Recent Merkava Attacks Highlight Growing Command Detonated Mine Threat

The Command Detonated Mine (CDM) is quickly becoming a staple of Asymmetrical Warfare. It has been used with deadly effect in both the First and Second Chechen Wars, as well as in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and the fighting in India’s Kargil region. Also known as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the standard device is often a 152mm HE artillery shell or its equivalent with a C-4 wad and detonator linked to a cell phone, pager, or radio initiator. Variations on this theme, to include wire-controlled detonation, are as widespread as the conflicts in which they can be found. The Israeli Defense Forces recently suffered two identical attacks in the same area of the Gaza Strip and yet showed no perceived ability to respond to this threat. Prior to February 2002, the IDF’s $3 million, 60-ton Merkava Main Battle Tanks were considered fairly invulnerable assets, since the Palestinians had no real antitank weapons. So Tel Aviv deployed their armored Goliaths to deal with the Intifada, in the assumption that their tankers were safe, that the tanks’ mere presence would dampen any crisis, and that they’d suffer no embarrassing losses. Wrong assumption. Three Israeli soldiers were killed and one suffered moderate to serious wounds when a bomb went off underneath their Merkava 3 tank on the night of February 14, 2002. This was the first time a roadside CDM managed to seriously penetrate an Israeli tank’s armor in the territories. Even roadside CDM and ATGM attacks in Lebanon over the past decade did not hurt an entire tank crew. The attack occurred at about 2100 hours along the single lane asphalted settlers’ road to Netzarim, a main north-south Gaza road at a junction constituting a no man’s land. Palestinian orange groves had been leveled on either side of the road because the Israelis claim that snipers were hiding in them, leaving sandy soil that IDF tanks used as shortcuts. About 30 minutes before the blast, suspected Palestinian fighters had detonated a smaller bomb on a convoy route in front of a civilian bus traveling with army jeeps and opened fire towards the bus from several positions. The convoy was moving along a road between the Netzarim settlement and the Karni checkpoint in the Gaza Strip. Although this particular road was patrolled every 30 minutes, it was clearly a trap. The 188th Brigade tank was called in to provide fire support and as it was moving to contact on a parallel track, the second charge was detonated when the tank passed on it. The tank was about 50 meters south of the set-tler’s road when it was blown up. The convoy bus driver (identified only as Itzik) remarked that he heard an explosion and saw a blue flash in the orchard area. He continued in the bus toward Karni, while the jeep behind stopped to open fire at the spot where the terrorists were apparently hiding. A group including the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat’s Fatah faction claimed joint responsibility for the attack. “In response to the killing of five soldiers of the national security forces and in response to the raid on our cities and villages ... Salahudin Brigade detonated two roadside bombs against a Zionist convoy ... then sprayed the convoy with machine gun fire.” The tank was toppled on its side and its 22-ton turret blown off, landing 10 meters away. The front-mounted engine was blown upward by the force of the blast, smashed into the gun barrel and flipped the turret off like a bottle top. Two crewmen were killed immediately, one died later. The only surviving member of the tank crew was evacuated by helicopter to Beersheba’s Soroka Hospital. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz quoted an unnamed top security official (involved in both the Merkava’s development and the use of the protective plates) who opined that tank operations on field assignments without the plates was “totally stupid.” He explained that the plates could have saved lives at the Netzarim junction, but other security officials never unanimously backed the 100 percent use of the protective plates. In muddy conditions, the plates limit the tank’s maneuverability. According to an initial inquiry headed by IDF Chief Armor Officer Brigadier General Avigdor Klein, no amount of armor could have withstood the massive explosion. Klein believed the life of the gunner was saved because the explosion did not detonate the tank’s ammunition or ignite its fuel. The CDM apparently consisted of more than 50 kilograms of the highly explosive CTP, which is made in the Czech Republic and is a favorite of terrorist groups. It was placed inside an empty water boiler. The inquiry concluded that “no additional armor to the underbelly could have prevented the loss of life from the large bomb.” Brigadier General Ze'ev Bargil (former head of the Defense Ministry’s Merkava tank project team) told the media that “the tank wasn’t developed to operate against terror; it is designed to take part in war. A tank is designed to move forward in an open field, to move quickly and attack the target 46 ARMOR — May-June 2002 swiftly ... Were we to provide a solution to every contingency and threat, the tank would weigh 100 tons, not 60; and that would hamper its speed.” Apparently, Hamas had executed a similar CDM attack along the Karni-Netzarim road in the Gaza Strip almost one year prior. In February 2001, as a tank-led foot patrol scoured the route for bombs, Hamas guerrillas, lying in wait, set off the charge when the tank halted. Hamas later distributed a video recording of the attack, which moderately wounded one IDF soldier. Hamas bombers, who triggered four smaller CDMs in 2000, also favor the Netzarim junction. As a convoy of three civilian vehicles escorted by two military vehicles reached the Netzarim junction