The Heavy Brigade in Restricted Terrain

“Division reserve. No sweat," thought Major Misconception, the brigade S3. “When I was a battalion ‘three,’ we were the brigade’s habitual reserve, and that wasn’t too tough. Occupy an assembly area or battle position in depth, and be prepared to attack into the brigade engagement area to finish off the enemy, or pick up ‘leakers’ through the main defense. After all, a brigade is just a battalion on steroids...” WRONG! Contrary to popular opinion (and unfortunately, contrary to some of our field manuals), the heavy brigade is not merely a big battalion. The brigade headquarters must set the conditions for success — for its assigned task forces, as well as for its parent division. Divisions can compensate for brigades that abrogate this responsibility... if there is sufficient suitable terrain to allow the movement and proper positioning of assets in spite of the brigade. Let’s face it. As our heavy forces become heavier, and our supporting arms “heavy up” too, we begin to restrict our ability to use terrain. Our tanks, infantry/cavalry fighting vehicles, howitzers, and other tracked combat vehicles are best able to maximize their mobility, firepower, and shock effect when they can deploy into appropriate formations and move rapidly across the battlefield. Similarly, our wheeled logistical vehicles need suitable routes on which to move, or our combat forces will quickly be brought to their knees. Now consider operating in an area where a single two-lane road (with no shoulders, many small bridges crossing unfordable streams, and transiting many small villages) is simultaneously the main supply route for two brigades, the evacuation route for casualties, damaged equipment, displaced civilians/refugees, and prisoners of war, and is the division reserve’s counterattack route. Sound like a recipe for gridlock? It is, unless every brigade headquarters is in the game, and acts in coordination with the rest of the division. One five-ton truck on the road at the wrong place or time can unhinge the timely commitment of the division’s reserve. Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations states that the primary purpose of the division reserve is to provide flexibility and retain the initiative through offensive action. The secondary purposes of the reserve are to reinforce the defense of committed forces, contain enemy forces that have penetrated the FEBA, react to rear area threats, relieve depleted units, and provide for continuous operations. In order to fulfill these requirements, the reserve force must be able to rapidly concentrate its combat power at the critical point in the division’s sector. In restrictive terrain, the difficulty of moving a heavy force quickly within the division’s sector is likely to drive the division commander to retain a larger reserve than he would otherwise, and to position it at multiple sites throughout the division’s sector in order to reduce the time required to deliver a task force to any given point. Let’s assume that the division commander has decided he wants to be able to rapidly concentrate and commit a two-task force-sized reserve within the division’s sector. To achieve the flexibility and desired speed of commitment, he has decided to place three task forces in assembly areas across the division’s sector. How do we constitute this reserve force? Two methods of constituting the reserve come to mind. First, the division commander could structure the division’s defense with three brigade combat teams in the Main Battle Area (MBA), and direct each brigade to maintain a task force in reserve, with a division “string” requiring the division commander’s authorization to commit them. We’ll refer to this as the “virtual reserve” option. Second, the division commander could structure the division’s defense with two brigade combat teams in the MBA, and the third in positions/assembly areas across the division’s sector as the division’s reserve. We’ll refer to this as the “reserve brigade” option. The Virtual Reserve The virtual reserve option, then, gives the division commander a brigade combat team’s worth of task forces, but 46 ARMOR — The Heavy Brigade in Restricted Terrain Division Reserve Operations (Defense) by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Arata In Korea, even on relatively flat valley floors, visibility is restricted by man-made features and the land’s contours. Rice paddies and their dikes also restrict mobility. - All photos by the author without the command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structure to employ them as an integrated, cohesive force. Some would argue these task forces could be commanded by the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M), using a portion of the division’s C4I structure, when the need arose. On order, the virtual reserve would be activated, task forces chopped to division control, and the reserve could be rapidly repositioned or committed in a division counterattack. Anyone who has attempted to change task organization “on the fly” will quickly recognize several significant areas of concern. First, and arguably most critical, is that as an ad hoc unit, the division’s reserve will have rarely, if ever, trained together prior to commitment. Its C4I structure and staff may be a “pick-up” crew culled from the division staff at the last moment. This arrangement certainly negates the “train as you will fight” precept of FM 25-101, and by the ad hoc structure of the C4I system and of the unit itself, negates our ability to develop and exploit the potential strength of our combat function “Battle Command” for the reserve force. Additional concerns with the “virtual reserve” include logistical support for the task forces, dedicated field artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, intelligence/electronic warfare (IEW), and military police headquarters (and units) for the planning and execution of the reserve mission. These concerns are resolvable, but the resolution will likely result in more ad hoc relationships, splitting unit focus at a critical point in the battle (since the reserve is rarely committed when things are going exceedingly well). The committed brigade commanders won’t want to part with support slices of air defense or engineers for the departing (reserve) task forces in the middle of the fight. The Reserve Brigade The reserve brigade option lessens many of those concerns, but has its own constraints. In this option, the division commander gets a brigade combat team’s worth of task forces, along with a trained infrastructure capable of performing all the combat functions required in FM 100-5, Operations. While the brigade combat team may not have all the unit assets required for combat operations (notably field artillery, engineer, and/or IEW), there is a battle staff present and trained to plan for their proper employment once those assets are made available. Additionally, as a major subordinate command (MSC) of the division, the brigade and its staff is used to coordinating with the division staff, which may not be the case for subordinate task forces. The constraints in this option revolve primarily around the use of the available terrain — terrain management and setting the conditions for the successful commitment of the division’s reserve forces. There is a finite amount of good terrain available for use in any division’s sector — even if 100 percent of it is good. As noted before, heavy forces and their supporting infrastructure tend to do best in trafficable terrain. Radars, sensors, command posts, and other communications sites tend to compete with one another for terrain, with certain elevation and line-of-sight characteristics. In severely restricted terrain, you may be unable to deploy more than one company team into battle formation at a time, with the remainder of the task force’s company teams strung along behind as they move up a defile. The supporting infrastructure (observation, mobility support, etc.) may be unusable if not emplaced in advance of the reserve’s commitment. This, then, is where the brigade headquarters is invaluable in restricted terrain; in ensuring the supporting infrastructure that allows the successful commitment of the combat task forces is planned for and emplaced. The remainder of this article discusses planning considerations for the reserve brigade method of establishing the division’s reserve force. Setting the Conditions for Success So what must the brigade staff do to ensure the division will be able to successfully commit its reserve force at the decisive time and place? The following are some of the critical areas they must consider:

