What tf1. .. (How MS might have made a dtffenmce In DESERT STOAM)

What If?.. How an IVIS-equipped M1A2 force Might have made a difference In twelve DESERT STORM incidents by David C. Nilsen This article comes from an unusual source. The author, David

C. Nilsen, is the chief game designer for GDW Games in Bloomington, Illinois. Although he has never been in the military, his job requires extensive study of tactics, strategy, and weapons and their characteristics in order to create realistic wargame scenarios. We believe that his imaginative exploration of an IVIS-equipped DESERT STORM force would be of linterest to our readers, many of them veterans of these recent battles who now confront the promise of the IVIS Revolution. - The Editor For the purposes of the following preliminary analysis, I will attribute the following set of capabilities to the IVIS system. Some of these capa-bi I ities already exist, while others are notional concepts that could be reasonably added to the system in the near- to middle-future. Because this is not a technical status report, but rather a thought piece, I believe these latter concepts are worth discussing.

I) For each vehicle so equipped, the system provides an electronic map showing the GPS/POSNAV-calculated location of every friendly unit included in the system, overlaid on all known terrain features. These maps also include all control measures such as unit boundaries, phase lines, way points, LOAs, etc. These maps are frequently updated across the entire organization via SINCGARS burst transmissions so that these maps are effectively real time representations shared by the entire force.

2) These maps permit commanders to add new graphics and key points of interest as needed, which are updated onto the maps of the force.

3) The system allows enemy positions to be added to these same maps by placing position reports onto known terrain features, or by vehicles equipped with laser rangefinders where the act of lasing the target allows the GPSIIVIS system to place the enemy location.

4) Requests for artillery fire are sent in TACFIRE format by the IVIS system. While these currently go to the company FSO and are then passed up the line using existing procedures, the IVIS architecture should allow further streamlining of the procedure in the future. With the precise knowledge of own unit locations pl"us enemy unit. Iocations noted above, artillery fire may be assigned with much greater speed. When this is coupled with the capabilities of the new MI09A6 Paladin to rapidly fire from the move without time-consuming surveying, precise artillery fire can be brought in with very little deJay, without requiring the artillery force to remai'n stationary and fall behind the close combat forces.

5) Included with the periodic burst transmission updates are reports on ammunition and fuel status which arc forwarded directl·y to the appropriate organizations so that supply needs may be anticipated across the force.

6) Finally, we will assume that SINCGARS is not being effectively countermeasured by the Iraqis so that the,transmission system works as 26 intended. We will also assume that GPS is not degraded in any way, as GPS is a crucial component of the IVIS system. Although IVIS directly uses the POSNAV system, rapidly moving units require periodic GPS updates to correct for POSNAV "slippage." As the shared vision of "perfect" location data is the crucial advantage of IVIS, it requires access to the best available positioning data (via these updates) to achieve its best performance. Presumably, price will prevent the system from extending to every vehicle fielded by the Army, but I am firmly of the opinion that to be used properly, IVIS must be in every close combat vehicle (and not just in platoon or company commanders' vehicles as some have suggested - see "MIA2 Tank Distribution," in March-April 1994) to provide its true revolutionary force multiplying benefits. In order to examine the use of such a "full-up" IVIS system, we will imagine that US Army units in SWA were equipped with MIA2s and MI09A6s, plus the follo\\ling IVIS-equipped vehicles. Close Combat Units - All M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles; M 106 mortar vehicles; M 113 and M577 CommandlTOC vehicles Army Aviation - OH-58 ClOs; AH-I Fs; AH- 64As; EH-60s; UH-6O command ships, if not all UH-60s; IVIS sets located al each FARP Engineers - M728 CEVs; M9 ACEs; MICLIC vehicles, whether AVLM or towed in trailers. Presumably units will have some sort of "float" IVIS units that can be placed at important foci of effort to provide IVIS benefits without the prohibitive and pointless expense of putting a system on every bulldozer, backhoe, and scraper. I would imagine that if a situation required that the location of each and every non-IVIS vehicle be placed in thi: system, such float units could have a lasing capability similar to the M I A2 where friendly units are placed into the system by being laser designated. ADA - Vulcans; Stinger Team vehicles IField Artillery - All firing vehicles (plus some system for integrating towed guns, Ipresumably in a 5-ton prime mover, say, one per firing platoon?); FISTVs; M577 headquarters, TOCs, FDCs and TACFlRE shelters Again, there ought to be IVIS systems suitably placed to show where ammo tracks and HEMITs are without having to put IVIS into each individual vehicle. Logistics Vehicles (Battalion trains plus FSBs) - Here again the issue is to be able to show on the IVIS system where the trains are in general, without the expense of an IVIS on' each and every truck, as well as allowing the trains to see where he combat units are. This is currently being accomplished with lightweight computer units (LCUs) using the B2C2 (Brigade and Below Command and Control) system in these support units. However, the current configuration may only allow the LCU user to see IVIS-equipped units, without making the LCU-equipped units show up 00 the IVIS screens. Whatever system is ultimately used (i.e., a full-up IVIS or an IVIS-compatible LCU), it must work both ways, displaying other fTiendly unit locations on Ihe LCU, as well as sending the LCU's location into the IVIS nel The best way 10 do this, I would think, is to have these systems in the HMMWVs (or whatever) of the officers and senior NCOs in charge of the various sub-units. There ought to be an IVIS located with each of the lowest CSS increments which will move or operate independently. Additional IVIS Placement - Higher-level headquarters must be on the net, but need not (and perhaps ought not) have a system that shows the location of each vehicle. Because of the scope of their view, higher headquarters might require a slightly different map system which allows larger areas to be viewed at a lime, with the option to zoom in on points of interest. At various levels of resolution, such maps might show locations of only company commander's vehicles, scout platoon commander's vehicles, battalion TOCs, FA battery FOCs concentration of log units, and so on. (This is not, strictly speaking, IVIS, as it is inter-echelon rather than inter-vehicle. However, it is the logical extension of the! VIS concept and is the sort of thing that could and should be layered onto such a flexible system once the electronic architecture is in place. These "commanders' sets" should ideally have an additional capability to send each other John Madden-style X and 0 and line and arrow overlay diagrams in near real time to assist in communicating concepts and intents. This would be a separate layer from the SlUff that is actually updated onto everybody's screen so that everyone else's map doesn't gel crapped up with all that notional goop. This is not a capability of current generation lVIS, but is a perfecl example of what the mature IVIS or IVIS follow-on oughl to allow.