on the night in September 2000, three roadside bombs were detonated in rapid succession. As the two soldiers stepped out of their vehicle to check whether anyone was hurt, the attackers activated a second roadside CDM loaded with a larger quantity of explosives. The two wounded soldiers were flown by helicopter to Beersheba’s Soroka Hospital. One soldier died later. The IDF and the Israel Security Agency believed that Hamas mas-terminded the attack, but did not rule out the possibility that Palestinian Authority police were involved. Merkava Vulnerabilities Even Hezbollah guerrillas (considered much better trained and equipped than Palestinian militants) using roadside CDMs, mines, and ATGMs were unable to destroy a Merkava during 18 years of fighting against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. By the end of 1997, Hezbollah had acquired AT-4 “Spigot” ATGMs which significantly strengthened their antiarmor capability. While there were several incidents in Lebanon where tanks were hit with ATGMs, the IDF tanks were never completely destroyed. In September, 1997, Iranian-backed Hezbollah units had launched a broad offensive, firing mortars and missiles at dozens of Israeli Army and South Lebanon Army militia bases. When LT Eyal Shimoni’s Merkava, deployed in the heart of Israel’s Southern Lebanon security zone, moved out to provide cover for troops, it took a direct hit from a “Faggot” ATGM. Hezbollah claimed that a Tank Sniper Unit group targeted a Merkava at the Kassaret Al-Oroush post, killing one Israeli officer and wounding two others. Two more Merkavas were lost in October to ATGM hits. In another attack in the Mount Dov region on the Israeli-Lebanese border, another soldier was killed in April 2001 when a Hezbollah “Sagger” ATGM damaged a Merkava turret. The driver had warned of the incoming missile, but the soldier in the turret had no time to duck before it impacted on the tank’s front. Another Mekava Mined! Shortly before 0700 hours, March 14, 2002, Palestinian terrorists triggered a Command Detonated Mine under a Merkava 3 MBT that had been escorting a civilian convoy on the Karni-Netzarim road in the central Gaza Strip. The force of the explosion from the 50- kilogram (110 pound) radio-controlled mine blew the turret off the tank. The terrorists were apparently hiding in or behind a nearby mosque near the settlement of Netzarim. Three soldiers were killed and two more were wounded. Rescue forces had difficulty freeing the crew’s bodies from the tank, while an IDF helicopter evacuated the wounded to Beersheba’s Soroka Hospital. One of the two wounded had been standing outside of the vehicle. Reuters reported that a coalition of Palestinian militant groups (including the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Salahudin Brigade, and the Islamic movement Hamas) took responsibility for the attack. The attack took place one month to the day after the first Merkava was destroyed, on the same road. The area was closed to traffic when a giant crane was brought in to tow away the Merkava’s remains. Some Palestinian witnesses said that IDF troops had searched nearby fields for suspects, while other tanks drove several hundred meters into Palestinian territory during the search. Palestinian Authority security officials and witnesses also insinuated that the IDF had retaliated by sending 15 armored fighting vehicles and three bulldozers towards the nearby Nuseirat refugee camp. There they demolished eight houses and a security post, as well as crops and irrigation systems in the area. CDMs, Speculation and Bad Habits On February 15, 2001, the Israeli-based Internet wire service DEBKAfile reported that their military sources theorized that a hollow, multi-stage (probably magnetic) charge was used, possibly in combination with a powerful magnetic mine or mines. They also advanced that it was a form of sabotage never before seen before in the Middle East. This turned out to be an inflated estimate, as both CDMs were large but apparently not spectacularly sophisticated. Recent history indicated that Hamas was capable of serial-deployment of CDMs in the Netzarim area, turning each operation into a learning event and improving their tactics for the next attack. What is perhaps most troubling about the two Gaza attacks was that the IDF had fairly recent experience with CDMs and yet seemed to be ignoring their own “lessons learned” from Lebanon. Due to OPSEC considerations, we’ll probably never know how often or vigorously the IDF conducted route reconnaissance, but apparently, it wasn’t enough. Could any armored behemoth withstand a 50-kilogram CDM? Not likely, unless one wanted to invest in some waddling 100-ton monster. So what should the U.S. Army do when deploying to a potential CDM arena? The more useful responses are operational in nature, but expensive and time-consuming. Varied convoy scheduling is the simplest countermeasure. Intelligence operations can use IPB to predict suitable ambush sights and chalk them up as NAIs, as well as track the movement of enemy sappers who can build and deploy these mines. Aggressive countermine engineering reconnaissance can focus on these NAIs, while other reconnaissance efforts are sensitized to search for caches of explosives and/or artillery shells. Furthermore (and topic for a future article), the use of electronic countermeasures should be exploited far more than we’re currently doing. Footnotes The Israelis should be familiar with how to quickly and stealthily emplace charges. On the night of June 17, 1946, the Jewish resistance blew up 11 bridges linking Palestine to the neighboring countries. Supposedly, they placed close to 300 kg of explosives and were gone in less than 30 minutes, all under the British guards’ nose. This operation became known as “The Night of the Bridges” and was the largest the Haga-nah launched.

