Recreating the Master Gunner Program

Recreating the Master Gunner Program by Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge, U.S. Army, Retired In armored combat long ago, lessons were learned that would shape the future of the U.S. Army’s armor force. Although these combat lessons were not learned by tankers on the field of battle, forward-thinking mounted warriors at Fort Knox, Kentucky, had the foresight to draw the right conclusions. The time was the mid-seventies, 1974 to be precise, when the Vietnam era was drawing to a close, the Army was developing new doctrine for the future, and the Cold War was heating up. It was a time when a new tank was midway through its development and another large scale mechanized war, with significant combined arms battles and tank-on-tank engagements, had just concluded in the Middle East. The tank would become the M1 Abrams, and the war was the October 1973 conflict between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. That conflict highlighted the need for tank crew proficiency at every level, and that sufficient force, good equipment, and sound methods of employment are not enough.1 From these lessons and a survey of commanders in the field, the master gunner program was created in 1975. However, that forward-thinking decision was made for the 20th century, based on the Cold War battlefield. Perhaps it’s time to rethink the master gunner concept and make another leap forward, setting the program up for the 21st century. Master Gunner History The model for creating a master gunner has worked for 30 years since the first master gunner school was started at Fort Knox in 1975, training soldiers on the M60A1, M551, and M60A2 tanks. The programs of instruction (POI) during those early years would eventually be replaced with POIs for the M60A3, M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2SEP, either as entirely new POIs or as transition courses to update the already-graduated master gunner on subjects specific to each tank. Success of the tank master gunner program has been such that, as the saying goes, “imitation is the highest form of flattery.” Other master gunner courses, with the exception of the Bradley Master Gunner Course, began forming in the 1990s, based on the rationale of an undisputed increase in lethality that master gunners brought to a unit’s warfighting capability, as exhibited during Operation Desert Storm. Therefore, to shape and improve soldier training, master gunner programs were designed for weapons systems beyond the tank and Bradley. The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, decided early to emulate the training approach of the U.S. Army Armor School for Bradley crewmen. Immediately after the Bradley was fielded in 1983, the Bradley master gunner program was initiated. As a mechanized armor system, the principles for training tankers and units seemed a natural fit to Bradley crewmen. Following Desert Storm in the early to mid 1990s, the aviation community began designating certain pilots to act as unit master gunners to improve gunnery training. Although aviation master gunner training has less focus on maintenance, due to the background of the candidate soldier, the functions of the master gunner position were similar. In 2003, the Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, formalized this program into one that would produce soldiers with an additional skill identifier to fill designated master gunner positions in units. Similarly, field artillery had unofficial master gunner programs that were training soldiers to be master gunners at division levels through the 1990s. The Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is currently formalizing this early attempt “The model for creating a master gunner has worked for 30 years since the first master gunner school was started at Fort Knox in 1975, training soldiers on the M60A1, M551, and M60A2 tanks. The programs of instruction (POI) during those early years would eventually be replaced with POIs for the M60A3, M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP, either as entirely new POIs or as transition courses to update the already-graduated master gunner on subjects specific to each tank.” Photos courtesy of Master Gunner Branch, Fort Knox, Kentucky May-June 2005 — 25 at a master gunner program to standardize training and produce an artillery master gunner with an additional skill identifier. An anticipated artillery master gunner pilot course is expected in mid 2005. The Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, created a program in 2002 to produce a master gunner for Avenger units. As each program was developed, the mold used to create a master gunner remained fairly consistent. The philosophy guiding each program was producing a soldier expert on maintaining the weapons system, a gunnery expert in fighting with the weapons system, an authority on training management for training others, and a true subject-matter expert (SME) on many subjects. Therefore, just as evaluations between dissimilar weapons systems are incomparable, comparing master gunner programs is irrelevant. Each master gunner program, like its weapons system, has a role to play on the battlefield. What is important is how the master gunner impacts training soldiers in a unit, regardless of the weapons system on which they achieved their master gunner position. A Drawdown, Change, and Ranges The master gunner program has never been without critics during its history or the drawdown following Desert Storm. Issues and changes between Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) go beyond the Master Gunner Course structure. Insincere support for the military during this period of drawdown also took its toll. As a result, during the lead-up to combat during

