Theater Immersion: First Army Post-mobilization Training

Theater Immersion: First Army Post-mobilization Training by Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac We are in a war with no rear areas or front lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into the mobilized soldiers we train. Every soldier must be able to function as an infantryman. Soldiers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive training until their response is intuitive. When soldiers get off the bus at the mobilization station, they must feel they have arrived in Iraq or Afghanistan. Between 11 September 2001 and the sum mer of 2003, the First and Fifth Continental United States Armies (CONUSA) mobilized and deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) soldiers from the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In the First Army’s area of responsibility (AOR), nearly 78,000 RC soldiers were trained and deployed from mobilization stations east of the Mississippi River. By fall, this number grew to 191,491. Some of these soldiers and units were employed in the Continental United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle, while others deployed to com bat zones in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Meanwhile, additional RC forces were mobilized and deployed to peacekeeping duties in Kosovo, stabilization forces in Bosnia, and Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Initially, the majority of these soldiers and units were combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) formations. Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003, when entire National Guard (NG) enhanced brigades were called up for duty in combat zones. In the First Army’s AOR, the 30th Brigade from North Carolina was the first such formation to be mobilized for employment in Iraq. The 30th Brigade’s post-mobilization training was executed with the 24th Infantry Division in oversight and the 2d Training Support Brigade (TSB), 78th Division Training Support (2/78th) as the lead for training. The 2/78th was heavily reinforced with trainers from the 78th and 87th Divisions. The 30th Brigade executed post-mobilization training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York. This mission was historic as it signaled the first time that an entire NG enhanced brigade would complete mobilization and deploy to a war zone under the auspices of the First Army. While this effort was a significant success, some challenges were experienced and significant lessons were learned. In the summer of 2004, First Army was tasked to mobilize multiple NG brigades in the form of Tennessee’s 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and Mis-sissippi’s 155th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). However, this time the approach would be different. To avoid competing for training resources on active posts, both formations would mobilize at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The 278th would train at Shelby from June through September and execute a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center (NTC) in October. When they completed the MRX, the 278th would return briefly to Camp Shelby and deploy to theater in

November. Similarly, the 155th would train at Shelby from July through October, execute an MRX at the NTC in November/December, and deploy to theater in December/January. Leading the First Army’s effort would be a command and control cell from the 24th Infantry Division (ID) with the 3d Brigade, 87th Division (3/87th) — heavily reinforced by elements of the 87th and 85th Divisions — as the lead trainers. This approach facilitated an economy of scale that provided savings in resources, particularly training support brigade observer controller trainers (OCTs). Moreover, lessons learned during the 278th RCT’s training could immediately be applied to training the 155th BCT. Not only would both brigades mobilize at a single location, but First Army would introduce a new approach to post-mobilization training — theater immersion — a training concept that is now the watchword for post-mobilization training across the entire First Army’s AOR. The Challenge RC units called up for mobilization come in all shapes and sizes. Moreover, they are called up for a variety of discrete missions requiring varying training programs. For the most part, specific training requirements are defined by the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC). The list of CFLCC tasks is not all inclusive and unit commanders often arrive at mobilization stations with specific mission essential task lists (METL) to meet particular emphasis or additional training needs. Moreover, while in general terms, units of battalion or smaller size receive 35 to 60 days of post-mobilization training, the precise number of training days will vary. This is based on mission, in-theater destination, and latest arrival date in theater. Mobilizing brigade-sized formations for combat in Iraq demands a significantly different approach. Under wartime conditions, these formations receive approximately 90 days of intense training at the mobilization station, ranging from individual-level through brigade operations training. Post-mobilization training covers a wide range of tasks mandated by CFLCC. These tasks range from individual to high-end collective tasks, from stability- and support-focused operations through conventional combat missions. The model for training RC brigades concludes with an intense MRX at one of the combat training centers. Theater Immersion — the Solution The purpose of theater immersion is to rapidly build combat-ready formations, led by competent and