Building from Scratch: One Method for Success in Structuring a Rear Detachment

Building from Scratch: One Method for Success in Structuring a Rear Detachment by Captain J. Clinton Tisserand — Gone are the days when commanders leave “sick, lame, or lazy” soldiers in the rear.1 In today’s Army, overseas and combat deployments are a fact of life and rear detachment units are being established to project power and maintain stability on the home front for deployed units. To assist in developing these rear detachments, several documents have been published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The Department of the Army has initiated a program called “Operation Ready,” and most installations are training rear detachment leaders in family support program management. Although these initiatives have helped rear detachment leaders better understand family support issues, they provide limited guidance on techniques for organizing a rear detachment and have largely ignored the personnel issues faced by rear detachments such as training soldiers for deployment, removing poor performers from the service, and caring for injured soldiers. This article focuses on assisting newly appointed battalion rear detachment commanders (RDCs) with structuring a rear detachment to support deployed units and sustain home front operations. Common rear detachment structure. In the absence of any existing field manual (FM) or modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) directing the structure and operation of a rear detachment, it is important that RDCs consider their element and create structures to manage the soldiers and operations of their rear detachment. Common organizational structures used by many rear detachments are often unknowingly limiting. The most common method RDCs use to structure rear detachments is generically based on the parent battalion’s MTOE. U.S. Army in Europe Regulation 600-8- 108 generally supports this structure.2 According to this regulation, “Company-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as normal (enhanced) platoons; battalion-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as normal companies, and brigade-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as battalions.”3 For short duration deployments (approximately 60 days), the common rear detachment structure works well. If the parent unit is not deployed for a long duration, this structure effectively enables a rear detachment to maintain accountability of its assigned soldiers and accomplish assigned garrison tasks. During a long deployment, however, the common rear detachment structure can become inefficient. While it still enables the RDC to maintain accountability and accomplish garrison tasks, it does not provide him with the flexibility needed to effectively accomplish training and take care of soldiers’ needs. The common structure is limiting because it is based on a unit’s MTOE designed to provide commanders with command and control over healthy soldiers fighting in combat. The MTOE is unit oriented and focused on retention and training soldiers for combat. Rear detachments do not deploy to combat; they do not have a plethora of healthy soldiers in their ranks and retaining soldiers assigned to the rear detachment is the last thing any commander needs. The 44 — May-June 2007 objectives of a rear de tachment are very different from a normal combat-focused battalion, and as a result, require a different organizational structure. The generic mission of a rear detachment is to support the operations of the deployed parent unit. The mission essential task list (METL) for a rear detachment is generally to manage personnel actions, support the unit’s family readiness group (FRG), facilitate medical care of injured soldiers, manage the reception, training, and forward movement of replacement soldiers, and manage out processing of soldiers who are departing the unit.4 Soldiers assigned to a rear detachment can generally be categorized into four elements: rear detachment cadre, medically nondeployable, pending separation from the Army or unit, or newly assigned replacements. By using the common structure, which places soldiers in a rear detachment platoon that is affiliated with their parent company, operations tend to become confused and RDCs may have difficulty accomplishing their METL tasks. This structure breeds a lack of focus — each platoon has several soldiers from each general rear detachment category, making it difficult for the acting platoon sergeant or platoon leader to provide his element with a collective focus. For example, a platoon leader cannot tell his soldiers they are all going to qualify their weapons today because only a handful of them need to or are physically or mentally capable of firing. The other soldiers in the platoon probably have scheduled doctor’s appointments, medical evaluation boards, legal appointments, or are out processing. The conflicting needs of soldiers in this type of organization make conducting collective training frustrating and difficult to accomplish. More often than not, leaders rely on noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from other units to conduct training for deployable soldiers because their NCOs are escorting soldiers to legal appointments or are attending their own doctor appointments. Recommended structure for a rear detachment. Every rear detachment should have a RDC and a rear detachment first sergeant (1SG) command team. It is important that RDCs and 1SGs recognize the various needs of soldiers assigned to a battalion rear detachment. It is important to design their organization to effectively support these needs, as well as the deployed unit’s needs. A RDC can accomplish this by recognizing the four general categories of soldiers under his command and using a generic company structure to organize his element. When assuming command of a newly formed rear detachment, the RDC and 1SG should identify early on why each solider is assigned to the rear detachment. Once this has been identified, the RDC and 1SG can begin to separate soldiers into the four categories of cadre, medical nondeployable, administrative discharge/ loss to unit, and replacement soldiers. Once these categories are identified, the RDC and 1SG should form three separate platoons and a headquarters element based on these categories, thus not allowing troop or company affiliation to dictate the platoons in which soldiers are placed. The platoons should be structured based on soldier needs. The general organization of this recommended structure is quite similar to that of an armor company. The organization should have a headquarters element with a minimum of a personnel clerk, mail handler, supply sergeant, first sergeant, and commander; additional personnel, such as a mechanic and arms room specialist, may be necessary, depending on existing stay-behind equipment (SBE) and brigade rear detachment support structures.5 The headquarters element should “The conflicting needs of soldiers in this type of organization make conducting collective training frustrating and difficult to accomplish. More often than not, leaders rely on noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from other units to conduct training for deployable soldiers because their NCOs are escorting soldiers to legal appointments or are attending their own doctor appointments.” Figure 1. Common Rear Detachment Organizational Structure May-June 2007 — 45 Battalion

