More than a Campaign of Platitudes: Effective Information Operations for the Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team

“The most important concept to remember about information is that it is not a weapon per se; it is a process, away of thinking about relationships. It is about perception, because information is an enabler.”1 There is a certain degree of comfort shared by combat arms officers in reading the operations order for conventional combat. It is reassuring to know what the enemy looks like, generally where the threat is located, and how conventional assets, guided by doctrine, can provide desired effects on a target. Unfortunately, armor and infantry commanders, who deploy their units to locations to support the Global War on Terror, find themselves pitted against afar more ambiguous enemy. It is also an enemy that easily morphs into a local populace, which may be ambivalent to, or resentful of, the presence of U. S. forces in its community. For the U. S. Army, information operations (IO) serves as the primary method for shaping verbal and symbolic messages used to influence the enemy and host-nation populations. This article outlines a methodology for incorporating IO, maneuver and collection efforts, into a well-synchronized operational plan that any task force can use as a starting point for providing company/teams with a realistic approach for engaging a local populace. Commander’s Commitment — the First Critical Component Despite the earnest efforts of many doctrine writers and thoughtful officers pen-ning articles from the Balkans and Afghanistan, few sources exist that provide coherent instruction on the application of IO for units that carryout the most basic and immediately influential forms of IO. If a battalion does not have an innovative IO officer, the commander may discount using IO, if he is unaware of its value. He may also misuse general support (GS) assets, such as a psychological operations (PSYOPS) team, because of a lack in understanding the element’s ability to serve as a combat (or peacekeeping) multipli- 20 — er. Such ignorance in stability and reconstruction operations does not do the mission or the people of a war-torn region justice. The tendency of commanders to rely on combat power is logical, considering that it is a doctrinal tool that they understand far better than the amorphous and immature doctrine of IO. However, discounting the importance of complementing combat power with relevant information will only make the war harder to win decisively. According to Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the Army defines IO as, “actions taken to affect adversaries’ and influence others’ decisionmaking processes, information, and information systems, while protecting one’sown information and information systems.”2 A dozen elements contribute to creating IO, but the most pertinent to battalion-level operations are civil affairs (CA), PSYOPS, public affairs, military deception, operations security, and at times, physical destruction. Other components, such as electronic warfare and computer network attacks, only come into consideration at higher command levels. Most of the elements of IO are not new to the Army, but for combat arms officers working from company to brigade levels, IO elements could easily seem intimidating. Many IO components do not fit within the conventional selection of weaponry used to destroy, neutralize, and suppress enemy forces. Even more daunting for combat arms officers is how to design an effective IO campaign to persuade a foreign populace to accept certain beliefs. Often armor and infantry task forces turn to their fire support officers (FSO) to create a plan. However, defining a task and purpose for a CA team to placate Kosovar-Albanians opposed to the return of Kosovar-Serb refugees is not as simple as requesting an artillery smoke mission to screen friendly troop movement. To be successful in IO, staff officers have to grasp anew assortment of tasks. Deceive, influence, inform, and preserve are just a few. Only by a task force commander’s direct guidance to his staff and subordinate leaders will a task force seriously study IO concepts and adapt those principles most pertinent to their planning and operational endeavors. One of the first opportunities a task force commander has to shape his unit’s collective mindset prior to a deployment is during the unit’s mission readiness exercise. On arriving at the training center, the commander should assemble his staff and company commanders to deliver his commander’s intent. By establishing IO as a key task for mission success, the commander ensures that IO becomes an integrated factor during all steps of the military decisionmaking process and mission execution. To stand alone as a separate annex to every order is insufficient. Further, company commanders understand that face-to-face engagements and talking points cannot be summarily ignored. Spheres of Influence — a Means to Prevent Information Fratricide Face-to-face engagements provide the most basic method for influencing people, eliciting information, and negotiating settlements. A fundamental for ensuring the effectiveness of face-to-face engagements is establishing spheres of influence (SOI) within the area of operation (AO). SOIs are individuals within communities who are deemed as leaders