• Positioning task force assembly areas to allow rapid deployment within the division’s sector.

• Controlling reserve force deployment routes.

• Planning for changes in the division’s task organization/asset handover at the time of reserve force commitment.

• Positioning supporting assets to facilitate reserve force deployment and initial operations.

• Planning for the employment and control of the reserve forces throughout the division’s sector. Positioning Task Force Assembly Areas This may appear to be a “no-brainer,” but the difficulty in doing this properly increases as terrain trafficability decreases. The goal is to position the task forces so they may rapidly move to reinforce or counterattack anywhere within the division’s sector. In restrictive terrain, the key to this mobility is to be positioned within reach of a road complex that supports rapid lateral and forward movement and deployment. These positions must also be relatively close to the projected areas of employment. Therein lies the difficulty. Those same trafficable sites along road complexes are the sites we use to position our howitzer batteries, combat trains/UMCPs, etc. Additionally, we ARMOR — 47 Much of Korea’s terrain is typified here - steep, untrafficable slopes bounding narrow valleys, often less than 1,000 meters wide, and containing streams, rice paddies, or built-up areas.

must consider the likelihood the enemy will target road complexes such as these for reconnaissance efforts, and may thus pinpoint our reserve’s location more easily. Controlling Reserve Force Deployment Routes These routes may or may not be in use as supply routes; in restricted terrain, it is almost certain they will be. Each route should be assigned to the “using” reserve task force, which will conduct route reconnaissance and security operations to deny the enemy’s ability to emplace light infantry or special operations forces (SOF) along the route to interdict the movement of the reserve), ensure mobility (assuming that the brigade’s habitual direct support (DS) engineer battalion has not been task-organized elsewhere), and maintain absolute control of brigade assets moving on the battlefield. Route Reconnaissance and Security Much of this will depend upon your expected threat. In restricted terrain, a small light infantry or SOF unit can interdict your use of a route through direct attack, observed indirect fires, or countermobility operations. Of these three, the last is the least likely to occur if the route is in continuous use. However, even if the route is in continuous use, the task force must reconnoiter it before moving significant forces on it, and must deny the enemy the opportunity to observe the route. The brigade and task force reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans must be fully coordinated and developed with this in mind. R&S assets must be used to verify enemy actions along the deployment route(s), as well as in the reserve’s expected areas of employment. Controlling Route Usage As mentioned earlier, one five-ton truck on the road at the wrong place/time can unhinge the employment of the division’s reserve. (Imagine your southbound supply truck with its water trailer jackknifed in a “rock drop” point obstacle. Now imagine the northbound logistics package (LOGPAC) that gets stopped by it. Then include the northbound reserve task force behind the LOGPAC, enroute to conduct the division counterattack. Move the supply truck immediately, and you still have a significant delay in employing the reserve.) The brigade’s DS engineer battalion may be able to provide some turn-outs to assist in clearing the route of damaged equipment, but they will not be able to turn that two-lane road into Interstate 65. Changing Task Organization/Asset Handover As the division’s reserve force is committed, it is likely to have additional assets “chopped” to it. Link-up with these assets may only require the change of a radio frequency or a code (if the asset, such as a radar or sensor, is already sited to support the reserve force’s commitment). It could also entail the physical movement of a unit to a link-up point on the ground where it would then join the reserve force’s formation (as in the case of NBC reconnaissance, decontamination or smoke elements, engineers, air defense, or field artillery). In the latter situation, one technique is to position these assets forward along the reserve force’s deployment route(s) so they may be folded into the march column as it moves forward. If these assets are not capable of providing for their own security or defense, the reserve may have to use a portion of its force to reconnoiter, quarter, and secure positions for these assets in order to ensure they will remain viable when needed for the reserve’s commitment. Positioning Supporting Assets The previous point brings us to the positioning of supporting assets, specifically the artillery radars, IEW sensors, communications infrastructure, logistical installations, and command posts to facilitate the reserve’s deployment and initial operations. Ideally, all these assets will be emplaced so that they support the MBA forces and the probable areas of commitment for the reserve forces. In practice, at least a portion of this infrastructure will have to be repositioned to support the reserve once it has been committed, especially if it is to be used to counterattack to any significant depth. Again, these assets should be repositioned as early as is practicable to allow them to “set” and support the reserve’s commitment. This early repositioning also helps to solve potential traffic control problems, as these assets may have to use (or at least cross) the reserve’s deployment route(s) as they reposition. Unfortunately, there is never enough “stuff” on the battlefield, and some assets supporting the MBA units may not be able to start supporting the reserve’s counterattack until it is launched and enemy contact is made. Assets could potentially echelon in this case, with a portion displacing to support the reserve while a portion continues support to the MBA units. If this is not possible, then these assets should be given priority to move to their new sites once they are able to “chop” from MBA support to counterattack support. Communications Communications support deserves special comment at this point. As stated earlier, C4I nodes must compete for 48 ARMOR — M1A1 passes through a “rock-drop” point obstacle on a division 2-way supply route.