RDC

Battalion RD

NCOIC

Company RDCs S1 / S4 S2 / S3 be considered the cadre and the only permanent party members of the rear detachment. In addition to the headquarters element, the organization should have three platoons: a medical platoon, an administrative discharge platoon, and a deployable platoon. Soldiers in these platoons are not permanently assigned to the rear detachment. The RDC should choose two capable soldiers from each of these platoons to serve as respective section sergeants in charge of each platoon. This does not mean that a soldier pending administrative discharge should be in charge of the administrative discharge platoon; rather, use two good soldiers from the medical platoon to be in charge of the soldiers pending discharge. The soldiers in charge of these platoons need not be permanently assigned to the rear detachment. By having two soldiers serve as section sergeants in charge of each platoon, they will maintain better accountability of their element. The battalion would generically resemble the organization represented in Figure 2. In this lean rear detachment organization, the RDC acts as the unit liaison to the FRG, has responsibility for command and control of the rear detachment, and represents his deployed unit’s interests at the home installation. He is also responsible for planning and providing training guidance and focus to the section sergeants of the deployable platoon. When considering the selection for a RDC, Colonel Thomas Gannon, et al., recommends in the Battalion Commander’s Handbook that a battalion commander, “appoint a rear detachment commander who can handle the job. This should be one of your best officers. Although leaving him/her behind from a deployment will be hard, remember that the selected officer is your personal representative at your home station.”6 It is further recommended that the officer not be more than two ranks below that of the unit commander.7 U.S. Ar my Europe Regulation 600-8-108, requires that battalion rear detachment commanders be captains.8 This rank is recommended because captains generally have the experience and knowledge to better facilitate unit and family needs. Also, most units provide their RDCs with authority to administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to maintain discipline in the unit. While a lieutenant can be authorized UCMJ authority, it is not recommended. Captains generally have more experience and knowledge to wisely implement UCMJ. The rear detachment 1SG is responsible for managing and maintaining accountability of nondeployable soldiers in the medical and administrative discharge platoons. He is also responsible for providing guidance to the headquarters element. When selecting a rear detachment 1SG, U.S. Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108 requires the rank of sergeant first class (SFC), master sergeant (MSG), or higher.9 Appointing an NCO with the rank of SFC or higher is helpful to successfully operate a rear detachment because senior NCOs are typically familiar with running large organizations and managing soldier and family issues. In the headquarters platoon, the supply sergeant is responsible for fulfilling normal supply activities such as maintaining accountability of stay-behind equipment and coordinating for and ordering supplies. The personnel clerk is responsible for recording rear detachment personnel status, overseeing financial issues of the rear detachment and FRG, maintaining records of all deployed soldiers, and assisting the 1SG with daily management activities. The additional duty of mail handler may be assigned to either the supply sergeant or personnel clerk; however, if the additional duty of mail handler overwhelms these soldiers, then the unit should appoint someone else to this important duty. Section sergeants of each platoon are responsible for maintaining accountability of their personnel and providing leadership. Section sergeants of the medical platoon must keep track of their soldiers’ medical appointments, therapy, and medical evaluation board (MEB) and medical review board (MRB) progress. Section sergeants in charge of the administrative discharge platoon must track the progress of their soldiers’ administrative discharge with the staff judge advocate (SJA), generate paperwork to assist with the discharge, and track soldiers’ clearing pro cess from the installation. Section sergeants in charge of the deployable platoon must assist the commander in planning, coordinating, and executing training for the deployable soldiers. They also must be prepared to act as primary instructors for training. Benefits of the lean structure. The three most evident benefits of the lean structure are seen in size, focus, and flexibility, which enable the unit to accomplish the important missions of preparing replacement soldiers for combat, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of deployed soldiers’ family members. The lean structure requires a minimal amount of permanent cadre to manage the rear detachment, which is a great advantage for a deploying unit because it limits personnel commitments to the rear. Since the Army has not developed an MTOE for unit rear detachments, each soldier remaining in the rear counts against the deployed unit’s personnel strength. This situation makes it difficult for the deployed unit to receive replacement soldiers. The Army generally only considers the aggregate number of soldiers on the unit identification code and does not provide replacements for assigned soldiers who are not deployed. Therefore, by minimally staffing a well-structured rear detachment, the unit can keep its combat strength while deployed. By placing soldiers into specific categories and assigning them to platoons that reflect their status, such as soldiers pend-Battalion

