The Ground Cavalry Troop in Afghanistan

Much has deservedly been discussed about the participation of ground cavalry units in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, very little, if anything, has been written about the deployment of Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th U. S. Cavalry Regiment (A/3-4 CAV) to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) V from April 2004 to April 2005. The OEF mission is also a counterinsurgency, but there are a number of major differences in the types and conduct of missions undertaken by Apache Troop from those of its Operation Iraqi Freedom coun ter parts. This article serves to inform the reader of the organization and missions conducted by A/3-4 CAV during its deployment. Initial Task Organization Alpha Troop deployed from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, as apart of Task Force Saber. Task Force Saber included one ground troop (Alpha), two air troops (Bravo and Charlie), one air maintenance troop (Delta), and the 25th Infantry Division’s (Light) Long-Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD). This was the first HMMWV-Kiowa Warrior integrated unit deployed to Afghanistan. As the only ground elements in an aviation-centric unit, Alpha Troop and LRSD assumed control of area of operations (AO) Saber, which covered the majority of Kandahar Province. On arrival in theater, Alpha Troop was task organized into four scout platoons with fifteen 19D soldiers and four M1114 HMMWVs assigned to each platoon; the LRSD was organized into six teams of six 11B soldiers with two M1114s assigned to each team. Two of the scout platoons from Alpha Troop were placed operational control (OPCON) to the LRSD commander and assigned AO Saber West, which covered the Pan-jawai, Maywand, and Zari districts. Similarly, three LRSD teams were placed under the Alpha Troop commander and assigned AO Saber East, which covered the districts of Shah Wali Kot and Khakrez. Thus, both Saber sub-AOs were each commanded by one company grade officer and patrolled by two scout platoons and three long-range surveillance (LRS) teams. Kandahar Reconstruction: April 2004-August 2004 At the troop level, the counterinsurgency mission was divided in four subtasks: reconstruction, disarmament and demobilization of Afghan militias and reconstitution of the Afghan army and National Police (DDR), counternarcotics, and offensive operations against anti-coalition militias, which were later relabeled “insurgents,” and included Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) forces. Enemy contact was enough to keep soldiers vigilant, though at times, complacency was a leadership challenge. Platoon leaders were frequently reminding soldiers that while the populace was, on average, far less educated and appeared to be steeped in disarray, there was still a very focused enemy in their midst that would like nothing more than to kill foreign troops. Task Force Saber’s initial focus was the reconstruction effort. Soldiers used a robust reconstruction plan to gain favor with local leaders in hopes of gaining a positive relationship that would facilitate the divulgence of actionable intelligence. This tactic generated mixed results. Some district leaders and council chiefs received coalition support warm ly, but others were very hesitant to engage in even passing conversation with soldiers out of fear of anti-coalition militia reprisals. Districts were patrolled daily and interaction with local nationals occurred regularly. As the populace grew accustomed to seeing the same coalition faces every day, they slowly warmed up to their presence. Every district in Afghanistan holds a weekly shura, which is a meeting of the district’s village elders. These shuras were always attended by coalition forces and were an excellent forum to gather intelligence, understand and interact with the culture, and broadcast the coalition message. As more time was spent with district elders, attitudes throughout the district toward coalition forces noticeably improved. The relationship continued to grow when money exchanged hands and local nationals observed the beginning of reconstruction projects. However, anytime one of the coalition elements came into enemy contact in its district, funding for that district’s reconstruction projects was immediately, albeit temporarily, halted until either the district leader issued a public statement condemning the violent act or an individual approached the coalition with valid intelligence on who was behind the attack. Though reconstruction was the focus of Task Force Saber during its operations in Kandahar province, platoons often conducted other types of missions. In keeping with the counterinsurgency tenet of gaining and maintaining popular support, platoons conducted medical civilian assistance programs (MEDCAPs) in various villages at least every other week. Narcotics, grown and used extensively in Kandahar province, were noted during intelligence debriefs, but otherwise left alone. At the time, U. S. forces were told that other coalition forces