Algeria: Total War

Retired U.S. Army Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying: “What is happening in Baghdad is similar to the battle of Algiers. Despite using many innovative tactics in counterinsurgency and getting the upper hand over the FLN, the French ended up alienating the local population and losing the war politically. This is what America has to expect.”1 From the partisan debate that he initiated, and to avoid the same mistakes and results in Iraq, came the idea for this article, which presents the Algerian conflict through the tactics used by French forces and by insurgents, as well as the positive and negative lessons learned from their applications. The notion of asymmetric warfare will also be developed to underline the similarities between that colonial war and the war in Iraq. Background of the Conflict Geography: Algeria is a 900,000 square-mile arid and hot country (almost twice the size of Iraq), mostly covered by the Sahara, and has a heavy urban concentration on its hilly Mediterranean coastline. In 1954, the country counted a booming population of 8.4 million Muslims, plagued by 25 percent unemployment, and about 990,000 European colons who accounted for most of the local wealth. Algeria was neither a colony nor a protectorate; it was a grouping of three French departments under the same metropolitan laws as other departments, seen as a full part of the republic. Also bordering Algeria were three Muslim countries that would eventually play an important role in the war by actively supporting the liberation movement. Lesson — international support. France failed to get any kind of international support for this war. Even America and Russia united to condemn the “Suez adventure.” (Egypt threatened the canal but was also a major contributor to the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] cause). Tunisia and Morocco were supporting the “insurgents” and provided bases, weapons, and funds. The United Nations also sided with Algeria. The Root of the Conflict: At the end of World War II, Algeria attempted to seize the euphoria of VE Day to make public its first nationalist aspirations. It was 8 May 1945, in Setif, and the repression by the French colonial authorities was brutal, sending the message to the nationalists that an armed revolution was the only possible option. From 1945 onward, France had to deal with its war in Indochina and armed unrest in Tunisia and Morocco. Eventually, on 1 November 1954, the nationalists “declared war,” initiating 70 quasi-simultaneous attacks, murders, or bombings in 30 different locations within three hours. “La Toussaint Rouge,” as that day was called in France, was considered an insurrection by the French government. Lesson — “labels.” Denial was fashionable in Paris from 1954 to 1962, and what happened in Algeria was always referred as “the events.” Furthermore, for France, Algeria was the grouping of three of its many departments, a critical extension of its metropolitan territory in Africa, a full part of France. Algeria: Total War by Eric Chevreuil

Overview of the Conflict Traditional Guerrilla Warfare: From 1954 to 1956, traditional mechanized units and tactics were used in the djebels, the Algerian rocky countryside. But that warfare, mostly conducted by conscript-based conventional units, was far from being successful against small bands of highly mobile rebels, who used Mao’s guerrilla doctrine to terrorize small “douars” (towns, villages) located far from cities or military strongholds. Lesson — conscripts. Groups opposed to the war targeted the “citizen soldiers” and promoted desertion, disobedience, sabotage, or collaboration with the FLN. Lesson — Cold War doctrine. The use of “heavy” units was fruitless against the high mobility of the insurgents. The forces needed to be tailored to the new enemy and battlefield. Lesson — static bases. The initial French military deployment of big bases for big traditional units left remote areas under the full and permanent control of the insurgents. Lesson — unguarded border. Relying on human detection or intelligence to prevent insurgents from crossing the borders of FLN friendly countries was inefficient by itself. If the 1954 fall of Dien Bien Phu, Indochina, likely triggered the Algerian November insurrection, then the end of the Asian conflict freed seasoned troops and military leaders for the new North African front. Quickly, these counterinsurgency professionals, who were used to fighting political guerrilla fighters, changed the direction France and its armies were taking in Algeria and applied proven counter-guerrilla tactics. Lesson — experience. Only veteran units led by charismatic leaders achieved critical tactical victories over enemy forces. Military Victory: In 1957, 415,000 soldiers, including forces fresh from Indochina, fanned out in Algeria and successfully applied new counterinsurgency tactics against the enemy. The French also had a Maoist goal in mind — cut the fish from the water and isolate the rebels! In 1958, the war in the djebels went from static to mobile. In the meantime, the famed and