Knowledge Management Integration

Knowledge Management Integration by Major Clint Tracy From July 2006 until January 2009, I was assigned to the National Training Center as an observer controller (OC). Following that assignment, I was assigned as a battle group (battalion) trainer, Canadian Maneuver Training Center, where I have observed 27 rotations of heavy, Stryker, and infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs) headed to Iraq and Afghanistan. As the wars change in each theater, the scenarios for rotational units do as well. However, one thing has not changed

— the BCT’s most complex fight is inside the tactical operations center (TOC) and knowledge management remains the heart of the issue.

Key Mistakes Based on trends and events from data collected at various training centers, there appears to be a cyclic nature to a handful of familiar training shortfalls, to include personnel changes, lack of data (lessons learned) from previous deployments, lack of a knowledge management plan, and inheriting bad habits from handoff units. Personnel changes. “We assume risk and push everyone to the line units then fill the staff last,” is the prevailing attitude on staffing at both battalion and brigade levels. In an average of 40 months, only a few staff officers stay in position for more than 6 months. Those officers who do stay in position for 6 months or more will move to another job immediately following rotation. Reality tells us that when we constantly move key personnel, much of our capability goes with them. A staff gets about one or two collective training events during a train up. Therefore, the obvious decision is to staff your staff first; inar-guably, it is the foundation of development and training. From the standpoint of complexity, lethal operations and some nonlethal operations at the company level are pretty straight forward. However, receiving, analyzing, and distributing information, as well as producing orders, on compressed timelines is considerably more complex; therefore, a well-trained staff is vital to the overall success of the unit.

Lack of data (lessons learned) from previous deployments. When preparing for redeployment, data and systems managers tell us we can’t bring any operational data back from theater, so these data managers delete all of our information and wipe out a year’s worth of data/refinement. Not only do we lose the crucial standard operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) we developed down range, but once we redeploy, we also fail to capture lessons learned for the unit. Again, great intentions, but it never happens; soldiers return home, take leave, and then PCS. The new leaders have to start from scratch, and always with: “Didn’t these guys have a SOP?” Lack of knowledge management plan. Knowledge management sounds easy; however, when you sit down and do some analysis, it is the staff’s most complex task. In the BCT TOC, there are no less than 20 different sources of information that must be managed as it arrives, as it is processed, and as it exits the management process. There are Army battle command systems (ABCS), such as operations summaries, intelligence summaries, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) reports, subordinate unit patrol reports, reports from adjacent units, local media, human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), reports from host nation security forces, and many others. The volume of information flowing into a TOC quickly overwhelms a staff; therefore, it is critical to establish how you will develop staff systems to enable the staff to identify what they need to know, who has a need to know, available assets, and what the information is tied to. Without a sound knowledge management plan, time-sensitive information and targets are incapable of being engaged when the opportunity arises, affecting our ability to influence our area of operations, as well as impeding mission accomplishment. Inheriting ineffective systems from handoff units. It is a big deal when systems fail, especially when you are in theater. The key here is to develop a system that you know works; a system that your staff and units can empower. The trend all too frequently results in units wasting an entire train-up trying to isolate and fix systems issues. This may be an acceptable risk if the unit is ‘deploying’ to Fort Irwin or Fort Polk; however, units deploying to theater should avoid, at all cost, the risks associated with developing any type of system while in contact. The Plan Knowledge management is much more than a few PowerPoint slides depicting your vision of how to receive information. The staff must have the ability to receive, analyze, and distribute information on compressed timelines. The best way to manage this process is to comprise a holistic plan that covers all aspects of knowledge management and is integrated into the unit TOC’s SOP.

