Nomonhan: Prelude to World War I1

Nomonhan: Prelude to World War 11 At 5:45 am. on August 20, 1939, massed formations of Soviet bombers and fighters flew east amss the Halha River in Mongolia Their bombing and strafing attacks on Imperial Japanese Army (UA) positions were followed by a Red Army combined arms offensive on the ground. During the next ten days, the Soviets virtually annihilated the Japanese ground farces. Overshadowed by the Geman invasion of Poland on September 1, the series of battles that took place around the obscure village of Nomonhan was to have a direct impact on the course of World War II in Japan's field army fighting in Asia was primarily an infantry force, dependent on horses and boot leather for mobility. Japan had not stressed tank development and lacked mobility, while the Soviets had assembled the largest armor force in the world. The result was a rout. Europe, as well as Asia. Russian troops, under the command of General Georgi Zhukov, destroyed two Japan-

Table 1

Russian TYPE 84oTSU

Diesel ViCkWS 12.7 tons 1 x57mm 2 x 6.5mm 10-1 7mm 15.5 mph Diesel

ViCkWS

13.8 tons 1 x37mm 1 x45mm 2 x 7.7mm 2 x 7.62mm 6-12mm 6-22mm 25 mph 45 rnph

ViCkWS 12.7 tons 1 x57mm 2 x6.5mm 10-1 7mm 15.5 mph Diesel Diesel

4.7 tons 13.8 tons 1 x37mm 1 x76mm 1 x 7.7mm 4-16mm 6-22mm 25 mph 40-69 mph 2 x 7.62mm RusSiian OT-130 Flame

ViCkWS 8.5 tons x 7.62mm 6-15mm 22 rnph

3.3 tons 1 x 7.62mm None 4-9mm 28-40 mph Data Source: Pictmd History of Tanks of the World 191545, Peter' Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, 1972. ese divisions, paralyzed the Imperial Japanese military hierarchy, and caused a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy for the balance of the war. Zhukov's use of tanks, combined with artillery and mechanized infantry, established the model for Russian victories at Moscow and Stalingrad.

The Russians had been extremely active in armored fighting vehicle technology during the 1920s and '30s. By 1936, the Soviet Union had the largest tank force in the world. The Soviets possessed over 10,OOO armored vehicles, ranging in size from the tiny, two-man MS Light Tank to the huge, multi-turreted T-35 with its 11-man crew. They had purchased examples of other countries' vehicles, to include Vickers from Great Britain, Renaults from France, and Christies from the United States. They adopted the best features of all these systems, and mixed them with uniquely Russian requirements to come up with their own breed of vehicles. Soviet tanks featured high-velocity cannons, sloped armor, and long-range diesel engines. They were organized as inde-

May-August 1939 I‘ --,---.----e * T. w h n MANCHUKUO j‘:,,e’ #’ i I / It‘ / /-/ i J*‘.‘ ‘. i.--*# INNER MONGOUA

\, Flgure 1,*‘ CHINA

\.-> I---Japanese Medium Tank Type 89-OTSU. Below, the Soviet BT-7. pendent tank brigades, thus maximizing their shock effect and mobility. The Russians continually updated their designs, improving their vehicles through an evolutionary process. The BT-7 used at Nomonhan was to become the direct predecessor of the T-34. Japan also purchased tanks from other counhies, but chose to make direct copies. As a result, the Imperial Army developed a fleet of vehicles based on World War I designs, which were intended to support the attack of the infantry. They were equipped with low-velocity guns, riveted armor, and were intentionally slow. Tank development was crippled by the Imperial Army’s foot soldier orientation, and by competition with the Navy and Air Force for raw materials. Japanese vehicle and engine production always suffered as a consequence. By the end of 1940, the Japanese had built a total of only 573 vehicles.’