confident leaders, who see first, understand first, and act first; and are manned by battle-proofed sol diers, inculcated with the Warrior Ethos. The theater immersion training concept accomplishes this by placing lead ers, soldiers, and units — as rapidly as possible — into an environment analogous to what they will encounter in combat. At the soldier level, training is tough, realistic, hands-on, and repetitive, designed to illicit intuitive soldier response. This training environment replicates conditions in a multiecheloned approach that thrusts formations into a theater analog soon after arrival at the mobilization station and stresses the organization from the individual to the brigade level. Essentially, theater immersion is a Combat Training Center (CTC)-like ex perience that replicates conditions down range, while training individual- through brigade-level collective tasks. Seeing First The most important component of theater immersion is a deliberate and continuous study of the contemporary operational environment (COE) in theater — particularly, a study of the threat. To facilitate this process, the First Army is refining web-based collaborative information sites where the latest intelligence and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) can be proliferated among trainers. The process must be continuous because of the evolving nature of the threat in Iraq. The 3/87th’s intelligence officer, in collaboration with the First Army’s G2, deliberately studied daily intelligence reports from the targeted employment areas for each brigade, as well as unit after action reports, Center for Army Lessons Learned products, and Department of the Army G3 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force products to replicate and update TTP in the training area. Soldiers and leaders of all ranks and positions, from riflemen to brigade and division commanders in country, were interviewed to obtain the most recent views of the COE. Meanwhile, the 3/87th’s brigade S3, in collaboration with the First Army’s G3, studied the latest TTP and operational patterns of coalition forces to determine the best methods to counter and defeat the threat. Twenty soldiers from the 3/87th deployed to Iraq in two coalition military assistance training teams (CMATT). These teams provided near-daily updates to help craft the training environment. Moreover, these soldiers, along with recent combat veterans from the 3d Brigade and across First Army, were employed as OCTs soon after returning from Iraq. Understanding First The entire training environment was grounded in an overarching friendly and threat operational scenario. This scenario was updated in fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and intelligence summaries “RC units called up for mobilization come in all shapes and sizes. Moreover, they are called up for a variety of discrete missions requiring varying training programs. For the most part, specific training requirements are defined by the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC). The list of CFLCC tasks is not all inclusive and unit commanders often arrive at mobilization stations with specific mission essential task lists (METL) to meet particular emphasis or additional training needs.” May-June 2005 — 13 (INTSUMS) that provided micro scenario sets for discrete training events. Employing crawl-walk-run, the eight-step training model, and multiecheloned techniques, soldiers, leaders, and units progressed from individual to collective events, beginning with vehicle and squad operations and progressing to battalion-and brigade-level operations. Collective events culminated at brigade level with a field training exercise (FTX) and peaked at battalion level with a five-day Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) that ended with a battalion live fire coordination exercise (FCX). In these high-end collective events, a premium was placed on battle command and decisionmaking in stability and support operations environments. To ensure fidelity with the environment in country, the TSB commander executed two reconnaissance missions, along with unit leaders, on pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) to confirm and modify training practices appropriate to each brigade’s sector. Likewise, key trainers, such as the TSB XO and command sergeant major, were dispatched to Jordan and Kuwait to ensure the fidelity of cultural aware ness and reception, staging, and on ward integration (RSOI) training. Acting First: A Realistic Environment and Threat The most obvious manifestation of theater immersion is the physical design of training sites. For the 278th RCT and 155th BCT, two fully functioning forward operating bases (FOB) were constructed, and four villages, a highway over pass, and local roads were lined with guard rails. The villages have mosques, offices for civil authorities, markets, walled residences, and tunnel complexes, as well as traffic circles and low-hanging telephone and electric cables that are typical of Iraqi villages. Joint Coalition Council (JCC) facilities were established to mirror those in theater and to exercise leader interface with a multitude of indigenous civil leaders. Meanwhile, cantonment areas were transformed into three FOB analogs, complete with entry control points (ECPs), guard towers, and wire. FOBs and towns were named after existing locations in country, and road signs, police cars, and markets were created based on recent photos from Iraq. To save time and conserve costs, much of the construction work to build these sites was completed by 3/87th soldiers. For example, 3/87th’s 2-305th Training Support Battalion (TSBn) built most of the two FOBs, where the units would execute FOB defense training and battalion-level ARTEP/ FCXs. Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization station, following necessary soldier readiness processing (SRP), dental, and medical examinations, units began operations from the camps and FOBs and moved to training missions as tactical formations. In these experiences, unit lead ers planned, prepared, battle tracked, and controlled their organizations while acclimating to the battle rhythm typical of units fighting in theater. While some classroom instruction had to be accomplished, field time was maximized, and by the time they completed training, soldiers averaged over 40 days operating from FOBs and camps under constant threat of contact with a resourceful enemy. Since time is limited at the mobilization station, immediately immersing soldiers into a replicated combat zone enables focused training 24-hours a day, and retraining can occur as needed. Instead of living in a normal garrison environment, soldiers saw concertina wire, entry control points, and guard towers to simulate the FOB environment. In an FOB, small-unit leaders not only trained on theater-specific tasks, but they had the opportunity to exercise troop-leading procedures and basic discipline continuously. To populate the villages, 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) were hired, to include 80 Iraqi-Americans. Under the control of 3/87’s logistics support battalion (LSB), these COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a powerful dose of realism to each training event. Linguists, mayors, police chiefs, religious leaders, terrorists, and news reporters, as well as leaders of the Iraqi national guard, army, and border police were portrayed by Iraqi-Americans who spoke to soldiers only in their native tongue and wore clothing appropriate to their positions. These COBs were given personalities, rehearsed (COB academies) and were habitually employed in roles required for various training events. Encountering these COBs, soldiers had to negotiate, conduct bilateral meetings, gather intelligence, and react to civil disturbances while communicating through their linguists. To aggress against training units, a full-time opposing force (OPFOR) from the 3/87th and 3-349th LSB, were employed. “The purpose of theater immersion is to rapidly build combat-ready formations, led by competent and confident leaders, who see first, understand first, and act first; and are manned by battle-proofed soldiers, inculcated with the Warrior Ethos. The theater immersion training concept accomplishes this by placing lead ers, soldiers, and units — as rapidly as possible — into an environment analogous to what they will encounter in com bat.” 14 — May-June 2005

These soldiers, primarily mobilized reservists, rehearsed operations for weeks prior to the arrival of the brigades. With periodic OPFOR academies and daily updates on the latest threat TTP provided by the S2, this OPFOR dressed and equipped like anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), designing and executing threat counter-tasks to expose leaders and warriors to the most realistic situations possible. IEDs in the form of booby traps, mines, projectiles, bombs, and vehicle-borne devices (VBIED) were ubiquitous in training. Soldiers were constantly subjected to sniper, rocket, and mortar attacks. Forging Competent, Confident, Disciplined Leaders To achieve success against the anti-Iraqi OPFOR, soldiers and leaders must conduct detailed troop-leading procedures (TLP), issue doctrinally correct five-paragraph orders, execute rehearsals, and perform rigorous precombat inspections (PCI) and precombat checks (PCC). Every training event was treated as a combat mission, be it individual weapons qualification (IWQ), military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), combat patrolling, or cordon and search. Discrete training events were organized in 19 training modules. Each of these modules focused on one or more of the 83 theater-specific training tasks established by CFLCC. Moreover, these modules accounted for new theater-specific METL developed for each formation and echelon. An aggressive and densely packed training matrix was created to ensure all required training tasks could be accomplished to standard. Moreover, by-name tracking of each soldier, progressing through CFLCC-mandated individual tasks, was executed. The resulting training plans were approved by the First Army’s commander. The 3/87th’s commander, who was responsible for training, would validate in writing that individuals and units had been trained to proficiency on these tasks. To accomplish all this, the 3/87th was heavily reinforced by trainers from the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades of the 87th Division, as well as elements of the 4th Brigade, 85th Division. At its peak, the effort employed some 750 First Army personnel to train the 7,000 soldiers of the 278th ACR and 155th BCT, making the OCT-soldier ratio approximately 1:13. TSBn commanders, responsible for various modules, prepared detailed training plans. Training events were rehearsed and the TSB commander walked the terrain and prepared detailed risk management work sheets (RMWS). The TSBn commanders’ creativity was put to the test in developing ways to build multiecheloned training events to validate individual and collective tasks. Speed and trust in absorbing the latest lessons learned, as well as flexible, adaptive, and responsive trainers, were the watchwords for developing training plans. While theater-specific tasks, such as FOB defense, entry control points, combat patrols/ground assault