Bernard Law Montgomery: A Question of Competence

Bernard Law Montgomery: by David Craig In 1946, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery was elevated to the loftiest position in the British military, replacing his friend and mentor, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). His tenure proved to be disastrous because of his abrasive personality,’ and he stepped down in 1948. Without Brooke to shield him, Montgomery could not cope. Even the royal family found his megalomania difficult to tolerate? Curiously though, it was his narcissism that kept him in the limelight during the Second World War in spite of his gross incompetence as afield commander who knew little of high mobility warfare.

Interestingly, the debacle at Dunkirk, in May 1940, propelled the career officer Montgomery to prominence in British military circles. As commanding general of the British 3rd Infantry Division, Montgomery acquitted himself extremely well in Belgium, even though he never saw a German tank. He made the remark later that he felt a well-trained and mobile infantry division could handle the finest Panzer? Yet it was common knowledge that German armor had won the victory. Colonel Baron Hans von Luck, who was with Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division at Dunkirk, recently surmised that, had Hitler not issued his famous stop order to von Rundstedt, the entire British Expeditionary Force

- including Montgomery’swell-trained 3rd Infantry Division -would have been overrun and destroyed!

Role In the Dleppe Raid After the devastating defeat of the BEF at Dunkirk, Montgomery was chosen as Southeastem commander, under Geneml Sir Bernard Paget of Home Forces. Although this is not widely known, one of his major tasks was the planning of the Dieppe Raid, first called Operation RUITER, and later, Operation JUBILEE. In one of the first of many blunders that revealed his ignorance of modem mobile warfare, Montgomery took it upon himself to change the plans for armored flanking attacks north and south of Dieppe, intended to isolate German forces in the city from their reinforcements, while infantry launched its simultaneous frontal assault. Instead, Montgomery eliminated the flanking attacks, changing the operation to a frontal infantry assault with supporting armor coming in be-A Question of Competence hind the infantry? JUBILEE was a total disaster. Had the raid been carried out as originally planned, with a clear understanding of the value of armor and infantry working together, it might well have succeeded. As it was, 5,000 Canadian soldiers were lost, and German propagandists had afield day!

Montgomery, however, escaped criticism because, two weeks before the raid took place, he had been ordered to El Alamein, in North Africa7 Blundering In North Africa By July 1942, the British commander in North Africa, GEN Sir Claude Auchinleck had managed to stop a year-long retreat with his battered and bruised Eighth Army at a dirty little Arab town called El Alamein. He formed a defensive line from the Mediterranean Sea to the impassable Qatarra Depression and thwarted a determined Erwin Rommel from taking Cairo and the Suez Canal. After the battle had ended, and a very frustrated Afrika Korps had fallen back to regroup and await supplies Disaster at Dieppe: 5,000 Allied Troops Lost British Churchill tanks lie destmyed and abandoned on the rocky beach at Dieppe after the Germans soundly trounced the invading Allied troops. The Churchills were being employed in their first combat operation. The author contends that Montgomery misused his armor as supporting artillery for the invading Canadian infantry. and fresh troops, the “Auk” started re-ing a page from his opponent, Rom-forming his army to go on the attack. mel, who had employed the same He abandoned the traditional format techniques with his highly successfu! of infantry forward with armor in sup-panzers.8 But before he could finish port to one of armor and “lorried in-making the changeover, he was igno-fantry” attacking together in tandem. miniously sacked by Winston Chur-Essentially, Auchinleck was borrow-chill, who was pressed for a military victory to keep him in political office. Montgomery was given command of the British Eighth Army?

Montgomery, a traditional staff officer from the First World War, was an advocate of the set-piece battle and attrition warfare. He believed, as did his mentor Alan Brooke, that armor was to be used only as mobile support artillery for the infantry.” He was appalled when confronted with Auchinleck’s new configuration and quickly assumed that Auchinleck was setting his army up for a mad dash to the banks of the Nile and anew defensive stand. Montgomery notified a very frustrated Churchill that it would take him two months to train the totally “demoralized army and mold it into a cohesive force, one capable of grappling with “a very tricky” Rommel.”

In the combat that followed, 13,500 British troops fell victim to Montgomery’s WWI-style set-piece battle of attrition at El Alamein. Rarely in the history of warfare was military incompetence more evident than in the North African desert in October 1942 through May 1943. Men were slaughtered needlessly advancing through minefields in the face of murderous North Africa: Victory at a High Cost Despite his victory in the desert, Montgomery learned little of tank tactics and less about mobile warfare. Here, PzKw Ills of Rommel’s Afrika Korps race to reposition themselves in Libya. machine gun crossfire. Armor advanced only reluctantly, and completely unimaginatively, after the infantry had cleared the minefields. Six hundred of the 1,200 British tanks were quickly destroyed or immobilized by Rommel’s 200 war-tom and scarred tanks. Finally, after 11 days of brutal punishment, Rommel, with 30 tanks left and dangerously low on fuel, started a slow retreat westward across the North African desert. The Afrika Korps, virtudly eliminated as a viable force, still continued to outmaneuver Montgomery and evade his entirely predictable, bludgeoning advance. Finally Rommel, after six months of highly skillful evasive action, escaped to fight another day,” while praise was heaped on Monty for having soundly trounced the Desert Fox.