dirty “Battle of Algiers” started on 7 January 1957 and ended with a total French victory ten months later. Lesson — military and law enforcement. Civil law enforcement tasks should never be given to the military whose missions are and should remain totally different. “Quagmire:” Terrorism, counterterrorism, treason, civil war, sedition, and the rebellious behavior of parts of the army and colons are some of the events that highlighted the end of a conflict that tore apart a country, destroyed the Fourth French Republic, and seriously threatened the Fifth Republic. The 1960s brought back diplomacy and talks of independence. Eventually, a cease-fire took effect in March 1962 and Algeria became independent in July of the same year, after eight years of a war that killed between 500,000 to 1.5 million (depending on sources) people. Lesson — “for or by the people.” The insurgency/counterinsurgency war fed on the people that the opponents claimed to defend. Eventually, the people paid the highest price. The pro-French boarded ships and left Algeria forever, while the remaining lived through years of purges under an FLN dictatorship. A Dirty War: The Tactics of the Insurgents The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN): The editorial of the first issue of El Moudjahid, the official newsletter of the FLN, published in June 1956, well summarizes the insurgency’s organization, drive, and goals. In the newsletter, the FLN explains the meaning of the word “jihad” (holy war) and defines it as seeking total destruction of the existing system (final victory) through unity, total sacrifice, and martyrdom, but without any religious or racial hatred, as “the climax of an open and liberal patriotism.” It also states that the jihad encompasses “the soldier of the National Liberation Army (ALN), the political activist, the liaison agent, the young shepherd boy that provides intelligence, the housewife that comments on the events in the “Kasbah,” the young Algerian pupil that goes on strike, the worker and his actions of economic sabotage, the student who joins the underground networks, the “fellah” and his family that suffer and hope.”2 Lesson — tolerance. The guerrilla leaders seemed to be far more tolerant than today’s radicals such as Bin Laden. The Armee de Libération Nationale (ALN): Mao and Sun Tzu met communism and Islam with a convenient unifying religious ideology that would fuel the drive of the armed rebellion until the independence of 1962. The Algerian “moujahidins” (combatants of the faith), initially in the hundreds and ill equipped, quickly reached the tens of thousands by 1957, and were directly aided by Tunisia and Morocco, who provided safe havens; Libya and Egypt with mainly international political or financial support; and by anti-war “liberal” movements in France. The soldiers of the ALN were trained in Maoist guerrilla tactics. Their tactics were both military and psychological, aimed at demoralizing the French troops and deterring any collaboration from locals, and were highly reminiscent of what the Vietminh successfully used in Indochina. Lesson — pragmatism. The guerrilla lead ers were more pragmatic than today’s ringleaders. Lesson — information operations. The fighters of the ALN demonstrated some basic understanding of “information operations.” Total War — the FLN: In the mountains and the countryside, the FLN would target isolated patrols, small convoys, isolated outposts police stations, communications facilities, and road infrastructure. They would extend the attacks to European colons and destroy farms and production plants. They also resorted to kidnapping and executing their own nationals if they were considered to be friendly toward the French. On many occasions they mutilated the bodies of their victims to reinforce the message that the executions conveyed — you are with us or against us! More than 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 Europeans, of all gen-ders and age, were allegedly slaughtered by the FLN during the two first years of war. Lesson — terror. The Algerian nationals were the best target; the FLN strongly believed that executing an Algerian low-level civil servant was better than murdering a French colonist because the brutal loss of a local figure effected the whole community. The same tactics are used in Iraq today. In the cities, the FLN used walk-by/drive-by shooting tactics on individuals (soldiers, colonists, Algerians) or customers at bars or restaurants. They also bombed public places and painted their slogans on walls while terrorizing the population into obedience or “inaction.” During the battle of Algiers, the FLN claimed that it successfully conducted hundreds of shootings or bombings a month! Lesson— roadside bombs. The simple and efficient concepts of suicide and roadside bombings did not seem fashionable for the jihadists of this war! Roadside bombs only appeared during the 1980s in the Middle East against Israeli forces in Lebanon, thanks to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.3 Like “a Fish in Water:” The local people were terrorized by ruthless