Thoughts on Restructuring Army Brigades

Thoughts on Restructuring Army Brigades by Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson “I want to know if he can turn his three brigades into five maneuver brigades, and if I provide the right equipment, could they be one and a half more lethal than before…This is just a question, but I believe with the right enablers it can be done.”1 The U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, has called on our Army’s best efforts to restructure the current force so we can send our forces into the ongoing fight with the best developing equipment, and more importantly, the best war-tested concepts for deploying and fighting. One such task force is meeting now under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) auspices to determine the size of the so-called unit of action or brigade combat teams. Drawing from Colonel Doug MacGregor’s “Breaking the Phalanx” ideas for a regimental based force and from recent operations in Iraq, the purpose of this article is to enter the intellectual fray and stimulate thought from within the armored force. Far too many people adhere to the notion that the Army cannot transform from within, as we are too hidebound, too wedded to orthodoxy. Clear-sighted, forward-thinking mavericks founded our armored force; the armored force is innovation and transformation. One of our founders, Brigadier General Adna Chaffee, defined the armored force as a team of all arms, with equal glory for all. Glory may be passé or antiquated in this post-modern era, nonetheless our proposal seeks to stimulate thought, rekindle the fire of debate within the armored force, and perhaps even contribute to the debate in a meaningful way; lest all “debate” take place behind closed doors away from the ideas of our armored force officers. Indeed, this effort is so important, as are all of our Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) focus areas, that all Army officers are obligated to write and present proposals on how we change our forces. We cannot let this process go on behind closed doors. We are at war, but our forefathers in the armored force were also at war and found the time to write, think, and debate on the structure of their armored divisions, weapons, and means of making war. We can do no less. The proposed brigade combat team (BCT) must be lethal, balanced, and modular (previously known as task organized). Modular also means we can deploy the BCT and have it almost literally either “plug” into established/establishing theater support units or remain plugged into its home installation/projection platform for all manner of combat service support and resupply. This is a very different way of looking at these forces. We cannot let the standard answer to a regional combatant commander be a division or nothing. Our previous CSA reminded us that we might not like change, but we will like irrelevance a great deal less. General Schoomaker asked, “Can we balance our force structure and develop increased modularity so as to enhance our critical role in effective joint contingency operations while maintaining our campaign qualities?”2 In the short term, the new ly redesigned armored force BCTs should fall in on established pre-positioned sets of equipment.3 In the long term, as we field the future force, the BCT must accept the future combat system family of vehicles with minimum effort and new equipment training to reduce the time a BCT is unavailable. This effort is actually underway at the 3d Infantry Division. I have no link to Fort Stewart, but the redesigned armored BCT should come from the Marne Division and others within the armored part of the current force. The 101st Airborne Division will, I understand, also recast into more modular BCTs on return from operations in Iraq. True modularity will require the armored BCT and the air assault BCT to share a common operational picture from the start of operations, as well as link into a common higher headquarters, regardless of that headquarters’ 20 — May-June 2004 form, either based on an armored division or an air assault division. Based on experiences drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the BCT should have an internal capability to perform reconnaissance. If we assume that in future fights, divisions, corps, field armies, or joint task forces will succeed in applying operational fires to shatter the enemy force’s command and control capabilities and large organized formations capable of maneuver, then the fights conducted at BCT level and below will be movements to contact against disorganized enemy forces. A corollary to this assumption is we must assume that any potential enemy will learn from our recent operations and not present organized targets for our operational fires again, placing a demand for reconnaissance on our redesigned forces. A BCT commander must therefore not only have the built-in command and control capability to link with division and higher intelligence systems, but he must also develop/refine the situation on his own as he sets the conditions for his battalion task forces’ success. Also, based on ongoing operations, the BCT must have the requisite on-ground infantry strength, as well as reconnaissance strength, to engage in stability and support operations. Any new structure for our BCTs must be balanced combined arms teams, where infantry is an absolute requirement. We saw in the opening stages of Iraqi Freedom that armor and armored infantry present the enemy with an overwhelming combination of speed, mobility, shock effect, and firepower. Our new BCT must have the capability to close with and destroy the enemy; the requirement for close combat will not go away. Following the assumption stated above, the BCT commander must have on-the-ground combat strength to fight and conduct stability operations because he may have to do both simultaneously. For the purpose of this article, we will accept the theory that the clash of massed conventional armies is unlikely, at least in our operations for the foreseeable future; therefore, armored forces will most likely be used in either pre-hostility operations, such as show of force, or combat and post-hostility operations against remnant, irregular, or unconventional forces.4 Strike operations with heavy forces are possible and even likely if we can succeed in developing a more rapidly deployable BCT. The BCT structure of the current force may be better organized as indicated below.5

• BCT headquarters comprised of: - A brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) with a rifle platoon for tactical operations center (TOC) security. - A brigade reconnaissance troop. - An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) company for extended reconnaissance.