ARMOR — May-June 2002 47

References Moqawama.org, September 1997 Operations “Hizbullah gets radio up and revelations of advanced weapons,” Arabic News.Com, 16 Oct 97 Moqawama.org, October 1997 Operations “Islamic Resistance Detonates Bomb; 5 Israelis Wounded,” Ba'labakk Voice of the Oppressed, 29 Nov 97 “Lebanon: Israel’s Vietnam?,” Peter Hirschberg, The Jerusalem Report, 11 Dec 97 Moqawama.org, December 1997 Operations “The Vulture and The Snake - Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon,” Shmuel L. Gordon, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 39, July 1998 Ha'aretz, 27 Sep 00 “Soldier hurt in Netzarim bombing,” Arieh O'Sullivan, The Jerusalem Post, 23 Feb 01 “IAF hits Syrian radar station after Hizbullah attacks,” David Rudge, The Jerusalem Post, 17 Apr 01 “Huge bomb under tank kills 3 soldiers,” Amos Harel, Ha'aretz, 15 Feb 02 “Three crewmen killed when tank hits mine,” Margot Dudkevitch, The Jerusalem Post, 15 Feb 02 “Israeli Tank Regarded With Pride,” Jack Katznell, Associated Press, 15 Feb 02 “Arabs Deploy New Explosive Against Tank; 3 Israelis Die,” James Bennet, New York Times, 15 Feb 02 “A Hollowed Magnetic Charge and Mine Blew up Chariot-3 Tank in Palestinian Ambush in Gaza Strip Thursday Night,” DEBKAfile, 15 Feb 02 “Wrecked Tank Lacked Special Plate Protection,” Amnon Barzilay, Ha'aretz, 17 Feb 02 “Tank Inquiry: No Amount of Armor Could Have Helped,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 Feb 02 “Israeli tanks leave Ramallah as U.S. envoy visits,” CNN, 14 Mar 02 “Three soldiers die in Gaza Strip landmine explosion,” Arieh O'Sullivan, Margot Dudkevitch and the Associated Press, The Jerusalem Post, 14 Mar 02 “Three IDF soldiers killed in tank blast near Gaza settlement,” Amos Harel, Jalal Bana, and Haim Shadmi, Ha'aretz and agencies, 15 Mar 02

CPT Adam Geibel is the S2, 5/117th Cavalry, 42ID (NJARNG). In civilian life, he is the Associate Editor of the Journal of Military Ordnance and a freelance writer.