insurgents into submission or active participation such as providing food, shelter, money, intelligence, and manpower to the rebels. The rebels 28 — May-June 2006 Algiers, 19 March 1962. Follow ing the Evian agreements, the Bab El Oued district is secured by French military in support of the cease fire. (All photos courtesy ECPAD FRANCE) were basically liv ing off the same people they were claiming to defend and were getting taxes and food from the peasants. Even in France, undercover FLN agents terrorized the Algerian community into paying war taxes, and also staged antiwar demonstrations. Lesson — dissent, treason, and free speech. The FLN enlisted in its ranks high-profile French intellectuals and show business personalities who they used as carriers back and forth from Paris to Algiers. These carriers were commonly referred to as, “les porteurs de valises du FLN” (the FLN suitcase handlers). Freedom at Last: It took eight years for Algeria to “win” its independence. This was partly because the insurgents’ ferocity toward their own people prevented the ignition of the “universal” and “spontaneous” popular movement against the powers of France. Mostly, however, since France was in such political and military turmoil in the early 1960s, it had to let go of Algeria for its own sake. On 13 March 1962, a cease-fire went into effect. However, it was not enough for the jihadists who attempted to strengthen the foundations of their future military-socialist dictatorship of the FLN with swift executions of between 50,000 to 100,000 former rallied Algerian soldiers in the months preceding the declaration of independence. Lesson — total warfare. The cease-fire was not respected by the FLN. From 50 to 100,000 harkis (Algerians who fought alongside French) and families, Europeans, French soldiers, and Algerians were massacred, or just vanished, without reaction from Paris or the military. A Dirty War: Tactics of the French Troops Tailoring the Forces: In November 1954, the French contingent in Algeria seemed strong on paper, but, in actuality, only about 10,000 soldiers were operational. Metropolitan police and paratrooper units were sent to assist French troops in “raking” operations of the countryside until more seasoned units from Indochina could take over doctrine and operations. In 1957, the focus was set on intelligence gathering, exploitation, and new tactics. France had committed more than 400,000 troops the prior year, after realizing that what Paris perceived as a simple “pacification operation,” was actually a major colonial war. Lesson — intelligence gathering. The only high-tech intelligence-gathering equipment was ground radars used along the border fences. The remainder was human intelligence (HUMINT), provided by pro-French supporters, military patrols, air surveillance, informants, spies, interrogation of prisoners, and police-style work. Furthermore, the chain of command was extremely streamlined to respond immediately, and intelligence was usually exploited at the first processing level without usual legal constraints — thanks to the extreme powers provided to the military by Paris. Tailoring the Tactics: To enforce the French presence in rural areas and weaken the influence of the insurgents, several changes were implemented, which included the system of quadrillage (dividing the country into permanently garrisoned and aggressively patrolled geographical zones); the displacement of vulnerable populations; the formation of Algerian-based auto-defense units; the control of Algerian provincial and local administration through the Section Administratives Specialisees (SAS); and the creation of Algerian units (Harkas) manned by 150,000 Algerian soldiers (harkis) who had volunteered to serve France. Lesson — SAS. SAS took over every single administrative and medical support at local and provincial levels, to include mail delivery, city management, elections, finances, and Muslim women’s issues. Lesson — control of the battlefield. The garrisoned quadrillage system, coupled with the SAS, denied the FLN control of the country, even in its most remote areas. Lesson — native units. Using Algerian nationals in “native units” was an asset to the French military, and the harkis were very effective against the insurgents. The one Algerian unit that stayed in 1962 was slaughtered by the FLN; the one that moved to France was relocated across the country. Active Battlefield Control: In 1958, two active border “barrages” were set up to prevent the free passage of combatants; however to facilitate weapons and logistics support to and from friendly Tunisia and Morocco (Morice lines), mobile units and task forces were created (“La reserve generale”) and supported with the extensive use of helicopters to facilitate massive search-and-destroy operations against detected rebel bands. Furthermore, on occasion, the air force even tracked the FLN across the border to bomb its bases within Tunisian villages. May-June 2006 — 29 Algiers, 23 March 1962. French paratroopers are deployed around the district of Bab El Oued in support of the implementation of the cease-fire.

