Using “Push Packages” To Resupply Cavalry Operations

Using “Push Packages” To Resupply Cavalry Operations Replenishment by Exception Saves Time, Cuts Net Traffic by Captain Daniel A. Beach The friction of the battlefield often prevents units from reporting logistical requirements in a timely manner, if at all. Yet, this very activity that prevents reporting expends supplies. Does an S4 need a report to accurately predict what the needs of a troop will be? Is waiting for a troop’s exact ammunition status worth delaying their resupply for hours until the S4 establishes contact? Isn’t a push package of some ammunition better than none?

This article presents one successful example of a true push package logistics support system. The troop does not have to be in constant radio contact with the combat trains. Lengthy reports for required daily supplies do not clutter the Administrative and LQ-gistics (a) radio net. This system allows the logistics personnel in the squadron to focus on exceptions, rather than on every detail. The S4 and support platoon leader have the flexibility to deal with rapidly changing situations inherent to cavalry operations.

The base of this system is the development of individual vehicle basic loads. The S4 coordinated with the squadron fust sergeants and identified the supplies most likely consumed when deployed (see Figure 1). We developed the MlAl and M3 POL packaged products stockage first. The high density of these vehicles (versus M109s or M106s) provided more opportunity for quick returns. They also constitute the majority of the unit’s combat power.

Regular use and storage capacity were the main criteria for this. For example, putting turboshaft on each tank means crew members can add oil and continue the mission. This immediate maintenance is the converse of transmitting a request and waiting for the oil to come forward from the field trains.

The Class IV operational loading came next. Obstacle material provides each vehicle increased local security or the ability to emplace a point obstacle. Combining all mines and wire from an M3 platoon yields enough material to start a hasty obstacle. This operational load can support deliberate obstacle construction by reinforcing engineers with additional Class IV material. Three pickets are candy striped for marking fighting vehicle positions (see Figure 1).

Packing lists for the.support vehicles came next. The cavalry troop and tank company each have a specially tailored rate load suits the headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) or howitzer battery. Each driver stocks these items in his M978 HEMTT fueler’s storage box (see Figure 1). Extensive training at Fort Bliss and the National Training Center Class I11 and V load. A spa-ARMOR - MayJune 1992 MlAl Class 111 & IV Bask Load Quantity Item 8 4 1 1 1 2 5 25 1 4 11 Ouarts Turboshaft Quarts 30W Gallon FRH Gallon GAA Gallon CLP M21 AT Mines M18 AP Mines sandbags Box of Trip Flares Rdl of C m n a U-Shaped Pickets M3 Class 111 & IV Baslc Load Quantity Item 6 1 1 1 1 4 5 50 1 4 11 0-1W40 Gallon GAA Gallon GMD Gallon FRH Gallon CLP M21 AT Mines M1B AP Mines sandbags Box of Trip Flares Roll of Concertina U-Shaped Pickets M978 Packaged Product Bask toad for a Cavalry Troopmank Company Quantity Itom 48 24 24 6 5 1 2 24 24 6 Figure 1 OuartslW40 Tubes GAA Quarts Turboshaft Gallons FRH Gallons Antifreeze Gallon CLP Quarts OEA Quarts 30WT Ouarts 1 ow SGallon Cans of MAS