convoys, raids or cordon and search, garner significant attention in training plans for combat in Iraq, a multitude of additional tasks were built into the training program. Moreover, METL-specific, branch, and specialty train ing were layered into the training matrix. Integral to this entire process was gathering and updating the latest TTP for each task, as well as developing appropriate threat counter-tasks for use by aggressors. This is a continuing process that lies at the very heart of theater immersion. As conditions change in theater, trainers must rapidly change conditions on the training battlefield. This approach placed a premium on agile and creative TSBn commanders, as well as an aggressive, streamlined approach to gathering the latest war-zone lessons. Key individual tasks cross-walked to collective tasks, such as react to indirect fire, treat and evacuate casualties, and nine-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) requests, were repetitively nested in every collective event in tough, realistic, hands-on conditions to create an intuitive response in soldiers. Likewise, the IED threat in theater was embedded in every training event possible, from land navigation to battalion ARTEPs, in every form conceivable, from projectiles slung behind guard rails to booby trapped buildings and vertical attacks from highway “Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization station, following necessary soldier readiness processing (SRP), dental, and medical examinations, units began op erations from the camps and FOBs and moved to training missions as tactical formations. In these experiences, unit leaders planned, prepared, battle tracked, and controlled their organizations while acclimat-ing to the battle rhythm typical of units fighting in theater.” May-June 2005 — 15 overpasses. During theater immersion, sol diers repeatedly train on multiple tasks. For example, a single simulated rocket attack trains react to indirect fire, casualty evacuation procedures, nine-line MEDEVAC requests, damage assessment, crater analysis, counter-battery fire, and many other procedures. Individual and collective training events placed emphasis on first-line supervisors and junior-level leaders. After action reviews (AARs) focused on key-leader skills and the Warrior Ethos to rapidly develop initiative and aggressiveness in the depth of formations. At the heart of this approach were comprehensive noncommissioned officer AARs, lead by battalion or brigade command sergeants major. Over time, as units progressed through training and gained greater confidence, the responsibility for conducting these AARs was passed to unit leaders. A Robust Live Fire Program A robust live fire program was devised and executed. Moreover, it was spread through the training matrix to ensure live fire events were performed throughout training. Soldiers and units progressed through rigorous pre-marksmanship instruction (PMI) to individual and crew served weapons qualification. Soldiers would then execute reflexive fire and close combat assault courses that included urban scenarios, IEDs and moving target arrays. This was followed by FOB defense live fire, which included a moving VBIED and a squad/platoon live fire assault course. Following crew served weapons qualification, gunners and assistant gunners qual ified weapons from their vehicles, including heavy ex panded-mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs), high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), five-ton trucks or howitzers, on moving platforms, engaging stationary and moving targets. Once complete, crews were formed into combat patrols and ground assault convoys for collective live fire events, in day and night conditions, using moving and stationary vehicles verses moving and stationary targets. Combat vehicle crews executed Bradley and Tank Tables up to Table XII, as Paladin crews and platoons fired through Field Artillery Table XV. Meanwhile, mortar platoons executed mortar reports. The culmination of live fire events was a battalion/brigade FCX that combined fires from motorized companies, howitzer platoons, mortar platoons, close air support, and Ar my aviation. By the time they had completed training at Camp Shelby, the 278th and 155th had over 14,500 soldiers qualify individual and crew served weapons on various ranges and during training events, collectively expending over 2.3 million rounds of ammunition. Supporting and reinforcing the live fire program, the 3/87th and Camp Shelby massed useful training devices to enhance soldier weapons proficiency. While traditional systems, such as the mobile conduct of fire trainer (M-COFT), were employed for tank and Bradley crews, new systems were fielded just in time for training. The most prominent device employed was the virtual combat convoy trainer (VCCT). It was used to good effect to practice and sustain convoy skills. Additional devices found useful in training squads and crew served weapons teams include the engagement skills trainer (EST-2000) and the virtual battlefield simulator (VBS- 1). Meanwhile, the fire arms training system (FATS), laser marksmanship training system (LMTS), and Beamhits provided trainers with superlative PMI tools. As the 278th and 155th mobilizations drew to a close, new simulators to better train reaction to IEDs were being fielded. These new devices will see plenty of action in impending mobilizations. Draconian Maintenance Whether breaking through the Normandy hedgerows or operating from dispersed FOBs throughout Iraq, a key arbiter in a unit’s ability to effectively perform its mission and survive remains effective logistics — particularly maintenance. A