Selected Desert Storm Incidents 1-1 Aviation Pre-war Fratricide incident Event: On the morning of 17 February (G-7), both lID and I CD had two battalions deployed across the border berm to establish a security zone in Iraqi territory (1-4 CA V and 1-41 IN for lID [latter actually 2AD FWD], and 2-5 and 2-8 CAY for lCD). Both lID and ICD units had reported seeing vehicles moving to their front, which in retrospect were probably each other. At approximately midnight, a lID unit fired on the units it was observing. At about this time, the forward I CD units reported receiving fire. A little over an hour later (OlIO), in response to these incidents, an AH-64 flown by the I-I Aviation's CO flfed Hellfires, destroying two vehicles of the 1-41 IN (one M3, one MI13). Two soldiers were killed and six were wounded. It is interesting to note that over an hour was available for officers of the neighboring divisions to attempt to sort the situation out by hand, but this proved to be insufficient time to prevent the subsequent lethal actions. 1 With MS: This incident took place at night, on a division boundary with its separate chains of communication, and within enemy territory. It is not, strictly speaking, surprising that such a thing occurred. Had the force been equipped with IVIS, this incident would almost certainly not have happened, with the following stipulation: that IVIS information is fully shared across division lines. This incident raises the important question: within which echelons is MS information shared and disseminated? Certainly within a brigade and presumably within a division, but if IVIS information from separate divisions is not shared and disseminated down to their lowest levels, IV IS could not necessarily have prevented this event. (The issue here is the architecture of the' FM radio net. It is not currently set up to provide broad information-sharing across unit boundaries. But I would argue that for IVIS to achieve its fullest potential, this sort of information-sharing must be allowed for, which may require a rethinking of how radio nets are configured and used.) However, assuming that neighboring divisions have as clear a picture of each others forces as those forces themselves have, it should have been relatively easy for the ICD and 1 ID units to be precisely aware of their own and neighboring units' front line traces, unit boundaries, and the locations of individual combat vehicles (the M3 that was hit would certainly have had an IVIS set). There is another interesting facet of this engagement. Only two weeks earlier, on I February, when 1-4 CAY was operating with I-I A VN, the 1-1 CO (the same officer who fired the Hellfires) reported that he had locked onto a ZSU- 23-4 antiaircraft vehicle. The 1-4 CA V CO was able to plot this position and establish that Hlis was one of 1-4' s ground surveillance radars (GSR) and called a cease-fire. (The rapidity with which the cavalry commander was able to assess and prevent a potentially dangerous situation - also during this period a 1-4 unit received machine gun fire, adding to the confusion - shows the effectiveness of unity of command in complex operations even without IVIS, and again demonstrates the importance of sharing MS data where there is not unity of command.) Following this incident, it was deterrnined that under certain conditions the GSR's signal can be identified as a ZSU-23-4 radar by the ECM equipment aboard the AH-64. For this reason, 1-4 CA V began shutting down their GSRs whenever AH-64s were in the area to avoid being misidentified.2 Several issues present themselves:

1) The loss of GSR capability whenever friendly Army aviation is overhead is a problem, as it would be best to coordinate such capabilities, not choose one or the other.

2) The fact that 1-4 CA V learned this lesson by accident begs the question of how many other times this almost happened to other units in the theater who did not have the benefit of this experience.

3) The soldiers killed on the 17th were members of I-41's GSR team,) which makes one wonder if the I-I Aviation CO thought he was locked up by a ZSU-23-4 when he fired his Hellfires. IVIS would not solve any of these issues by itself, but would assist in sorting them out before irrevocable action need be taken. The three points above are addressed in order: I) GSRs could have been used if the ground troops had been able to establish an SOP with AH-64 units in which the Apaches would be able to use their IVIS to be aware of where the GSRs were set up, and disregard ZSU-23-4 indications from those locations. 27

2) Other units who were not aware of the potential GSR! ZSU confusion would at least have had the reality check of being able to look at their {VIS screen and notice that the ZSU was strangely co-located with a friendly GSR before they loosed their missiles.