48 ARMOR — May-June 2002

These shared learning experiences result in officers and NCOs who are, “self-confident, adaptive leaders who motivate teams to solve complex problems while operating in a full-spectrum environment in an Army transforming to an Interim and an Objective Force.”15 The Armor School continues to refine and enhance leadership development that trains our future leaders to, “Lead teams that are lethal at the point of contact.” When discussing the new enemy, there are two words we should drop from our vocabulary — “always” and “never.” Those two words quickly sum up our understanding of the enemy in the COE. The authors of the new OPFOR manuals fully understand the importance of their mission to bring us this information; now it’s up to us to use it to our advantage. “Thus we know that there are five essentials for victory:

• He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

• He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

• He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all the ranks.

• He will win who prepared himself, and waits to take the enemy unprepared.

• He will win who has military capability and is not interfered with by his sovereign. Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.”16 We are literally standing on the doorstep of a new age of warfare, and we must embrace the fact that we are a principal actor in the COE. We are the enemy of our enemy, and as simple as that sounds, our awareness of that perception is often fleeting. The enemy knows and studies us, so let us know and study him.

Notes 1Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Thomas Cleary (Translator), Shambhala Publications, Inc. January 1991. 2The Opposing Forces. (See also FM 7- 100/.1/.2), TSD, TRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 28 August 2001. 3Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9Ibid. 10White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment, TSD, TRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 2 February 2000. 11The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld, The Free Press, 1991. 12White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment. 13Martin van Creveld. 14Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999. 15Command Philosophy, COL John F. Antal, May 2000. 16Sun Tzu.

MAJ Kenneth C. Cary enlisted in 1980, and served with the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell Ky., and the 3rd Armored Division. He attended California State University Fresno, earning his ROTC Commission as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1989. After Armor Officer Basic Course, he served during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield as a tank platoon leader in the 2-8 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division. He later led 1st Cavalry Division’s Horse Cavalry Detachment. In 1994, he transitioned into military intelligence, and served as a G2 plans officer and as the special security officer for the 2nd ID, Korea. He later served with the 902d Military Intelligence Group, Fort Meade, Md., as the group S2; as operations officer for the 308th MI BN, and as commander of Charlie Company, 308th MI BN, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. In 1999, he was assigned as the S2 and intelligence instructor-writer for the 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment. Currently, he is the regimental S2 for the 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, Ky.

Know the Enemy from Page 45 face a free-thinking opponent, you can have different outcomes from the same scenario. In closing, I would like to caution CPT Johnson in making broad statements that attribute the success or failure of particular units on how much field time the unit has or how they defeat the MILES equipment. The success or failure of a unit is a direct reflection on how the unit leaders train their soldiers and the attitude that the leaders instill in those soldiers.

ROBERT W. PHILLIPS

CPT, IN

HHC 1-4 IN (OPFOR)

