later it 3Gm48&J clear that the men as well as the 086Cm would not teenlist for patriotic reasons aIone; and, if the Amy was to be kept at some respectable ~aargth, it was nee essary to provide a stimulus "besides love of caurtry, to make men fond of the KIPiCC.n49 The!widamof t k - ' wasbome Congress a n! in and out of the manifested even by soldier5 who essary to 6% the o&exs the 6nt OUt the cetulns t h t amc in. which. 16, u u e - puted at ks tbln 4m -. 01 sane 4,000 lar Ihan WAiDgtat a t i r m t s d d k n e a k d f o r d e fmsive But adrkd i#hrcmen rrtornlist ~ \ ~ w i t h m i r p c d f c d n r g s i a sew Engkind rod in the sart&m C d o o i c r ~ W ~ O a V inclined to tbe si& of a bounty for tbe mcn as well as 08;rrrS. rhrp Merrnccs of opinion were voiced throughout the munuy. Gencnl Sathanacl G m was SUR the payment ofa bounty would rmLe it pes-sible to pick tbc bat mar, 6ll up tk m y . a d Leep 'a proper discipline . . . a d gmd order and co\.ernmcnt in the camp. . . ."" John Adams argued jw as stron ly lgaiasr the paymeat of a b u s w L h he thought would impore new hardships upon the Xew England C O ~ ~ * and Congress were in 110 mood to grant any bounty, going 40 far as to voice disapproval of tbosc already pro\.ided by Rhode Island." But this was Decemk 6,1775; the .Army had not yet disintegrated. Toward the end of that month, when the men began to quit their posy Congress veered toward the viewpoint expressed by General Greene, and by January 19, 1776, each State was advised to encourage enlistments by the grant of a bounty of s6H to any man who appeared properly clothed and armed for sem-ice: and S4 to those men enlisting without such arms and accautre-ments.s4 By tk 26th of June, Congress had resolved to der a bounty of SI0 to each UWI wb0 w d d a- list to serve for three years: and on !September 16, in reorganking the for short term enliste& To those who agreed to setye for the duration of the war (and there were few) an additional gift of 100 acm of land was &exed;ss and one month later an annual h t y of 520 was prom- &- ised to every non-cer and private enlrsbng for the duration.- Left to i d , the operation of the fect. But with each State engaging to fill tbeir qwtas by the grant d s i d r h t i u and in ~ome cases intreasirig the amount. it was diffi-Anny, the bounty was raised to s20 . . might bunt). ham SyEVm p"luced bp congress the desired abw, ef- I ? 4 troapr wbm pitoed against supah n U m b a r o f ~ ~ ~ ~ an ekquemt plea f o r a s m b g - y whichcouldberdiaaupar tbe duntiaa. TbecktknseofAmcdour libertiesat thiraiticalpmod h was sun?, "must of & be haza&d,ifnotaltklylort,' their defence is khtoany but ap6"Dawht standing ArmF.1 mQul one toexist durin the Wpr."- To acccmpplish if attempted merely by an inducmwn t of a bounty, but the rdditim of h d "might have a COIlsidQabk in&leacc on a perm?wnt establishment."" An anny such as this, compririog from S0,O to lO0,OOO men, would not only a s u e victay, but also would be ksJ expensive to maintain in tamsofbountiarod laad grants. Washington wadd sdve this problem pay to that tendued British 086Ca for the execumm - ofsimilarmponsi-gage"; Inen who "ue acNwd by enteqmixk" a d wirh mozc rrgard P this, t went on, w d d be di6icdt by Offering good a q d t bilities. This would "indurr Gentle men and M a of choaaer to QI-principles of homrr and a spirit of for the charaim of such men than-for "the Number d Mar they a Inha, we sbould in 1 liak time have an Army abk to cap'' with any that could be opposed to itu Moreaver,asizeahkstlDdingfarce would put an ad a the borrifyiog ~ d w i m e ¶ s i n g t b e d i o o b r - tion of th Army io the face d tbe enemy, and w d d aL0 settle the problem of training d by the appuuarrrx of raw remits at fsc quent intrrvab. To acquaint men with theirmilitalyduciesand to bring themtoanuIMhmdm *gofdiscc pline and subordi-was not only time coosumhg, ba a work of great di86culty. In the Amy of 1775, tbese pfobkms were CoppOuMkd by an akwa complete absence of distinction between 086an d enlisted men. T h i s c o u l d ~ b e ~ 'for th fuhllc, observed w;lshington. by engaging men for the duratiosl sonable assufa~~ of securing the senices of the me!n.needed, but Jamahinghadtobedone&- ately, fot "it will PML do to let tbe matter h e as it was last year, tin the rime of ZeTviCc was near expiring."