by the local populace, such as politicians, clerics, tribal sheiks, businessmen, and members of the press. They have the capability of informing and influencing wider audiences within an AO than a task force could as alone entity. SOIs should be tracked on a master sheet by name, title, ethnicity, and the U. S. soldier who will meet with him a specified number of times per month. The task force commander may meet with the police chief daily to discuss the security situation. For example, a company commander or CA officer may meet with a village mayor once a month to discuss funding infrastructure improvements; or a PSYOPS team leader may meet with a radio station owner weekly to deliver a CD of commercials and jingles about the importance of participating in upcoming elections. In each of these examples, the U. S. soldier builds a positive rapport with his SOI by meeting regularly with him. Failing to meet at an arranged time or sending random alternates to meet with the SOI is inconsiderate and causes the soldier to lose credibility. During every informal and scheduled encounter, the soldier should take notes. Sharing relevant notes with the S2 and IO officer helps the staff build intelligence. Recorded information can also be used in the future against the SOI if he forgets about previous agreements made or compliments given. By fostering trust in the relationship and subtly incorporating virtues prized by the host society, you can influence the SOI to make a public statement. For instance, an influential sheik denounces the reliability of Iraqi police in his village during the weekly sheik’s council. While the claim is entirely unsubstantiated, the sheik intends to use this council as a forum to improve his social stature by directly confronting the task force commander and local political leaders. As a counteraction, the company commander assigned as the sheik’s SOI travels to the village the following day to meet with the sheik privately. The commander mentions that his “A fundamental for ensuring the effectiveness of face-to-face en gagements is establishing spheres of influence (SOI) within the area of operation (AO). SOIs are individuals within communities who are deemed as leaders by the local populace, such as politicians, clerics, tribal sheiks, businessmen, and members of the press. They have the capability of informing and influencing wider audiences within an AO than a task force could as alone entity.” — 21 task force recently received $30,000 in funds tabbed for dilapidated waterworks. The commander wants to recommend the sheik’s village as a priority location for new pipes. However, the task force commander would not support the recommendation due to the sheik’s negative remarks concerning the police force. The company commander reminds the sheik of specific examples of Iraqi police accomplishments by citing the sheik’sown words from previous conversations. Perhaps if the sheik makes another public statement at the next sheik’s council acknowledging improved police professionalism, then his village would be guaranteed funding. By the end of the meeting, the sheik agrees because he realizes that his prestige will swell considerably more if his tribe enjoys fresh water than if his peerage at the council thinks he is headstrong. Besides being a basic courtesy to attend all scheduled meetings, acting as the primary counterpart to a local SOI reduces information fratricide, “actions, perceptions, and information from friendly forces that create improper impressions [that] can adversely affect IO in sensitive situations.”3 For example, the PSYOPS team should not independently visit the Iraqi army battalion commander in the task force sector to offer handheld Motorola radios if the primary SOI is the task force S3. Likewise, the task force commander should not normally visit with a village sheik if a company commander is the primary SOI. If the colonel arrives at his home once or twice, the sheik may refuse to talk with the captain in the future because the sheik would feel that he has gained stature in the community by having the task force commander listen to his grievances. Considering that a task force sector often includes dozens of city districts or villages, it is not feasible for the task force commander to meet regularly with every local leader. Having the U. S. Army deployed to the same locations aides planners in building continuity folders and intelligence databases that expand on the influence, attitude, and threat of each SOI. Take pictures with each SOI and write down full names and addresses. If a unit’s relief in place is curtailed for some reason, incoming soldiers may not have the opportunity to be introduced to their SOIs by outgoing personnel. By providing the new unit with as much historical information as possible, local SOIs are less likely to deceive the new task force and soldiers are spared the onerous task of conducting detailed background interviews with their SOIs. The Talking Point — a Point from Which to Engage a Target For the staff to fully incorporate IO into maneuver and intelligence operations requires the IO officer to maintain a constant dialogue with the battalion’s planner, intelligence officer, and company-level leaders. Messages, or talking points, need to be scripted for targeting specific audiences. A generic message parroted to