Torsion Bar Suspension Claim Falls Short on Documentation

Dear Sir: Mr. D.P. Dyer’s criticism of the Ordnance Department for not having a torsion bar development program is fascinating but by no means persuasive. (See “The Origins of Torsion Bar Tank Suspensions,” March-April 2002 issue.) It is ludicrous. First, and most important, is a definition of “development”; a word the author uses acrimoniously to launch his misleading thesis. According to English dictionaries, development means “to evolve to a more complete complex.” The word also means, “advance, amplify, and promote.” The Ordnance Department followed this process during World War II. Furthermore, his article falls short on historical substance because of a lack of important primary sources to support his argument and subjective conclusions. Apparently, Mr. Dyer did not take the time to look at the important Andrew D. Bruce Papers at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Headquarters Army Ground Forces (Record Group 339, NA), the Ordnance Historical Files (OHF) and the Ordnance Committee Minutes (OCM) Items (Record Group 156, NA), and the Barnes Files to mention a few. If so, he would have had a better understanding of the organizational process in weapon acquisition decisions in the U.S. Army during World War II. These sources provide important information on Ordnance Department initiatives regarding the development of equipment for the using services, including the torsion bar suspension system. One example displaying development initiatives was in late December 1942 during a meeting with representatives from the Tank Destroyer Board, manufacturing representatives, and the Ordnance Department’s Subcommittee on Automobile Equipment. At this meeting, it was proposed and recommended to develop the torsion bar for the T70 (the T stands for development), which became the M18. The key member from Ordnance at this meeting was the chairman, BG Gladeon M. Barnes, who in 1934-35 had submitted with Warren E. Preston torsion bar suspension patent letters. (See Reference Material: History, Ordnance Department, WW II, Vol. II, Chapter 6, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Record Group 156, NA.) Dyer, in his article, is not at all clear nor does he offer proof if the original torsion bar design was based on Barnes and Preston’s designs or upon German ideas. He should have examined the G- 2, Military Intelligence Division (MID, Record Group 165, NA) files from the U.S. Army military attaché in Germany during the mid 1930s. Other key ordnance members in attendance on the torsion bar decision were BG John Christmas, an engineer and tank designer, and LTC Joseph Colby, a protégé of General Barnes. In addition, a few additional examples will service to contradict Dyer’s thesis. In The Tank Destroyer History, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 29 (1946), page 62, it was noted that the “greatest single accomplishment of the Tank Destroyer Board was the development of the M18.” In its development, however, special mention was noted regarding the cooperation of General Motor’s officials with the Ordnance Department. Another example of the Ordnance Department’s initiative in developing the torsion bar can be found in The Role of the Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 34, (1946), page 38 in reference to OCM Item No. 19775, 18 February 1943, subject: Medium Tank T20E3. It stated, “At the request of the Armored Board, it was decided to provide one model of the T20 series with torsion bar suspension, which had been developed by the Ordnance Department…[it] appeared to give greater promise than the conventional volute suspension.” Later when the T23 pilot model was being evaluated (OCM Item No. 20182, 15 April 1943, subject: Medium tank T23E3), the Ordnance Department suggested the torsion bar suspension be substituted for the volute suspension system. Eventually the torsion bar system was used in the M24 Chaffee and M26 Pershing tanks. The developmental history of the torsion bar suspension is indicative that it would not have become a proven system without the proposal, recommendation, and approval of the Ordnance Department. What is even more disingenuous in Mr. Dyer’s article was when he wrote (page 45) that General Colby stated, “he was never in a position to get funds for its [torsion bar] development until the winter of 1942-43.” Dyer listed no source regarding Colby’s comment. However, in ARMOR, November-December 1991 (page 18), the author of an article on tank destroyers quoted Colby from a personal letter he had received from the general stating, “I was never in the position to get funds for its development until the winter of 1942-43.” In this case, the author did list his source (page 19, fn 20). General Colby wrote the letter to the author regarding his early involvement over the torsion bar debate. It is courteous among professional military historians to quote accordingly and not engage in plagiarism. This adventurism questions the validity of Mr. Dyer’s article. For Mr. Dyer to say that the Ordnance Department did not approve and was not involved in the development of a torsion bar program is shortsighted and demonstrates a lack of research. Furthermore, his article is obscured by his lack of understanding the organizational turmoil experience by the Ordnance Department due to huge demands of developing new weapons under wartime pressures and rapidly changing requirements insisted on by the using services. Nevertheless, the torsion bar system would never have been approved without the driving force of the Ordnance Department. It is a pity that Mr. Dyer created another myth. He has, over the years, contributed many excellent technical drawings for various technical and buff magazines, many of which appealed to “nuts and bolts” historians.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D.