limited suitable terrain. To further complicate matters, it is conceivable the brigade may have task forces operating in separate defiles, hindering direct FM communications. Retransmission sites can become the key to maintaining digital fire support linkages and FM voice communications. Again, terrain management, site reconnaissance, and site security are important considerations. In extremely restricted terrain, the brigade may have to put a “string” on task force retransmission assets in order to ensure critical nets remain operational across the division’s entire sector. Command Posts and Logistical Support When committed, the reserve may be moving into or through a highly congested MBA. If the brigade has been successful in planning for the initial sites of the brigade support area and the brigade main command post, they will be able to support/control at least the initial phases of the reserve’s commitment and operations from those locations. If the reserve is to counterattack to a significant depth on the battlefield, then the brigade main command post will have to bound forward to maintain communications, act as the brigade’s asset and information coordination and clearing center, and plan future operations. The brigade tactical command post (TAC) will likely be echeloned forward of the brigade main command post to control the current battle. The brigade support area (BSA), being a space-intensive installation, will most likely not be able to move forward in its entirety. As the brigade combat team moves forward, the forward support battalion (FSB) may have to echelon support through the use of forward logistical elements (FLEs). In severely restricted terrain with minimal lateral supply routes, the BSA may have to remain to the rear with FLEs echeloned forward on multiple routes to ensure timely support to the task forces. Planning for Employment and Control of the Reserve The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is going to be an immense effort, since you must consider employment of the reserve anywhere within the division’s sector. You must have the graphic control measures from the division, each brigade, and each task force/squadron posted on your maps. This should help you to understand the current battle conditions and locations as the reserve is committed. The division, each brigade, and each task force/squadron must also have the reserve’s graphic control measures posted, on at least one map in the command post. This exchange of graphics and information can help in avoiding situations where the reserve force encounters an unexpected mine/wire/crater/ditch across its deployment route. The reserve will also be better prepared to enter a brigade or task force area on commitment (as a counterattacking or as a reinforcing force) if it can quickly exchange information with the MBA unit using common graphics for reference points and locations. Graphical Control Measures The reserve brigade must plan for operations in an area initially assigned to another unit or units. Those units will have developed graphic control measures to support their operations. Those graphics may or may not support the intended operations of the reserve in that portion of the division’s sector. If they do not, the brigade is faced with the task of issuing additional graphical control measures which allow rapid focusing of combat power without cluttering up the operations overlay. One of the keys to successful reserve operations is the development of graphics that support the many employment options for the heavy brigade within the division’s sector. Graphics offer a simple means for the commander to control his forces on the battlefield. More important, however, is the role that they can play in relation to the enemy. We have found that, when reserve graphics are tied to the IPB, our ability to react/counteract to enemy actions is greatly enhanced. Having the S2 and S3 jointly develop the IPB, and tying the operational graphics to that process, has resulted in an improved understanding and use of the terrain in developing the scheme of maneuver and a better linkage between the scheme of maneuver and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Target! Cease Fire! No operation is ever as simple as it seems, and I have not provided a universal solution to the problem of planning for heavy force reserve operations in restricted terrain. What I hope to have accomplished is to have provided the reader with insights into some of the challenges of these operations, as well as some of some of their potential solutions. Author’s Note The author wishes to acknowledge that the majority of the information presented in this article is a distillation of procedures developed and lessons learned by the members of the Iron Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Republic of Korea, over the past two years. ARMOR — 49 Lieutenant Colonel John L. Arata was commissioned in 1979 with a B. S. degree from Ohio State University. Since then, he has served in a variety of assignments, to include troop commander in Germany and CONUS, tank battalion S3 in CONUS, assistant professor of military science at Purdue University, and as the commander, Headquarters Company, U. S. Army at Fort Myer, Va. He earned an MSA degree from Central Michigan University in 1994, and graduated from the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Ala. in 1995. He was assigned as the S3, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, in the Republic of Korea when this article was written, and is currently assigned to the Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

century is provision for the input of junior leaders who, after all, will be the senior leaders implementing our emerging doctrine. Providing a firm link and ensuring consideration of the new ideas should probably be one of the key roles of the school commandants. You’re providing a good forum. Keep up the good work.

MG (Ret.) U. S. Army Thoughts on Excellence in Armor Dear Sir: I enjoyed CSM Davis’ informative article, “A Reflection of Success: The Excellence in Armor Soldier,” (Jan-Feb 97). I was an EIA participant in one of the early classes back in 1985. As I crossed the bows into the officer corps, I took all of my enlisted knowledge with me and applied it aggressively. I have encouraged my eligible soldiers to enroll and learn from the program. I also keep a close eye on my colleagues to make sure that these guys are on tanks, and not driving HMMWVs. We tend to want to take squared-away guys off tanks and make them drivers.