* even $ 3 O o r o r . at the Y o f + - t y o f I otthatthuwasana- A- co andooldiec wbo w0uldenlkt.m forthewar,butfbrthrrey- TWO weeks earlier, a Board of War and merit;" a nemsary reform but of small relief to Washington wbo re quired more men. The queQi00 was not what shall Gngrro do, but -what can coagas do7 arribedtotbem,theGmpaied desperately to bllow WasIIingds rrcommendations fix an adequate force Afterrmnywe&ofstu+ to face tiK d t y of tbe siruatioo rated among the states- Tbe term .of smiccwaslefttotbedisaceionof tbe statabut was-at t h e yeas or the duration of tbe war. Those who chose the former received a bounty of sa and far the latter an additid 100 acres of land." With- m three d wa5hinp * warned congrrpt that tbe Army was -on the errt d its pditicll diadu- &" d*g &j$ kgkb-tion. funbrnwrr,th?icap~avast and raising mm, di&rena between o f c d 6 c c X % ~ t h e W ~ a r p s ~ ~ t b o s n o r t h r e tainmg "will leave tbe %mice at thc e irationofthepmse~tterm...."'~ the 88 baaaliam by autbaizing the states DO & far thrre p M while softly hinting that enliameno for the dmtioa would be preferable. But thc seasal was *g late. and it was apparent that tbe full quota of men fort& newestlMhhmcnt would not be reached by the ead of the year. Fully aware of this condition, washington urged congress to in crease the number of battliions to
  4. T h i s d p r o P d c a L r g e r number of otkas and dtbougb be aQliaedtbtim 'bilitydrecnlit-na f number, the 086Cm of 110 bat-taionsdRauitmarrmenthzo tbosc of tbe 88P what was important at this late date was not the size of the establishment, but rather the number of men that cuuld be brought . . SlOfbr evap a o o w - OrdnaDCc tbe rrsponribiliciesof was created a War to carry Dcpaxt-OUt Actingwithin tbe limited authority and debate, they brought thennelvcs ba 16, p"ided for anarmy and On 2- 88banaliarstobepro-TIeanwhik congrrp swugllt to fin in afdlcump ~ f o r r b e a i g i a viigomus&ort to increase the sire ot the b y . but aL0 vested washing ton wilh exaordiaa ry paw-to bring chis about. Canpucd by that stem and mributive Gewnl N- siw, they had bear forced m a p e tdtwhichinangorhr ' tbev would have s h d as the p&& Placing dance up00 the Widom a d chvrtcr of th cam-mading Gemral, thy Resolved to p t him full and compk power m raise and collect togaher, in the marrspesdyand&dmanner, fIom any or d of tbesc United states,sixtecnbtraliarsdinfan-np,inadditiontotbosc?Ifcody voted by Gngms.. . to applp to any of the srate5 for arh aid of t8e militi? as be shall judge ne.cessary . . . to d q k e and appoint all 086Cm under the rank of briga-dngwrol, and to 6U up the va- c o D e i a i n m r y a h e r ~ t m tk AmeXhl IlllljeJ; to &. whrrva he may be, whatever be moy want forthe we of thc army; and if the inhobitana will not sell it, ?Ihwing reasomibk price for the aw; to u ~ a and conhe per-SODS wbo refuse to take the continental txlmncy. . . .'. F d that such a sweeping grant . of authority might be misinterprcred on the same day named a committee to pepvc a paper explaining 'he reasons which iuduced Congress to the Powers* of the C0m- Wyhingunr was not almgether unpparai for thb urtcadon of power, Cor on December 20th he argued that a cammadr situated at such a great distance from the scat of governmentra must have some also be was somewhat aware of General Grads letter of the 21s to G m p l b n g t h e li-79 However grateful be might have been at this sudden windfall, Washin* lvver kt himself forger that he was the servant of a civil authority and the army under him an in-strumCht for safeguarding civil lib ertia. Instead d thinking himself freed han all civil obli nons by this mart of confidence, assured his friads: "I shall constantly bear in mind, that as the Sword was the last Raort for the preenation of our Libertier, SO it ought to be the 6nt rhing laid aside when those Lib enies are firmly establisbed."~ by tbe iadividd states caagrrrs mcawc of dimcion; and perhaps it isn't too eurly to be &inking of a Christmas Gift Subscription to or a selection of gift books availuble TYIOU6U T i € M O K BEFARTIEN1 M ARMoI-N~~~-o.olmb.r, 1953 t
End of indexed article

Citation

CAnAIN WU C. HARMON. “INTERVIEW.” ARMOR, November-December 1953, pp. 15-24.
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