RDC

Battalion

RD 1SG

Deployable Platoon Medical Non-Deployable Platoon Chapter / Loss Platoon Headquarters Platoon Figure 2. Lean Battalion Rear Detachment Organization 46 — May-June 2007 ing administrative discharge in one platoon, medically nondeployable soldiers in one platoon, and deployable soldiers in one platoon, the unit gains focus. Each platoon can be assigned one specific mission, whereas with the common structure, platoons had three missions to accomplish and leaders had to learn to manage legal, medical, and training issues. With the recommended lean structure, section sergeants in the administrative discharge platoon focus on legal issues, section sergeants in the medical nondeployable platoon focus on medical issues, and section sergeants in the deployable platoon focus on training. The lean structure also fosters institutional knowledge within the rear detachment and provides focus to the cadre members in the headquarters platoon. By assigning members of the cadre to the unit rear detachment for the duration of the deployment, they learn how to best use existing support structures and focus on their mission of training soldiers, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of families. Lessons learned by the U.S. Census Bureau, in regards to contingent staffing, indicates that a core staff is important for temporary organizations, such as a rear detachment, to retain institutional knowledge necessary to successfully sustain operations.10 An article written by Patricia Schaefer echo’s this notion by identifying that there are training needs required to prepare a new member of an organization.11 Such training can detract from the current operations of an organization. With so few people actually running the rear detachment, changing out a member of the cadre can be a significant event. Another consideration is if cadre are not assigned to the rear detachment for the duration and expect to deploy soon, they may have a tendency to focus more on their own personal needs rather than the needs of the deployed unit.12 Irene Pada-vic cites several studies that are available to contradict this notion, but it may still be a valid concern.13 Assigning cadre to rear detachments for the duration of the deployment increases the likelihood that they will diligently work to support the forward element. For a rear detachment organization, garrison taskings and other training distracters provide some of the greatest frustrations.14 In the common structure, RDCs often find that healthy soldiers preparing for deployment are executing red-cycle taskings rather than training. This is a great disservice to these soldiers — they deserve the best training prior to combat and a RDC owes them his greatest attention. The lean structure provides RDCs and 1SGs flexibility to accomplish the never-ending garrison tasks without degrading the unit’s ability to accomplish its most important responsibilities of training replacements, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of families. Rather than interrupt healthy soldiers who are training for deployment with a garrison tasking, the 1SG can now task the medical or administrative discharge platoons to provide available soldiers to execute a given task. This unit organization enables 1SGs to complete tasking requirements without interfering with training deployable soldiers or important unit responsibilities. To date, there is not much documentation available to guide newly appointed RDCs in organizing their unit. This article serves as a guide to assist new RDCs with establishing rear detachments. The details of the lean structure described in this article were tested by 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry during phase one of their second deployment to Iraq and have proven valuable to the unit. Thus far, the unit has accomplished daily training for its deployable soldiers, efficiently out processed discharged soldiers, assisted soldiers with medical issues, maintained accountability of spouses in the unit, and fostered a strong relationship with the FRG. The structure proposed in this article is not the only successful method to organize a rear detachment, but it offers advantages in size, focus, and flexibility that many other structures do not. Notes 1Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Family Readiness,” CALL Newsletter No. 01-3, January 2001, p. 22. 2Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108, Rear Detachment Command, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army, Heidelberg, Germany, August 2004, p. 8. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., 7. 5“Family Readiness,” p. 21. 6T. Gannon (ed.), The Battalion Commander’s Handbook, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1996, p. 147. 7CALL, “The Yellow Ribbon: Army Lessons from the Home Front,” CALL Special Bulletin No. 91-2, June 1991, p. 3. 8Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108, p. 7. 9Ibid. 10N. Fangenson and M. Holdrege, “Contingent Staffing: Lessons from Census,” The New Bureaucrat, Spring, 1999, pp. 23- 27. 11P. Schaefer, “Management and Human Resources: the Pros and Cons of Hiring a Temp,” 2005, accessed online 28 September 2006 at http://www.businessknowhow.com/manage/ hire-temp.htm. 12R.S. Belous, “How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift toward Contingent Workers,” Monthly Labor Review, March 1989, p. 8. 13I. Padavic, “Laboring Under Uncertainty: Identity Renego-tiation among Contingent Workers,” Symbolic Interaction, 2005, p. 112. 14J. Meyer, Company Command: The Bottom Line, Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., Alexandria, VA, 1996, p. 113. Captain J. Clinton Tisserand is currently the rear detachment commander, 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry, Fort Lewis, WA. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and is currently completing an M.A. from Chapman University. His military education includes Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, Scout Leaders Course, and Rear Detachment Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including platoon leader, 1st Platoon, B Troop, 1-14 Cavalry (RSTA), Tal Afar, Iraq; platoon leader and assistant S1, 1-14 Cavalry, Mosul, Iraq; and XO, C Troop, 1-14 Cavalry (RSTA), Fort Lewis. “In this lean rear detachment organization, the RDC acts as the unit liaison to the FRG, has responsibility for command and control of the rear detachment, and represents his deployed unit’s interests at the home installation. He is also responsible for planning and providing training guidance and focus to the section sergeants of the deployable platoon.” May-June 2007 — 47 the men responded in the typical aloof manner to our tactical questioning we began executing our raid/search TTP, separating the men from the women and children. We executed perfectly, but anticlimactically, found nothing. Later that day, however, an anonymous tipster directed Grim Troop to the mortar firing point, which was approximately 10 feet from the building we had searched, in an abandoned building sharing a wall with it. The mortar tube was hidden inside of partially buried PVC pipe. It is worth noting that we came very close to stumbling over it because we had accurately read the people, but I was wrong to order a search of the building. It would have been far smarter — and safer — to cordon off the area and await the arrival of the scouts who, with the proper manpower, could have more thoroughly searched the area. The ultimate strength of the motorized platoon in the COIN environment is not its ability to conduct hard attacks. It is, in fact, extremely limited in this ability, and is far better suited to a supporting role during searches and raids. The key strength of the HMMWV in this environment is executing soft attacks via engagements with the people. Our platoon positively influenced Grim Troop’s AO by using its newfound mobility and flexibility to reach the people in the irregularly built-up terrain off limits to armored tracked vehicles. The limited combined arms capability afforded by the HMMWV allowed our pla toon to establish security on the ground and manage crowds while conducting engagements. I violated the limitations of this combined arms capability by conducting hard attacks, and lucked out only because of the low-threat profile achieved by Operation Restoring Rights. The HMMWV also served as a reconnaissance vehicle in the COIN fight. Effectively engaging the local population allowed our troop to accurately read the human terrain, which should have enabled me to provide key information that would have allowed my commander to act on enemy locations with forces more suitable to the task of raiding and searching an objective. The HMMWV, despite limitations in lethality and survivability, is still an effective option in the urban COIN environment, but does not complete the combined arms equation. Captain Gavin D. Schwan is currently serving as opposing forces (OPFOR) commander, 21st Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), Fort hood, TX. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course; Armor Captains Career Course; Scout Leaders Course; Airborne School; Voice Interceptor Electronic Warfare Course; and Spanish Basic Course, Defense Language Institute. He has served in various command and staff positions, including tank platoon leader, G Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation Iraqi Freedom III, and at Fort Carson, CO. Motorized Platoon from Page 40 48 — May-June 2007

• Mental agility — adapt to the operating environment with intuitive decisionmaking.

• Initiative — see what must be done — do it — and take charge if necessary.

• Physically fit and mentally tough.

• Technical and tactical competence.