Cdr, A Co, 1-67 Armor Ft. Hood, Texas In-Service Recruit Program Cautions Dear Sir: There is apparently some misconception in the Regular Army about the “In-service Recruit Program.” The majority of in-service recruits that have been assigned to my unit have decided to just quit soon after arrival. They are under the impression that they can take it or leave it with no consequences for going AWOL from the National Guard. This seems to stem from the idea that the National Guard is not really apart of the Army, and it is OK to quit. This is not the case at all. When you leave the active Army and are thinking about joining the Reserve Component, you must take into account the following. First of all, you are entering into unemployment and may have some difficulty. The National Guard and Reserves is apart-time job and will not always make ends meet. The different states usually have their own benefits above the usual school benefits; you will have to contact the National Guard representative in your state for details. There may be some restrictions, and you may have to serve a term longer than your remaining service obligation to get some state benefits. For instance, in Ohio you must serve six years in the Ohio National Guard for 60% of your tuition to be paid by the state at an approved institution in Ohio. Approved institution means a state-funded school like Ohio State or Cincinnati Technical College; there are many all over the state. It can be a good deal if you are ready to buckle down and study. The affiliation bonus is usually for a specific critical MOS, and the town with a guard unit with that MOS may be along drive each weekend. You should take that into account when thinking of the National Guard. Also, the uniforms you were issued in basic training will belong to the National Guard if you become an in-service recruit. Yes, you are responsible to have your whole initial issue upon reporting to your Guard unit. On the plus side of this, you usually will be too far from an active duty clothing sales store to maintain your uniforms. In the National Guard, you will not receive a clothing allowance, but you will get direct exchange (DX) of your initial issue as well as TA-50. There are some other misconceptions that must be cleared up about guard service, especially for the 19-series CMF soldier. You must pass the APFT once a year - not a watered down APFT, but the real McCoy as stated in FM 21-20. This level of physical fitness may be difficult to maintain when you work a civilian job all week, and the time to stay in shape may elude you. We do not change the standards. Most guys tend to grow horizontally when they leave active duty and first come into the Guard. We are required to meet the standards of AR 600-9; do not come into the Army National Guard and get fat. If you received any affiliation bonus or state benefits and are discharged for being overweight or failing the APFT, you will probably have to pay it all, or a prorated portion, back. You tankers will still be responsible for TCGST skills, a decent reticle aim on the M-COFT if you are a gunner, and all of the other skills tankers need, active or reserve. You scouts will have to maintain all of your skills as a scout and possibly learn some new ones. You will only have one weekend a month and approximately two uninterrupted weeks a year to train and maintain these skills. This may be even more difficult because the training facilities are not usually as available as they are on active duty. Your unit may have to get on a bus and drive long distances to training sites. It is not always easy to be in the Guard. We are not the beer-drinking, inept, weekend warriors we are so often stigmatized as. You have to measure up to the same standards that you have always measured up to on active duty, with very little in the way of resources. The last thing I want to do here is talk anyone out of being in the Reserve Component after serving on active duty; we need your expertise. The National Guard and the Reserves may be a big help to you when you get out, and maybe you will want to stay to retirement, but don’t forget that you are still a solider, so come ready to soldier. If you do not want to soldier, or are just tired of soldiering for awhile, do not become an in-service recruit. If you decide that ISR is the way to go, come ready to face the challenges and you will reap the rewards. If later you decide that the Reserve Component is what you want, see a Guard or Reserve recruiter after you have stabilized your civilian life. Whatever the case, do not become an In-Service Recruit only to just quit when you get to your Guard or Reserve unit; AWOL here is just like AWOL there, and there are consequences to pay for it.

