What Can W. Do With light Armor?

What Can We Do With Light Armor?..... In just less than four yean, anew generation of light annor forces will become part of our armor community. While light armor's fielding is year.; away. the doctrine that will guide and direct our employment of light at· mared forces is being written now. These light forces - three light armor ballalions and alight cavalry regiment - will fonn the most visible and de· ployable element with which annored warriors are likely to serve. This course of events presents us with a singular opportunity to shape the doctrine under which we will train and fight for years to come. NO( since the birth of the American annored force have we had the rea1 opportu· oily to consider at such length how new te(:hnologies will be employed on the battlefield. What we do now. or fail to do, will have a lasting impact on what remains to be done when light armored forces deploy for war and operations other than war, once these new systems are fielded. Light armored vehicles have along and mixed (some would say mongrel) pedigree in the American annored force. Historically, light armored vehi· 42 cles have served as infantry support vehicles. as sunogates for tanks. as fighting reconnaissance vehicles. and as airborne infantry's force multipliers. More often than not. a single generation of light armored vehicle has simultaneously been tasked with several of these functions. From this mixed heritage. it remains for us to develop a comprehensive and consistent doctrine for our new light armor units. Historically. concepts ranged from the bold. sweeping maneuvers envisioned at the dawn of the armored force to the plodding sweep and clear infantry support mis.- sions of more recent history. 'The varieties of possible tactical employment are further complicated by capabilities such as the use of air assault. and employment in conjunction with attack helicopters. Our doctrinal challenge is to consolidate modem. historical, and conceivable future light armor roles into a cohesive, rational and structured whole. In the current efforts to address this challenge, the most highly developed is FM 17-18, Ugh! Annor Operations. which reached final draft in May 1993 and is now under review. Additionally, FMs 17-95-40 and 17·97-40 are being developed to address squadron and regimental light cavalry operations. Light armor employment will also rely to some degree on the employ· ment experiences of soldiers of the 82d Airborne, where light annor is task-organized down to, and sometimes below, platoon level. Experience gained in light-heavy operations. deployments, and JRTCINTC rotations combining armor forces (whether light or heavy) with light infantry will detennine how light annor forces should. and should not, be used. Many lessons concerning light armor's use may be gleaned from the history of American light armor forces. Mechanized cavalry's use of M2 and M3 combat cars in the 19305, followed initially by Stuan M3- and M5·series tanks, and then M24 light tanks in the cavalry groups of wwn. provide a heritage of light armor forces intent on fighting for infonna· tion. Light annor's infantry support role dates to use of the Renault FTI7 in WWI. and was continued by MJO and M IS tank destroyers in WWIl.

M24 light tanks and M41 "76-mm gun combat" tanks in Korea.' Light armor has also been pressed into service as a surrogate for more heavily armored (and generally better gunned) medium. or main battle. tanks. The use of MID and M 18 tank desltOyers as surrogate tanks forms another branch of American light armor'S family tree, while light armor forces in the airborne role began with the M22's development in WWII and COnlinues in the now venerable M551. Since the close of WWII, the tank's principal role has been to fight and destroy other tanks. Before this. tanks were envisioned as shock weapons to attack soft targets while tank destroyers fixed and killed enemy tanks. The reality proved to be that tanks served as the best antitank weapon while tank destroyers and other light systems were more survivable and effective in reconnaissance and infantry suppon roles. For instance. as the M24 was fielded to replace older light tanks at "the end of 1944 most (light) tank battalions had learned to use their older M5Als circumspectly to minimize the danger presented by their thin annor. "2 Like the tank de-sltOyers the M24 was based on, light armor units learned that they could not employ their vehicles as tanks and survive. Light tanks performed the entire range of armored missions. from antitank - to infantry suppon - to reconnaissance. during WWII. The last officially designated "light tank" (the M24) also served in Korea through 1953.1 Through this combat experience, the crews of American light armor forces learned to compensate ror the limitations of their equipment. A U. S. armored division training circular of the period, addressing use of the armored battalion'slight company, advised that "the light tank company provides a fast. mobile element that may be used to exploit the success of the medium tank (companies). to execute battle