everyone — Sunnis and Kurds, farmers and lawyers — will not be as persuasive as separate messages constructed to directly appeal to personal interests. IO becomes a campaign of platitudes when soldiers recite messages verbatim without asking follow-up questions or attempting to qualify the effectiveness of the messages. As an example, a common theme spoken throughout the Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment encouraged citizens to respect the rule of law, which many ignored after the Serbian army withdrew and towns were rife with looting, arson, and ethnic intimidation. While on patrol, a squad lead er telling a mother of seven to “respect the rule of law” would most likely receive a blank stare. In contrast, the squad leader could encourage the woman to ensure her children do not skip school so they would gain a good education. By cor relating academics with the opportunity to enjoy a brighter future, the mother might be more inclined to care about whether her children attend classes and how they spend their time after school. Task force officers involved in other activities in the AO should receive different talking points about the rule of law to frame “While on patrol, a squad lead er telling a mother of seven to “respect the rule of law” would most likely receive a blank stare. In contrast, the squad leader could encourage the woman to ensure her children do not skip school so they would gain a good education. By correlating academics with the opportunity to enjoy a brighter future, the mother might be more inclined to care about whether her children attend classes and how they spend their time after school.” “During every informal and scheduled encounter, the soldier should take notes. Sharing relevant notes with the S2 and IO officer helps the staff build intelligence. Recorded information can also be used in the future against the SOI if he forgets about previous agreements made or compliments given.” 22 — their discussions. For example, between country and pop songs, a company commander attending an Albanian-language radio show explains that international businesses have little desire to invest or build factories in Kosovo until the security situation improves. This will only occur after the youth take responsibility for their actions. The task force commander delivers a prepared statement during his participation in the weekly press conference with the municipal president. His remarks encourage Kosovar-Serbs to understand that there are no Albanian or Serbian problems in the municipality, but only community issues that required the entire citizenry to resolve. Major themes should not be strictly reserved for specific SOIs or focus groups. The S2 and IO officer can prepare a card every two weeks with messages and questions to aid soldiers on patrol in villages that are devoid of specific nonlethal targets to engage. Over the course of an extended deployment, it is easy for leaders to fall into a malaise and run through the motions of a patrol without accomplishing anything productive. With message/ question cards distributed throughout the task force, each platoon and squad leader will be armed with talking points to deliver, and information requirements to resolve prior to departing the base camp. This simple product is important in any situation where leaders are otherwise unsure of what issues to address while providing a security presence with soldiers. General Support Integration — a Combat Multiplier Constructing a well-synchronized IO plan requires constant assessments, refining and rewriting messages to provide soldiers with a realistic approach for engaging the local populace on a daily basis. The CA and PSYOPS teams operating within a task force sector have the ability to share a common IO message, but only if they are directly involved in the task force IO and targeting meetings. A task force should not be complacent with allowing these teams to operate freely throughout the task force AO solely on guidance from brigade. GS assets should be invited by the task force to be viable participants in weekly targeting meetings where they can regularly lend input on refining nonlethal targets and assessing effects on the same. Commanders and staffs must do their homework to understand the capabilities and limitations of GS assets. Technically, these assets work directly for the brigade headquarters. Most GS units are also reservists and possess unique talents and capabilities. Members of a CA team often arrive on active duty from professions in civilian business, teaching, and city planning. Tactical PSYOPS teams have the ability to mass produce handbills and fliers, and one of their HMMWVs normally has amounted speaker with the ability to amplify voice messages by more than a kilometer. Through an open dialogue and willingness to understand each other’s missions, it is possible for these special teams to act as enablers of the task force’s IO campaign. CA officers can knowledgably engage local businessmen and government employees to develop projects. Task force messages can easily be incorporated into their discussions and negotiations. A PSYOPS team that regularly visits the AO’s most popular market can disseminate colorful newsletters to shoppers that also relate to the task force’s IO focus of the month or week. Synchronization Process and Link