3) This last one is tough, because if the pilot feels he is in a kill-or-be-killed situation, he is less likely to study his IVIS screen, but the fact is that the IVIS would be there as a final chance to double-che<:k the situation. 3d ACA Fratricide Incident Event: During the night of 26-27 February (0+2/3), the 3d ACR was advancing east near the east-west xvm Airborne Corps-vn Corps boundary on its way to take the AI Busayyah North East airfield (Objective Tim). Just across the corps boundary, in the VO Corps sector, a group of engineers from lAD were at the Umm Hujul airfield awaiting assistance for a broken-down M548 (the other engineer vehicles consisted of a HMMWV and an excavator). 1lIese engineers had been left behind to clear the airfield following lAD'staking of nearby AI Busayyah earlier that day. Although 3d ACR found AI Busayyah NE abandoned, its southernmost squadron, 3d Squadron, spotted some activity at the extreme southern end of the airfield complex. 1bese were, in fact, the lAO Engineers, across the corps boundary. Warning shots were fired, and elements of 3d Squadron eventually opened up with 25-mm, killing one engineer and wounding another before the engineers were able to identify themselves.· Although the 3d ACR commander was aware that his unit was operating dangerously close to the corps boundary, and communicated this to his force, in the heat of the moment, it is not clear that the 3d Squadron realized how close they were, or that they were actually firing into the neighboring sector. With MS: Had the forces been equipped with IVIS, this incident may not have happened Given the parameters at the beginning of the report, the detachment of engineers may not necessarily have had an IVlS set, so may not have shown up on the 3d ACR's MS systems. More to the point, IVIS infonnation is not currently intended to be disseminated across corps lines. As discussed above in the example of divisions. it is clearly my position that MS data damned well ought to be shared across corps lines. However, the 3d SquadronI3d ACR would have been able to discern that they were right on the corps boundary, which might have enabled them to sort the situation out short of lethal measures. Furthennore, even if the engineers did not have their own IVIS set reporting their position into the net, their location could have been manually added in by their higher headquarters (54th ENG Bn) so that it would have shown up to 3d ACR (and to the recovery units that were going out to find the detachment). 1st AD Clearing Cross-corps Boundary Arty Are vs. Adnan Division Event: On the afternoon of 27 February (G+ 3), I AD found itself in repeated skinnishes with the Republican Guard Adnan Division, whose main body was actually in the XVIII Corps sector. Much of this conflict was in the form of exchanges of artillery fire. 28 At 0930, Iraqi artillery began falling to the rear of the lAD's 2d Brigade TOC. The DivArty located the firing unit, but as it was in the xvm Corps sector, had to request pennission for across-boundary fire. Pennission took 39 minutes (which under the circumstances was considered to be rather prompt), and the Iraqi artillery was smothered beneath MLRS and 8" fire.' Very nice, but what if the Iraqis had not been so cooperative? In almost every case, Iraqi artillery only fired (and continue to fire) on pre-registered targets, whether they were occupied or not. American troops were actually able to adopt a fairly blase attitude toward this fire.6 Had the Iraqis been firing accurately, those 39 minutes would have been an eternity, and could have annihilated the 2d Brigade TOe. Similarly, had the Iraqis been firing chemical rounds, the blase attitude would probably not have pertained. Given the fact that the Iraqi Republican Guard formations were equipped with G-5 and GHN-45 guns which could have outranged the U. S. systems if used properly, 39 minutes would have been plenty of time to have lost an artillery duel. Time to out-think and out-execute the enemy is of the essence when one is potentially oUlnlnged. Thirty·nine minutes is too long against a competent foe. With MS: One of the reasons given in the accounts for the length of the clearance time was the need to get 3d ACR out of the sector.1 Such a requirement is meaningful when there is only a very general sense of the relative locations of friendly and enemy forces, as was apparently the case here. Clearly if Adnan artillery battalions were firing, 3d ACR units were not crawling over top of them. IVIS should have been able to significantly shorten the time to provide fire clearance in one of two ways. Assuming that IVIS data is shared across corps lines (again, this echoes the points raised above), both VII and xvm Airborne Corps would have been aware of the location of 3d ACR with relation to the prospective targets of the lAD DivArty (located with great precision by the division's Fire Finder radars). Given this capability, I assume that SOPS for clear· ing cross-boundary fires would be streamlined, and that streamlining would show in very short required times to clear such ftres. Even if IVIS data is not shared across corps lines, once the request arrived at xvm Corps, IVIS should have allowed them to very rapidly see that 3d ACR was well away from the target, and not in danger of being hit by lAD's fires. This would have relieved them of the need to move 3d ACR out of the way, and would have also drastically shortened the time to clear the fire request. 2d Bri. 3d AD Use of Anny Aviation and CAS Event: During the 3d Armored Division's heavy fighting of 26-27 February, the 2d Brigade (the division's main effort) attempted to make heavy use of Anny Aviation and Air Force close air support (CAS). CAS efforts, and to a lesser extent Anny attack helicopter missions, had their effectiveness significantly reduced due to concerns over pas. sible fratricide: numerous sorties were cancelled or simply wasted. These concerns were a result of poor visibility (night operations and sandstorms) as well as the difficulty in tracking other friendly units (notably the 2d ACR and 1st AD). Brigade air liaison officers rated the use of CAS in direct support of the brigade as "marginal at best," and coordinated activities between Army aviation and the Air

Force was "nearly nonexistenl." Most of this was due to concern over fratricide, but some of the difficulty in con· trolling attack helo operations was the result of inadequate FM radio range.' With Ivis: Obviously, IVIS would not have solved all these woes, but it cenainly could have eased the difficulty in Irocking the localion of friendly forces, and this alone would have greatly enhanced the ability to control aerial assets. More importantly, IVIS sets on the attack battalions' OH·58s and AH·64s would have allowed these forces to conduct autonomous operations, rather than being restricted to external control over unreliable radio links. This self· control capability would have been more effective than re· quiring them to hover and wait for someone to tell them where to go and what to do. IVIS would also have assisted Anny helicopters in adapt· ing to the localized nature of sandstorms. Sandstorms would rise up rapidly and just as rapidly abate, allowing aircraft to take advantage of these lulls, or holes. Coordinat· ing nearby attack helos to pop in through such holes in the crud is clearly a tricky business, as the helos need to be aware of the location of friendly troops so that, as they pounce through the holes, they can rapidly gain their bear· ings, hit the enemy. and get out. IVIS would allow these helos to remain oriented on invisible ground units until such time as the storm cover breaks long enough for them to roll in. Battle of 73 Easting Event: On 26 February (G+2) at the Battle of 73 Easting (I am using this name to refer to the 2d ACR engagement; 3d AD's battles in this vicinity are referred to as the Battles of Phase Line Tangerine and Phase Line Bullet, and 1st! D's are the Bailie of Objective Norfolk or "Fright Night"), G Troop of the 2d ACR found itself astride an Iraqi line of withdrawal and faced retreating Iraqi annor. After having destroyed the Iraqi forces defending in place, the troop found itself facing Iraqi forces moving into their zone from the south. In the midst of this fight, the troop's ASTY lost its thermal sight. The FIST sergeant was now obliged to run to a neighboring BFV to use its thennals to pick out Iraqi targets, and, because the BFV was not on the fire sup· port network, back to his ASTY to actually call in the fire. Against a more formidable foe, this could easily have been the proverbial nail for want of which the horseshoe was lost. etc. As it was, a ISS-mm howitzer mission called in by the G Troop FlST is credited with preventing an Iraqi T-72 company from overrunning a platoon of G Troop during the fight 9 With IVIS: With IVIS, each MIA2 in the ACR could have called in prompt and accurate artillery fire, eliminating the weak link of one broken down AST vehicle. As this bailie lasted anywhere up to 6 hours (depending upon the unit) before 1st ID was passed through, the value of are· dundant ability to call fires, particularly against a more formidable enemy, cannot be overestimated. This is especially true when a unit might unexpectedly find itself astride a major enemy route of advance or retreat and find itself engaged with an effectively self-replenishing enemy. Artillery is crucial to "pre-digest" these columns before they come into direct fire range, to ease the strain on the U. S. units by breaking up and slowing down the flow of the enemy columns (lhis assumes U. S. forces in position to observe the approaching Iraqi forces. but with each M IA2 able to call fire, the chances of this improve astronomically). Confusion during " Fright Night" Event: During the afternoon of 26 February (G+2). due to dithering on the part of CINCCENT with the ARCENT reserve (I CD), the VII Corps commander was forced to come up with an alternate unit to provide the third division for his three-division "fist." This division was 1m, which had begun the corps' portion of the campaign by conducting the breach and passing through the British lAD plus the VII Corps Field Artillery Brigades, and was still engaged in passing through the final elements of the British unit at 0200 that morning. Nonetheless, in order for the "Big Red One" to be in position in time to fonn part of the heavy fist. it needed to begin moving rapidly, and at 0430 on the 26th, it did. IO All day long the division advanced to catch up to 2d ACR, the corps' offensive screening force, aU the while making up plans "on the fly." By mid-afternoon, the division's brigade commanders became aware of the mission to conduct a passage of lines through!he 2d ACR to attack elements of the RGFC." (Note that although other individuals, notably 2d ACR and VII Corps headquarters, had knowledge of this eventuality, both since the previous day, this was the point at which HD's brigade commanders came into the loop, as they were necessarily focused on other matters before that point.) Planning for this evolution was rushed at best, with some units never getting map overlays for tbe operation, and even the 1st Brigade's commander had only a brief look at the division's copy of the overlay, which was, in any case, about three weeks 01d. 12 lID's 1st "Devil" Brigade was the left (northern) component of the division's attack that night. The passage of lines was relatively smooth for one of the brigade's battalions, 1·34 Annor, but 2·34, on the brigade's left (northern) flank was unable to find its correct passage point. Once actually engaged. of course, the confusion multiplied. Soon after the passage, two companies of 2·34, while attempting to ma· neuver to take up stations on the left flank of the battalion, wound up 9(» out of line, facing north instead of east. The two companies eventually had to complete a full circle in order to join back up on 2-34's left flank. I} As the fight developed, 2-34 found itself engaged with two tank ballalions equipped with T-ns, rather than the mechanized battalion they were led to expect. 2-34's execution was deliberate. with all fires being cleared and distributed by unit commanders, with the result that 2-34 was not involved in a single fratricide incident, in contrast with other U. S. units that same night I' However, the ability to use artillery during the 1st Bri· gade's fight left much to be desired. 2-34 had one fleeting target of four fleeing enemy vehicles, but was unable to get a proper plot with which to call in fire, thanks to limitations of the M981 FISTY. IS Similarly, the brigade commander reports that due to uncertainty about the location of the 1-4 Cavalry on the brigade' s north flank, he was also obliged to forego the use of artillery throughout the night attack. 16 None!heless, the engagement was a complete success, vividly demonstrating the amount of chaos and complication 29