reconnaissance, or to act as a covering force for the (tank) battalion: Generally speaking. the gradual abandonment of light armor by the U. S. Army resulted from its employ- ment as a tank, rather than as a 'tank-like' weapons system fundamentally different than tanks. The failure of light armor systems to perfonn successfully as tanks resulted in their removal from the inventory, except for those light armor forces that were retained solely due to the strategic m0- bility inherent in their air-deployability. We must confront these biases and difficulties in developing our light armored doctrine for the next century. We must closely define what armor functions light armor should not be perform identical tasks. The clearing of mines offers an analogy: a mine detector or mine plow's availability makes all the difference in how one goes about removing the obstacle. as opposed to using probes or bayonets alone. In the past. we have expected light armored vehicles to be 'jacks-of-all-trades' without acknowledging that light armor must do things differently. 1be present resurgence of light armor forces grows from strategic deployment considerations, NOT be- "The reality proved to be that tanks served as the best antitank weapon while tank destroyers and other light systems were more survivable ana effective in reconnaissance and infantry support roles." expected to perform, as well as those additional tasks light armor must perform which lie beyond the scope of heavier armor forces. 1be development of an American light armored doctrine has suffered from a lack of rocus and an unwillingness to differentiate between light and heavy mechanized forces. It is also necessary to define "how" light armor will perform its assigned duties. recognizing that different tools require different methods of employment to cause of a reevaluation of light armor's utility. proper role, or anticipated function. Like its predecessors, our rorthcoming light armor system is characterized by a reduced level of protection and primary armament as compared with the cunent tank. In the past. strategic deployability has sus· tained only a fraction of the total light armored force. If light armor forces of the future are worth having, they are worth keeping, and their capabilities and limitations must Iherefore be addressed doctrinally - outlining spe- 43 cific tactics, techniques. and proce· dures peculiar to light armor - to en· sure that light armor forces are not poorly employed and abandoned. again. "Doctrine should reflect new tech· nology and its potential for the future, as well as its effects on Anny operations... s doctrine must be the engine that drives the exploitation of technology,''' Doctrine also serves to codify operational realities. In this way, les· sons learned through practice and practical experience may become common knowledg:. An unfonunate part of this process is the potential for doctrine 10 ossify as specific solutions are accepted as first general, and then immutable, truths. How then, should the evolving doctrine for light armor forces reflect the potential of this new technology? Our present doctrine certainly reflects our technology, especially the sense that "Armored units equipped with the Abrams. (can) go where no other forces could survive."7 Current armored force doctrine. as detailed in Field Manuals 100-5. HX>- 15. 71- 100, 71-3, 71.2, 71- 1, and 17·15, has evolved into an aggressive and capa· ble whole. largely due to reflections of the potentials inherent in the M I- series tanks. Exhortations that "To win, one must attack,'" to always re· turn fire. and to develop the situation "through fire and movement to fix or destroy the enemy'" serve tank lead· ers well. What is not clear is how well the identical doctrine will serve lead· ers of lighter armored forces. " h won't be easy for a thin·skinned combat vehicle. mounting however good a gun. to move about future battlefields against conventional heavy annor," wrote General James Gavin in 1947, " It may be that (this) Iype of tank... has greater tactical defensive qualities than offensive... "'o Ughtly armored antitank guns serving in this manner Idlled a disproportionate number of tanks during WWII using both stationary and moving ambushes. This was especially true of German employment in North Africa from 1941 to 1943." 44 Like previous American light armor systems, the varied missions our new vehicle will perform impact on the development of its doctrine. Ught armor will be fielded to help airborne fon:es "fon:e a lodgement,"nor in separate armor battalions which may suppon light infantry divisions or corps, and in a corps-level cavalry regiment. Whatever doctrine is written to guide the light armor leader. that doctrine must contemplate the demands of these varied organizations and their disparate roles and missions. Aexibil· ity of employment and engagement must be emphasized to maintain sur· vivability throughout the spectrum of light armor employment In contemplating light annor doc· mne, there is merit in 'daring to be different.' Recognizing that light armor systems are neither IFVs, AFVs, or tanks. it should be