The characteristics of some of the vehicles that each country used in 1939 are shown in Table 1. Initial Engagements On May 11, 1939, Manchukuoan horse cavalry, with UA advisors, conducted patrols into the area east of the Halha River, or as it was known to the Mongolians, Khalkin Gol. Along this river, in an area approximately 60 miles long and 20 deep, was the temtory claimed by both the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) and Japanese-backed Manchukuo. Mongolian patrols had been reported in the vicinity of the border village of Nomonhan, and the regional Japanese command had ordered a reconnaissance. Local Japanese commanders were encouraged to be aggressive, and to respond “by completely destroying”* any enemy forces in areas where the border was illdefined.

The western border that Manchukuo shared with the Soviet Union and Mongolia was just such a place with vague boundaries. (Figure 1) Not only were the Japanese intent on acquiring new temtory at the expense of the Russians, they also hoped to disrupt the military aid Chiang Kai-shek was receiving from the Soviet government.

The terrain in this area was barren grassland with few trees growing in the sandy soil. The landscape had few distinguishing features, and in some cases, different hills were identified solely by their elevations. The Halha was the major source of water for the villagers and herders, and was large enough to provide for a local fishing industry. Summers were extremely hot and mosquito-infested. Winters were severe, with low temperatures and high winds. The road net was minimal and the only large-scale means of transportation was provided by the railroads.

The Manchukuoan patrol crossed the Halha into Mongolia, but was chased back over the river by MPR border cavalry. By May 28, the 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division, supported by Russian regulars, armored cars, and artillery had taken up positions on the east bank of the river, and were digging in. The Japanese attacked several times, trying to push the Soviets and Mongolians back into the river, but were unsuccessful.

The size of the skirmishing units increased as the days went on. Patrols were replaced by companies, companies by battalions, until, by midJune, regiments supported by artillery, tanks, and aircraft were joining battle. The number of reinforcements turned from a trickle to a flood as each side became more determined to crush the opposition.

Initially, due to their superior railroad network, the Japanese were able to strengthen and concentrate their forces more quickly than the Soviets. During July, they launched several attacks combining infantry, artillery, and tanks. The actions, however, were poorly coordinated. The tanks sometimes outdistanced their supporting infantry, or the artillery preparation was inadequate to suppress the Russian defenses, and heavy losses were the result.

By the end of that month, the LlA had expended most of its limited sup ply of armored vehicles. The Soviets had successfully engaged the Japanese tanks with heavy artillery and direct fire weapons from wellcamouflaged, reinforced ground emplacements, as well as using dug-in tanks. “Japanese tank guns were outranged decisively by those of the Russian tanks, which had an effective range of 2,000 meters... Whereas Japanese cannon shells sometimes bounced off enemy armor, Soviet shells - even ricochets -could penetrate the belly of IJA tanks at even a “flat” angle of only 15 de-Without supporting armor, the Japanese infantry was forced to fight Soviet tanks with “human bullet units.” These troops fought with gasoline-filed bottles and antitank mines attached to ten-foot bamboo poles. When they disabled a Russian tank, they attacked the crew by pushing their bayonets and swords through the vision slits. In addition to barbed wire, the Russian &oops used entanglements of piano wire as antitank obstacles. This wire was used low to the ground and hard to see. It was impervious to artillery fue and did not break when the Japanese tanks rolled over it. Instead, it wound itself around the spmkets and tracks, jamming or cutting into the moving parts of the vehicles. It was very effective in sepa-grees.”3 rating the tanks from their supporting infantry; the footsoldiers passed through while the tracked vehicles became hopelessly entangled.

On one occasion, the IJA was able to penetrate the Russian defenses on the east bank, and cross to the west side of the Halha. The Japanese hoped to continue the attack south to trap the Soviet forces on ever, a swift Soviet counterattack employing a tank brigade from the north, mechanized infantry from the east bank. HOW-SOVlEi AlTACK 20 August 1939 I I ( l l k M l e r \....

I Pll.r-MANCHUKU( the west, and armored cars from the south threatened to trap the Japanese against the river, and the IJA forces were forced to retreat!