• Two combined arms battalions:6 - Each task force has four maneuver companies (each company has two tank platoons of four tanks and two mechanized infantry platoons of four M3A2s).

• Fire support battalion with: - One howitzer battery, two mortar batteries, and a UAV battery.

• Combat support battalion staffed with: - Engineer, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), signal, and military police (MP) companies.

• Forward support battalion staffed with: - Medical, transport, supply/distribution, and maintenance companies. This structure’s success depends on making network centric communications work. The BCT headquarters must be able to fight within a battlespace-encompassing network of information-sharing devices that give the BCT commander and his subordinate commanders not only a common operational picture of where friendly and enemy forces are arrayed on the battlefield, but also a total picture of supply and maintenance status. The network must support commander centric planning and execution, as well as staff to staff information sharing on status of key systems and units. The BCT must be able to integrate its communications systems into the common operational picture of the higher headquarters and with the home station/projection platform, depending from where the BCT draws its supplies. The CSA wants these smaller, more lethal units to be half as powerful as the current BCTs. This can only be done with superior information and decision superiority, which will enable our units to achieve a mobility differential over any enemy force in a major combat operation, stability operation, or show of force deterrence operation. The BCT headquarters will coordinate the supply and resupply function for the task forces. Given that BCTs will have the capability to operate independently from division control, we can remove the G4 element from division headquarters, thereby making division headquarters more of a command and control element. G4 actions will go from BCT level to installation level (when at home station), or corps or Army service component headquarters (when deployed), or even the proposed joint logistics task force currently under development by Department of the Army G4. The two task forces of the BCT will be balanced. Each task force will have two tank companies and two mechanized infantry companies. The task forces will retain their scout platoons. This organization of two tank and two mechanized infantry companies is a reminder of the U.S. Army’s attempt at combined arms battalions that were established in the 1st Cavalry Division in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We must go beyond that experi- “The proposed brigade combat team (BCT) must be lethal, balanced, and modular (previously known as task organized). Modular also means we can deploy the BCT and have it almost literally either “plug” into established/establishing theater support units or remain plugged into its home installation/projection platform for all manner of combat service support and resupply.” May-June 2004 — 21 ment. The proposed company team organization requires that officers assigned to the company be familiar with both the Brad ley and the Abrams fighting systems, as well as the requirements of training both infantry and armor troopers. The company headquarters must have an M1A2 and a Bradley A3 in the headquarters platoon. The task force headquarters company must also have a section of tanks and a section of Bradleys in place of the standard tactical operations section. A task force would therefore have 38 M1A2s and 38 M2A3s as the combat power of the BCT — total tanks and Bradleys would be 78 M1A2s and 82 M2A3s. The fire support battalion will consolidate the two mortar platoons of the original battalions into batteries. This fire support battalion will respond to the immediate fire requirements of the task forces. Adding a UAV battery will enhance the fire support commander’s observation assets and provide links for reinforcing fires from restructured division artillery.7 The fire support battalion would have 12 120 mm mortars, six M109A6 Paladin howitzers, and four Shadow UAVs. The fire support battalion would also continue to provide fire support coordinator teams to the maneuver companies and task forces. Although the UAV battery extends forward observer eyes for the battalion, it should also be organized to provide data links to the BCT UAV company, thereby extending the entirety of the BCT common operational picture from scouts, UAVs, and linked data systems from higher headquarters. The combat support battalion will consolidate previously reinforcing capabilities into one command for direction during training periods, prior to commitment to combat operations and focused sustainment, and after commitment to an active theater. Ordinarily, CA, MP, and PSYOP units are attached to the BCT, but this proposal attaches these units as part of the BCT’s permanent structure. Constructing the usual cross attachment of engineers, MP, CA, and PSYOP units into a standing battalion increases the modularity of the entire BCT. It also removes the “ad hoc-ery” usually found in the always late cross attachment of other combat multipliers we face prior to going into battle. Cavalrymen familiar with the command and control squadrons of the border regiments during the Cold War will recognize this organization. It was a good idea then and remains a good idea. The forward support battalion commander will have the dual role of supply coordinator and commander of logistics troops for the BCT. Placing both task forces’ support platoons and the fire support battalion into the structure of the forward support battalion increases the forward support battalion’s ability to accomplish the extremely important mission of distributing supplies within the BCT battlespace. Distribution and distribution management will be the major challenges of sustaining operations, especially on a truly nonlinear battlefield. The commander of the BCT logistics troops must have both the means to distribute supplies and a situational awareness of the BCT’s supply status along with an operational picture to conduct operations in support of the BCT. The combat service support (CSS) unit’s common operational picture must be a part of, and not distinct from, the BCT’s overall common operating picture. The CSS commander must further have the means to integrate his picture into the joint task force or land component picture to anticipate combat units’ needs and coordinate the arrival of supplies not “just in time,” but ahead of time and necessity. While increasing reliability of our systems is a worthy goal, we must deal with the builders of our combat systems — the supply and distribution system itself must give “Murphy” his due. The needed repair part will be late or get lost, or the essential truck carrying A34’s final drive will be the lone loss in an ambush. Knowing this will happen, as history does repeat itself, informed decisions must be made in designing these battalions, the BCT, and the network that sustains the BCT. Present and future professionals of our nonlinear battles would do well to study logistics. “Based on experiences drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the BCT should have an internal capability to perform reconnaissance. If we assume that in future fights, divisions, corps, field armies, or joint task forces will succeed in applying operational fires to shatter the enemy force’s command and control capabilities and large organized formations capable of maneuver, then the fights conducted at BCT level and below will be movements to contact against disorganized enemy forces.” 22 — May-June 2004