significant challenge for mobilizing units is the paradigm shift from “normal” operating procedures, practiced at armories and drill centers, to the full exploitation of the standard Army maintenance information system (STAMIS). It was imperative to rapidly immerse leaders, operators, and units in the unit-level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G). A two-day struc tured ULLS-G gunnery was devised and executed with all operators and maintenance leaders in attendance. Subject-matter experts were brought in for training and included the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) G4 and III Corps’ command maintenance evaluation team (COMET). This ULLS-G gunnery laid the foundation for effective maintenance management and class IX flow throughout mobilization and carried the brigade through the MRX and into theater. Enforcing attendance, oversight, and accountability at brigade-level maintenance meetings was instrumental to unit success. Simultaneously, Department of Defense Army activity codes (DODAAC) were issued to units, while parts ordering and tracking were enforced. Time was of the essence, as all unit equipment had to be inspected and validated prior to deployment, and in many cases, prior to training. Creating accountability and confidence in the maintenance and supply system was imperative. Other than COMET teams, internal trainers included the TSB’s S4 and logisticians with recent theater experience. Train- “To populate the villages, 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) were hired, to include 80 Iraqi-Americans. Under the control of 3/87’s logistics support battalion (LSB), these COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a powerful dose of realism to each training event.” 16 — May-June 2005 ers such as these focused on overall logistics management, as well as building unit administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) procedures. Along with one-on-one assistance, trainers distributed relevant logistics information, such as a Mobilizing Unit Leader’s Maintenance Management Smart Book and Baseline SOP and ALOC Smart Books from recently drafted U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) publications, Fort Lee, Virginia. With some units receiving relatively short post-mobilization training, a sense of logistics urgency combined with recent in-theater doctrine/TTPs had to be stressed immediately on the unit’s arrival. During sustainment operations, establishing a thorough baseline of logistics fundamentals greatly improved unit success. Battle Command: See Yourself, the Enemy, the Weather, and Terrain For RC leaders and staffs, steeped in legacy battle command designed for high-intensity operations, the challenge presented by stability and support operations and counterinsurgency represented another significant paradigm shift. Traditional commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) were no longer easily applied to the operational environment. A whole new lexicon with supporting tasks and TTP would have to be learned and applied to theater immersion so unit leaders could see, understand, and act first. Watchwords, such as doctrinal and situational templates, were overshadowed by pattern analysis and sanitation water energy academics trash-medical and security (SWEAT-MS) charts. Effects-based targeting, information operations (IO), and force protection working groups, among others, would move to positions of prominence during unit planning. A suite of new digital equipment would have to be embraced and employed for optimal effects throughout the formation. Meanwhile, entirely new battle rhythms would have to be learned to align with operational rhythm in theater. A robust battle command training plan was designed and executed. This program included the leader training program (LTP) at the NTC; cultural awareness training in Jordan; pre-deployment site sur veys; staff and leader IED training; a battle command training program command post exercise (CPX); a signal exercise; and a series of company, battalion, and brigade CPXs. Both brigades participated in a CPX-based MRXwith each of their division level headquarters. The Capstone CPX, conducted at Camp Shelby, was based on the brigade/battalion simulation (BBS) system and employed the 1st Brigade (simulations), 87th (1/87th) Division, as primary trainers. Equipped with a digital division tactical operations center, 1/87th replicated higher headquarters and provided digital links for all key Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) devices across the brigades. This event provided a model of the utility of training support division sim ulations brigades. The principle of Sun Tzu’s often-quoted aphorism, “knowing the enemy is critical to battlefield success,” is amplified in battling the AIF. Simply put, actionable intelligence drives operations. To build unit proficiency, a rigorous 11-day training plan was developed that incorporated two major areas: knowledge of the enemy to drive building intelligence products and conducting analysis of the enemy to logically develop predictive analysis for future operations. A two-day knowledge-based training plan gave the brigades necessary baseline knowledge to understand enemy forces “To achieve success against the anti-Iraqi OPFOR, soldiers and leaders must conduct detailed troop-leading procedures, issue doctrinally correct five-paragraph orders, execute rehearsals, and perform rigorous precombat inspections and precombat checks. Every training event was treated as a combat mission, be it individual weapons qual ification, military operations in ur ban terrain, combat patrolling, or cordon and search.”