Readiness NCO/MG A Look Back at WWII Procurement Dear Sir: Since my last message was rather long, I decided to defer additional comments on the development and fielding of new equipment that was in place in the ’30s and ’40s. The only way to understand why it typically took so long to get something really new in the hands of the troops is to learn how the process worked. I don’t know how this process works today, but the salient point is that it was the user who made the crucial and ultimate decisions. Ordnance is expected to translate user needs into appropriate specifications with advice as to what is best, recognizing that compromises are the order of the day. For example, you cannot get heavier armament and still get a lighter-weight vehicle. If you want to transport a tank in a plane, it can only weigh so much, and it has to fit inside. There were 10 steps prescribed for standardization of equipment. First came the decision, approved by G4 of the General Staff, that a specific need for anew or improved item existed. Second was the statement of the military characteristics that the item must have to serve its purpose. This statement was drawn up by aboard of officers of the using arm, such as Infantry or Artillery. On each board, an Ordnance officer was one of the members. The third step was the formal initiation of a development program. The Army Service Forces had to approve classification by its type, nomenclature, and a model number, beginning with the letter T. Following the official classification, the project became the responsibility of the appropriate unit of the Research and Development Service to work out. “The next five steps in peacetime tended to be long drawn out, as the test upon the semiautomatic rifle in the 1920s and 1930s show. First, the men who had designed and built the pilot model subjected it to a series of engineering tests. Each component had to correspond to the specifications. A model that met these requirements was then labeled ‘service-test type’ and was ready for the next process — service testing. Service tests, conducted by aboard under control of 50 ARMOR — LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) the using arm or occasionally by troops in the field, were to determine the suitability of the equipment for combat in the hands of ordinary soldiers.” (page 241, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions For War, 1955, Office of the Chief of Military History) Such tests almost always revealed that modifications were needed, and after these were incorporated into the item, the using service resumed testing. Modifications for complicated equipment, such as tanks and artillery, could run into the hundreds. The next stage was extended service tests. Major items were usually tested by tactical units. From these tests came production in some quantity, “limited procurement type.” If it was GO, recommendations were made to the Army Service Forces for standardization, and an M number and name resulted. “Nevertheless, in developing most new items, when time was lost needlessly, it was in the course of service testing, modifying, retesting, and extended service testing. If, instead of being submitted to prolonged tests against dummy targets in the United States, new materiel could be shipped to the active theaters for battle trial, then, the Ordnance Department contended, a dual purpose would be served: the research and development staff would have indisputable proof of weaknesses and strong points of the new equipment under real, not simulated, combat conditions, and the armies in the field would have the use of weapons, usable even if far from faultless. Later modifications could be made with greater certainty. Here was a variation of the Ordnance pleas of the 1930s protesting the refusal of the War Department to standardize materiel until it was nearly perfect as possible. Ordnance engineers concurred in Colonel Studler’s statement of 1940: ‘The best is the enemy of the good.’ For years, the Army Ground Forces resisted this approach of shipping new materiel overseas not yet wholly proved. General McNair ‘repeatedly objected to issuing materiel possessing even minor defects of design.’ ” (pp. 241-243) Regarding the development and standardization of the 76mm gun to replace the 75mm gun for the M4 tank, the process described above was extraordinarily condensed in a period of less than one month by 10 September 1942 — months before General Patton landed in North Africa in November 1942. Ordnance had been alerted previously to the experiences of the British with the Sherman in fighting off Rommel and the developments of the Germans to up-gun their tanks, the Panther Mark IV, and the monster Tiger with its 88mm gun. Regarding the comments of Lewis Sorley in your Jan-Feb 97 issue of what LTC Creighton Abrams wanted and the reaction of an unnamed Ordnance officer who was so concerned about gun tubes wearing out too fast rather than trying to get tank commanders what they needed, I think it not unusual to find blokes anywhere in any outfit at any time who don’t get the message. But, if higher velocity gun tubes wore out faster than replacements could be furnished, what then? Would it be better to stick awhile longer with a lower velocity gun than have none at all? Such trade-offs are always something to be dealt with, and you’d like to think that there are guys around who do the right thing when it is time to upgrade and field equipment, and not wait until it may be too late. Going back to the story of the incredibly rapid standardization of the 76mm gun that then-LTC Abrams wanted in 1944 when Ordnance had completed the work in 1942, now whose ox should be gored? Finally, General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, commented in 1945 on what he considered unjust criticism aimed at the Ordnance Department: “In some of the public discussions of such matters (the quality of American ordnance) criticism was leveled at the Ordnance Department for not producing better weapons. This department produced with rare efficiency what it was asked to produce, and these instructions came from the General Staff, of which I am the responsible head, transmitting the resolved views of the officers with the combat troops or air forces, of the commanders in the field. (See pg. 258, same source). I hope that what I have provided will put to rest the extended dispute of who was responsible for what, and when, concerning the undergunned Sherman. COL GEORGE EDDY (Ret.) Via e-mail Tank Dispersion in Formations Dear Sir: After submitting the articles on M1A2s and Smart Ammunition... the question I asked myself is how far do we REALLY want to spread our formation? The calculations I used in the article were based on straight line distance with line of sight (LOS) to all enemy vehicles in their formation (i.e. the Saudi/Kuwaiti/Iraqi desert). Using backwards planning of a sort, I then figured how far we could spread out and still target the enemy’s formation. An article in the Jul-Aug 96 Military Review by BG (Ret.) Wass de Czege on the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) concept seems to indicate that a key planning factor in future force deployment is targeting. (“... Although the MSF never totally achieved it, all 800 fighting vehicles and 2,200 support vehicles in the average division could be theoretically attacked and defeated in a ten-minute engagement by weapons organic to or in support of a single MSF brigade...”) If we get caught up in a strictly targeting mentality, we begin to think like the Air Force, which still has never won a war singlehanded. What we need to figure may well be a different matter when we look at the platoon leader deployed with his platoon in the field. Maybe we should determine our dispersion based on how much area an M1A2’s gunner’s primary sight (GPS) and commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV) can simultaneously “see” at our desired engagement range, and multiply times four. Y (GPS degree field of view) + (CITV field of view) x 4. Geometric calculation of the cone formed with a base of x-meters at the far end from our main gun with sides equal to the distance we wish to observe/engage shows us how much one tank can see and target at any given time. Multiplying times four to allow for the rest of the platoon and ensuring our vehicles’ ‘cones’ overlap might reveal for us how much we truly want to disperse. What do the master gunners say? If the idea behind doctrinal distances is mutual support and not targeting capability, then I only figured half of the equation I should have offered. It really bothers me that writers in ARMOR’s editorial page have not attacked my methods as I believe only CRITICAL analysis will yield true answers.