would handle the counternarcotic mission. Not unlike the situation in Iraq, actionable intelligence was difficult to acquire. However, platoons occasionally conducted cordons and searches after gathering enough corroborating evidence indicating the presence of a person of interest and/or an illegal weapons cache.1 Leaders had to be skeptical of the credibility of the intelligence they received. Frequently, Afghans would attempt to get coalition forces to arrest a person who was nothing more than an Afghan’s tribal rival. Leaders always assessed the source and worthiness of the information and, if the mission was approved, they made every attempt to bring a district leader with them to deconflict potential friction points and give the operation the face of Afghan authority up front. When conducting cordon and search missions, platoons usually operated on their own or with a team of Kiowas from the Task Force’s Bravo or Charlie Troops. Built-up terrain in the Kandahar province is usually characterized by narrow dirt paths, lined by deceptively sturdy mud walls and irregular urban planning. When a platoon could control each corner of a targeted compound, the cordon was obviously successful. If they could not (which was usually the case), a team of Kiowas was employed to provide overhead observation of the targeted area and could vector ground forces to the location of an “Task Force Saber’s initial focus was the reconstruction effort. Soldiers used a robust reconstruction plan to gain favor with local national leaders in hopes of gaining a positive relationship that would facilitate the divulgence of actionable intelligence. This tactic proved varied in terms of success. Some district leaders and council chiefs received coalition support warm ly, but others were very hesitant to engage in even passing conversation with soldiers out of fear of anti-coalition militia reprisals.” 34 — escaping element. For this reason, air-ground integration was absolutely essential to accomplishing the decisive point of cordon and search operations. The knee-jerk reaction to solidify a cordon is to add more ground forces, but, in this case, such a solution would have proven futile as the confined dirt paths were unable to provide adequate avenues of approach to and from the objective, while still maintaining some form of surprise. Furthermore, if ground forces had been required to quickly extract themselves from the objective area (to conduct a pursuit or medevac personnel), their movement would have been further restricted by the traffic jam created by an excess of coalition ground vehicles. Cordon and search missions were usually conducted during the day to provide the least level of interference to the local populace. In rural parts of Kandahar province, local nationals usually take naps at their residence soon after lunchtime. This is especially true during summer months, when temperatures regularly reach 120+ degrees Fahrenheit. Coalition forces took advantage of this cultural practice by conducting most of its search missions during this time. This method was advantageous because the target would most likely be home, it lessened the chance of the coalition forces’ approach being identified by anti-coalition militia sympathizers, and the routes were mostly free of traffic, as most Afghans were inside and asleep. Green-on-Green Fighting in the West: September 2004 After approximately 4 months of counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar province, Task Force Saber relocated to western Afghanistan in response to open hostilities between rival warlords in the Herat-Shindand area. The two warlords were Ismail Khan, a Tajik, and Amanul-lah Khan, a Pashtun. Both of their respective forces possessed substantial numbers of soldiers and weapons, to include surprisingly well-maintained tanks left behind by Soviet forces. Though the task force’s only anti-tank weapons were tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles,.50-caliber machine guns, and Hellfire missiles, the two rival factions were successfully separated with only one day of riots (12 September 2004). The riots were reportedly incited by Ismail Khan, who had been a significant, long-term leader of the Herat city and province and possessed close Iranian ties. During the riots, Task Force Saber elements secured the Herat Airport, United Nations compound, and other key government-related structures. Though the task force’s air and ground elements frequently came under fire from unidentified individuals in the rioting crowds, coalition forces stayed off their triggers and focused on their area security mission. Because of this discipline, it is now largely believed that a conflict, which could have easily been a large-scale urban battle, was instead de-escalated relatively quickly. Diplomatic efforts by senior Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 leaders and other government agencies (OGAs) greatly contributed to the riots’ quick conclusion. Afghan President Hamid Karzai invited both of the former warlords to join his newly formed national government