“The TSBn commander’s creativity was put to the test in developing ways to build multiecheloned training events to validate individual and collective tasks. Speed and trust in absorbing the latest lessons learned, as well as flexible, adaptive, and responsive trainers, were the watchwords for developing training plans. While theater-specific tasks, such as FOB defense, entry control points, combat patrols/ground assault convoys, raids or cordon and search, garner significant attention in training plans for combat in Iraq, a multitude of additional tasks were built into the training program.” and how they are organized. During these two days, soldiers studied the nature of insurgency operations and learned about the multitude of AIF organizations currently operating in Iraq. This training built knowledge of weapons systems and IEDs to develop expertise on enemy equipment and tactics. This knowledge cannot be absorbed completely in two days; therefore, using classified computer networks becomes critical to the continued study of evolving AIF tactics. The second element in the training plan was analysis. This part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the element that defines success or failure for intelligence organizations. A focused nine-day training plan included the all-source analysis system-light (ASAS-L), urban IPB, link pattern analysis, collection management, targeting, and analytical techniques. During the first six days, intelligence soldiers mixed classroom instruction with practical exercises to prepare for a three-day intelligence exercise, which integrated all aspects taught during the first six days of training. Moreover, the intelligence exercise allowed the brigades to develop intelligence battle rhythms and familiarized them with useful intelligence products. This was carried through other brigade staff training, to include brigade/battalion CPXs and battalion ARTEPs. All of these events possessed detailed and realistic threat scenarios to reinforce previously learned analytical procedures. Intelligence training was aggressive and mentally taxing, which gave the intelligence soldiers valuable training to set conditions for the unit’s success in theater. Given the U.S. Army’s dependence on ATCCS, battle command could not be accomplished without competent signal units. Signal units define “theater immersion” as experiencing theater-like conditions in all collective signal-specific training events. Signal elements set up voice and data communications backbones in FOBs and base camps, as well as remote sites, and when required, they were moved and set up again. Signal-specific collective training posed a couple of issues that had to be addressed: a TSB does not possess divisional or area signal asset trainers or tactical network engineers; and a garrison support unit (GSU) does not possess the requisite signal asset maintainers. The solution included a combination of contracted support for technical and maintenance expertise, tasking a signal battalion for tactical network support, and creating a signal-specific OCT team from across the 87th Division. Under the oversight of the 3/87th’s S6, the training began prior to arrival at the mobilization station. During this phase, contractors were sent to the unit’s home station where they provided an initial operator proficiency assessment, operator training, and an initial equipment assessment. Moreover, they begin maintenance on the unit’s equipment. These assessments were provided to the TSB’s S6 and contributed to refining the training plan. Once at Camp Shelby, the signal company was integrated into CPXs, while simultaneously polishing the unit’s collective tasks. Much like the NTC, the optimal training plan enables the signal company to participate in all digital CPXs. Finally, the signal companies were provided additional digital command and con trol (C2) training during battalion ARTEPs. Transformation Juxtaposed against this aggressive and densely packed training matrix, both brigades underwent an extensive version of theater-specific transformation. Most significantly, they transformed from heavy mechanized formations to more agile motorized organizations primarily made up of HMMWVs, while retaining one mechanized infantry task force. Simultaneously, the Army fielded new equipment to these formations that many Active Component units had yet to receive, including the Army’s latest digital battle command tools. The ATCCS devices, such as blue force tracker, maneuver control system-light (MCS-L), ASAS-L, and the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) were among the systems fielded. From new individual equipment, such as M4 carbines and a host of soldier favorites in the rapid fielding initiative (RFI), to the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and PROPHET intelligence system, new equipment training (NET) programs where packaged and integrated into the overall training matrix in a manner that best facilitated the immediate employment of these new tools of war in unit training. Transformation does not apply only to digital systems and new pieces of equipment, soldiers had to transform as well. In the case of mobilizing brigades, many soldiers were cross leveled. This process affected combat soldiers, such as tankers and scouts, who would gain an additional military occupational specialty (MOS) as infantrymen. Mission Rehearsal Exercise While a discrete article