OIF, some found that soldier readiness was lower than reported under peacetime conditions, especially when judged against the looming reality of “tomorrow we ride into combat.” This begs the question: under the new contemporary operating environment (COE) of the War on Terror, what lessons can be learned from OIF to shape the master gunner program for the future? Changes needed by the master gunner program have been proposed, but other areas of the Army are already in the process of change, to include the transformation and reconfiguration to units of action (UA)/units of employment (UE), initiatives in transportation doctrine for convoy operations, and changes to aviation gunnery in response to a new/old threat. Each of these changes makes a fundamental leap forward, and in some cases backward, in the Army’s doctrinal philosophy on war fighting tactics, techniques, and procedures. Their importance cannot be exaggerated when considered as separate topics, nor are the impacts of these changes limited to the isolated topics. The concept of a UA/UE and other initiatives put forward by the Chief of Staff, Army, draw on both future concepts of configuration and new lessons, with a goal of modular, cohesive, and combat-ready unit formations that allow more stability and predictability for soldiers and their families, as well as the ability to better fight the evolving Global War on Terror with units that can react to various levels of threat while retaining an inherent warfighting ability to sustain battlefield lethality.2 However, these changes are not limited to the physical restructuring of how the UA/UE is equipped and manned. Changes also “Th e Cavalry Team” Jody Harmon armorart.com involve schools and training centers that train soldiers and leaders. These changes may be predictable in the short-term view regarding changes to instruction. But the long-term effect on soldier abilities cannot be assessed until students integrate back into units and time has passed. However, the case of a master gunner is much different. The delay in evaluation will be longer, and may be too late to roll back if changes are made to fit an arbitrary mold. Changes to master gunner training will not be apparent until soldiers trained by a new master gunner are assessed, long after that master gunner has graduated under revised instruction. Transformation to modular UAs/UEs is a step forward, but not all training and courses should be arbitrarily conformed to any schedule for the sake of convenience. Basing master gunner training on a rotation schedule is hardly the best course of action, especially when considering the role a master gunner plays in unit readiness. Another area being transformed is convoy operations and protection, which has long been relegated to the “if we have time, we’ll train that” status. Convoy protection as a topic is driving changes in range design and producing undeveloped doctrine. Doc trine and live fire training for convoys was largely ignored prior to combat in Iraq. However, this often ignored area of vulnerability in soldier skills has been driven to the forefront by combat operations increasingly focused on softer targets rather than direct confrontation with maneuver units. Even though many lessons in con voy defense were learned during Vietnam 35 years ago, many have been forgotten. Changes instituted for deployed soldiers in the interim have addressed the issue, which concurs with the statement made by the Chief of Staff, Army, that “every soldier (is) a rifleman first.” Along with new doctrine has emerged a requirement to conduct convoy live fire exercises, creating a need for a new range type that would allow travel along the center axis of the range, while firing outward. Once this range is combined with new doctrine on convoy training, the result will be an enhancement in the lethality of combat support soldiers. Combat in Iraq has also driven changes in aviation. Prior to action in Iraq, the aviator’s primary threat for being shot down was opposing anti-aircraft capabilities, so doctrine and training focused on lower-flying aircraft to minimize this threat. However, in Iraq, Army aviators have learned lessons similar to convoy lessons that trace back to Vietnam, which concluded that the old technique of flying above small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) capabilities is more important than the threat of anti-aircraft. They also found that due to higher elevation, it is necessary to reintroduce the engagement technique of “running and diving fire” into the latest aerial gunnery doctrine.3 For this reason, recent discussions have proposed an aviation range complex, which requires a firing lane down the range center to practice and evaluate aviation door gunnery, with running and diving avenues of approach on the edges of the range, which would engage targetry reconfigurable to directions of fire from either avenue. An urban target environment should also be added on the downrange end of