in Kabul (the capital of Afghanistan), and coalition forces began the long process of disarming the two war-lords’ robust forces. Economy of Force: September 2004-December 2005 As the DDR process of the two rival warlords concluded, Task Force Saber remained in northwestern Afghanistan as the only element larger than a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or Special Forces A-Team. The LRS detachment moved back to division control and began a counter-improvised explosive device (IED) mission based out of Bagram Air Base. At this point, Task Force Saber’s AO included the provinces of Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor. To accomplish its mission, Task Force Saber assigned Alpha Troop a substantial economy-of-force mission in which each scout platoon was assigned an entire province as its AO. Execution Platoon missions during this phase of the deployment typically lasted 5 to 6 days, followed by 3 days of maintenance, rest, and troop leading procedures. Interaction with other elements within Task Force Saber, and even with outside coalition elements, was minimal. The task force’s Kiowa Warriors could not support missions in Ghor due to the elevation — air support for the platoon assigned to this province came from fixed-wing assets based out of Bagram Airfield and took about an hour to arrive on station. It was common for a scout platoon not to see its troop command element for days, if not weeks, at a time. Platoons would base operations out of a C-130-capable airstrip, which served as that platoon’s lifeline for supplies. Fuel blivets were established adjacent to the airstrip. Personal hygiene, already a significant necessity anywhere in Afghanistan, became an even more important facet to mission readiness, as substantial quantities of clean water were not always readily available to platoons that deployed to the more remote areas of an already destitute and austere country. — 35 “...a team of Kiowas was employed to provide overhead observation of the targeted area and could vector ground forces to the location of an escaping element. For this reason, air-ground integration was absolutely essential to accomplishing the decisive point of cordon and search operations. The knee-jerk reaction to solidify a cordon is to add more ground forces, but, in this case, such a solution would have proven futile as the confined dirt paths were unable to provide adequate avenues of approach to and from the objective, while still maintaining some form of surprise.”

Still, platoons were able to accomplish a remarkable amount in their respective AOs. Presidential elections were held in October with no reported violence in Task Force Saber’s AO. Later, in Ghor province, one platoon leader developed a “snitch plan” with the provincial governor. In this plan, the governor wrote down names of various friends in his province’s districts, who, in turn, would link up with and guide coalition forces to compounds concealing weapons caches. Great care was taken to conceal these individuals’ identity inside the platoon’s HMMWVs. The snitch plan yielded almost daily seizures of large quantities of high-caliber weapons and ammunition that usually required renting one or two local trucks, as well as drivers, to haul confiscated munitions back to the platoon’s forward operating base (FOB). These weapons were then turned over to the UN’s DDR program. During these missions, it was common for coalition soldiers to eat and sleep in local establishments while pulling local security in conjunction with local law enforcement personnel. Not only did this quasi-“Lawrence of Arabia” approach give the local populace a view of the “human” side of the high-tech ground force that was maneuvering through their land, but it also helped legitimize the strength of the newly elected government by showing that the Americans were willing to respect and work with the Afghan populace, not conquer and change them. Service Support Resupply methods became unique during this mission. In cases of emergency resupply, the troop first sergeant would load needed supplies in the back of a Polaris vehicle or Gator, back the vehicle into the cargo area of a CH-47 or CH-53, then fly with the aircraft to the platoon’s designated emergency resupply location. Upon landing in the designated landing zone, the first sergeant would drive the vehicle out the aircraft, drop the supplies, and drive back into the aircraft. This resupply process took no more than 5 minutes from when the aircraft landed to when soldiers began distributing the requisitioned Class I, III, and/or V. Throughout the year-long deployment, but especially at this point with the task force dispersed over four provinces, platoons relied on the highly effective tactical satellite radio for long-range communications. Each platoon had two complete tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios in addition to Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) capabilities. Platoon Augmentation As is the norm, platoons were assigned one medic, who would go with them on all