This T-72 tool< multiple hits near Battle of Norfol< site. that can be handled by a well-trained and well-integrated force and encompassed in a one-sided victory. With MS: Although Maggart is absolutely correct in pointing out that the "leap of faith" collectively taken by 1st Brigade's band of brothers at the Battle of Norfolk validated the brigade's concept of team building, the availability of rvIS could have had a profound and beneficial effect on the way that the battle was fought. Bear in mind that this is not to say that the battle was not fought well and successfully. However, by making things easy that had to be done the hard way, MS would have freed up more time and attention for additional execution. Like any force-multiplying component, IVIS does not make possible something which was impossible, but allows the possible to be done with greater efficiency. permitting other things to be done as well. I count eight aspects in which IVIS and its associated effects would have been relevant. First of all, the difficulty of disseminating out-of-date map overlays would have been sidestepped. IViS would have transmitted the appropriate data directly to the electronic maps in each vehicle. Aside from simple organizational benefits, this would have provided a tremendous boost in confidence at al1levels of the 1st Division. Second, eltecu-tion of the passage of lines through 2d ACR would also have been greatly eased. as IVIS would have provided the ability to orient precisely on the ACR's rear, and locate, close on, and pass through the agreed upon lanes. Third, the difficulties with 2-34's out-of-line companies would have boen minimized. It is likely that they would have never broken formation to begin with, given IVIS's constant real-time display of the remaining vehicles of the unit. Even assuming that they had, IVIS would have enabled the companies to electronically see the rest of the battalion and plan and execute their refonnation with speed and preci· sion. Contrast this with the fact that the commander of one of the wayward companies had to actually dismount from his tank to use his magnetic compass to establish his orientation.11 Similarly, earlier in the evening. 2-34 found it difficult to keep station of I-34's nank. and eventually sorted out the fact that they were guiding on the wrong tank, and changed their orientation accordingly. II Considering the amount of time routinely spent on such "simple" issues. the fact that IViS helps "simple" things to remain simple allows commanders to spend less time sorting out the little stuff and more time planning and commanding. Against a different enemy which was I) using superior equipment, 2) better trained in its use, and 3) not merely using the tank batteries to light their bunkers. the importance of these points cannot be overestimated. 30 Fourth. the calculations and re-orientation necessary to return to their correct positions could have been made independently by the lost companies. without the need ror the battalion commander to coordinate them. thereby taking his attention from the remainder of the fight. or 10 endanger himself by illuminating his position to guide the companies back. The 2-34 commander had to light himself up with nares several times during this night, twice while bringing the missing companies in. and again to show the brigade commander the way to his position. On both these occasions, others observed that every Iraqi srtem capable of firing opened up on the command lank. I II was only bad Iraqi fire control that preserved the commander, but with IV[S providing a clear electronic view of his location to other friendly units. this is a risk that would have been unnecessary. 1be loss of a battalion commander in the midst of a confusing and rapidly-unfolding ground action could have been catastrophic. Fifth, the shared view of the location of friendly forces provided by IVIS would have streamlined and sped the allocation of fires while still meeting the strenuous requirement or limiting fratricide. 2-34's restrictive use of fires was explicitly used to reduce the chance of fratricide, and was based on techniques used at the NTC.lO These were completely effective under the circumstances, but given better opposition, may have given up too much offensive capability. As it was, the troops in 2-34 felt that these rules of engagement were needlessly endangering the force. leaving the opposition too much opportunity to get the first shot in while fires were being allocated and cleared.ll Even ig-This T·55 took a TOW hit at the Battle 01 Norfolk. noring the greater absolute effectiveness of more rapid fire. the simple increase in confidence among the 2-34 crews resulting from more pennissive ROEs by using IVIS would have been wonh quite a bit. as confidence pennits better perfonnance by minimizing the mental clutter of uncertainty and the perceived need for over-hasty execution. Sixth, the battalions would have been able to make better use of artillery by using each M IA2's ability to call for fire by simply lasing and burst-transmitting into the TACFJRE queue. This rapid and opportunistic use of fire would have been useful in the example of the fleeing vehicles. and also in suppressing enemy dismounts. Seventh. the use of artillery on the brigade level would have been enhanced by allowing a clear view of the location of neighboring units (1-4 CAV and 2d AD [FWD» so that aniUery fire could have been plotted without fear or hiuing friendly forces. Eighth and last, IVIS would have permitled more than the separate details above. It would provided the synergistic ability for the brigade to accomplish the above issues in a rapid fashion with better and more clear cross-communication of current situations and future intentions. Brigade and battalion commanders would have had more fine control in using their forces to respond to eventualities. and the entire force would have benefitted from shared perception of the "big picture." While the actual result of the battle was entirely successful, there is no reason not to imagine entire dimensions of enhanced performance with reduced casualties and mission accomplishment with less expenditure of ammunition, fuel, and most importantly, time. 2AD (FWD) at Objective Norfolk Event: At the same Baltie of Objective Norfolk, the right (southern) portion of the I ID attack was fought by the 2d AD (FWD), operating as 3d Brigade/liD. Although this brigade also convincingly defeated the Iraqi forces it faced, its performance was altogether less satisfactory than that of the Ist Brigade to its north. The brigade lost a total of 10 vehicles to fratricide during the enga§fment. with a total of six killed and 25 or more wounded in three separate engagements. In the first. three Bradleys of TF 1-41 Infantry were hit by units of the same brigade, killing four and wounding 18. In the second, five MIAls operating with TF 1-41 Infantry (belonging to 3-66 Annor) were hit. again from the same brigade, killing one and wounding one. In the last, two Bradleys, also of 1-41 Infantry, but operating with TF 3-66 Armor, strayed north into the 1st Brigade/lID zone and were hit forces of the neighboring brigade. with one soldier killed. In addition, during the course of the passage of lines through 2d ACR, the brigade' strains bunched up within 150 meters of the combat units, and very nearly became embroiled in combat, with obviously disastrous implications.:z,. With MS: It is hard not to imagine how IVIS could have saved several soldiers from death or wounding, although that is easy to say from this distance. It is said that, when viewed through thermal sights, RPCis detonating against the annor of Bradleys look very much like a tank main gun firing, which in two of the cases is what aUracted the fire.2S The units that erroneously fired at friendly forces would most likely have benefitted from an IVIS view of the loca-lion of the forces of the adjoining units to their flanks. Even in the face of apparent enemy tank muzzle flashes, IVlS could have provided enough reasonable doubt to prevent firing until more informalion had been obtained. This applies equally well to the intra-brigade and inter-brigade fratricide fire, assuming that IViS data is shared across brigade lines. As we have seen. fratricide is most likely along unit boundaries. whether those boundaries are corps, brigade. or battalion. Any system that breaks down the barriers of accurately perceiving the friendly forces on one's flank can hardly help but drastically reduce the incidence of fratricide. However, the 2d AD would seem to provide another lesson as well. Compared to the disciplined. fratricide-free fire of 2-34 Armor (discussed above). which was learned in realistic simulated combat at the