could be devoted to the subject of planning and executing MRXs at the NTC, it is important to highlight their role in First Army’s theater immersion. The MRX is the culminating event in the overarching First Army strategy. Fresh off planes and trains, the brigades flowed into Fort Irwin, California, in an analog to RSOI in theater. Just as they would do immediately on arrival in Kuwait, the brigades were forced to battle track the build up of combat power and force protection, plan for training, and prepare for a long-contested move into the Mojave Desert. At the NTC, the brigades conducted long combat road marches into areas of operation and occupied FOBs as they would in country. The units faced the challenges of force protection, stability and support operations, and combat tasks prevalent in theater — all under constant attack from AIF. Training also included a robust live fire compo nent, which included MOUT and ground assault convoy/combat patrol live fire, as well as live counter-fire missions by Paladins from the environs of the FOBs. A joint effects training (JET) live fire, analogous to the FCX conducted at Camp Shelby, was executed as well. With elections looming in theater as a crucial operational step in the overall strategy for victory, election support missions at the NTC were the graduation exercise of training units. Theater Immersion: An Evolving Concept First Army is not resting on the mission successes of the 278th and 155th; instead, it continues to lean forward and employ these lessons learned as a point of origin. Trainers from across the First Ar my descended on Camp Shelby and lessons, techniques, and methods spread rapidly to mobilization stations across the eastern United States. Various theater immersion initiatives were improved on at each mobilization station and tailored for combat, CS, and CSS formations. Likewise, innovative methods employed at other mobilization stations were brought to Camp Shelby. FOBs are being built at every major mobilization station, in some form, as are many of the other theater immersion tools pioneered in the 278th and 155th mobilization missions. The most significant lesson learned in the 278th ACR/155th BCT effort was the need for more sophisticated and rigorous training in battalion and brigade battle command — particularly, effects-based targeting and information operations. Time is the enemy as are the multitude of training and transformation requirements that compete for leader time and attention. To mitigate the problem, the phased mobilization concept was expanded to provide more time for leaders and headquarters and CSS elements to mobilize in advance of main bodies. This would allow them to complete individual and some collective training requirements pri or to the mobilization of their units. Moreover, this approach created more time to focus on critical battle command training events, to include multiple brigade-level CPXs, as well as a brigade field training exercise with multiple maneuver battalions in the field. Finally, it was determined that an OCT team, created along lines analogous to the NTC’s Bronco Team, was necessary to coach, teach, and mentor brigade and battalion leaders and staffs throughout their post-mobilization training. In the coming year, these initiatives will be put to the test in the mobilization of the 48th Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 2d Brigade, 28th Division at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, as well as other mobilizing units across the First Army’s AOR. LTG Russel L. Honoré is currently the commander of the First Continental United States Army, Fort Gillem, GA. He received a B.A. from Southern University and A&M College, and an M.A. in 1971. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, Europe and Korea, including commander, Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security, U.S. Northern Command; commander 2d Infantry Division; vice director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff; deputy commanding general/assistant commandant, United States Army Infantry Center and School, Fort Benning, GA; and assistant division commander, maneuver/support, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He commanded, 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; was “Scorpion 07” at the National Training Center; and commanded, 4th Battalion, 16th Infantry. LTG Honoré holds a Masters Degree in Human Resources as well as an Honorary Doctorate in Public Administration. COL Daniel L. Zajac is currently serving as commander, 3d Brigade, 87th Division, Camp Shelby, MS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Louisville, an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Ar my Com mand and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, and an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army War College Advanced Strategic Arts Program. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, Infantry Mortar Platoon Officer Course, and Armor Office Advance Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include senior armor and cavalry trainer/senior brigade trainer, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; commander, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Stewart, GA; XO, 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart; and operations officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Baum holder, Germany. May-June 2005 — 19