Class V Package for Cavalry Troops

SABOT

SABOT

I

SABOT

HEAT

25mm SABOT 25-mm HEI-T

TOW

TOW

I

2-m

SABOT

-

25mm Ha-T

I

50 HE

46 WP

I

I

120mm SABOT 1-m

HEAT

TOW

25-mm SABOT

4-2" HE

WP

SABOT

SABOT

25mm SABOT 2knm HU-T

50 CAL

7.62inm 4(knm HE 25mm HEI-T

LAWS

Fuzes Tank Company Round Count for Two M977s 120mm SABOT 120-m HEAT

.SO CAL

7.62-m

Smoke Gmnadeo

Figure 2

SABOT

HEAT

25-mm SABOT 25mm Ha-T 4 x

50 HE

46 WP

confirm that these configurations satisfy the great majority of unit the number of cans to six. The cans strap onto the M978 fenders without tome ratio of SABOT to HEAT. He keeps 25-mm ammunition in pure palrequirements. The presence of 1/4-ton trucks forced the strapping of ten MOGAS cans to the top of each HEMTI' fueler. Current fielding of the High Mo- bility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) leaves the 42-KW generator as the only MOGAS consumer. Therefore, current load plans reduce modification to the vehicle. The 3/3 ACR system requires two Class V packages due to the number of different weapon systems in a cavalry squadron. Figure 2 depicts a troop's ammunition configuration when loaded by pallets on the cargo bed of an MW7 HEMTT. Each driver loads 120-mm ammunition in a threelets and stacks them two pallets high to speed loading. TOW pallets stack two high also. Figure 2 also lists the tank company package round count. The 4.2-inch mortar round pallet requires tailoring to arrive at the mix depicted. We did not include any illumination rounds in this configuration. This is due to the density of ther- ARMOR - May-June 1992 mal sights in the MIAl/M3 squadron. The unit commanders deemed an anti-personnel/anti-vehiclehmoke round much more valuable than an illumination round.

The objective is to provide the maximum flexibility possible while meeting the combat unit's needs. Quick transfer of ammunition requires downloading some pallets on the ground. The recovery of empty pallets was not deemed critical when weighed against the increased amount of ammunition carried. We configured the M977s nearly the same. This provides a quantity of each type of ammunition in the event enemy fire destroys one of a unit's two M977s. This also allows for maintenance losses as well.

The Modified Table Of Organization And Equipment (MTO&E) effective 16 Oct 88 authorizes the howitzer battery six 5-ton trucks. Each truck has a 1.5-ton ammunition trailer. The new document (effective 16 Sep 89) authorizes six M977s. The organic ammunition section handles the battery requirements. The battery often finds itself attached or OPCON to a DS battalion. Therefore, this independent ammunition capacity is essential. Nonetheless, the support platoon can assist in this high tonnage requirement, if necessary.

Figure 3 depicts the distribution of HEMlT assets into LOGPACs for the 1988 and 1989 MTO&Es. Vehicle readiness or combat losses may dictate the use of extra HEMlTs from the field or combat trains to fill out a LOGPAC. These vehicles return to their respective location after reloading at the ammunition transfer point. Habitual relationships between M977/8 drivers and troopdcompanies prove very helpful to the timely execution of the LOGPAC.

The HEMlTs located in the combat trains provide great flexibility to the S4.

One option is immediate LOGPAC resupply for a troop establishing a screen. Prestock of ammuni- -LOGPAC Breakdown Element M9Tls M978s I Troop K Troop L Troop M Company Howitzer Battery HHT

Combat Trains Field Trains 2 2 2 2 0' 0 4 4 This figure reflects the 16 Oct 88 MTO&E. The suppart platoon is authorized 16 Mg77s under this document. The howitzer battery is authorized six 54011 dmpside trudcs, each with a 1 Ston ammunition trailer.

The 16 Sep 89 MTOCLE authorizes the howitzer battery six M977s for in ammunition s&n. The support platmn is authorized 13. This will1 necessitate the use of all but one M977 fram the field trains for a LOGPAC. Figure 3 tion is another possibility. Augmentation of the LOGPAC sent to a troop with unusually high ammunition or fuel requirements is also possible. However, their primary use is for emergency resupply. The S4 bases HEMlT use on the current tactical situation. An offensive mission may dictate a mix of four fuelers with one troop and one tank company M977 in the combat trains. A defensive scenario would dictate two troop M977s, two tank company M977s. and one M978. Prestocking ammunition in or near battle positions is also a consideration in defensive planning. Attachments to the squadron need special attention. First sergeants must plan for the ADA platoon operating in his area. For example, the K Troop supply sergeant can transport the Stinger missiles his troop needs on his supply truck with the normal LOGPAC. This prevents the attachment's limited resupply assets from traversing the battle area unnecessarily. The ADA platoon 5-ton truck must remain in the combat trains loaded with an emergency resupply of 20-mm and missiles.

Attachments integrate easily into the LOGPAC flow if the S4 teaches them the system. Attachment leadership must also participate in the system. The unit must give a copy of the unit Tactical SOP (TACSOP) to them. Unit leaders must provide extra instruction and coaching if new arrivals are unfamiliar with the TACSOP. Time spent with the attachment logistics leader pays handsome dividends. This system also facilitates the quick addition of Class IV support packages. Stake and platform trucks, sent by regiment to assist the squadron, move out with the LOGPAC at the normal time. The first sergeant simply leads it to his troop area, along with the rest of the LOGPAC. Attached engineers working in the area can pick up preconfigured barrier material pallets when they rotate through the LOGPAC service station. The established Logistic Resupply Points (LRPs) furnish a simple framework for positioning this material separately when time is short.