Orders group of!tie 1st Brigade, 110 gathers in the vicinity 01 PL Plum at 1200 hrs. on 24 Feb. NTC, the perfonnance of 2d AD (FWD) seems to demonstrate the difficulties encountered by Europe-based units which have no training facility comparable to the NTC. Remember. however, that the cost of 2-34's disciplined fire was the perception that they were placing themselves at risk to enemy counterfire which. against a better foe, might well have been true. Under other circumstances, 2d AD's procedures may well have proved more effective. But the point here is that. under these circumstances, 2-34's procedure did payoff, and this was a procedure that was driven home to them specifically at the NTC, an experience 2d AD (FWD) didn't have. While lVlS would have aided the 1st Brigade in its fight, it would appear thai IVIS, like many tools. may provide greater net increases in effectiveness to units eady in their training cycles than to units that are already at their peak, having already mastered.. the little stuff" that makes such a critical difference in real combat. Given the likelihood that the power projection Anny of the future will be called on to rapidly respond to crises without being able to send units fresh from NTC rotations, the value of IVlS looms large indeed. In the case of the brigade trains coming suddenly upon the edge of the battlefield, IVlS sets present with the officers and NCOs leading the trains would have allowed them a better view of the front lines, and allowed them to keep a better safety cushion between the vulnerable fuelers and ammo haulers and the chaotic night battle. 2AD Logistics Rendezvous Event: During liD's final all-out stretch to cut the Kuwait City-Basra highway, 2-66 Annor of 2AD (FWD) found itself critically low on fuel. The battalion's logistics officer took four HEMlT fuelers out to refuel the tanks. Because the log officer could not make radio contact with the battalion to get them to stop and wail for him, he struck out across the desert to intercept the battalion. As it turned out, he got out ahead of the battalion with the four fuelers and was waiting for them as they crested arise. At this point, one of the 2-66 gunners asked if he should take the four unidentified fuel trucks under fire. but was told to identify them first.16 31

