How Manpower and Personnel Integration Was Applied to the Armored Gun System

We have all been frustrated at one time or another by apiece of equipment that just didn’t live up to its expectations. Whether it was a weapon system, such as the Dragon, that promised a 90 percent hit probability and usually did not achieve that, or a radio, such as SINCGARS, that despite its tremendous technological leap forward has small buttons that make it difficult to operate with gloves in a cold weather environment and requires constant retraining. How many times have you sat in the TC’s hatch of your M1, preparing to negotiate Table VIII, and asked yourself, “what kind of idiot is responsible for the traversing and elevating mechanism on this.50 cal?” Or did you ever think that the individual who designed the feeding system for the 25mm on the Bradley knew that he would never have to use it. What is going to prevent these problems from happening again? Will the armor community be forced to accept the Armored Gun System (AGS) without these problems being considered? This article will look at the integration between man and machine, or MANPRINT, which is one of the checks and balances in the acquisition process, and how it affects the end product of our newest tank before it is delivered to the field. As you sit there reading this article, I am sure you could name dozens of problems you have had or are having with Army equipment. Yet, we are constantly told that we have the best equipment in the world. After our success in DESERT STORM and the falling of the Iron Curtain, there are not too many people who could successfully argue that there is a nation out there with better tools to fight and win on the modern battlefield. Yet, we are not too arrogant to realize that we have some problems. These problems became extremely noticable during the ’70s and ’80s as the Army introduced many new systems and equipment. Several major problems were encountered. New complex systems were fielded to soldiers who could not operate them to the standards that the manufacturer claimed that they could. A perfect example is the Dragon missile mentioned earlier. The second biggest problem was that, in fielding the new system, we discovered that we needed smarter soldiers when compared with the previous system. Due to the more complex nature of the equipment, we also needed more maintainers and operators to keep these systems operational. Fixing these problems required recruiting more highly skilled soldiers, putting more weapon systems in the field, and increasing training programs. These solutions were totally unsatisfactory. The Army could not afford to increase training programs or increase the size of the Army. This situation only led to more problems. It wasn’t until 1982 that the U. S Army Research Institute conducted a study that looked at previously fielded systems in an attempt to identify what could have been done differently to better integrate the manpower, personnel, and training issues. The study indicated that, if these issues are addressed early in the design process, money and time could be saved. In 1984, General Maxwell R. Thurman, as the Army DCSPER, directed that a MANPRINT program be started to maximize soldier-system performance. MANPRINT is a comprehensive management and technical program to improve total system (soldier and equipment) performance by focusing on soldier performance and reliability. Constant integration of manpower, personnel, training, human engineering, system safety, health hazards, and soldier survivability considerations throughout the acquisition process improve total system performance. Each consideration is called a “domain.” These domains are:

• Manpower: The number of human resources, both men and women, military and civilian, required and available to operate and maintain Army systems.

• Personnel: The aptitudes, experience, and other human characteristics necessary to achieve optimal system performance.

• Training: The instruction, time, and supporting resources (equipment, devices, technology) required to transfer to personnel the knowledge, ARMOR — 9 How Manpower and Personnel Integration Was Applied to the Armored Gun System by Captain Timothy Flanagan To ease transition training, the AGS was designed to be as similar as possible to other tanks. It shares many components with existing U. S. Army systems.

skills, and abilities that will enable and sustain efficient operation, maintenance, and support of the equipment.

• Human Engineering: The comprehensive integration of human characteristics into system definition, design, development, and evaluation to optimize the performance of human-machine combinations.

• System Safety: The inherent ability of the system to be used, operated, and maintained without accidental injury to personnel.

• Health Hazards: The inherent conditions in the operation or use of a system (e.g. shock, recoil, vibration, toxic fumes, radiation, noise) that can cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job performance of personnel.