Defining what is important. Simply said, the staff must define the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) through the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Our current doctrine defines CCIR as priority information requirements (PIR) and friendly forc es information requirements (FFIR). These two requirements need to be refined based on mission and tied to a decision. Most staffs overlook this fact or provide a list of 20 or more information requirements not tied to any decisions. CCIR is not posted at every workstation in the TOC; instead, it is either computer accessible or posted on a ‘news’ board across from the radio operators. Typically, this information comes in via radio operators, who not only operate radios, but also receive information from both higher and subordinate headquarters; therefore, every workstation should have a copy of the CCIR within immediate reach. As information is received, radio operators scan lists to determine if the information received is CCIR or routine information. Once CCIR are approved and distributed (to the staff and subordinate headquarters), a framework for reporting exists, which is the first big step in getting mission critical information reported rapidly and accurately.

Developing the SOP. Once a framework is established, all members of the brigade and battalion must understand how information is meant to flow to the TOC. Every unit is required to submit routine reports; therefore, choosing the best format, such as PowerPoint, Excel, or Word, is critical. To offset the large amount of bandwidth required to send PowerPoint presentations, leverage the ability of ABCS systems to import and export data in Excel. Submitting reports in Excel allows staffs to directly pull information into their systems. This may not apply for some reports, but if everyone has an understanding of formats and systems [many may be available on command post of the future (CPOF)], send the report — the unit is on the right track. The largest single source of wasted time and inaccurate reporting is personnel at multiple echelons duplicating report data, or several staff personnel entering data on multiple systems. The phrase “single input multiple access” should be a ‘flat ass rule’ in all knowledge management SOPs, which would prevent multiple differing reports on a single event and save thousands of man hours.

Another common mistake is made when staff officers store working files or documents on their desktops. Inevitably, as soon as somebody departs the TOC, someone will need data from a file, which cannot be accessed given that it is stored on the desktop of the person who departed. To avoid a potential crisis, store all data on “Based on trends and events from data collected at various training centers, there appears to be a cyclic nature to a handful of familiar training shortfalls, to include personnel changes, lack of data (lessons learned) from previous deployments, lack of a knowledge management plan, and inheriting bad habits from handoff units.” a shared server or drive. There are several ways to implement this type of system: SharePoint is one technique and others prefer shared drives or storing data on Army Knowledge Online (AKO). The U.S. Army knowledge centers (AKO and AKO-SIPRNet) are effective tools that enable organizational units to store unlimited data on either system; thus, averting the issue of unobtainable data. By simply moving data to one of these knowledge centers (AKO-S for sensitive information and AKO for nonsensitive data), it is available every time you log onto the net. AKO allows users to limit access to specific individuals or build custom groups, thus protecting data and ensuring access to only those with a need to know. Figure 1, Shared Drive File Architecture, represents file architecture for a shared drive. Data is categorized by staff section, month, week, and day, allowing the staff to search collected data by date, which is extremely helpful in searching for specific items produced during specific timeframes. This method enables the staff to generate time-based trends for various activities such as significant activities (SIGACTS). This system can also be applied to CPOF and then used by the staff for predictive analysis. Naming conventions, which will be used for files, is the final step for building network architecture. Based on my experiences, the best method is to cite the file designation, then the date, and finally the author’s name in parenthesis; for example, Battle Update Brief 040630, May 09 (Tracy).ppt.

This citation style allows anyone who accesses the file to immediately identify the contents of the file, establish when the data was entered, and verify the document’s point of contact. For example, if the staff needs historical data on a certain trend, or an investigation arises, these files can be accessed rather quickly, which saves a great deal of time and resources in trying to otherwise find contact information.