the range complex, which could be engaged or assaulted by aviation assets. Comparatively, the proposed range for convoy live fire doctrine is very similar. Doctrine writers for convoy live fire training also want to move down a course road through targetry, and possibly move into urban terrain. This similarity in range design provides an opportunity to design and construct one range to address two distinctly different doctrinal requirements. Creating a multi-use range to conduct a variety of training is beneficial to the modularity intended in emerging doctrine and transformation, in addition to being cost effective. Changes to armor doctrine, documented in “The Future of Tank Gunnery,” have also identified areas that will require range changes for armor, including new skill sets that tankers will need in the COE and how training must be changed.4 In contrast to a new convoy/aviation range, armor has company in transforming its doctrine with impact on range design. Why is range design important to the master gunner? Because changes to range design are modifications to the realm on which the master gunner culminates the unit’s gunnery training program. Live fire of the unit’s weapons systems, whatever they may be, defines the lethality of that unit. The ability to deliver accurate, decisive, and lethal fire is a critical indicator of master gunner success and a soldier’s battlefield survival. Combat is the ultimate test of training, but lessons learned on the battlefield are sometimes learned at a high price. Ranges must provide the means by which such training can be accomplished. However, the concept of ranges can no longer be limited to existing definitions of the multipurpose range complex (MPRC) or multipurpose training range (MPTR.) Future ranges must also include the ability to train urban warfighting skills. Reconfiguring to UA/UE, implementing new doctrine, and improving range infrastructure must all be integrated with a COE master gunner to maximize affordability of these changes. “As each program was developed, the mold used to create a master gunner remained fairly consistent. The philosophy guiding each program was producing a soldier expert on maintaining the weapons system, a gunnery expert in fighting with the weapons system, an authority on training management for training others, and a true subject-matter expert (SME) on many subjects.” 28 — May-June 2005

Conventional Wisdom in an Urban Environment Although change is inevitable, conventional wisdom before change is not always accurate. Following the introduction of the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT) and the horrific events of 11 September, there was some debate concerning the role of the Abrams tank, especially in urban environments. Many thought it was a subject better left alone because of the uncertainty of how the Abrams would fare in urban combat. Prevailing theory held that future conflicts may not even require the weight and battlefield dominance of the Abrams tank — even mentioning the employment of the Abrams in urban fighting was often met with resistance. In spite of this conventional wisdom, strides were taken in the area of urban combat. Fort Knox designed and built the first of its kind urban training environment, specifically designed for tanks and other vehicles. During 2001, various published articles proposed modifying an existing M1A1 tank with various add-on options to enhance its lethality and survivability in an urban environment, which led to test exercises intended to develop evaluation criteria of mounted forces on an urban battlefield. Though the focus of these initiatives was on modifying tanks for future deployments, developmental work has continued in this area by the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). It may not be long before devices, such as the counter-sniper anti-material machine gun (CSAMM), are seen on an Abrams tank fighting in an urban environment. Though changes in urban lethality and survivability have been slow, progress on a limited scale for a few add-on options, such as CSAMM, may soon be seen on tanks deployed to Iraq. Therefore, changes that connect urban combat to COE gunnery training will play a critical role in future events. Thunder Run – Great Battles, OIF, and Tank Lessons Optimism can be found among commanders of maneuver elements in OIF who obviously missed the memo about the Abrams’ vulnerability in an urban environment, since these apprehen-sions did not come into being and the élan and skill of tankers and soldiers were never more apparent than during Thunder Run. Looking back at the history of the Abrams tank serves to highlight the significance and achievement of Thunder Run. The Abrams tank was named after General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., who commanded the 37th Armor during World War II and whose tanks were the first to reach the besieged town of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. The pivoting of General George Patton’s 3d Army from a winter attack to the east into a headlong rush north has long been considered one of the most audacious and spectacular military maneuvers ever, that is until 5 April 2003, when a few Abrams tanks and Bradleys, combined with a philosophical audacity, making Thunder Run possible. When units of the 3d Infantry Division reached and secured Baghdad airport on 2 April 2003, it