Lesson — quick reaction forces. The use of extremely rapid reaction elite forces, such as legionnaires, paratroopers, and commandos, tailored to the detected threat, finally denied the FLN the mobility that allowed its units to freely roam the djebel. Lesson — helicopters. The war in Algeria saw for the first time the extensive successful use of helicopters to quickly transport quick reaction forces. French helicopters were armed with machine guns, rockets, and guns, and carried troops and mortar batteries. The French heliborne tactics were later adopted by most of the armies in the world. Lesson — ground radars. Ground radars were successfully used in combination with electric sensors to monitor the border “barrages” and detect any penetration by rebel units. In Vietnam, ground radars and intrusion detection systems were also extensively used to detect enemy covert movement. Lesson — unilateral aggression of foreign countries. Tracking down the FLN in neighboring countries and bombing foreign bases alienated other North African countries, as well as the United Nations. Total War — the French: Between 1954 and 1962, French authorities also used questionable counterinsurgency methods to balance the effect of the guerrillas and terrorist activities. They displaced populations from “sensitive border areas” (sometimes quite forcefully), relocated “douars,” set up internment camps for FLN militants, burned villages and crops, and quickly executed suspected agents. More that 4,000 officially (arrested with a paper trail) “assigned” prisoners disappeared. Lesson — legitimacy. Inhumane and illegal actions undercut the legitimacy of counterinsurgency operations when conducted by a democratic state. Lesson — abuses. Obviously, torture and other abuses brought a short-term military victory but alienated the Algerian and French populations, eventually bringing a political disaster that led to political defeat. Lesson — terror. The use of terror to “win the hearts and soul” of the population was counterproductive. Lesson — burned ground policy. Forcibly displacing and relocating certain populations and destroying their villages and crops alienated more locals. A similar tactic called the “Strategic Hamlet Program,” was used by U.S. forces in Vietnam, with the same negative results. Intelligence: Intelligence gathering, exploitation, and quick dissemination were critical to the efficiency of the quadrillage concept and to the success of the quick reaction motorized or heliborne forces. Intelligence was provided by the colons, the pro-French Algerians, the rallied FLN soldiers, prisoners, ground or air patrols, and electronic equipment (radars). Intelligence was quickly exploited at the garrisoned zone level. Prisoners were rapidly dispatched to the interrogation center of the zone for what would be defined as cruel, inhumane, or degrading (CID) treatment. Lesson — HUMINT. HUMINT accounted for most of the intelligence the rapid reaction forces acted on. Lesson — intelligence and quick reaction forces. The extensive focus on intelligence gathering, exploitation, and quick dissemination to small and highly mobile units (heliborne, airborne, and motorized) was definitely the main lesson to be drawn from this conflict. French forces quickly responded to information and deployed adapted task forces to the enemy. Whether detected by reconnaissance units, seen by spotting planes, exposed by devices of the Morice lines, or provided by any other intelligence source, rebels ended up running for their lives in the rocky desert. Lesson — creating a “free hunting zone.” Displacing the potentially FLN-friendly population from the borders with Tunisia and Morocco and creating a so-called “free hunting zone” (zones de chasse libres: free firing zones) dedicated to the “hunting commandos” (commandos de chasse), finally denied the night to the insurgents. La Bleuite: The rallied FLN soldiers wore highly visible blue coveralls for psychological reasons. The effect of their direct contribution to intelligence operations was called la bleuite (the blue illness) because of the color of the coverall. Some of these rallied FLN also infiltrated their former organizations like efficient moles. In one well-known example of la bleuite, disinformation from a French intelligence operative accounted for the “purge” of 2,000 enemies. Lesson — rallied forces. Only locals dedicated to the cause can infiltrate enemy cells without detection and provide high-value intelligence. Lesson — disinformation. Intelligence operatives often infiltrated enemy units to exploit the existing paranoia of the many leaders of the many factions that made the FLN. Leadership: From 1954 to 1962, a total of 1.7 million officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers served with honor and pride in Algeria. Most of these units were elite and seasoned, forged in the jungles of Asia and commanded by charismatic field command- 30 — May-June 2006 Oran, 1 Nov 1961. Security operations during demonstrations in favor of independence.