Once a baseline for reporting is established, the next step is analysis. In many cases, the primary staff is thought to conduct analyses; however, there are many other personnel available to analyze information and discuss conclusions with the primary staff officer. In fact, there should be a core group of personnel who review CCIR and make recommendations on collected data, to include what, if any, decisions/operations are to be executed based on collected Figure 1. Shared Drive File Architecture S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S9 FSE

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Execution matrix 060700MAY09 (Tracy) Target synch matrix 060830MAY09 (Chasteen) BUB 060600MAY09 (Tracy) FRAGO 5 to OPORD 0905 Bucking Bronco 060900MAY09 (Tracy) SITREPS

“…the staff must define the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) through the military decision-making process (MDMP). Our current doctrine defines CCIR as priority information requirements (PIR) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR). These two requirements need to be refined based on mission and tied to a decision. Most staffs overlook this fact or provide a list of 20 or more information requirements not tied to any decisions.” data. On the other end of the spectrum, routine data or information requirements should be received and analyzed during the targeting process. Some information will immediately drive a decision, other information may drive the requirement to execute a concept of operation (CONOP), but key personnel should review the information and ensure an agreement, or at least a healthy debate, prior to recommending a specific course of action. In either case, it is critical to identify personnel to review data and come to a conclusion, which is briefed to the primary staff and potentially the commander, depending on the situation. The final ingredient in the SOP is developing a distribution plan. Based on the typical dispersion of units, especially in Afghanistan, it is impossible to distribute hard-copy documents daily; therefore, we had to find another method to distribute information. There are several systems, such as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), and Harris 117G wideband/narrowband tactical radio, with the capability to send and receive Word and Excel documents at an acceptable rate. There are also several other systems currently available, and more on the way with remote access. Whichever system your unit uses, the signalers must have a full understanding of the commander’s requirements to develop the system’s architecture to support the distribution plan. As with any mission, the S6 shop needs time to order, receive, and distribute cables, crypto, and other equipment to the right units to enable them to effectively send and receive data. This process may include cross-leveling large items, such as command post node (CPN) trailers and other line of sight (LOS) systems, to enable the unit to distribute information within 30 minutes across the entire formation. In many cases, units have experienced failure at the point of execution due to the 48- to 72-hour timeframe it takes to get orders out, which usually results in missed opportunity. Implementing the SOP. Implementing the SOP is the most difficult part, especially if the unit develops its SOP late in the training cycle. By this point, in the absence of a system, most subordinate units have developed their own systems, and are experiencing difficulty getting them all synchronized. In most cases, synchronization requires draconian enforcement by subordinates empowered to ensure data is submitted to standard and on time. However, in the long-term, this streamlines data flow and improves the unit’s effectiveness, so it is worth the investment. Obviously, the best opportunity to implement the system is at the beginning of the training cycle. Once everyone is indoctrinated and understands the benefits of the system, they will ‘buy in,’ making the system even more effective based on an ‘investment return.’ Remember, the goal of the system is to rapidly enter, analyze, and distribute data; therefore a litmus test is required. For example, select junior staff members and ask them to show you how to find specific items; if the implemented system is functional, subordinate unit personnel will quickly locate information. Once the BCT staff is trained, conduct the same testing at battalion and company levels. Battletracking. Battletracking is the skill most affected by constant personnel changes, which is the operations side of the knowledge management plan that is always overlooked. If data received, analyzed, and distributed is not constantly tracked for friendly units, the operating environment, and the enemy, the information is useless. Under these circumstances, a unit will struggle to meet the commander’s intent based on its inability to track operations within its areas of operations, thereby failing to collect solid information to drive concrete decisions. At a minimum, each staff should track personnel and equipment outside the wire, on forward operating bases, at command observation posts, at high readiness condition levels, as well as other available organic and nonorganic enablers. This effectively ensures that combat power charts, recon and surveillance matrices, execution matrices, target synchronization matrices, unit timelines, and aviation asset trackers, with time windows of availability and ordnance on hand, are available (at a minimum) for the battle captain or noncommissioned officer. There should “Based on the typical dispersion of units, especially in Afghanistan, it is impossible to distribute hard-copy documents daily; therefore, we had to find another method to distribute information. There are several systems, such as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), and Harris 117G wideband/narrowband tactical radio, with the capability to send and receive Word and Excel documents at an acceptable rate.”