In the early part of August, the Japanese launched a series of piecemeal attacks to dislodge the Russians. The Soviets responded aggressively with numerous counterattacks along either side of the Holsten River. The Soviet Response The Soviet government in Moscow had been watching the events in Asia with great concern. They had no intention of being caught simultaneously between hostile forces in Europe and Asia. The decision was made to teach the Japanese a lesson in mechanized warfare they would not soon forget. The Defense Ministry sent General Georgi Zhukov to take charge of the situation.

Zhukov, who was then 43 years old, was arising star among the Soviet Army officers who had survived the purges of 1937-38. A Red Army cavalry squadron commander during the Russian Civil War, he was to become a favorite of Stalin. ‘Zhukov was tough and self-willed, with a flair in strategy that switched from the darting protection of the Soviet jugular in defense to onerously planned battering of the enemy torso in offense. He had a direct and brilliant impact on operations in the field. He could be ruthless and cruel, ordering a division commander he thought slow and nervous to be sent to a penal company, ill-mannered, indifferent to casualties.”’ In his new assignment, he was directed to use whatever resources he deemed necessary to smash the Japanese.

Upon his arrival in Tamsag, Zhukov found a confusing command situation and a scarcity of up-to-date tactical intelligence. He ordered immediate and extensive ground, air, and signal reconnaissance. He requested that the 57th Corps, of which he had now taken command, be provided with three additional rifle divisions, a tank brigade, heavy artillery units, and 100 more combat aircraft. To support this build-up in the wilderness of Mongolia, Zhukov’s staff commandeered anything with wheels and a motor. They assembled a fleet of 3,500 cargo and 1,400 tanker trucks (such an assemblage was unheard of in what was still an era of foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery). The round trip from the railhead at Chita was almost 900 miles, and took five days. “Soviet truck usage dwarfed IJA capabilities and thinking at that time: the Japanese regarded 60 miles as ‘far’ and 200 trucks as ‘many’... In any event, IJA intelligence experts remain awed to this day by the amount of men and materiel moved so ruthlessly.” Even firewood for the troops’ cooking fires had to be trucked in!

As their stockpiles for the coming offensive grew, the Soviets set about deceiving the Japanese as to where and when the blow would fall. Russian forces on the eastern bank of the Halha were intentionally kept to a minimum; only enough to contain the Japanese attacks. On the western side of the river, however, large numbers of men and vehicles were carefully assembled. All major movement took place at night; units were camouflaged and dispersed during the daylight hours. Loudspeakers were set up to broadcast the sounds of jackham-mers and other construction equipment to give the impression that the Russians were digging-in. Lone bombers would hams the Japanese positions after dark, denying them a full night’s sleep.

The armored and infantry units moved to their assembly areas in small groups, along different routes. The degree to which the Soviets had mechanized their forces allowed them to assemble for the offensive at the last possible moment. The Russian BT-7 tanks were able to move to their jump-off points quietly and at high speed, running on only their powered roadwheels. True to their Christie-type design, the Soviet vehicles could move on the roads on wheels, and mount their wads just prior to the attack.

On August 19, four additional Soviet regiments and five brigades took up their assault positions, crossing the river on bridges that had been laid just under the surface of the water, in order to avoid detection. The Russians had approximately 80,000 men facing 60. OOO Japanese: 500 tanks versus 180; 500 artillery tubes to 300.7 The Battle At dawn on August 20, hundreds of Red Army bombers and fighters attacked. Interceptors swept the IJA Air Force from the sky while bombers assaulted troops, supplies, and artillery throughout the depth of the Japanese position. When the fighters ran out of aerial opponents, they strafed targets of opportunity on the ground. After the air attacks, Russian artillery of aII calibers opened a stunning barrage on the Japanese emplacements. The effect was so devastating that “for 75 to 90 minutes, the Japanese artillery could not even respond.”* When the Russian fire shifted to targets behind the front line, hundreds of Soviet tanks and a company of mored flamethrowers appeared with supporting infantry (Figure 2). By the evening of August 21, the Soviet’s 6th Tank Brigade had turned the Japanese southern flank and had cut their supply and escape routes to the east. In the north, the Russians had isolated and were steadily reducing the regiment that guarded the Japanese right flank at Fui. To add to the IJA’s predicament, all their major forces were drawn up along the line of the river; there was no depth to their array. Once the Soviets got behind the main line of defense, there were no units between the Halha and Nomonhan that could stop them.