With IVIS: As discussed at the beginning, IVIS sets among log units would presumably be assigned to key officers. so the battalion log officer should certainly have had one with his intrepid fuel convoy. With IVIS in both groups, not only should the combat and log elements have been able to find each other via their electronic maps to plan a timely rendezvous. the rendezvous could have been planned so that the fuelers need not have been exposed and defenseless. out ahead of the combat unit. Naturally this should also have prevenled the fuelers from being tragically misidenlified and destroyed by their own tanks. Alpha Troop, 4-7 Cav Engagement at PL Bullet Event: On the evening of 26 February. 4-7 Cavalry was screening ahead of the 3d AD. advancing to engage the Iraqi Republican Guard. Shortly after dark. Alpha Troop made contact with a force of Iraqi tanks and infantry. and combat ensued. During the course of the fighting. two Bradleys were known to have been knocked out. As increasingly more enemy heavy forces were observed by the scouts. it became clear that Alpha Troop. now also low on ammunition, had completed its screening mission and needed to withdraw to allow the division's maneuver forces to engage the enemy. At this time. the troop commander, Captain Davie. decided to check what he assumed were the two knocked-out Bradleys to be sure that none of their crews were left behind as the troop withdrew. While conducting this check. Davie discovered that there were not two, but four knocked-out Bradleys. He only learned of the two additional vehicles by coming upon them while looking for the other two. All four Bradleys had been evacuated., and Alpha Troop withdrew through the ap-proching 4-34 Annor.v With MS: AJlbough the troop commander's unaware-ness of the additional lost vehicles had no impact on this event. it is not hard to imagine other circumstances where it might have created difficulties. Although the current MS system does not call attention to a vehicle that has been hit (the icon of a vehicle that has gone off the air merely remains at its last transmitted position), such a capability is a simple and logical addition. The icon of a vehicle that no longer transmits could be set to flash. or have some sort of flag added to it. This would allow other units to be aware that something was amiss and check to see if the vehicle was a catastrophic kill or merely needed a mechanic. On the other hand, the MS terminal could be fined with an ''I'm Hit" switch that could be activated by the vehicle commander upon abandoning. or which could be activated along with the fire suppression system. This capability would allow rapid medical attention and offer other benefits. For example, during the 1st AD attack into the Tawakalna Division on the 26th. the command tank of C Company, 1-37 Annor was knocked out. Althougb the battalion commander was aware of this loss, he was unable to raise the company's XO to have him take over command.lI Although the company XO was eventually contacted and the outcome of the battle was not affected. the ability of the force to directly monitor the status of friendly vehicles without waiting for reports to find their way to them could allow more rapid recovery of command and control when commanders are killed in combat. Fortunately, neither the 32 C Company commander, nor in fact any in 1-37, were killed in this engagement. Sub-optimal Use of Army Aviation Event: There have been a number of observations since the war that Anny Aviation was not used as it ought to have been, as a fully functioning maneuver element. Rather, it was too often used as Anny-owned close air support. Consequently, AH-64s sat at their bases waiting to be called in for fire support or assigned deep strike missions, rather than being fully inlegrated into the battle. With MS: This problem will be difficult to solve because of the very different nature of aviation and ground units. Ground units move relatively slowly, take up space on the ground. and have their supplies brought to them. while aviation units move rapidly, but only temporarily occupy air space before returning to their bases to refuel and reann. Fully integrating these conceptually different capabilities will be difficult. However. any system that simplifies the visualization of the size, shape, and changing nature of the battlefield and provides an identical vision of those details to alJ participants will simplify that integration by allowing these disparate air and ground elements to be meshed in real time. rather than requiring the more difficult task of meshing their rather different planning assumptions without a common view of operations. IVlS provides that crucial connection. VII Corps Commander Event: LTG Franks spent a great deal of time travelling the battlefield in his UH-60, "riding the circuit" of his division and ACR commanders to maintain a constant loop of two-way feedback. He used these trips to gain a persona) feel for conditions on the battlefield and for his unit commanders' states of mind, as well as to pass on to them details of the developing corps operations. This included physically showing his map to bis subordinates. and in some cases drawing maps in the sand to explain his concept of the operations. With IVIS: The kind of IVIS commanders' features I postulate above would reduce the necessity of some of this effort. While the corps commander will still want to take the measure of his subordinates and communicate his vision by face-to-face meetings during the campaign. if he is relieved of the burden of having to physically show a map to them. the demands on his time are eased. This gives him more time for other issues requiring his attention. and perhaps most imponantly. allows him more time to rest. Rick Swain believes that by the morning of February 28 (G+5), both Franks and his G-3. COL Cherne. were nearing the end of their productive endurance, and that this had to do with some of the confusion about Safw8n being taken vs. being interdicted by air. N Had the war gone on for another day or more. the physical and mental limits of the corps commander would have become ever more important. A system which allows the corps commander to more effectively use his time to command., communicate. and remain mentally fresh enhances the effectiveness of the entire corps.

General Franks meets with his VII Corps field commanders. Sharing the Vision of the Battlefield with the CINC and the NCA Event: The CINCCENT, General Schwarzkopf, appears to have spent much of the ground war quite exercised about the performance of VII Corps. JO However, it is quite evident that he had a very inadequate view of the battlefield, which cenainly could not have helped his humor. For example, in the famous phone conversation between the CINC and General Franks on the 26th (G+2). Schwarzkopf unaccountably berates Franks to not tum VII Corps to the south.l ' Without assuming that Schwarzkopf had a completely inaccurate picture of the alignment of forces on the battlefield, it is impossible 10 understand what he could have had in mind when assuming that VII Corps was in any danger of turning south.n Schwankopfs fuzzy view of the campaign was compounded when he repeatedly insisted that.. the gates are closed" during his "Mother of All Briefings.''lJ This effectively amounted to a declaration of victory, and apparently set the tone for the Coalition's cessation of hostilities. Although the war was ended by President Bush after consultation with his advisors and Coalition allies for political reasons, not military reasons, there is every reason to believe that Bush, Cheney, Powell, etc., would have wanted the political decision to dovetail as closely as possible with military realities, had these details been available. There are abundant reasons to believe that Washington did not, for whatever reason, have a very clear picture of the situation on the ground at the time the decision was made to end the war.loI Although the exact same decision may have been made in any case, it is inarguable that when about to make a decision about the prosecution of a war, the National Command Authority ought to have access 10 the absolute reality of the military situation. With [VIS: Assuming a vertical IVIS application that would display the location of ground units to higher headquarters (as postulated at the beginning of this paper), Schwarzkopf could have seen real-time displays of VII Corps. which should have calmed him down on the 26th. Similarly, the mistaken report that U. S. ground troops had taken Safwan would not have taken place with such an IVIS application, as it was only the erroneous application of a sticky note at vn Corps, 3d Anny, or CENTCOM that allowed the misunderstanding to take place. This would have saved Schwarzkopf from offering Safwan as the cease-fire site, and saved VU Corps and lID the headache of. respectively, being accused of lying, and taking Safwan under the cessation of hostilities tenns. We would have additiona1ly been spared the current round of misinfonned Monday-moming quarterbacking based on Schwarzkopf s inaccurate battlefield picture. and perhaps history might have been spared from an additiona1 round of the CINC's histrionics. On a much more important level, given the same vertical [VIS application transmitted to the national level, the President and his advisors would have had an accurate picture of the battlefield in case their political goals required specific ground objectives to be taken. Bush may have wanted another day to close the Basra pocket, or he may have felt that it was unimportant. But at least there could have been an infonned debate and an awareness among the decisionmakers that the pocket was not closed at 0800 (Gulf time), 28 February (G+5), 1993. Summary The collision of the U. S. and Iraqi armed forces in the Gulf War was that of the First World and the Third World. The difference in equipment, training, and strategic and op-. erational expertise of the two sides was an order of magnitude. Nonetheless, there is still demonstrable room for further improvement in the perfonnance of U. S. forces, and IVIS can arguably answer many of those needs. Assuming a reasonable application of IVIS' current capabilities and reasonable growth of its current baseline, the following capabilities would be addressed:

I) Enhanced situational awareness on the part of all close combat vehicles, which translates into greater flexibility and capability on the battlefield and a tremendous new ability to rapidly and effectively respond to changing situations.

2) Shared vision a1lows decentralized decisions as the information required for these decisions is unifonnly avail· able at lower echelons, thus freeing commanders to do more commanding and less coordinating.

3) Greatly improved ability to avoid fratricide on the battlefield without positive control measures, simply by having reaJ-time access to accurate data on friendly troop locations.

4) More rapid ability to call and clear artillery fires. spread throughout the force with the primary direct fire system (M IA2).