apparent that their methods of employment may not (and sometimes. must not) mirror those of other fighting vehicle classes and types. Speed and mobility are the hallmarks of mechanized war. In the words of General George S. Patton Jr., "In small operations, as in large, speed is the essential element of sue· cess."I) Although different in scope, range, and circumstance. speed and mobility also characterize light forces. "Ught infantry units also exploit speed in their operations... the capa· bility to negotiate difficult ground. By moving to an objective faster than the enemy thinks possible. light infantry can achieve surprise."" It is more than possible that a proper doctrine for light armor will empha· size stealth, speed. maneuver. and in· dependent action, coordinated with other arms to ensure synchronicity and mass in employment. '''The application of such heavy firepower... com· bined with rapid maneuver to the flanks and rear of the enemy's positions, creates a violent shock effect that can lead to quick victory."'s Coordination with other anns to create shock action will be even more vital for light armor forces than for their heavier brethren. "Light mechanized or annored forces will not be able to tackle heavy units head-on in direct fire engagements; instead. they must rely on stealth, concealment. maneu· verability, and high technology weap-- onry to achieve their goals. "16 In this manner as "light infantry forces maintain a Oexible attitude toward the battlefield."17 so, too, will their light ar· mor compatriots. Ught armor doctrine delineated in existing publications is still coalesc· ing. For instance, FM 10005's perspective is that: Ught annored units can participate in a variety of Army operations, including rapid worldwide deploymenl. throughout a with range of environmenls. Tactical miu ions include providing security. reconfUIissance, and amiar-mor firepowu to tire lighl infantry or airborne division. light armored units also conduct standard annor operations, including the destruction of enemy forces in coordination with othu arms. II TIle finaJ draft of FM 17- 18 puts forth the much more limited view that "the: primary purpose of M8 light tank forces is to operate with light infantry during rapid--deployment contingency operations."" (M8 is the designation for the new Armored Gun System.) At divisional level. our doctrine does not address light armor at all. holding that "heavy forces are categorized by their capability for ground mobility. not armor protection'<X! and groups motorized foonations with heavy forces. At lower tactical levels, how· ever. it is imperative that we make more subtle distinctions about a force's 'weight: A step in this direction may be FMs 17-9540 and \7-97-40. which are currently being written to address the new formations of light cavalry regimental and squadron organizations. Attempting to cope with the difficulties inherent in adapting mission profiles designed for heavy forces and the fields of Europe to lighter forces and worldwide contingency operations, the authors of these manuals must resolve a vast range of questions. These issues embrace not only the use of emerging technology, but new uses of eltisting systems. as in the increasingly widespread use of HMMWV scout platoons. In a very real sense, these are not new problems. Almost SO years ago, ARMOR Magazine (then, the Cavalry Journal) printed articles advising that "wriuen doctrine needs modification... based upon the past and present employment of mechanized cavalry," 21 and the author also cautioned thai "Cavalry's heritage - mobility of mind and body - must not be compromised."n Doctrinal manuals specifically designed for light annor battalions, companies and platoons are not currently envisioned since sections of FM 17·18 address these organizations. Light cavalry regimental, squadron and troop manuals are, in contrast, already under development. One question that might be addressed in this regard is whether formations down to platoon level in light cavalry and light armor organizations need their own sets of field manuals. Such a move could involve the development of related Mission Training Plans (MTPs) and Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) now contemplated. The advisability of this course of action is, of course, dependent on determining that light armor forces possess unique chamcteristics requiring singular doc· trinal approaches. The fact that such a doctrine is being composed in the light cavalry squadron and regimental manuals. and the possible need for ARTEP, MTP. and MOS-based publications, might indicate that FMs for all command levels and light armor formations are needed. The tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment of our light armor forces are still being molded. As the future employers of light armor forces. it is the armor community (us) who can best help shape this new force. Instead of snarling disagreement with a defenseless manual"s faceless authors during some future ARTEP or training rotation, perhaps light armor soldiers will be able to take pride in an individual idea accepted as doctrine!