became clear to maneuver commanders that perhaps intelligence on Iraqi intentions to turn Baghdad into another Grozny was not entirely correct. “Baghdad looked difficult, but it did not look like Grozny.”5 This assessment led the 3d Infantry Division commander to direct his 2d Brigade to conduct a thunder run — or what 1st Battalion, 64th (1-64) Armor’s history would later refer to as “a show of force”— through central Baghdad and loop back southwest to the Baghdad Airport. The 2d Brigade commander subsequently ordered Task Force 1-64 Armor (the Rogues) to execute the first thunder run on 5 April. In assessing the situation, the Rogues concluded the mission would be a true raid, by definition a short duration operation, with the explicit objective of demonstrating freedom of action and gauging the reaction of the Baghdad defenses. Task Force 1-64 had conducted two such thunder runs in advance of reaching Baghdad, but neither had encountered significant enemy resistance. Nonetheless, nerves were on edge when 29 Abrams tanks, 14 Bradleys, and assorted other combat vehicles, including M113s, crossed the line of departure at 0630 hours on 5 April 2003.6 The simple daring brilliance of this operation should serve as a lasting testament to the heroic prominence of America’s mounted force, and accounts have touted the tactical aspects of this achievement. But make no mistake; in absolutely no other single operation has the lethality of U.S. armor been so apparent in its tactical superiority. Battlefield glory, however, is not without cost. Perhaps the sacrifice of one tank commander, who gave his life during Thunder Run I defending his crew, should serve as an example to all tankers. In the words used by his comrades during his memorial, he died “helping his crew, his platoon, his company team. He saw the need to be up there, exposed to fire, engaging the enemy to protect his crew. He didn’t need to be asked, he just did it.”7 Regardless of such gallantry, the 2d Brigade commander and the chain of command were less than satisfied with the tactical results of Thunder Run I. The attack proved it was possible, and all soldiers fought magnificently, but “Baghdad Bob” was still declaring that U.S. forces were repulsed and none of them were in Baghdad. Therefore, on 7 April, the 2d Brigade embarked on Thunder Run II, with the objective to “test defenses and maintain initiative” in going downtown.8 The 2d Brigade commander also realized from this established intent that it may be easier to stay downtown than to continue to conduct thunder runs again and again.9 The resultant fight was valiant and the battle fervently intense, but the outcome is a true testament to the voracious fighting spirit of the American soldier. The morning of 8 April dawned with Abrams tanks sitting in front of Saddam’s palace on the banks of the Tigris in downtown Baghdad. There they were, there they stayed, and there they remain. The thunder runs established that the Abrams could maneuver and be strategically relevant in the urban fight and the gallant actions of well-trained tank crews could employ the Abrams tank in ways contrary to conventional wisdom. However, existing issues of capability, vulnerability, and training must change to address the evolving contemporary operating environment as the war on terror proceeds. Such issues are being addressed in changes to tank gunnery doctrine and range design. Other areas include the abilities of master gunners and the role they played, and continue to play, on the battlefield in Iraq. Master gunners are doing what is needed, often without being asked — a true testament to the master gunner program. The rewards of the master gunner go far beyond personal recognition, which is epitomized by the phrase, “if things are going good, where’s the commander; if things are going bad, where’s the master gunner.” The master gunner is central to initiatives needed to adapt and train soldiers, to transform and reshape the Ar my; not to re-fight Thunder Run, but for future fights. Therefore, an interconnected plan for merging the master gunner with the contemporary operating environment will be critical. One Tanker’s Thoughts on the Way Ahead There are many conclusions that can be drawn from lessons learned on the subject of tank and mechanized actions in OIF, including transformation efforts by other branches of the Army, the reconfiguration to UA/UE, aviation and transportation communities, and modifications to range design. The U.S. Army Armor Center and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development at Fort Knox are well on their way to implementing doctrine changes, and new gunnery tables will soon be a reality. Radical changes, such as these, May-June 2005 — 29 would normally take years and include prolonged discussion in going from concept to published doctrine. However, in the current wartime atmosphere, approval was not as difficult as anticipated, for two reasons. First, the changes proposed no increase to the number of main gun rounds needed; and secondly, machine gun ammunition was only increased by a small amount. Because the change in resources was not significant, approval was quick since it is tempered by the potential value of training soldiers, particularly when addressing weaknesses that may affect the lives of soldiers in combat zones. Therefore, one thing is certain, lessons learned from OIF