• Teamwork — willing to be a member of standing or ad hoc teams. For 1ATB to keep producing the caliber of soldier the operating force requires, we need your continued support and constant feedback. In terms of support, the drill sergeant has historically been the most influential noncommissioned officer in an enlisted soldier’s career. This remains true today, but the first squad leader or tank commander the IET graduate receives in the operating force will be an equally influential leader in the soldier’s development and career goals. For this reason, it important for junior leaders in the operating force to understand the content and context of IET and the approaches and techniques we are using to transform civilians into soldiers. Armed with this information, the transition from the training base to the operating force will be more seamless than it has been in the past. As this article points out, IET is not soft. The requirements and standards IET soldiers must meet to graduate produces high caliber soldiers who meet the Army’s needs. The 1ATB very much appreciates constructive feedback. We use various forums to gather comments, which include the web-based annual field surveys sent to IET graduates and first-line leaders (supervisors) in the operating force. We administer the same web-based supervisor survey to the Maneuver Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (M-ANCOC) and the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) for 19Ks and 19Ds. To support the collection of valuable feedback, 1-81 AR has a 63A and 63M BNCOC web-based supervisor line leader survey. The 1ATB has a forum site on MountedManeuverNet with discussion threads posted. Of equal importance is the feedback we receive from IET graduates as they prepare to depart for the operating force. We use web-based surveys to gather feedback on IET with a focus on how well the soldiers learned and the type of leadership they experienced during training. The soldiers of 1ATB know we perform our mission day in and day out for the operating force. It is essential we remain partners with the operating force in this effort because we all have a vested interest in the future of this great institution. With this in mind, 1ATB remains focused on producing soldiers who know “how to think,” who possess the ability to be a combat multiplier, and who will be contributors on arrival at their first operational unit.

SOLDIERS OF STEEL!

Colonel Peter Utley is currently the commander, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from The Citadel and an M.A. from the Naval War College. His military education includes The Naval War College, Armed Forces Staff College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Armor Officer Advanced Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Current Operations and Contingency Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3, Washington, D.C., director of training, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany; commander, 2d Battalion, 63d Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; and assistant operations officer, U.S. Central Command, J3, MacDill Air Force Base, FL. Initial Entry Training from Page 11

The legend of Saint George uses common symbols of that age to convey deeper meanings. Virgins or maidens (depending on the story) represent the innocent, the dragon has been a symbol of evil since the writing of the Bible, and the poor represent all those who are too weak to defend themselves and rely on the sacrifices of others. In this legend, we as modern day knights, have an example to follow. No matter what the setting or why we are there, we know we are doing the right thing. Follow the example of Saint George and you will have a very simple set of rules of engagement— protect the innocent, destroy evil, and provide for the common good. The Holy Bible is filled with directions to protect innocents, to destroy evil, and to provide for the common good. The written works of other faiths echo these themes. In our many stations in life, we are each faced with decisions. Whether you are in Iraq fighting the war or somewhere in garrison, you will be in contact with the innocent, faced by evil, and surrounded by those in need. When you follow the example of Saint George by protecting the innocent, destroying what is evil, and providing for the common good, you are not simply following a moral example from a bygone era, you are also internalizing concepts that are consistent with modern counterinsurgency doctrine. In the end, you will not only help to accomplish the mission, you will also return home knowing that you did so with honor.