ers. Paris supported the war and successive governments gave the priority to a military victory while implementing local political reforms. Eventually, out of desperation, Paris wrote “a blank check” for the army to win quickly. The battle of Algiers in 1957 and the riot of the pro-French Algeria colons in May 1958, eventually contributed to the final collapse of a weakened fourth republic and the return of De Gaulle to power in the fifth republic. Lesson — leadership. Some of the famous field commanders may have chosen to lead, order, and allow indiscipline, lawlessness, and use of excessive force; however, most of them actually ran tight and highly cohesive units that stayed faithful to the republic. The Battle of Algiers A Political Goal: In 1957, Algiers became the focal point of the war when the FLN set up a 1,500-person terrorist network spread out among the 70,000 inhabitants of the city’s older Muslim neighborhood, the “Kasbah.” Terror was a weapon of choice for both sides and again, faithful to their doctrine, insurgents terrorized other Algerians into obedience or inaction. There was no neutrality possible during this war and when the paratroopers of Massu entered Algiers on 8 January 1957, they had been granted full powers to “re-establish order” at any cost and put an end to the wave of bombings and executions that had shaken the capital for months. Lesson — psychological warfare. To win over the population, French forces also used meetings, tracts, propaganda, and distribution of food and sweets. The FLN relied mostly on terror as a tool to obtain collaboration. Victory … and Dishonor: The military used the tactics that served them well in the djebels, which included intelligence gathering, quadrillage, raking, combing, and surprise raids, against the Kasbah. Furthermore, because of the government’s failure to cope with the size of the rebellion and impose the rule of law, the military used its new powers to conduct searches and seizures, detentions, physical violence, torture, and executions. The cycle of violence and torture became the routine in Algiers as the two protago-nists resorted to terror to win the city. A couple of months later, the FLN was totally defeated in Algiers, while the terror expanded to a metropolitan France that sentenced 58 terrorists to the guillotine and opened four major detention camps. Lesson — legitimacy. Illegal actions totally destroy the legitimacy of operations when conducted by a democratic state. Lesson — judicial powers. The exceptional powers granted to the military by Paris allowed the army to avoid many time-consuming legal procedures (checks and balances). Searches without warrants were conducted at any time and suspects were immediately detained and interrogated. Some of the military commanders and units resorted to torture or summarily executed their prisoners. Lesson — police database. The French police compiled a huge database of suspects, including their relatives and friends. Extensive use of this continuously updated database allowed law enforcement officials to quickly arrest a suspect or track him down through his entourage. Purging the Algerians The defeat in Algiers deeply shook the FLN from within, splitting its coalition of various armed and political factions. From August to December 1957, a weak FLN was shaken by internal purges both inside and outside of Algeria. The entire populations of villages were slaughtered for supporting one faction or the other. These gory and merciless scenes resurfaced some three decades later when the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) used similar tactics to terrorize douars into Islam. The rebels often used axes, shovels, and picks for their execution. Lesson — “Divide to conquer.” History has shown that most insurgency movements were often made of temporary coalitions of rival factions weakly united by convenience. A Dirty War: Rebellion, Military Coup, and the End Last Hope: In 1958, General De Gaulle was recalled to power after the collapse of the government of the fourth republic. By June 1958, he carried the hopes of the military, the colons, and the pro-French Algerian, as he shouted, “Je vous ai compris” (I got the message). In 1959, the “plan Challes” and operation “Courvoie” were the last major pacification offensives launched throughout Algeria. By the end of that year, a pragmatic De Gaulle clarified his official stance on Algeria, disclosing his views of an Algerian self-May-June 2006 — 31 Algiers, 19 March 1962. Following the Evian agreements and the implementation of the cease-fire, armed forces are deployed in Algiers to avoid confrontation between FLN and OAS (Secret Army Organization).

determination, which infuriated everyone who had wrongly believed in his commitment to keep Algeria French. Purging the French: 1960 and 1961 saw the French purges and rebellions. Generals Challes and Massu were recalled to France while desperate colons set up barricades and fought police forces. In 1961, once again abandoned, after suffering heavy losses for a cause they were made to believe in by their successive government, some military units followed their commanders in an uprising (the putsch of the generals) that would force De Gaulle to constitutionally assume full powers in Paris. In the meantime, a new player in Algeria, the Secret Army Organization (OAS), launched a terrorist offensive against forces loyal to France. The organization wanted to keep their “word of honor,” which was given to all Algerians who sided with the republic. The situation got so serious in Algiers that tanks and soldiers seized the airport around Paris where a military coup was feared. On 8 September 1961, an attempt on De Gaulle’s life, organized by the OAS, failed. A Sour Ending: The path was being paved to Algeria’s independence and 1962 put an end