ARMOR Magazine is well suited to serve as the sounding board and wellspring of ideas for the coming light armored force. The individuals responsible for writing light armor's doctrinal manuals are interested in hearing from the larger armor community. Articles and letters written to ARMOR will reach these authors whether published in the magazine or not. NCOs, officers, and enlisted ranks with strong feelings about what light armor should be, or experiences with light armor operations, should detail their thoughts in this forum. At this time, the writers of these manuals are most interested in tactics, techniques, and procedures adopted or abandoned by armor soldiers in light forces. Combat Training Center (CfC) experiences would be espe· cially prized by many of these authors. Light armor forces have been eclipsed and abandoned in the past. Those who will ride the vehicles should help write manuals - sow the wind before we reap the whirlwind. so to speak. With the strong input of the armor community, our light armor forces of the future will be vibrant, focused, and effective. As in the past. the way things are "really done" will be developed by the people engrossed in the doing of them. The point here is that. with the input of those doers. we can reduce the gap between the "book" or "schoolhouse" solution and the realities of the field before one or the other crashes and bums. We have the knowledge, we have the technology, we can be better, faster, stronger than ever before... and the hardware isn't even six million dollars a pop. Notes IZaloga. Steven J.. u.s. Ughl Tan1cs: 1944· 84, t9S4, Osprey Publishing Comp.1ny. London. p. IO. 2,bid.. p. 5. J,bid., p. 6. ·,bid., p. 4. SFM 100-5. Oralions, June 1993. p. 1-2. "Ibid.. p. 2-3. 1Kelly, Orr, King of I Killing ZI. IM, 1989, W. W. Norton & Co.. N. V.. p. 234. IFM 17-15, Tank P/a/(NItI. October 1987, p. 3-1. 'Ibid.. p. 3- 12. 10Gavin, MG James M., '1'he Future of Armor." Annorcd Cavalry Jrmmal. Novembct"- December 1947. "Hams, J. P. and Toase. F. H., ed., A""""rtd War/aft. 1990. B. T. BalSford Ltd.. London. p. 78. I2FM 100-5, p. 2.2. u Pauon, GEN George S. Jr., qlJ(l(ed in Ma-riTlt Corps GaUl/t. August t993. p. 62. 14McMichac:1. MAl ScOIl R.. A Historical Pl!fspeclille on Ughlln/unlfY' 1987, U. S. Army Command and Stafr College: Combat Studies Institute, p. 225. IS/bid. l'Mazarr. Michael J.. Ughl Forcu and 1M FUlrue 0/ U. S. Mililary SlrtUegy, 1990, Brauey's (U. S.). Inc.. p. 59. I1McMichacl. p. 220. I'FM 100-5, p. 2-23. I 17-18. light A.nnOl' Operations (Final Draft). May 1993. p. 1-2. 71-100, Division Operalions, 1990, p. A-I. 21 Hoy• LTC of Cavalry Charles J.. "Trends in Mechanized Cavalry," Ca\I(J/ry Journal. July-August 1945, Director of Training. the Cavalry School, formcr commandct" Sist Mechanized Cavalry Squadron, 1st AfITlOI"cd Division. lZHoy, p. 58. Second Lieutenant Kevin

M. Rieders enlisted in the Army in 1988. He served as a scout with 1·1 Cavalry, 1st Armored Division, Bismarck Kaseme, Germany; and 3d Battalion (ABN), 73d Armor (Light), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. A graduate of

SCCC, PLDC, Airborne, and 190 OSUT, he holds a B. A. degree from Florida International University. He partici· pated in border operations and Operations

SHIELD/STORM, 1-1 Cavalry as a scout, and with 3- 73 Armor as a TC. He is currently assigned as an an· tiarmor platoon leader with 2ACR, Ft. Polk, La. 45