History Professor University of Cincinnati

Battalion Master Gunner Disagrees With Civilian Replacement Concept

Dear Sir: I am writing in regards to SFC McIntosh’s letter in the March-April 2002 ARMOR. I would like to start with this statement. I completely disagree with his assessment! I have served as a master gunner on both Active Duty and as a member of the National Guard. I have served in positions at the company, battalion, and brigade level. I will not say that I am the best there ever was or the best there ever will be, but I will say that I am a leader and a soldier no matter what position I hold. Regarding SFC McIntosh’s questions: “Do we really want or need that high speed NCO in the tower, the MILES warehouse, or making tracking charts? Wouldn’t we rather have him leading his men?” — if he feels that he is not needed in the tower, in determining those discreet CCFs, in making sure that the MILES and LTIDs the battalion’s 44 crews are about to use are operational, in tracking gunnery results for historical data, fixing broke fire control systems, etc., and isn’t leading men or training them to be warriors, maybe he needs to evaluate exactly how high speed he is. I am currently serving as the battalion master gunner for M1A1-equipped 2-123 AR, of the Kentucky Army National Guard. We do not have the luxury of self-diagnosing equipment, on-board diagnostics, in-line replaceable LRUs, or air conditioners. Our master gunners are instrumental in keeping our tanks operational on ranges and during maneuver exercises. The use of the STE-M1 and the BOB are still daily occurrences for us and, most times, we are the trainers for our turret mechanics in their use. I use them often to ensure the OPTEMPO on firing ranges continues at the highest possible rate. They work hand-in-hand with my maintenance sections. They provide the majority of the input for the commander as we/he develops yearly training plans. I will agree, to a point, that a lot of what is taught at Master Gunner School is not al-LETTERS from Page 4 ARMOR — May-June 2002 49 ways used at the unit level. However, I would submit that what they teach gives the Master Gunner a decent understanding of how the Fire Control System and the subsystems work and at least provide a starting point for diagnostics. Replacing these dedicated and knowledgeable leaders with civilian contractors would be a mistake. Are the civilian replacements going to come out to the range in subzero temperatures, climb through the mud at Graf or Hohenfels, show up at 0200 to troubleshoot a tank, or deploy to war with us? The master gunner must be in the same uniform and face the same hardships as the soldiers. He makes the argument that being the master gunner keeps leaders from leading soldiers. The master gunner position is an additional slot on the TOE/MTOE of armor units. Replacing them with a civilian would eliminate a senior NCO position, of which there are already not enough. The master gunner is a very valuable asset to the commander, at any level he is assigned. His knowledge of the Abrams capabilities and that of our possible enemy’s equipment can and should be a consideration of commanders, not only on gunnery ranges but in the preparation for war. Our input can and should help the commander develop training scenarios that will help the Armor force prevail on the modern battlefield. The master gunner’s input during staff exercises, Warfighters, and even during a basic MDMP process can help mold the way commanders think and act. The key is to know when and how to present this valuable data.