missions. Soldier casualties requiring care beyond the medic-care level were evacuated by C-130 from the airstrip directly to the nearest combat support hospital or by UH-60 to the task force aid station at Shindand Airfield. On-scene medics were, at times, required to stabilize casualties for periods up to 90 minutes, as air evacuation assets were usually a substantial distance away from some of the platoons. Local national medical facilities and personnel, and sometimes non-government organizations, were enlisted for aid as needed, though their actions were closely observed by U. S. soldiers. Maintenance support came in the form of two mechanics per platoon. Typically, one would stay at the FOB while the other went on the mission and served as that platoon’s maintenance support. If the mechanic could not fix a disabled vehicle on site, the platoon self-recovered with the tow bar or, if necessary, a tow strap. The mechanics would then take the HMMWV back to its FOB and required parts were immediately flown in by C-130. If the platoon could not self-recover its disabled vehicle, a sling-load extraction was requested.2 To the Taliban Birthplace: Helmand Province, January-April 2005 At this point in the deployment, health considerations and Afghan mountain winter conditions brought the entire troop to Shindand Airfield. Reconstruction efforts in the Shindand area were started, but soon after, the task force relocated to Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. Three of the platoons operated out of a FOB in Gereshk, colocated with a Special Forces detachment. The troop’s remaining platoon operated out of the PRT in Lashkar Gah. Operations during this part of the deployment were significantly more enemy oriented, as Hel mand Province is widely known to be the world’s opium growing capital and is often the site of Taliban activity. In this AO, Alpha Troop operated as a unit, closely integrated with the Special Forces team, interdicting enemy movements into Afghanistan from its southern border with Pakistan. Alpha Troop also employed a Rivet Joint aircraft to identify enemy communications in reaction to the troop’s movement during a mission throughout the province.3 This mission resulted in a number of intelligence hits that were passed on to relieving forces from the 173d Airborne Brigade’s LRSD. Alpha Troop redeployed to Schofield Barracks after accomplishing a mission in which a number of high-level leaders expressed pleasant surprise at the effectiveness of an air-ground cavalry unit in Afghanistan. Task Force Saber was given a mission that would normally be executed by a brigade. The unit’s ground cavalry troop proved to be absolutely indispensable in accomplishing the unit’s mission and giving the CJTF commander a highly effective and self-sustaining additional ground maneuver force that successfully applied emerging counterinsurgency doctrine. Without Alpha Troop’s independent operational capability, Task Force Saber, in the words of its aviation-branched squadron commander at the end of the deployment, “would have been just another aviation unit.” Notes 1At the time, each Afghan household was allowed one small-arms weapon, such as an AK-47, with two magazines, ostensibly for self-protection. 2Prophetically, great effort was taken to send as many soldiers from the troop as possible to Schofield Barracks Air Assault School before deployment. For its operations in Afghanistan, the sling-load phase of this paid great dividends for the troop. 3Rivet Joint, an asset based on a U. S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, orbits a large predesignated area at high altitude and employs various sensors to detect cellular phone traffic and other transmissions. This asset is best employed as ground units maneuver through the area that the aircraft is monitoring. At the conclusion of the flight, pattern analysis can be applied to determine possible enemy presence, based on the volume of transmissions detected in response to the proximity of coalition ground units. For the mission referenced here, Alpha Troop conducted what amounted to be a very large presence patrol throughout Helmand Province. Each scout platoon was given a different circuitous route to generate potential communications throughout the area. Rivet Joint collected a large amount of communications “hits” as the troop maneuvered through the various parts of the province. Captain Michael O’Neil is currently the S1, 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Hovey, Korea. He received a B. A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military education includes Airborne School, Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Leaders Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including squadron maintenance officer, 6th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, Wheeler Army Airfield, HI; executive officer, Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th (3-4) Cavalry, Schofield Barracks, HI; and scout platoon leader, Alpha Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, Schofield Barracks. 36 —