age to Collection and Maneuver Efforts An IO campaign will be successful when leaders make a deliberate effort to adapt the Army’s doctrine into a fashion that does not seem to intimidate soldiers, from the squad to task force level. By constantly seeking the opinions of company leaders and frequent discussions with CA and PSYOPS soldiers, the IO officer can continuously update and revise products. By tailoring talking points for each sphere of locals, soldiers will use the words written specifically for them to engage the populace. The foundation for nonlethal targeting is the Army’s effects-based operations targeting system and the use of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A). However, there are several striking differences between indirect fire targets and IO targets. An enemy tank observed in open terrain is a clear target and the observer can quickly determine if a 155mm barrage will destroy it. It is much more difficult to ascertain the effects on all 16- to 24-year-old males in a town where the task is to deter, and the purpose is to prevent local youth from intimidating returning refugees. The delivery process for nonlethal targets incorporates the variety of GS assets, SOIs, and talking points described in this article. Synchronizing these assets with maneuver operations during targeting meetings is just as vital as a fire support rehearsal conducted prior to an operation to mass the effects of multiple forms of contact near-simultaneously on the target. With the help of the S3 or assistant S3, the IO officer verifies that no single company is overburdened with IO targets. Considering the variety of additional tasks that a company must achieve in a week, it is important that the company commander receives a listing of only “Through an open dialogue and willingness to understand each other’s missions, it is possible for these special teams to act as enablers of the task force’s IO campaign. CA officers can knowledgably engage local businessmen and government employees to develop projects.” — 23 the most essential targets to engage with his relatively limited resources. During the targeting meeting, the S2 identifies IO targets that are identical to his intelligence targets so that talking points and priority intelligence requirements can be paired together in the next published task force order. The last thing a patrol leader wants to do after returning from a mission is to discover that he must return into sector to locate an intelligence target for questioning that happens to be the same target he just engaged to accomplish an IO task. Often the desired effects on a target may take an entire deployment or longer to fully achieve. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, one of the key endstates was to transition security operations to the Iraqi government. At the time of this writing, units deployed to OIF III continued to strive to meet this endstate. A task force staff should identify key tasks that will support reaching the desired endstate. Commanders and staff officers must demonstrate the tactical patience to regularly engage a target for months at a time, or even for an entire year-long deployment. To verify that the staff is on the correct path to gain the desired effects, intermediate nonlethal effects should be articulated during targeting meetings. Establishing intermediate effects that can be achieved during the mission rather than focusing exclusively on the final endstate allows units to measure their successes in relation to the final goal more precisely. Assessing the effects of nonlethal targeting requires a qualitative analysis of engagements. The lethal targeting process relies on quantitative battle damage assessments to determine if an enemy is destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed. Often, IO officers want to create measures of effectiveness (MOE) that account for purely statistical data. Such an assessment is inappropriate for the nonlethal targeting process. Perhaps your unit’s goal is to reduce ethnic intimidation in a village. Quantitative MOE would include: number of physical assaults against minorities; number of direct fire attacks against minorities; and number of explosives detonated in a minority community. During Task Force 2d Battalion, 63d Armor’s deployment to Kosovo, a fight broke out between two families in one of the towns in our sector. First, a teenager started a fistfight with a man in the other family. The quid-pro-quo restitution escalated with a grenade being lobbed into the home of one family, and finally a drive-by shooting on the tavern owned by the other family. Based on the MOE, we had three alarming indicators that signified a spike in ethnic intimidation in our AO. However, the two families were longtime neighbors, and the dispute had nothing to do with the rights of minorities. Quantitative MOE are too inflexible, may cause unnecessary alarm, and discount anything that does not fit into the description of their cookie-cutter molds. Numerical assessments fail to wholly assess the effects in the unconventional environment. Investing the time in articulating qualitative assessments as part of the targeting process helps the staff refine intermediate effects on preexisting targets and in selecting new, lucrative targets. Company/Team Level IO — Considerations for Soldiers on