ROBERT W. KYLOR

MSG, KYARNG

2-123 AR BN Master Gunner

Prepositioned Floating Heavy Brigade Could Act as Armor RDF

Dear Sir: I have been an avid reader of ARMOR magazine for many years, but have never written to you before. As a former NCO and officer in both 3/185 AR and 1/184 IN, CA ARNG, I retain both my interest in the go-ings-on of the Armor Community and its future. The invitation issued by MG Whitcomb in the Nov-Dec 2001 issue, and the ongoing discussion within your pages over the formation and equipping of the IBCT brigades, has inspired me to offer my own opinion about this new force structure and, more importantly, the role of the Legacy Force and the Objective Force. The decision to equip the IBCT with the LAV III has been hotly debated by many of your authors, most noticeably Mr. Stanley Crist, and I do not believe that I can contribute significantly to it here except to say that I LIKED the M113A3. It is handy, quick, and reliable. In the hands of a skilled driver, it can overcome most types of terrain and, key point, it can swim. This is a capability sadly lacking in today’s Legacy Force. As to its protection and firepower, these can be upgraded just like those of the basic LAV III. In fact, when I was associated with United Defense Technologies, the makers of both the Bradley and M113, I encountered numerous examples of upgunned M113s equipped with 20mm or greater caliber cannons and TOW missile launchers. These modified M113s were, and are, used by Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, and others. Although to the purist these are not tanks, they don’t carry infantry and they function as light armor. As such, the Armor Community has a strong interest in their development and employment. It occurs to me that the Army could purchase these off-the-shelf items for the IBCTs at far less cost than developing a completely new 105mm cannon armed LAV variant, which, as Mr. Crist notes in the March-April edition, may not be technically feasible. Light armor, M113 or LAV based, equipped with missiles and light cannon, may be all the IBCTs get. That being said, where the rapidly air-deployable infantry divisions are “light” forces and the Abrams/Bradley divisions are “heavy” forces, the IBCTs are “medium” forces falling somewhere in between. As such, the IBCTs can be air deployed where an Abrams/Bradley brigade cannot and, once on the ground, they provide the desperately needed stiffener to the light infantry forces likely to be deployed with them. However, if an IBCT encounters a local force of heavy armor — think Iraq, Iran, or North Korea — they may survive the encounter, but they will suffer for it. The key to surviving the next medium- to high-intensity conflict remains with the “heavy” forces that this nation used so successfully in WWII and Desert Storm. Following on the letter by MAJ Stollenwerk, also in the March-April 2002 edition of ARMOR, which advocated the elimination of various levels of intermediate headquarters between battalion and corps, I suggest that the “heavy” brigade be the core combat element of any future American Expeditionary Force. A suitably reinforced heavy brigade with battalions of armor, mechanized infantry, aviation, artillery, and engineers, as well as a beefed up support battalion, could serve as a mini-division at the beck and call of the in-theater corps commander. Supplemented by the IBCT and infantry brigades deployed in front of it, the heavy brigade, especially digitized, would act as the wide ranging armored fist of the corps commander. I suspect that a corps with one heavy brigade, a pair or more of IBCTs, and an infantry division could, and would, demolish just about anything our foes could throw at it — certainly long enough for follow-on forces to arrive if needed. To make this concept a reality, however, requires the cooperation of the Navy and the support of the senior Department of Defense leadership. As has been stated many times, and is the final justification for the IBCTs, the Abrams/Bradley forces are just too heavy to get anywhere very quickly if deployed directly from CONUS. Transporting from home station by rail to a suitable port and then combat loading onto ships takes weeks. The answer to this dilemma is pre-loaded, fast sea lift. If the Navy can be prevailed upon to build and maintain two sets of fast sea lift ships with two sets of proposed heavy brigades aboard, it would be only a matter of days before a heavy brigade-sized force could be deployed wherever it was needed. Having two sets of floating reserves would allow one set to be in port at any given time for maintenance and overhaul leaving the other to patrol in the vicinity of potential hot spots. If it became necessary to deploy the floating heavy brigade, after an air/beachhead has been established, its soldiers could be airlifted out to meet their equipment at the dock. The second brigade could follow shortly thereafter. In effect, these two brigades would be the Armor Community’s version of the Rapid Deployment Force. Note that this concept is recommended for both the Legacy and the Objective Forces as I have a very hard time believing that even the future armored vehicles of the Objective Force will be light enough to be air deployed in great numbers. Obviously, this is just an idea. I offer it in the hopes that it will spark discussion beyond what kind of Objective Force vehicle will eventually be developed to the debate on how that vehicle will get where it is needed.

TIMOTHY S. SMYTH

Los Angeles, Calif.

Look To Div Cav for Basic Concept Needed to Empower Company CO

Dear Sir: I am responding to MAJ Stollenwerk’s letter, “Empowering Company Commanders: Now It’s Time; Here’s a Way,” in the March-April 2002 issue. One need look no further for this basic concept than the divisional cavalry unit. The only difference with this concept versus MAJ Stollenwerk’s is that the brigade HQ is eliminated, instead of the the division. Just coming from such a unit in Germany, and now being assigned to an armor battalion in CONUS, I find myself missing the added support of having organic mortars, scouts, maintenance, and air support, as well as having the added benefit of direct engineer and medic assests sliced to you at troop level instead of at battalion. The current armor battalion, as MAJ Stollenwerk points out, has too many echelons directing training and training support, without the convenience of having any of the above-mentioned assets, and the number of soldiers to train with directly. Making the companies larger by assigning CSS and combined combat arms together and empowering the company commander to be able to train his soldiers as a combined arms team not only gives leaders at all levels the experience to work with every BOS, but establishes an esprit de corps among the troops creating a more cohesive combat team.

SFC JASON R. MCMURRY

Platoon Sergeant

2-70 AR, 1AD

50 ARMOR — May-June 2002