A daily meeting of the key support leaders at the LRP is essential. The CSM, first sergeants, S1 or S4, and ARMOR - MayJune 1992 squadron motor officer can briefly meet to coordinate and solve problems. The S3 can send additional graphics for distribution. This simply provides another opportunity to ensure information flow.

The support platoon leader conducts face-to-face coordination with the S4 at the combat trains while the LOGPACs are with first sergeants. He eats and then replaces the platoon sergeant at the LRP. Always manning the LRP is essential to solve problems and supervise local security. The support platoon leader/sergeant begins cross leveling HEMTT loads as they retum from the forward units. This prevents each HEMlT from traveling all the way to the regimental support area with needed material still aboard. The support platoon leader can dispatch a third HEMlT to a unit with unusually high fuel or ammunition requirements as well. Some minor weak points exist in the "push package" system. If a troop has only light contact, two full M977s of Class V may be more than is needed. A few additional rounds may end up in the first sergeant's track, in the M88 boom and strappea into bustle racks. Cross leveling between M977s at the LRP will provide another troop with needed additional rounds. At worst case, an M977 may have to return to the rear with ammunition. A unit's failure to communicate needs accurately can lead to wasted transportation assets.

The responsibility to maintain their basic load rests squarely on the shoulders of each vehicle crew. Vehicle commanders must constantly know the status of their basic load. Remind the driver to get those quarts of oil. A tired M978 driver will want to sleep instead of chasing down turboshaft or tapping off his MOGAS cans. Discipline minimizes these performance problems.

The strengths of this system are many. The greatest benefit is that leaders are confident in a replenishment system that fills their requirements. Taking orders from each troop for each type of ammunition and POL overwhelming majority of these requests do not change. It is U M ~ C ~ S -sary to send a request for two fuel HEMlTs each day. Units always need 120-mm/25-mm sabot, HEAT/HEI-T, TOWS, 4.2-inch, etc. Address exceptions, rather than every small detail. The M977 driver knows how much of each type of ammunition to load upon returning to the regimental support area. He has the load plan taped to the inside of his vehicle door. The driver doesn't have to wait for the request to pass through the combat trains, field trains, support platoon leader, and support platoon sergeant. These people are concentrating on vehicle maintenance, or refitting for the next LOGPAC. This makes more time available for planning and inspecting. It also minimizes turn-around time for reloading support vehicles. The squadron could decide to pass the maintenance reports and requests through the supply sergeant. Or, it may designate the flow of maintenance documents between the troop and squadron motor sergeants. It is important to recognize, however, that a redundancy exists that can remedy a failure in whichever the primary procedure is.

This system normally requires minimal reporting to execute. The first sergeant knows precisely what types and quantities of supplies are enroute to his troop. He knows if he has a critical issue that requires the use of the radio. He must request only excep tions. This reduces radio traffic. The system functions when distance, or the loss of a key element, disrupts communication links. An effective SOP cuts out unnecessary radio transmissions. This reduces enemy radio direction-finding opportunities. The S4 handles the exception or emergency via FM. packaged product is unrealistic. The This system simplifies command and control. The planning process is streamlined because each element knows exactly what it will receive. LRPs along the main direction of attack can suffice if planning time is at a premium. The support platoon sergeant has more important issues to deal with than whether I Troop wanted 37 or 38 rounds of SABOT. This push package system has served 3/3 ACR quite well. The conclusion of the squadron's NTC rotation resulted in the observer/ controller's grudging acknowledgment of two successes. First, no ammunition rack was ever less than full before a battle. Second, maneuver was never inhibited for lack of Class III. The NTC is by no means the ultimate test. It is, however, the most realistic training for combat that logistics systems receive. The standard support package that meets the supported units' requirements is an effective, flexible, and responsive resource for success. Commanders are confident that fuel, ammunition, and other supplies required for sustained operations will arrive when and where needed. That is the bottom line for tactical unit support.

Captain Daniel A Beach graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1984. He served as a platoon leader, troop XO, and liaision officer for 3-7th Cavalry in Schweinfurt, Germany. Following the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he served as S4, 3/3 ACR. He is currently the S4, 135th MI Battalion (CEWI) and a graduate student of history at the University of Kansas.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992