Via e-mail “Bandits”: What’s In a Name? Dear Sir: I am researching the origins of our battalion nickname, the “Bandits,” and need some help from ARMOR readers. My research indicates that the Bandit nickname was used by 1-32 Armor (Elvis’s unit) here in Friedberg since at least 1963, and was adopted by 4-67 Armor when the battalion redesignated in 1988. I am also trying to learn the origin of the unofficial crest that we use, which is a white skull on a black diamond superimposed over the Armor insignia. I can be reached at DSN 324-3441 (Germany) or by E-mail at CreedR@email.hanau.army.mil, or write me at Unit 21104, Box 36, APO AE 09074. Thanks for any help you can render.

CPT RICHARD D. CREED JR.

Friedberg, Germany ARMOR — 51 Longtime Reader... Dear Sir: Thank you for sending me the January-February issue of ARMOR, and for all the past copies you have sent. I am now in my 95th year, and after reading ARMOR with great interest, I always send it on to the librarian of The Tank Museum at Bovington. I now feel it would be helpful if you would send my copy directly to them. With my thanks and good wishes. Lady Kathleen Liddell Hart England

Into the Storm: A Study in Command by Tom Clancy with General (Ret.) Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Putnam, N. Y.,

1997. 532 pp. $27.50. General George Marshall purportedly said there were three things he looked for in a soldier’s baggage which would indicate a commitment to the profession: Afield manual showed dedication to tactical competence; apiece of sporting equipment showed devotion to physical fitness; and a good reading lamp showed a desire to grow as a soldier and a person. Field manuals are plentiful, and it’s easy to keep fit in a health-conscious society, but browsing through a bookstore will usually present budget-constrained soldiers with their toughest choice. Should this visit’s pick be a work of history or a biography? Should the selection be apiece of military theory or philosophy? How about a break with an intriguing read of an accomplished novelist? In his newest book, Into the Storm: A Study in Command, Tom Clancy (with retired General Fred Franks) has tapped all these areas. The result is a fascinating blend of a first person account, a third person narrative, a compact analysis of military philosophy and warfighting theory, and an absorbing piece of history. And, like many of Clancy’s works, it is sure to be a best seller because it is a damned exciting read. Clancy’s first volume in anew set of works — this will be one of a series which will eventually address the lives of several flag officers who commanded during Desert Storm — Into the Storm is a compelling account of the life of Army General Frederick