5) Ability to better coordinate logistical support with combat units, through situational awareness of relative locations as well as regular data on actual supply status. This results in the ability to exercise a push supply policy based on accurate anticipation of needs at future times.

6) Provides the tools for better coordination with Army aviation.

7) Provides better integration of vision up and down the chain of command. all the way to the National Command Authority. (Although its name is inter-vehicular information system, which implies that it is a horizontal integration system, IVIS should not only be a horizontal system. In fact, its capabilities demand that once this infonnation is collated for horizontal distribution that it be spread vertically as well.) 33

Issues Naturally, none of these improvements will come about without a great deal of thought, testing, training, and revision. Any system as revolutionary as I believe lVtS is contains a great number of unanticipated potentials (good and bad) which will probably be stumbled over as it is tested and broken in. Some relevant difficulties and issues to be resolved follow.

1) Cost: In the post-Bottom Up Review era, money will be hard to come by. It will be very expensive to re-equip the spectrum of vehicles listed at the beginning of this paper, and there will be no shortage of uninformed bean counters who will attempt to cut entire classes of vehicles out of the IVIS loop.

2) Do Not Surrender the Vision: As part of the endless rounds of cosI-Cutting, there will be numerous attempts to truncate the IYIS vision by limiting its application to certain vehicles only. Chief among these is the recurring suggestion that only company commanders or platoon commanders need. have M IA2s to enhance their command and control capabilities. This is a criminal failure of vision, and must be mercilessly exterminated wherever it arises. IVIS only reaches its full fruition when all units share the common vision of the battlefield. Otherwise large amounts of time must still be pissed away incorporating "blind" units into the world of sight, which wastes the time, energy, and attention that ought to be freed up by IVIS. Yes, selectively issuing tVIS to a few units will improve capabilities, but these improvements will be only arithmetical. The improvements possible if the entire force gets tVIS will be not arithmetical, but exponential. Given the expense of even a small application of the program, it is worth the extra cost to get an exponential increase over an arithmetical one. The same arguments apply to limiting IVIS to only close combat units or any other distinction that you may imagine. The proper vision of IVIS is to have a set at each of the lowest levels of organization that are expected to operate separately (individual ve.hicles for close combat, groups of vehicles for CSS). Do not surrender this vision.

3) Outstanding Organizational Issues: The Army must decide at what level, and across which boundaries, the lVIS data will be shared. It is my opinion that the system works best if information is shared at all levels (certainly cross-boundary fratricide is best prevented, and cross-boundary artillery fires are best cleared. when units can see friendly forces on both sides of the line). However, this will require the Anny to rethink the meaning of organizational divisions. If neighboring companies on either side of a corps boundary are able to pass information directly one to the other, what exactly is the role of the corps under these circumstances? These issues will clearly be thorny and emotional, but must be addressed. Echelons of command should exist only if they are adaptive within contemporary realities. It will take time to son. out which features of which echelons are adaptive in the context of this information revolution, but fonn must follow function.

4) Outstanding Ergonomic Issues: Very nice, but how do we build it so that people will use it? If the IVIS screens are inside the turret, how do we expect our commanders to exercise open-hatch command? Do we expect them to rap- 34 idly pop up and down like jack·in-the-boxes? Do we tell them to keep their hatches closed from now on? Do we put an IVIS repealer outside the hatch? Do we put IVIS on a flexible arm so that it can be pulled. out when the commander is unbulloned, and pushed back down when he is buttoned up? As fussy and fiddly as these details are, they are crucial if we actually expect people to use the system. We must make it easy and intuitive to use.

S) Run-up Time: It will take time to doctrinally incorporate the new capabilities in the IVIS system. More than that, il will take time for troops in the field to build up confidence in the IVIS system and to implicitly trust it and thereby take advantage of the enhanced capabilities it offers. This confidence can only be created by experience, by getting the system into the field and into the hands of the troops so they can start learning how to use it.

6) It Won't Always Work: There will always be some damn vehicle whose lVlS is down, and which disappears from the map. Periodically entire units may fallout of the system for one reason or another. How will the troops deal with these events? What are the back-ups? The issue is similar to the notion that we don't want troops so dependent upon GPS that they forget how to do traditional land navigation. We don't want IVIS to become an Achilles heel.

7) Coalition Warfare: How do we cooperate with non-IVIS-equipped forces? Can our [VIS sets, in English, communicate with the Arabic IVIS sets in Saudi and Kuwaiti M IA2s? What about the next time we fight alongside the Syrians? How will some poor liaison guy get all of those friendly T -62 locations entered in his LCU? Will we become so tied to IVIS operations that we will hesitate to engage in coalition warfare because of the difficulty in cooperating with non-IVIS-equipped forces?

8) Countenneasures: Gadzooks, what a can of wonns. Communication is the heart of IVIS, and it is vulnerable to countermeasures. Furthennore, communications to cenain pivotal systems are crucial, such as GPS, which provides the bedrock positional reality checks for POSNA V. Within the next few years, the U. S. GPS system will be used by a bewildering array of civilian organizations as well as foreign militaries. Will this compromise the system in some way, or expose it to easier countenneasuring? It might. The IVIS data network is an absolute gold mine of data on friendly forces. How do we keep it secure? What happens when COL Badguyski captures one of our tanks? How compartmentalized should the data network be in case it is compromised (this fits in with point 2 above)? (Presumably there are better minds than mine at work on this, but it needs to be said.) Once word gets out that an IVIS-linked U. S. force is as good as it ought to be, people are going to start thinking about taking out the weak links. This could be done by anti-satellite technology, knocking down navigational satellites, or with electro-magnetic pulse which might fry not only the satellites, but the [VIS hardware as well. How do we deal with that likelihood? At first glance, this concern may seem misplaced in the post-Cold War era. However. the more time that goes by, the more such ASAT and EMP capabilities will be available to non-superpowers. Consider on the one hand the tre-

