Army TRAFFIC CONTROL

In this age of mechanized warfare, traffic control is a key to effective operations by ground forces. Good traffic control is assurance of effective logistical support, troop movement and tactical employment. An experienced German commander discusses a subject that lacks glamor but not importance, involving such diverse elements as combat organizations, supply units, refugees, prisoners of war, rain, snow, dust, and mud. ARMOR-November-December, 1951 T HE invention of the internal combustion engine brought with it the problem of traffic control. It is the duty of the civilian traffic control system to keep in movement a complicated stream of innumerable vehicles which are proceeding in all directions. Their movement is controlled by police traffic regulations. As a matter of principle, the regulations treat all vehicle operators on an equal basis, apart from a few exceptions, such as, among others, the fire department. Traffic policemen are employed to enforce the observance of traffic regulations and to keep traffic moving at points of congestion. An alert police force is well aware of possible points of traffic congestion from their observation of traffic and from their general experience. The military traffic control system is confronted with the same problems. Fortunate indeed is the Army that has such ideal traffic facilities as the Autobahn for movement. Here prisoners of war move to the rear as tanks and trucks move forward. Conditions ideal. These are made considerably more difficult, however, by the fact that the military traffic control system is not a stationary one. Its men have to follow the army into new territories, often into territories where the capacity of the road net is not very well known and where the roads are subject to constant alterations as the result of destruction, new building projects, and the like. This raises the additional requirement, therefore, of flexible operation, speedy determination of the condition of the road net and the rapid location of possible points of congestion. In addition to this, however, the military traffic control system is faced with an entirely new type of problem: It has to facilitate complicated march movements by units of all sizes while observing the priorities which result from the missions assigned to these units. Traffic control thereby becomes an important problem of the field command. The military traffic control agencies must also receive their orders from the field commanders who determine the march movements of the 25

In addition to this it is absolutely necessary to have very close liaison between the traffic control units and the command headquarters. This can be achieved by regularly assigning a traffic control officer as special-missions staff assistant to the general staff operations officer of the headquarters. His work there will be not so much to receive orders from his unit as to be present at all the planning conferences of the command; this applies particularly to the lower headquarters, such as division and corps. Only in this manner can this officer do justice to his task. He should think things out in advance, be willing to accept responsibility and should not wait for orders, particularly for written ones, which are useful for the war diary and instructions in schools but not for practical operations with motorized troops. The duties of this officer are as follows: Traffic Control Liaison a) To inform the commander of his traffic control unit in sufficient time of the traffic control assignments which the latter may expect to receive.

b) To prepare cooperation with other units and with other agencies of the staff in question. In addition to the commanders of all possible combat teams and combat troops, this also particularly involves the commander of engineers for problems of bridge and road repair, the commander of signal troops for the installation of special signal communications for purposes of traffic control, the director of the cartographic office for the production and distribution of road condition maps, the commanders of medical troops and motor vehicle repair services for the establishment of emergency centers at specific points along the roads, and so forth.

c) To establish close liaison with the proper special-missions staff officers at both higher and subordinate headquarters in order to insure cooperation with the traffic control units, to obtain reconnaissance data, maps, and so forth. It may become necessary to transfer elements of the traffic control units of one'sown command sphere to other command spheres for specific tasks, and vice versa. The strength and equipment of the traffic control units depends on the organization of the other units in the army in question, on the type of vehides and communications facilities with which it is equipped and on the nature of the theater of war. In estimating their strength the main consideration should be to get along with as few men as possible. Manuals contain general rules for carrying out the work of the traffic control units, for the use of sentries, patrols, and the like. However, it is by no means possible for the manuals to cover all cases which may arise in actual practice. Therefore, the commanders of traffic control units should be able to adjust themselves easily to new situations, and above all should see to it that their signal communication facilities are used in a carefully considered manner and that they always have traffic control men at their immediate disposal in order to cope with unexpected changes in the situation. It should never be allowed to happen that the intentions of the field commander are impeded by a lack of flexibility in the traffic control svstem. ' The supply officers should be assigned elements of the traffic control units for their own purposes, which are more of a stationary nature. These should not be changed any more than necessary. In areas which are in a backward state of civilization, such as, for example, the countries in eastern Europe, it is difficult to carry out troop movements. In such countries paved roads, as well as solid bridges and cities with technical facilities, are rare. The expanses are wider. For this reason the forces of nature have a much stronger influence on the mobility of the troops. The Bottlenecks Even if in many places it is possible for four or more columns to drive side by side, they are nevertheless forced to submit themselves to strict traffic control at bridges and other points of congestion, just as under normal circumstances. In such regions the wide expanses, the condition of the ground, which changes so rapidly according to the weather and the seasons, the dearth of technical resources, the often unreliable maps, as well as the foreign languages spoken by the inhabitants, constantly present unexpected difficulties to the troops. Here, as was already mentioned in the beginning, the problem of training and ARMOR-November-December, 1951 disciplining the troops, from the commander down to the last driver, not to shrink before any difficulty but rather to overcome it under all circumstances, becomes the most important factor in maintaining mobility and speed. '\..... In regions of this kind the traffic control units have to be equipped with particular care. They should have the best possible motor vehicles, with the greatest degree of crosscountry mobility; they should be well armed; they should be abundantly equipped with cold rations; they require a large number of maps, for in these wide expanses they are also information offices and traffic-direction centers for individual vehicles and units which are inadequately supplied with maps; they should also carry along sign-painting equipment and a large number of prepared direction signs. Special Measures In conclusion, traffic control units in such regions are also faced with problems which do not appear to have anything to do with traffic control proper. When road conditions become so bad that traffic can hardly move, the best traffic control system is no longer of any use. However, since the most imperative requirement is still that all troops should be brought up to the front as quickly and efficiently as possible and that their supply system should continue to function smoothly, the additional problem necessarily arises of simply keeping the traffic moving. At such times the officer who has been transferred from the traffic control unit to headquarters becomes a particularly important figure. The traffic control units must then plan for the future and cooperate with other service arms by instigating and directing road repairs on their own initiative. They must also cooperate with towing and repair services, and so forth, and establish bases where individual drivers and casuals can find food and warmth, as well as medical care. Special tactical situations, such as, for example, river crossings during an attack or a retreat, fighting in mountainous terrain, and similar situations, may compel the commanders of traffic control units, as well as the tactical commanders of troops, to take special measures. 27