Another extremely necessary — indeed mandatory — ability that our information and vehicle systems must have is to link commanders at all levels, from vehicle commander to BCT, to the relevant common operating picture. The commanders’ presence on the battlefield is still a requirement of leadership. Personal leadership must still be exercised on these most ferocious of battlefields as we face shattered remnants and irregulars. Commanders must lead from wherever the front happens to be and must always be aware of the immediate situation, both physically and virtually. When a commander’s “horse” is shot out from beneath him, he must have the ability to leap onto any available “horse” and regain his link to the larger common operational picture. We must also recognize that we might have a situation where a junior lieutenant might have to assume command of the BCT because he happens to be the surviving senior officer or is at the decisive point. This too has happened in our Army’s history. There is a need for a close hold on potential courses of action. We are living in an age where it is easier to denigrate than offer constructive criticism. We are also an Army at war and must temper our debates for the greater need of the service. I believe though that there must be debate and mining for ideas from the force at large. We cannot allow such major shifts in our Army’s structure to merely happen and then wonder why. Our CSA sounded the call for new thinking and questioning. What is right for the Nation is good for the Army. What are you doing to answer the call to arms? Notes 1Speech by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army, at the annual Association of the U.S. Army Convention, Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003. 2General Peter J. Schoomaker’s arrival speech during his swearing in as the 35th Chief of Staff, Army, 1 August 2003. 3This assumes two things: that 3 and 5 sets of equipment will be reconstituted both by repair and additional equipment as required, as well as supporting ongoing operations in Iraq; and that the Army Materiel Command can bring in line the associated property books and property management systems with reorganization. The second task is within capability; the first depends solely on money. 4Post-modern theories on using military force abound, and while germane to the structure we propose, are rightly the subjects of different essays for different journals. 5Proving the old maxim if you want a new idea read an old book — my proposal for mixing tanks and infantry has distinguished roots. See Maurice de Saxe, My Reveries Upon the Art of War, in The Roots of Strategy, edited and translated by Brigadier General T.R. Phillips, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1985, p. 210, “Since what I write is only a game to dissipate my boredom, I want to give full play to my imagination. I would form my body of infantry into legions, each composed of four regiments, and every regiment of four centuries; each century would have half a century of light-armed foot and a half century of cavalry.” 6Kevin C.M. Benson in “The Armor Battalion After Next,” ARMOR, September-October 1997, p. 12, I proposed a structure for the battalion headquarters and headquarters company that greatly reduces the organic combat service support within a battalion. 7A proposal for a restructured division artillery is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it must be considered in light of the CSA’s directions. It might be time to focus the power of the division artillery on lethal and nonlethal fires, a true effects coordination center, thus mixing counterbattery radar, missiles, and cannons with cyberattack means and information operations. COL Kevin C.M. Benson currently serves as the Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S. from The Catholic University, and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His military education includes the Army War College Fellowship Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge; U.S. Ar my Command and General Staff College; Marine Amphibious Warfare School; and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has held various command and staff positions, including assistant chief of staff, C5 (Plans), Combined Forces Land Com ponent Command, Third U.S. Army, Kuwait and Iraq; Chief of Staff, Army Transformation Task Force, Fort Lewis, WA; commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Cav alry, Fort Hood, TX; assistant chief of staff, G3 (Plans), Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, GA; and XO, 2d Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA. “Also, based on ongoing operations, the BCT must have the requisite on-ground infantry strength, as well as reconnaissance strength, to engage in stability and support operations. Any new structure for our BCTs must be balanced combined arms teams, where infantry is an absolute requirement. We saw in the opening stages of Iraqi Freedom that armor and armored infantry present the enemy with an overwhelming combination of speed, mobility, shock effect, and firepower.” May-June 2004 — 23