STEVEN RINDAHL

Chaplain, U.S. Army Sending Reserve Units to Fight a Limited War is a Fundamental Mistake Dear ARMOR, In the “Letters” feature in the January-February 2007 issue of ARMOR, Major Aeschliman’s assessment that, “The fundamental force structure of the U.S. Army ... is completely wrong for the 40-year war” on terror is overstated. Aeschliman asserts that our Cold War force structure is not “fundamentally designed to defeat an insurgency.” Is this a force structure challenge or a rules of engagement challenge? Heavy forces did quite well during World War II in urban environments, but the application of that force was considerably different from how we are waging war in Iraq. I do not think it is wise to transform the U.S. Army into a border constabulary, especially given the conventional military might of our potential adversaries. You may recall Custer had Gatling guns and chose to leave them behind; thought they would slow him down. There is nothing intrinsically defective in heavy force structure that precludes such forces from winning hearts and minds. Occupation forces that do not speak the native language and usually depart country after one year really have no stake in the country, a bit like the difference between a boyfriend and a husband. There is little doubt that deploying Reserve forces overseas for extended periods, other than in a national crisis, is an inappropriate role and places unfair and undo stress on units, soldiers, their families. It would be equally unfortunate for the Reserve Components, especially the Army National Guard, to be the repository of heavy force structure, as long as the standard of performance is decisive victory. If the Nation reaches the point where it is unwilling to fund the necessary training and operational tempo that allows heavy forces to defeat the enemy with relatively few casualties, then perhaps Major Aeschliman’s solution is acceptable. However, I am sure your readers understand the cost of such a decision would be the lives and blood of Army National Guard soldiers who, by the nature of the service, cannot be as proficient in mechanized warfare as its Active Component counterparts. Consider the training goals for pre-mobilization training and those for post-mobilization training, and how long it would take to train Army National Guard companies, battalions, and brigades to achieve a standard of decisive victory — all in the midst of a national crisis with extraordinary pressures to get heavy forces on the ground now. Major Aeschliman asserts that the Army National Guard is “second best,” and is okay. He assumes that our potential heavy force adversaries will be poorly trained and equipped — beware of underestimating the enemy. From a combat readiness perspective, I have never understood putting combat units, particularly heavy units, in the Army National Guard. They seem to have the least value to Governors, are extraordinarily expensive to maintain, and are clearly the most difficult to train. Having served in the active Army of the ’70s, ’80, and ’90s, I can assure you that such service did not entail a “normal civilian lifestyle.” It seems that Aeschliman’s primary concern is the employment of the Army National Guard overseas for extended periods, “throwing bodies into the breech to take the load off the active Army.” I agree with his point, but not his metaphor; however, his point does not require a fundamental change in roles and responsibilities of the components of the U.S. Army, nor does it require force structure changes. We simply should not send Reserve Component units overseas to fight a limited war.

PHILIP ALLUM

LTC, U.S. Army, Retired Adding V-Shaped Armored Bottoms to the HMMWV and Stryker Dear ARMOR, Vehicle armor protection could be improved on the HMMWV and Stryker vehicles to resemble that of the Cougar and Buffalo vehicles. These two specialty vehicles are protected against land mines, hostile fire, and improvised explosive devices. They both have V-shaped armored bottoms, which direct the force of the blast away from their occupants. This technology is over 20 years old, but has never been used on American vehicles. The flat style used on the HMMWV and Stryker could be changed to add this type of protection. Cougars are currently being produced at 50 per month, which is a relatively small amount. The HMMWV should be outfitted with Cougar/Buffalo armor protection as soon as possible.

GLENN W. BROWN

LETTERS from Page 3 May-June 2007 — 49 Active duty Army, Reserve, and National Guard units or installations are invited to participate in the Army’s 2008 Deployment Excellence Award (DEA) competition, which opened on 1 December 2006 and runs through 30 November 2007. The requirement for the competition is for the unit to have executed or supported a training or contingency deployment during the competition year. Each winner and runner-up unit in their category will send two unit representatives to Washington, D.C. for an expense paid, 4-day trip to accept the unit awards. The trip includes travel, per diem, lodging, and ground transportation costs; time for shopping; tours of the D.C. area; and a photo with the Army Chief of Staff. To enter the competition, submit information in accordance with the following guidelines:

• 2008 DEA competition/submission period. The 2008 competition runs from 1 December 2006 through 30 November 2007; and nomination packets will be accepted from 1 December 2007 through 31 January 2008.

• Submitting nomination packets. Submit packets through your chain of command. After chain of command endorse-ments are completed, forward packets to the nominated unit’s respective Army command, Army service component command, or direct reporting unit.

• Suspense dates. Completed nomination packets are due to the DEA board no later than 31 January 2008.

• DEA competition board dates. The DEA board will convene from 4 to 15 February 2008. Semifinalists will be notified by 28 February 2008.

• Onsite DEA validation team visits. DEA validation teams will visit semifinal-ist’s home station to validate deployment practices from 3 to 26 March 2008.

• Official Winner Announcement: Release of official Department of the Army message announcing DEA winners is scheduled for 13 April 2008.

• DEA award ceremony: DEA awards are presented at the Chief of Staff, Army Combined Logistics Excellence Award ceremony and banquet scheduled for 3 June 2008. DEA guidance and evaluation criteria can be found on the Deployment Process Modernization Office website at: https://www.deploy.eustis.army.mil Army Deployment Excellence Award