Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq

Two years ago, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) began conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations using both precision strikes and maneuver enabled by human and electronic intelligence sources at the operational level of war to find, fix, strike, and exploit insurgents operating across Iraq.1 These enablers allow coalition forces (CF) to conduct rapid planning and strike at the enemy’s battle rhythm to disrupt their operations. Ultimately, the CF is setting conditions, which allow Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to build combat power to assume the COIN fight, while simultaneously enabling the Iraqi transitional government to conclude an elections process that will seat a permanent Iraqi government. The Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) Threat To understand how coalition forces conduct the COIN fight, it is important to examine how the threat, terrain, insurgent tactics, and regional differences influence the Iraqi battlespace. To advance their goals and achieve freedom of action, the Sad-damists (SDM) and Iraqi rejectionist groups (IZR), backed by terrorists and foreign fighters, focus on gaining passive supporters from the disaffected segments of the Iraqi population by securing the acquiescence of other segments of the population through the use of terror and intimidation. The insurgents recruit new members from a smaller, disaffected segment of the Sunni population, primarily poor, illiterate young men. Without the passive and active support of a large segment of the Sunni population, SDM, IZR, terrorists, and foreign fighters would be denied freedom of action. By using an aggressive information operations campaign and enabling economic efforts, coalition forces are demonstrating that Sunni extremist attacks are only hurting the Iraqi population. The terrorists and foreign fighters are the least likely to participate in the Iraqi political process due to their extremism and unwillingness to negotiate with the government of Iraq; these groups include the Zarqawi network and Ansar al Islam. While the Sunni are the current focus, there is a latent Shi’a constituency that could enable resurgence of a Shi’a insurgency under certain post-election conditions or if Iranian agitation occurs. The Shi’a, in particular, perceive coalition forces not as an “army of liberation,” but rather a western occupying force in the center of the Islamic culture. While not part of the insurgency, the Kurds likewise retain the potential to initiate violence to advance their political aims. The nature of the terrain in Iraq requires coalition forces to adopt a variety of tactics and enablers to disrupt insurgent forces. The most difficult and complex is the urban terrain found in aline of cities running west to east from Al Qaim to Baghdad along the Euphrates River, and a second line running north to south from Mosul through Baghdad to Basra along the Tigris River. This type of terrain requires large amounts of manpower and precision weapons systems and, at the same time, provides insurgents with resources and sanctuary. The terrain also denies coalition forces the advantages offered by advanced technologies and sensors. Targeting insurgents while minimizing collateral damage is difficult. Using ISF and coalition forces’ human intelligence sourc- — 13 es offset insurgent advantages in urban areas. Open terrain is found outside the cluster of cities and offers coalition forces the ability to use mobility, speed, sensors, and stand-off to their advantage. Open terrain provides few resources to insurgents. Some disadvantages to coalition forces include long lines of communications and moving logistics to remote areas, especially in the western located Al Anbar province. Insurgents understand the limitations of coalition forces’ technology in COIN operations and have adopted asymmetrical tactics that are both simple in execution and complex in planning. Some examples of these tactics include improvised explosive devices/vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED/VBIED), assassinations, and information operations. IED/VBIED are low-tech weapons requiring simple delivery and targeting systems that can be adapted for both mobile (convoys) and stationary (buildings) targets with a high payoff in both casualties and information operations. Both types of attacks use a five-phase process that includes financing and information operations as critical components of the attacks. Delivery systems vary from explosives carried in vests to artillery shells buried along roads and highways. As one of the oldest terrorist tactics, assassination has proven successful during previous Arab insurgencies in Algeria and Palestine. The 2004 withdrawal of Philippine forces and closure of the United Nations commissioner’s office are examples of political effects resulting from assassinations with high information operations payoffs involving coalition members who had weak political support. Assassination can also have repercussions if the wrong state is targeted, such as the 2005 Arab League condemnation of the kidnapping and killing of Algerian diplomats. Additionally, this tactic is particularly useful in targeting local Iraqi nationals who cooperate with coalition forces. By demonstrating the inability of coalition forces and ISF to protect and secure the population, IED/VBIED attacks and kidnap-pings provide insurgents with immediate information operations success at little cost. COIN Operations The diversity of religious and ethic communities requires different COIN approaches. The majority of the Iraqi population consists of three major ethic groups: the Shi’a population located in southern and central Iraq; the Kurdish region located in northern Iraq; and the Sunnis located in a triangle running from northern Al Anbar to Baghdad and north to Mosul. As stated above, COIN operations must include the ability to find, fix, strike, and exploit insurgents. To accomplish this task, coalition forces use a variety of enablers to channel insurgents in a target area where precision strikes and maneuver are employed to strike and disrupt their operations. This method is applied at both the macro and micro level of operations. The principles of COIN operations include planned operations, intelligence-based execution, and offensive operations. Planned pattern of operations is a product of leadership, discipline, training, education, and experience. Commanders are required to quickly make necessary judgments — to objectively assess a wide range of situations — and almost intuitively use appropriate kinetic and non-kinetic force as required. Intelligence drives operations using various intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and sources, to include human intelligence. The ISF are a vital part of the ISR network by providing lightning-speed, actionable intelligence that allows coalition forces to find, fix, and finish insurgents and their sources of support. Cross-cueing from a variety of ISR platforms allows coalition forces to conduct precision targeting and defense in depth in an effort to economize forces conducting security operations (special operations forces, border security, and infrastructure). Finally, offensive operations, both kinetic (special operations forces, snap vehicle check points, counter-IED) and non-kinetic (information operations, military transition teams/battalion transition teams) are vital to COIN operations because they disrupt insurgent operations. MNC-I Mission MNC-I focused on the security lines of operation, such as seams and gaps, infrastructure, borders, and IED/VBIED, while simultaneously supporting the MNC-I forces, government, economic, communications, and coalition transformation lines of operation. Developing an ISF capable of the COIN fight is critical to the long-term success of the coalition efforts. To achieve this goal, several essential tasks must be accomplished, which include neu- “To understand how coalition forces conduct the COIN fight, it is important to examine how the threat, terrain, insurgent tactics, and re gion al differences influence the Iraqi battlespace. To advance their goals and achieve freedom of action, the Saddamists (SDM) and Iraqi rejec tionist groups (IZR), backed by terrorists and for eign fighters, focus on gaining passive supporters from the disaffected segments of the Iraqi population by securing the acquiescence of other segments of the population through the use of terror and intimidation.” 14 — tralizing AIF; developing an ISF capable of operations at battalion, brigade, and division levels; developing an ISF capable of controlling regional territories; developing an ISF capable of conducting independent operations; and developing a self-reliant ISF. To achieve long-term effects over time and space, MNC-I must accomplish six key tasks to ensure successful transition from coalition forces to ISF, which include developing a capable ISF prepared to take the lead in counterinsurgency operations; continuing the support and maintenance of joint coordination centers and provincial joint coordination centers; transitioning the battlespace to Iraqi control; implementing transition team programs; assisting the government of Iraq and provincial governments in developing and securing infrastructure; and coordinating with border security forces and developing their capabilities. Current COIN Operations The complexities of COIN operations lie in the nature of their environment. Much like police officers working a city neighborhood beat, COIN operations must be conducted in urban and rural areas to develop sources of intelligence, determine trends and irregularities, and establish relationships with community leaders and local citizens. Once coalition forces and ISF are established in an area, COIN principles are applied in both rural and urban areas at different levels of operations. At the macro level, COIN operations can shape the strategic fight. The use of ISR assets, such as tactical- and national-level platforms, can find insurgent cells and help commanders shape the battlespace. Once this information becomes available, commanders and staffs can begin rapidly planning to shape the battlespace to effectively strike insurgents with precision fires or maneuver forces. Intelligence gathered from these strikes, through human sources or captured materials, allows commanders to exploit information, which will assist in finding the next insurgent target. Finally, the find, fix, strike and exploit cycle can apply to micro-level operations. Using human and electronic intelligence sources greatly enhances coalition forces and ISF operations in rural and urban areas where insurgent forces are difficult to locate. At the operational level of war, coalition forces and ISF in Iraq use both human and technical intelligence sources to find, fix, strike and exploit insurgents using both precision strikes and maneuver. These enablers allow coalition forces to conduct rapid planning and strike at the enemy’s battle rhythm by effectively disrupting their operations. Simultaneously, this sets conditions that will allow ISF to build combat power in the assumption of the COIN fight, and will permit the Iraqi transitional government to conclude an elections process that will seat a permanent Iraqi government. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC., 21 September 2004, defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency;” and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, DC., 20 January 2005, defines the operational level as “one that involves planning focused on developing plans for campaigns and major operations that cover the broader dimensions of time and space than the tactical level.” Planners at the operational level focus on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, or organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns and major operations. Operational-level plans link the tactical employment of forces to strategic objective. Major Jayson A. Altieri is currently serving as corps planner, C3, Multinational Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory, Iraq. He received a B. A. from Norwich University, and an M. A. from the Air University, Alabama. His military education includes the Aviation Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Cavalry Leaders Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Air Command and Staff College, and School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3, 1st Battalion, 159th Aviation, LSA Anaconda, Iraq; XO, 1st Battalion (TS), 337th Aviation Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC; and commander, Aviation Detachment, Task Force Safe Border, Patuca, Ecuador. “Commanders are required to quickly make necessary judgments — to objectively assess a wide range of situations — and almost intuitively use appropriate kinetic and non-kinetic force as required. Intelligence drives operations using various intelligence, surveillance, and recon naissance (ISR) platforms and sources, to include human intelligence.”