The Japanese infantry bore the brunt of the Soviets’ combined arms assault. The Japanese reaction to this onslaught was based on their f m belief in the power of cold steel and bushido, the warrior spirit. Time and again they had seen the Chinese run when IJA units had closed for hand-to-hand combat. They were convinced the Russians would do the same. Mechanization and firepower were not considerations in the Japanese estimate of the situation.

Most Japanese artillery was horse-drawn, and so many animals were killed in the first two days, that the fieldpieces were practically immobile. Also, none of the artillery units had prepared for a 360-degree defense. When Soviet tanks and troops began to appear behind them and to their flanks, the Japanese had to move their howitzers by hand.

On August 23, the Soviets overran the regiment at Fui, the northernmost Japanese outpost. They then turned south along the Mongolian-claimed border line, and raced for Nomonhan to complete the encirclement of the 23rd Division and all its supporting units.

The Japanese were trapped, but continued to fight with tremendous bravery and ferocity. The 6th Army command (the 23rd Division’s next higher headquarters) told their troops along the river to hold on: a counteroffensive was being planned. Orders were issued for a combined attack of units from the 23rd and 7th Infantry Divisions against the Soviet southern pincer. Priority of fires, bransportation, and supply was to go to this operation.

The Japanese counterattack began on August 24 (Figure 3). It was a disaster. Foot infantry with inadequate indirect fire support were caught on the rolling, wide open temin and cut down. Whole battalions were wiped out. By attempting to use some of the 23rd Division units already engaged

SITU=.

\ \ \ -a\- / ‘4 along the river and throwing them into the southern sector, the 6th Army planners had unwittingly uncovered their remaining artillery units. Marauding Soviet tanks swept in and devastated the Japanese gun positions. By August 26, the Japanese counter-offensive was over (Figure 4). Soviet tank units completed their sweep when the 9th Armored and 6th Tank Brigades met at the village of Nomonhan. Most of the Japanese units had been without food and water for two to three days, and ammunition was running low. The troops were reduced to licking the morning dew from ground cloths and metal surfaces. The 6th Army was unable to fight through the Russian encirclement to provide supplies or reinforcements. Zhukov then proceeded with the next phase of his plan which was to dismantle the 23rd Division. ‘?he most effective way to overpower the Japanese defenses was to drive wedges into the supporting network, dismember separate sectors, seal off and then eventually destroy individual SITUATION. 26 Aug11.1

\ \ pockets of resistance. Single artillery pieces, up to 15cm in caliber, were used to lay down precise fire and cover the advance of tanks, which were in turn followed by infantrymen operating at close quarters and throwing grenades.”’

Isolated, and without hope of relief, the Japanese infantrymen and artillerymen fought on. Individual units attempted to battle their way out, moving east toward Lake Mohorehi under the cover of darkness. The pursuing Russians used searchlights to hunt for the survivors and ran them down with tanks.

Those IJA troops that stayed in their positions along the river were given special attention by the Soviet artillery. “The tactics of the Russians soon became apparent: isolated Japanese positions were mopped up, one after another, by ‘pillars’ of fire massed against individual targets for about two days. After wiping out one strongpoint, the (Russians) moved to the next.”“ The last Japanese stronghold to be overcome was Barunishi Heights. which overlooked the junction of the Halha and Holsten Rivers. On August 31, the 24th Regiment of the Soviet 36th Infantry Division reported that the mopping up was complete, and there were no longer any IJA troops west of Nomonhan that had not been killed or captured.