the Ground If company commanders do not express an interest in incorporating IO in their company operations, then soldiers will not deliver a common message. With the tremendous firepower carried by soldiers on patrol in Iraq, symbolic IO of ten rivals verbal messages as the most persuasive method for influencing the populace concerning the intentions of mul tina tional forces. IO not only affects the local inhabitants in the task force AO, but potentially people around the world, thanks to modern media. International perceptions about the Global War on Terror could be swayed quickly by anonymous observers whose digital photos become immediately available to millions via the internet. The actions and words of a HMMWV gunner may rival the delicately scripted press statement of ahead of state in shaping public opinion about the war. When a company commander wants to coordinate for indirect fires during an operation, he coordinates with his FSO who, in turn, coordinates with the task force FSO. During stability operations, each company should have an officer responsible for coordinating IO. The obvious choice is the company FSO, but if he is unavailable during a deployment, the company commander should assign secondary duties as the company IO officer to his executive officer or a senior platoon leader. The availability of company-level IO officers provides the task force IO officer with people he can regularly talk to concerning nonlethal targeting. The senior IO officer can meet with company IO officers prior to every targeting meeting to review changes to existing targets, consider nominations for new targets, and schedule combined missions with GS assets. Following the targeting meeting, the IO officer should review the updated target list worksheet and talking points with each company IO officer to verify that they understand the tasks and purposes. With greater visibility on activities within his company sector, the company IO “...one morning in Baqubah, my platoon escorted the PSYOPS team to the education ministry. One of their HMMWVs towed a trailer teeming with soccer balls and jerseys. While my platoon provided perimeter security, the PSYOPS team leader met with the director of athletics to donate the hundreds of shirts and balls that would allow dozens of youth soccer teams to begin playing in a matter of months. As soccer is an extremely popular sport in Iraq, the goodwill gesture was quite appropriate.” 24 — officer offers the task force IO officer a realistic appreciation for progress and frustrations within his assigned sector of the task force AO. This is similar to a company FSO refining the grid locations to lethal targets, or a company commander requesting ground-burst illumination to mark a target reference point. To enhance IO efforts at the company level, commanders should empower platoon and squad leaders to establish their own SOIs within the company AO. If the company commander is the primary SOI for an Iraqi city mayor and the leading sheiks, then platoon leaders should identify muqtars (informal mayors of smaller villages or city districts) and shop owners who are influential in the areas they patrol. By assuming ownership of the company AO, subordinates will exponentially improve the task force’s collection capabilities as they deliver messages to key communicators who are respected by the local populace. A database of photos, names, and addresses can be maintained in the company command post. All of this information should be handed over to the replacement unit just as SOI information is transferred at the task force level. Company commanders need to prepare platoon leaders to cooperate with the CA and PSYOPS elements working in their AO, and see them as additional enablers sharing the same mission. Understanding the task and purpose for a mission involving a platoon and GS asset will ensure that the platoon does more than provide the team with security. For instance, one morning in Baqubah, my platoon escorted the PSYOPS team to the education ministry. One of their HMMWVs towed a trailer teeming with soccer balls and jerseys. While my platoon provided perimeter security, the PSYOPS team leader met with the director of athletics to donate the hundreds of shirts and balls that would allow dozens of youth soccer teams to begin playing in a matter of months. As soccer is an extremely popular sport in Iraq, the goodwill gesture was quite appropriate. However, the next step in advancing the IO campaign would be for every platoon leader to tout his excitement about upcoming soccer games while conversing with local parents during patrols. Questions about whether a son plans to play on a school soccer team begs questions regarding whether parents know what their children — to include older children — are doing in the afternoons and at night. Are they practicing soccer, lamenting on the scarceness of employment opportunities, or attending Mujahadeen meetings? Without talking points from the IO officer and linked questions from the S2, few lieutenants will take the initiative to share similar good news stories that make the elicitation of credible information more natural. An OIF Vignette — A Coffer of Millions, a Coffer of Ideas In mid-May 2004, my platoon received the tasking to establish security for a groundbreaking ceremony in a district of Baqubah. Participants