1-4 CAY lroops herd 2,000 Iraqis attempting retreat to Basra. mendous fonner·Soviet defense establishment which seems increasingly willing to Slay in business by working for whoever has liquid capital, and on the other hand the potential of sophisticated nations such as Japan becoming regional rivals in the next decade or so. What 10 do? David Nilsen is the Chief of Design at Game Designers' Workshop (GDW) in Bloomington, 111., which produces wargames on military his· tory and speculative topics. He researched and designed Phase Une Smash, a study and simulation of VII Corps operations in DESERT STORM, and recently produced a detailed DESERT STORM order of battle for use with GDWs Command Decision wargame. He also oversees the Harpoon line, GDWs game of modem naval combat. He is currently designing Annor 21, a game on armored warfare in 2020- 2030, which will be published in late 1994. He is a graduate of Duke University. Remain one step ahead. To my mind. IVIS is that one step. Notes ICOL Rick Swain, /.. IJcty War: Third A.rmy in DESERT STORM. Unedited dmft dated 22 Se mber 1993. pp. 295--6, and Headquarters ]-4 Cavalry, "'Ibe History of the Fourth United SlateS Cavalry." p. E-15. 1Headquancrs 1-4 Cavalry, p. E·9. llbid.. p. E. 15. 'Sean D. Naylor, "Home of the Bmve. H A.rmy Tis, January 27. 1992. p. ]6. and BG Robert

H. Scales, Jr.. et al.. Cenaill Victory: T1u! U. S. Army ill t Gulf War, pp. )02·3..sSve Vogel. "Metal Rain. H Army Tis. September 16. 1991. p. 22. and Scales, et al.. p. 299.

6. Scales. et aI., p. 298. But foc an exception to this rule. sec the experience of C and D Companies, 4-70 Armor, in "Award· Winning Staff of U. S. News amJ World Rpon,- Tnwnph Withnut Victory. pp. 378·379. 7Vogel."Metal Rain,H p. 22. points are taken from Appendices 2 and 3 to the 1st Edition of the 2d Brigadcl3d Armored Division History. -OPERATION DE· SERT SHIELD Isic]: December 1990 thru 27 February 199I. H 9Steve Vogel, "A Swift Kick. H Army Tims. August 5. 1991. p. 30: Scales. et at.. p. 262: and Headquarters. 2d Squadron, 2d ACR. Memorandum foc Record, Subject: Historical Namnive of 2d Squadron, 2d Armored CaYlllry Regiment's Role in the Campaign to Liberate Kuwait, 2J February·7 April 1991. Icnavid Nilsen. Phase Li1I Smash Historical Notes. pp. 3 1. 32: LTC Peter S. Kindsvauer, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offen· sive," Mi/itary Rview. February 1992. p. 28: and Swain. pp. 123, 162,285-6, 300, 304-3O, 316 n.67, 331. 3.50-32, 3·6. 359, 361·2. II(Then) COL Lon E. Maggart. "A Leap of Faith," ARMOR. January·February ]992, p. 24. u Staff of U. S. N",-,s. Tnwnph Witht)llt Vic· tory. pp. 362·3. and COL Greg Fontenot.

"Fright Night: Task Force 2134 Armor." MiIi· tary Revitw. JlIl1uaty 1993, p. 52.!3/bid., p.45. 141bid.. p. 43-44. IS/bid.. p. SI. 16ConversatiOll with BG Maggart, Ft. Knox, 7 December 1993. nFonnot. p. 45. IS/bid.. p. 42. 19/bid.. p. 45. and conversatiOll with BG Maggart. 7 [)ca,mber 1993. 2OConversations with COL Gregory Fontenot. 2l FonteIKM. "Fright Night. H pp. 48 and 49. 22Steve Vogel. "Hcll NighL M Army Times. October 7, 1991. pp. ]6 and 18 uses the figure of the 30 wounded, while the figure of 25 wounded is cited in Sean D. Naylor, "Friendly Fire: l1lc: Rcckoning,R Army Times. August 26. 1991, pp. 4 and 6. 11le latr anicle is based on the August 13. 1991. DoD announccmcnt on Gulf War fratricide. Uvogel. "Hell Night. M pp. 16 and 18: Naylor. "Friendly Fire." pp. 4 and 6: Steve Vogel. "Numbness, Chills Strike Witnesscs,- Anny Times, AugU$l 26, 1991, pp. 4 and 6: and Scales, et al.. Certain Victory. p. 285. l"vogel, Hell Night. H pp. 16 and 18. u Scales. et al.. p. 285, and Vogd. "Hell NighL" pp. 16 and 18. 16vogel, "Hell Night,R p. 69. 27CPT E. Allen OIandJer Jr., Historical Report - Combat AviationBrigadc (3d Armored Division). "4-7th Cavalry Contact with Iraqi Tanks: ' 2tTom Carhart, fron Snldien, pp.259·261. 29Swain. Ludcy Wllr, p. 408. plus personal conversations with Swain.. Normlll1 Schwanlcopf, fl D«SII', TaU a Hero. Pick a page. any page. ll fbid.. p. 463. lZSwain. U4c1cy Wllr. pp. 360-1: LTG Ronald

H. Griffith, "Mission ACCOOIplisllcd-ln Full:' U. S. Naval Institute Procudings, August 1993, p. 64: and conversation with BG Stanley Oicr· rie at FL Leavenworth. November IS, 1993. Chenie explained th.at ARCENT Commander LTG Yeosock had mentioned the possibility of using the 1st (UK) AD to clear the border area to allow a shorter MSR to be opened up foc vn Corps in the vicinity of the Wadi al Batin. This impression may have been strengthened by the British division's apparent overreaction to Chenie'J request that they begin looIcing into that possibility. Although Cherrie innded th.at they would respond to the request as a U. S. di· vision would. by back-bumering it, apparently the British turned a good deal of (irritated) at· ntion to the issue. as Chcnie found OUt after the war. Had division commander Rupert Smith passed this on to UK theater commander Gen· eral Sir Peter de la Billib-e. it is possible that Schwankopf might have gotn lIl1 elTOOCOUS impression about this notional operation, but thai is speculation on my pan. It is interesting thaI Schwankopr caUs funher atntion to this failure of situational awareness on his part by suggesting tIw: Franks use the British division foc this putative southern at· tack.. Had Schwarzkopf had a real picture of what the corps looked like th.at aftcmoon. il would have been clear that lIl1 attack by any corps element other than I (UK) AD was out of the question. and he was merely proving his own ignocancc. »rmnscripl appears. among other places, in MAJ Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and CPT David A. Dawson. U.s. Marinu in t Prsi{lfl Gulf, J990-1991: Amlwlogy amJ Annolllted Bibliogrophy. p. 57 and 70. J( A very persuasive description of the discon· I1CCt bccween ground truth in the sand and per· ccived reality at CENTCOM in Riyadh and at the Presidential level in Washington is presented in Rick Atkinson. Ct'IlJIlde. pp. 449-454. 469-478. However. aOer laying this out very carefull y, Atkinson unaccountably comes to the prepos1llU$ conclusion that even though the entire decision·making process was flawed rrom the start. thatthoc decision was sound. 35