have already started to impact the way the Army and armor units will train in the future. Changes will not be limited to the way training is conducted. As stated, changes to range design are equal in magnitude to the generational leaps forward that have occurred in the past. Imagine the period before the first standardized MPRC or MPTR template was defined. Today’s range changes for armor, compared to changes driven by aviation and convoy live fire scenarios, may prove just as far-reaching. New designs must train emerging skill sets, with new types of targetry, new designs in grouping targetry on qualification ranges, and even new types of target mechanisms. At any rate, soldiers must continue to train to fight on Army ranges long into the future, with tactics and doctrine no doubt continuously debated in many forums. But the unassailable characteristic of this issue is that changes must enable soldiers to maintain and achieve a level of lethality unsurpassed in the world. So, what about the Master Gunner Course? What can be done to improve a course that can be directly tied to the success of armor in major combat operations and 30 years of success? Perhaps the answer lies in simply analyzing the thought process involved in creating the original Master Gunner Course. Perhaps it is time to take another generational leap forward to ensure a viable, relevant, and critically essential master gunner. There are three areas with potential to improve the skills for a COE master gunner, continuing the tradition of a subject-matter expert for the dynamic training of soldiers. First, throw out the aforementioned preconceived time limit. The first Master Gunner Course was not built by picking an amount of time and then filling in subjects. The course length for a COE master gunner should be driven by content, not any arbitrary preconceived time allocation. This is not to say that the course for a COE master gunner must be longer or shorter than the current course; simply, the time should be content based. Lessons learned from OIF and other operations should be actively analyzed to determine “Throughout the history of the tank master gunner program, one reality has always held true and has constantly been under assault: a candidate gets a set number of tries and is held to a set standard to display proficiency, or is otherwise removed from the course. Maintaining this standard may not be a politically correct or an enjoyable experience, and some would characterize it as a waste of resources, but it has been a key element in the success of the master gunner program.” 30 — May-June 2005 what subjects are still relevant, what subjects should be culled, and any subjects that should be added. As the commander’s gunnery expert, advisor, and subject-matter expert, this is not a soldier on which to restrain training resources or training time. Something to consider is that one well-trained crewman may improve the lethality of the tank crew, but one well-trained master gunner improves the tanks, crewmen, and soldiers in that unit. The goal must be a soldier with the skills to serve this critical function in every unit. The length of the course must be driven by the skill sets required by the successful candidate; proficiency cannot be achieved if based on a predefined time allocation. Secondly, a COE Master Gunner Course needs to address issues relating to broader skills and standardization, not standardization in how a tank master gunner relates to armor units, but standardized training that allows master gunners to broaden skills to better function within the combined arms team and the UA/UE. Areas such as ammunition management, urban gunnery, patrolling or dismounted operations, enhanced surface danger area diagrams for weapons beyond tank-mounted weapons, training live fire for other than tank weapons, building ranges from scratch, conducting gunnery training programs in war zones, and battle damage and repair assessment are all topics that could better prepare the COE master gunner for future challenges. Additionally, some of these areas that focus beyond armor and specific weapons platforms offer the opportunity to standardize at Army level for the various master gunner schools. The concept put forward by General Schoomaker in January 2004, that, “every soldier is an infantryman first,” should not be limited to the cross-leveling of various generalized soldier skills.10 It only makes sense that certain subjects should apply equally to various master gunner schools. It is time to forego the individual allegiance that some profess to a branch or school in order to benefit the greater good of the Army. The effective benefit of this standardization to the combined arms team will surely increase as the Army transforms. Standardizing master gunner schools will transcend the benefit to soldiers from the particular branch, as well as facilitate easier integration of the combined arms team. Standardizing certain subjects would broaden the versatility of master gunners and enable uniform skills to be available to units of action. Finally, the COE master gunner must be held to a higher standard. Throughout the history of the tank master gunner program, one reality has always held true and has constantly been under assault: a candidate gets a set number of tries and is held to a set standard to display proficiency, or is otherwise removed from the