in the ceremony included the Diyala governor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) representative for the province, the brigade commander, and the mayor of Baqubah. Various news agencies and tribes were also represented at the groundbreaking. While I knew that the groundbreaking would begin the resurfacing of a major road network in the lower Baqubah district, I learned nothing else about the activity when I received the tasking a couple days prior to the event. Following the ceremony, the brigade commander informed me that the CPA recently presented half-a-billion dollars to the Diyala province for infrastructure improvements. This road project marked the first of many endeavors, which the provincial government would autonomously identify, prioritize, and initiate. Prior to returning to his HMMWV, the brigade commander also told me, “If Kosovo was college for you, this [Iraq] is your graduate work.” By delivering these words of encouragement, the commander implied that it was my responsibility as a platoon leader to continue to inform and influence the people of Baqubah. However, there was also a deeper meaning to his words. The situation in Iraq, particularly accentuated in the spring of 2004, often flipped between combat operations and stability operations. An officer could not allow his men to take a myopic view of their mission, seeing patrols as entirely combat patrols or face-to-face engagement patrols. Members of a platoon had to be capable of switching quickly between warfighting and peacemaking, even though most were more comfortable being warriors all the time. Using the brigade commander’s important information, patrol leaders throughout the city could discuss Diyala’s available funds while talking to locals during dismounted patrols through Baqubah. Invariably, shopkeepers and homeowners complained about unreliable electricity, impure water, and nonexistent sewage systems. The patrol leader could explain that their provincial government maintained a $500 million engineering budget, and encourage people to speak with their muqtars and sheiks about petitioning the provincial council for a portion of the funds for their dilapidated community. After all, a representative government requires a citizenry willing to publicly advocate its convictions. “Patrol leaders could also influence the locals with whom they spoke to report all suspicious activity to U. S. and Iraqi security patrols, or make an anonymous call to the police station. If the people want to believe that locals are not shooting at Americans, then the residents need to at least notify multinational forces or local police regarding any stranger who enters their community. Any town or district that refuses to tolerate insurgent and criminal activity deserves infrastructure improvements ahead of those communities that harbor terrorists and pretend their districts are entirely peaceful.” Continued on Page 52 — 25

Information Operations continued from Page 25 52 — DRIVER’S SEAT from Page 6 the rim should just be in view. All ACH helmets should be fitted with the thinner size 6 crown pad in the top of the helmet. The crown pad should touch the top of the wearer’s head. Fit can be adjusted by adjusting the pad positions inside the helmet, tightening the retention straps, or exchanging the helmet shell for a larger size. By inspecting, leaders can quickly determine if the bottom of the ACH comes to the top of the Soldier’s ear canal opening. If it does not, leaders are required to examine other possibilities for the improper fit and take corrective measures, to include suspension pads and retention straps for serviceability. If any of the components are broken or worn out, they should be replaced. Since there is currently no small-sized ACH, Soldiers who have a loose field of vision, stability, and hearing, which significantly enhances Soldier survivability. However, if Soldiers are un aware of the proper fit and wear of these helmets, they are exposed to increased risk of injury due to ballistic threats — knowledge is power. Leaders must ensure correct fit and wear standards are enforced. This is only one of the many safety key enablers that increase Soldier survivability. Leaders must ensure that every safety procedure on every piece of equipment is enforced. Technical references, fitting guides (with visual examples), and requisitioning instructions for both helmets are available online, courtesy of PEO Soldier, at www.peosoldier.army.mil/ achsoum.asp. “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think.” fit in a medium-sized ACH shell with size 6 pads are best accommodated in a medium-sized ACH with size 8 pads or a correct fitting PASGT helmet. It should al so be noted that when other items, such as headsets, NBC mask, and cold weather caps, are worn with either helmet, the headband and suspension on the PASGT and the pads in the ACH will need to be adjusted to allow for the additional equipment. Failure to make adjustments may make the helmet ride too high on the head, putting the Soldier at greater risk. Soldier safety remains priority one and Armor leaders are dedicated to en suring the safety of their Soldiers. The PASGT and the ACH were developed to provide ballistic protection to the head, temple, ear, and neck areas against fragmenting munitions without degradation to the Soldier’s