M. Franks, Jr. More than a biography, it gives the reader background and relevance that some of the current ‘as told to’ works never approach. For as fascinating and dramatic as Franks’ life is, his story — told by both Clancy and Franks — serves as a vehicle. His tragedy and triumph on and off the battlefield become a mirror reflecting the injury, the rehabilitation, and the eventual victory of the Army as an institution in the second half of the twentieth century. What’s best? The book will prove thought-provoking for both civilians who have never worn a uniform and professional soldiers who have dedicated their life to serving the nation. There are myriad high points in both the story and storytelling. The book begins at the VII Corps Command Post on the eve of the ground attack into Iraq, then flashes back through the years, experiences and preparations that made Franks a great commander. Interspersed are primers — not too complicated to confuse the civilian reader but filled with gems that had me reaching for my soldier’s notebook on numerous occasions — about maneuver warfare theory and doctrine, the recent history of our Army and how it got to where it is, what it takes to prepare a large organization for combat, and some tips on leadership of people. The book ends with a chapter on Franks’ final posting as the Architect of the Future Army: Commander of Training and Doctrine Command. Appropriately, the focal point of the work is a detailed history of VII Corps’ actions during Desert Storm told in the first person. This long-awaited recounting comes at the reader in intricate detail; it makes up 322 pages of the work. For those wanting to get beyond button-collector history and dive into battlefield discourse, you will find it in the chapters that relive the “Jayhawk’s” finest moments. And, for those who have waited for General Franks’ answers to the undeserved professional lambasting he received in the It-Doesn’t-Take-a-Hero ambush, you won’t be disappointed. There are a few low points. Franks’ experiences in Vietnam should have been told in the first rather than third person (he gives an indication in the acknowledgments that this was a subject of contention with the publishers), and it may be tough for the average Clancy reader to follow the battlefield actions of all the units that were part of VII Corps: maneuvering large mounted forces is, after all, sometimes tougher than brain surgery. But these are minor issues when considered in the context of the work as a whole. In one of the chapters, Franks describes how he took five books along with him when he deployed to Saudi Arabia (you’ll have to do some reading to find out which ones they were, but it is interesting that even when packing for war his actions proved true to General Marshall’s admon-ishments). Knowing this, I predict most will read Into the Storm for pleasure, many will return to it as a reference work, but there will be some — in the future when our army again goes to war — who will take this work to the battlefield as a reminder of how great commanders accomplished the mission.

Chief, Armor Branch Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 by J. P. Harris, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995. 342 pages. $79.95 cloth, $24.95 paper. Most armor officers know that Colonel Ernest Swinton, author of The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, invented the tank in the early days of the First World War, but reactionary British generals, especially Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, prevented full use of the tank to break the stalemate of the trenches on the Western Front. When tanks were finally used en masse at the battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917, Haig’s shortsightedness in failing to leave a tank reserve as an exploitation force prevented tanks from achieving a decisive victory. During the interwar years, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart were voices in the wilderness of British defense planning, promul-gating the idea of blitzkrieg, which was ignored by their own High Command but adopted by Guderian and the Wehrmacht to decisive effect in the Second World War. Most armor officers know these facts. In Men, Ideas, and Tanks, Sandhurst lecturer J. P. Harris disproves all of them. Harris traces the idea and the reality of tank warfare from its beginnings in an H. G. Wells science fiction story published in 1903 (“The Land Ironclads”) to the tragic position in which the British Army found itself in 1939. The nation which had invented the tank, first employed it in battle, and led the world in tank development until the early 1930s, found itself on the verge of armored warfare with inadequate armor doctrine and inferior tanks — and nothing better on the drawingboard. Men, Ideas, and Tanks convincingly demonstrates how fragile is the process of innovation in a military organization, how important the support of senior officers is in making innovation become an accepted part of the institution, and how serious the effects of neglecting innovation can be. At a time when the U. S. Army is itself in the midst of a revolution in military affairs, and defense expenditures will be at best stagnant for the foreseeable future, these lessons are immediately relevant to our own Army. History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, and in the wake of the Cold War, the international system and America’s security situation may more closely resemble Britain of the 1930s than we might think. By the way, while no one person should be credited with the invention of the tank, Winston Churchill’s role was the most central in this as in so many other areas. Haig devoted more resources to the tank than its early performance demonstrated it deserved. Mechanical shortcomings in the tanks of the day prevented exploitation at Cambrai, which was, in any case, as much a victory of improved artillery tactics as it was of massed armor. J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart vastly exaggerated their own role in the development of armored doctrine in the inter-war years, being wrong on many central points, including the necessity of combined arms formations. The weaknesses of British armored forces in 1939 were primarily due to the British government’s failure to accept that the Army should play a role in France against Hitler until it was almost too late. And many of the failures of British armor against Rommel were a result of poor training and doc- 52 ARMOR —