to the drama. The Evian agreements were signed, supported by 90 percent of the French population. General Sa-lan, the leader of the military coup, was arrested and a ceasefire was implemented with the FLN. In June, the OAS made a truce and the colons and harkis began a massive exile to France. On 3 July, the Algerian Republic Provisionary Government (GPRA) took control of the country, thus ending the last major colonial conflict of the century. Iraq: The U.S. Military’s Algeria Asymmetric Warfare: The war in Algeria inspired the basis of a new “anti-occident” strategy, largely rooted in the writings of Mao and Sun Tzu, and later labeled “asymmetric warfare.” As shown in this article, the FLN, in the name of its legitimate revolution, resorted to terror against the enemy and its own population, bloody purges within its ranks, torture, executions, mutilation, kidnapping, terrorist tactics, bombings, extortion, disinformation, and sabotage, both in Algeria and France. At the same time, the slightest morally reprehensive or illegal act from French forces was fully exploited to its fullest extent by the Parisian FLN disinformation apparatus. Eventually, the media would end up echoing the alleged or documented atrocities committed by the army of the republic, soon followed by the rest of the world and international organizations. Finally, that sort of moral blackmail would end up paralyzing the government and scaring politicians and military leaders into inaction for fear of scandal. Role of the Media: In his book, Asymmetric Warfare or the Defeat of the Victor, Jacque Baud claims that the media is the major weapon of terrorists.4 Brazilian author and philosopher, Olavo de Carvalho, echoed this theory when he said that disinformation as a weapon has recently become the most pervasive action of the media. The war in Algeria is very similar to the current conflict in Iraq, in terms of both the military battlefield and the media battleground. Asymmetric warfare at its best is still applied today. To function, asymmetric warfare needs to influence society so “it won’t even detect the inborn immorality of the so-called moral requirements demanded from one of the parties, while granting the other an indifferent and accomplice silence for its violation of the same requirements.” (Olavo de Carvalho) Selective Memory: The majority of the 1.7 million servicemen who fought and died served admirably and honorably for eight years for a cause the democratically elected government of France ordered them to defend. Innovative and traditional military and psychological tactics were extensively used to counter ferocious insurgents. The only aspects that history remembers from this conflict are the tortures and executions performed by some on the French side; an example of asymmetric warfare at its best; selective memory for those who conveniently forgot the bloody tactics used by the FLN to gain power and to keep it. The war in Algeria was total war, an early asymmetric conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of people, mostly civilians — the very hearts and minds the French troops and FLN were fighting for. The conflict spilled into neighboring countries all the way to Egypt and as far north as France and Paris. It was a dirty war by all standards; one closer to a civil war than a colonial war, with absurdities, horror, treasons, cowardice, and extreme self-righteousness from both parties. For history’s sake, always conveniently rewritten by the winners, it was a colonial war won by the oppressed Algerian people, a conflict that almost destroyed the mean French republic; one that brought victory and dishonor to its Nazi-like armies. For historians, it was a dirty conflict in which one camp was held to higher standards by the international community than was its ruthless and ferocious enemy. The chapter of these dark times is not yet closed and the debate about confessing the institutionalized use of torture in Algeria rages in France; brought back to the fore by “the carriers of the FLN.” Certainly, a joint recognition of guilt and apology would finally put an end to this drama, which continues to cause pain to French and Algerian generations. As far as the current war in Iraq goes, even in its consequences, it is not likely to become another Vietnam. Iraq is going more in the direction of a U.S. military Algeria — something that will deeply affect the U.S. Army, its leadership, doctrine, training, and the way it will be perceived far beyond the lifetimes of current decisionmakers in Washington, D.C. Notes 1Retired U.S. Army Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich, “We Aren’t Fighting to Win Anymore U.S. Troops in Iraq Are Only Trying to Buy Time,” The Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2005. 2El Moudjahid, editorial of the first issue, Algeria, June 1956. 3Eric Chevreuil, “Peace in Galilee: Long Forgotten lessons,” ARMOR, July-August 2005. 4Jacque Baud, Asymmetric Warfare or the Defeat of the Victor, Editions du Rocher, France, 20 March 2003. Eric Chevreuil retired from the French army after 18 years of service as an armor and cavalry officer and is currently employed by Hansen Technologies. He is pursuing a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nancy, France. He received his military education from several French academies, to include St. Maixent NCO Academy; Saumur Armor Academy; St. Cyr-Coetquidan Officer Academy; Language and Intelligence School, Strasbourg; and Staff College, Compiegne. He served in various command and staff positions, to include tank platoon commander, tank company commander, long-range reconnaissance patrol commander, intelligence officer, military English teacher, multimedia course developer, and head of the British and North American Language Studies Department, Strasbourg. 32 — May-June 2006