• Soldier Survivability: A combination of, but not limited to, actions taken to: reduce fratricide; reduce the detectability of the soldier; prevent attack on the soldier, if detected; reduce vulnerability, if attacked; prevent further medical injury, if wounded; and reduce physical and mental fatigue. In looking at any system using the above domains, there is never going to be a system that is perfect. There are always tradeoffs. Some aspects, such as safety defects, are usually not compromised. Other areas, such as manpower, personnel, and training depend on the political and budgetary climate at the time the system is being developed, due to the costs associated with each. Now that we have an understanding of the MANPRINT domains, let’s look at the Armored Gun System from a MANPRINT perspective. We must remember that the AGS was not built to replace the M1A1 tank. It is unfair and foolish to compare survivability in the AGS with overall survivability in the M1-series vehicles. As we look at the Armored Gun System and how it stacks up under each domain, there is no choice but to compare it to its predecessor, the M551A1 Sheridan. The AGS operational requirements were identified early in the acquisition process. In order, they are: deployability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Under the manpower domain, the AGS is a clear winner over the Sheridan. The addition of an autoloader negates the need for a fourth crewman. There are those who will argue that the loader does much more than load the main gun. Besides helping with maintenance, he acts as the tank’s air guard and covers the left rear of the tank. The loader also helps provide dismounted security for the tank. The effect of one less person on the sleep plan of the tank crew cannot be denied. Using the AGS in a combined arms environment will offset the negatives of a three-man crew. The AGS will support dismounted infantry. Security concerns will have to be addressed with the help of those infantry. Reducing the vehicle crew size by 25 percent makes this vehicle attractive from a manpower perspective. There is also no indication that the AGS will cause an increase in the maintenance assets of the organic or support units. The engine and transmission can be rolled out of the vehicle within ten minutes, “ground hopped” while still on its rollout tracks, and then be reinstalled in about ten minutes. Compare this with any of our previous tanks! Two soldiers can also easily reload the AGS from outside the vehicle while the gunner tells the computer the type of round loaded. From a personnel standpoint, there appears to be no difference between what will be required of a 19K and what will be required of the AGS crewman. There is no need to increase either the education or physical requirements from what we are currently recruiting. From the start, this vehicle was designed with the intent to be as similar to our other tanks as possible while still fulfilling the operational requirements stated earlier. Since this was accomplished, personnel requirements have not changed. Should we be concerned about the new training requirements that the AGS will entail? Apparently not. In fact, one of the comments made by a soldier during User Jury II testing was, “Nineteen Kilos will have an easy transition to AGS from the M1 tank.” The driver’s station was designed with a T- bar similar to the M1. The tank commander’s station can accept either an M2, M240, or MK19. Although the fire control system is from the British Challenger series of tanks, it should not require too much of an adjustment for American tankers. The laser rangefinder is patterned closely on the M1, and the main gun will be the XM-35 105mm. As mentioned earlier, the pack can be easily removed and reinstalled. However, another big advantage of this system is the use of a HEMTT-type engine and Bradley transmission. Both are proven designs, and mechanics have been successfully maintaining these systems for several years. The obvious advantage of using these already developed components is that the developmental phase of the AGS is shortened considerably. This also carries over to the training domain. Training plans have already been developed and proven in training mechanics on other systems. Some modifications will 10 ARMOR — Roll-out powerpack feature simplifies servicing. Computer control panel (top) and the fire control computer (above) are similar to the systems on the British Challenger 2, but U. S. tankers should have little problem learning to use them.

have to take place, but the core is already complete. The domain of human engineering ensures we optimize the performance of human-machine combinations. The best tank in the world will be of little use to us if all its operators must be shorter than 60 inches. That is why testing is taking place to ensure that soldiers with physical characteristics of the 5th to 95th percentile male soldier can operate and maintain this vehicle. Are all aspects perfect on this vehicle yet? The answer is no. The testing allows problems to be identifed and corrections to be made prior to production and fielding. The domain that is near and dear to all tankers’ hearts is system safety. One of the primary safety concerns on the AGS is bound to be the autoloader. We have all heard the horror stories of the one-armed Russian tankers. A steel access panel separates the TC and the gunner from the autoloader, effectively eliminating this safety concern. If the door between the TC and autoloader is open because of a malfunction then the autoloader will not engage. All stations include a seatbelt. One potential AGS drawback in the health hazards domain is the volume of noise produced by the main gun. The unique nature of the muzzle brake on the AGS directs the noise back toward the vehicle. Of particular concern is possible damage to the tank commander’s hearing when more than 15 rounds are fired in one day. As of this date, only the 900-series rounds testing is complete. Training rounds for the AGS are not expected to cause a problem. Solutions to this problem are currently being examined and will probably be worked out. Shock, recoil, toxic fumes, and radiation have not presented any problems in testing thus far. Vibration, experienced in all tracked vehicles, is manageable, but improvements, such as different style trackpads, are still being examined. Many of the lessons learned during the production of the M1 have been applied to the AGS. Ammunition is compartmentalized and “blow-out” panels similar to those on the M1, are installed. The fire suppression system utilizes Halon to extinguish fires in the crew compartment and anew powder extinguisher for the engine compartment. In order to ensure the rapid deployability of the system, armor has been kept to a minimum to save weight. Additional armor can be added once the vehicle is on the ground. If the armor was built into the structure of the basic AGS, airlift capability would be jeopardized. Using modular armor allows upgrades to be made later on without building an entirely new vehicle. Commanders will have to use METT-T to determine how much armor they want to install. Like all new weapon systems, AGS is undergoing extensive, Congressionally-mandated live-fire testing. In an attempt to keep procurement costs down and shorten the developmental process, the AGS uses much current, proven technology. This appears to be an extremely successful way of doing business. The AGS has already met or surpassed all that was required by the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The developers of the AGS, by using the principles of MANPRINT, are going to deliver to our soldiers alight tank that is easily deployable, safe, and user-friendly. ARMOR — 11 Captain Tim Flanagan is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and company executive officer with 1- 70 Armor at Fort Polk, Louisiana. After being assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in Korea he served as assistant S3 in the Aviation Brigade, commanded HHT 5-17 Cavalry and A/2-72 Armor. He is a graduate of AOBC, AOAC, JOMC, ORSA MAC I, and the Airborne School. He is currently serving as an ORSA with the MANPRINT Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Force Integration and Analysis (DCSPLANS), U. S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), at Alexandria, Virginia. On the AGS, a compartment wall separates the commander and gunner from the autoloader magazine and the breech of the 105-mm main gun. The AGS modular armor system defeats a HEAT round in this photo from a testing sequence at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Using modular armor allows upgrades to be made later on without building an entirely new vehicle. Commanders will have to use METT-T to determine how much armor they want to install.