The Kwantung Army rushed reinforcements to the area in early September, but the Soviets had already stopped at the border line previously designated by Moscow. The battle at Nomonhan was over, but its effect on world events was just beginning. The Aftermath The military establishment in Japan was stunned by the outcome. as well as the cost, of the battle. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, a particularly bloody conflict, the UA infantry losses had been 17 percent: 28 percent during the heaviest fighting.” Of the 60,OOO Japanese involved at Nomon-ARMOR - MayJune 1993 han, the overall loses were an as: tounding 76 percent. Some UA infantry battalions lost over 90 percent of their effective strength. By comparison, the Russian losses were 11 percent.

Japanese officers investigating the disaster were forbidden to speak of it in public; surviving units were not allowed to return to Japan. The wounded were dispersed to quaran-tined facilities throughout Japanese-occupied China.

The outcome of the battle at Nomonhan had a direct impact on the political relationship of Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union during World War II. In March 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was in Berlin to sign the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. On his way home, he stopped in Moscow to sign a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. The Japanese were convinced they could not win a land confrontation with the Red Army. At the Moscow railway station, Stalin embraced the Japanese minister and assured him "We are both Asiatics. Japan can now turn south."'* n u s the stage was set for a direct confrontation between the Japanese and the Allied Powers in the Pacific.

In November 1941, when the German armies stood at the approaches to Moscow and requested that Imperial Japan lend its support with an offensive in Asia, the Japanese respectfully declined. Japan continued to honor its neutrality pact with the Soviets throughout the war, and as a result, the Russians were able to transfer 1,700 tanks, 1,500 aircraft, 15 rifle divisions, three cavalry divisions, and eight tank brigades to the beleaguered European front. I3 With all his other reserves gone, Zhukov, now commander of the defense of Moscow, was able to use these seasoned Siberian troops to cripple the German offensive and save the Russian capital. By February 1943, Zhukov, applying the concepts he had developed at Nomonhan, successfully destroyed the German 6th Army in the battle for Stalingrad. In this, and subsequent victories, his formula was the same: hold the enemy in the center with minimal forces, conserve his strength: then attack with overwhelming mechanized forces on the flanks, scattering the covering forces, driving deep into the enemy's tear area.

The climactic battle that occurred around the village of Nomonhan is important to the overall history of World War I1 and represents a significant stage in the development and use of armored forces. The Russians gained the upper hand through their superior use of maneuver, technology, logistics, and detailed operational planning. They did it so convincingly that the Japanese never attacked them again.

ARMOR - "Very few Japanese prisoners were taken. Large numbers were killed by the Soviet artillery, while others died facing the flamethrowing OT-130s or in hand-to-hand combat.

At left, an OT-130 flamethrower tank, a variation of the then-obsolete T-26. Unlike the BT-7 and later T-34, which were derived from the American Christie tanks, the T-26 was based on the British Vickers designs. Notes 'Cmx, Alvin D.. NOMONHAN: Japn */bid, p. 186. '/bid, p. 400.

Glynn. Gary, "Shadow On The Rising Sun, " 5M.loynahan. Brian. Claws Of The Bear, 1989, 6Coox, p. 580. 'Hogg. Ian V., ARMOUR IN CONFLICT, Against Russia, 1939.1985. p. 1024. 4 WORLD WAR I/. May, 1988. p. 46.

p. 113.

1986. p. 68.

8coox. p. 663.

9/bid, p. 999. "/bid, p. 757. "/bid, p. 917.

"Clark, Alan, BARBAROSSA: The Russian-Moynahan. p. 97.

German Confict. I941 - 1945.1965. p. 170. Gregory J. Samson was commissioned in Armor from the United States Military Academy in 1975. He attended the AOBC and the motor officer course. He served with the 1st Armored Division as a tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, company XO, and brigade maintenance officer. After attending AOAC, he was assigned to the Directorate of Training Developments at Fort Knox. He currently works for a major defense contractor.