course. Maintaining this standard may not be a politically correct or an enjoyable experience, and some would characterize it as a waste of resources, but it has been a key element in the success of the master gunner program. Not every soldier can achieve the standards, nor is meant to become a master gunner, and it should not be any other way. The result of lowering standards goes well beyond the calamitous effect felt by the individual soldier. At its heart, master gunner training must be guided by the intended goals of gunnery training programs. Credibility of the master gunner as a subject-matter expert is vital to the unit’s success. Without high standards, such credibility cannot be maintained, and once lost, will be extremely difficult to regain. As the current war on terror and the COE illustrate, these programs need change, but making master gunner or unit training easier will only force these lessons onto the battlefield. The consequences of a less-capable master gunner getting it wrong are potentially ominous and catastrophic. Remember that a good soldier impacts the unit by one, but a good master gunner impacts the abilities of every soldier in that unit. Many lessons learned about our equipment and the master gunner’s role in combat have been recent and a direct result of OIF. Lessons learned before OIF (during the final ramp up to combat operations and the march to Baghdad) and in the transition to support and stability operations can be characterized many ways, but none without mentioning the role of the master gunner. Therefore, the changes needed are not simply refinements to the current Master Gunner Course; lessons from OIF should produce ideas as innovative as the philosophy that drove the creation of the master gunner program. In 2005, the armor community can celebrate the tank master gunner program, produced by forward-thinking armored warriors 30 years ago. The generational leap back then has produced today’s armor force, which can arguably be characterized as having no equal on the battlefield. Today’s soldiers, in particular armored soldiers, are more lethal, audacious, adaptable, compassionate, capable, and skilled than at any other time in the history of U.S. mounted warfare. However, those abilities do not equate to a cumulative end state; there is room for improvement in many areas. This commitment to improvement forms the basis for the Army’s transformation in the midst of fighting a war on terror in a contemporary operating environment. A key component to how units and soldiers will prepare, fight, and persevere on future battlefields is undoubtedly linked to the soldier known as the “master gunner.” Now is the time to look at how the master gunner of the past 30 years can be transformed into the COE master gunner who will shape Army units long into the 21st century. We owe this to every soldier who takes his first steps to becoming a tanker; to tankers, such as the tank commander who gave his life defending his tank, epito-mizing the phrase “freedom is not free;” to all soldiers who become master gunners; and to those soldiers who will be trained by master gunners. Creating the master gunner program took a bold step forward in 1975; creating a COE master gunner program should be the bold step forward in 2005. Notes 1LTG J.R. Deane Jr., “Keynote address: Armor Today and the October War,” ARMOR, July-August 1974, p. 35. 2GEN Peter Schoomaker, Department of Defense News Transcript, “Defense Department Special Briefing on U.S. Army Transformation,” 26 July 2004, online at http://www.globalsecurity. org/military/library/news/2004/07/mil-040726-dod01.htm, retrieved 7 September 2004. 3Briefing given by LTG Richard Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, Headquarters, Department of the Army, before the Tactical Airland Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 30 March 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040330-cody.pdf, para. 2, page 11. 4Herbert L. Skinner, and Michael Dunfee, “The Future of Tank Gunnery,” ARMOR, September-October 2004, p. 20. 5Global Security Website, “On Point, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Regime Collapse,” Center for Army Lessons Lessons (CALL), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Chapter 6, online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ report/2004/onpoint/index.html, retrieved 7 September 2004. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Ibid. 10Global Security Website, “Future Force,” online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ agency/army/future-force.htm, retrieved 7 September 2004. Retired Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge is currently serving as master gunner, System Integration Team for the New Generation Army Target System, Computer Sciences Corporation, Huntsville, AL. His military education includes M1A1 Master Gunner Course; Senior Instructor/Operator, Unit Conduct of Fire; M1A2SEP Operators Course; and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. During his career, he served in various positions, to include operations sergeant, Master Gunner Course, Fort Knox, KY; battalion master gunner, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; company master gunner and platoon sergeant, 5th Battalion, 77th (5-77th) Armor, Mannheim, Germany; and tank commander, 5-77th Armor, 1st Armored Division, Mannheim. May-June 2005 — 31