The tank had played only a supportive, inefficient, and unimaginative role under Montgomery. He knew nothing of tank tactics and would not permit his subalterns to express innovative ideas, even though Rommel, with much inferior forces, was dancing elusively before him.

Comparison with a Master Montgomery’s performance in Sicily, as well as in Italy, was equally uninspiring. The Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, while not epito-mizing the alliance’s finest hour, did offer an example of the proper use of armor, which was under the command of the master tanker, George Patton. Shunning Montgomery’s traditional approach, which had served the British so well during the Boer Wars, Patton pressed his armor into action shortly after landing at Licata and Gela on Sicily’s southern coastline. He raced north for Palenno, than east to Messina, arriving the day before Montgomery’s troops entered the city from the south. Montgomery sustained 11,843 casualties in the 38day campaign, while Patton lost 8,731.13 Sicily: Another Plodding Performance British soldiers unload ammunition and vehicles on the first day of the invasion of Sicily. July 10, 1943.

Patton, however, had covered a distance three-and-a-half times that of Montgomery with greater exposure to enemy opposition.

Montgomery was relieved of his command of the British Eighth Army in Italy, although his slow and unimaginative performance earned him the reputation in Great Britain for being prudent with the lives of his troops. He returned to England to relieve Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan (COSSAC) from his 1943 preliminary planning for the assault to Normandy.

The decision to appoint Montgomery as ground commander for the cross-channel invasion was a political one. Harold Alexander was better qualified because he was Army Group commander in Italy, but Churchill really had no choice. He would have been keelhauled by the British people had he chosen otherwise, because Monty was considered the messiah, the savior of the British Empire since El Alamein, and he could do no wrong.14 Montgomery did not attempt to persuade them to the contrary. Overcautious At Caen The key to the success of the Normandy invasion was the early capture of the city of Caen, nine miles inland from the seaside resort town of Riva-Bella, at the confluence of the Orne River and the sea. Caen, Normandy’s major road and rail center, was vital to Allied strategy and had to be taken on the first day. Beyond Caen, the plains of Falaise to the southeast of the city were important also. The flat land was suitable for airfields and ideal for tanks. Failure to take Caen the fmt day would dangerously compromise the invasion.”

ULTRA code-breakers determined that Rommel had positioned the refitted 21st Panzer Division (which had been destroyed in North Africa and had been reconstituted of mostly inexperienced troop)'^ southeast of the city. It was the only obstacle facing Montgomery’s forces, other than light beach defenses. The British, however, faced one major obstacle that came close to destroying them and over ARMOR - MayJune 1992 which they had no control -the weather.

A storm of considerable severity struck the English Channel on June 4, 1944. Eisenhower summoned his meteorologist, who advised him that the storm would abate long enough to allow the invasion to proceed before the storm closed in again. Eisenhower issued the command that set NEFTUNE in motion. Miraculously, the weather lifted, and the invasion armada was set irrevocably under way. I7 The tides from the storm surge, however, were very high. Bradley and the American forces decided to launch their assault on Omaha and Utah beaches at 0630 hours, while Montgomery and the Canadian and British forces opted for 0730 hours to achieve a higher tide with less beach to cross before reaching the dunes. The higher tides had some effect on the American divisions, but Sword Beach was a disaster. Where the beach at Riva-Bella is normally 30 yards wide at high tide, this day the beach was a scant 30 feet," hardly enough room to accommodate a Sherman tank!

A traffic jam of horrendous proportions developed, with tanks stalled in long lines of supply ehicles.' No priority had been given to armor even though, according to Montgomery, three armored brigades were committed to take Caen before the 21st Panzer Division could counter?' As it was, without any supporting armor, the British 3rd Infantry advanced cautiously to within three miles of Caen before encountering elements of the 21st Panzer Division at 1400 hours. Fortunately for the British and Canadians, confusion and uncertainty in the German high command had delayed the 21st Panzer Division from counterattacking until 1400 hours, and the 12th SS Panzer Division stationed nearby was not released until 1500 hours!*' The 3rd Infantry was stopped in its tracks, and the prize of the city "Questions quickly arose in SHAEF headquarters regarding Montgomery's competence. Eisenhower was angered and dismayed with Monty's performance, and recrimination raged "... of Caen would remain elusive for the British until late July, when Omar Bradley's Operation COBRA and George Patton's Third Army were loosed h m the strangling hedgerows of Normandy.

Armor was absolutely essential for the capture of Caen and the open plains to Falaise. Yet Montgomery and his commanders treated armor like a stepchild. Confronted with narrow beaches and abnormally high tides, with beach defenses all but eliminated by the commandos earlier, a skilled tank commander would never have put up with a h-afftc jam. Without question, he would have pushed his armor over the embankments and into the village streets." But Montgomery's tank commanders we= not permitted any freedom to act on their own. The potential for disaster was there, with 21st Panzer in the shadows, and 12th SS Panzer not far away. Warehousing tanks on the beach came very close to spelling disaster for the entire invasion, and perhaps the outcome of the war. The GOODWOOD Fiasco On July 18th, Montgomery launched a massed tank assault against fixed enemy positions in a herculean effort to finally take the ravaged city of Caen. With 3rd Infantry holding flank positions, Montgomery forged his armor east from Benouville and the Orne River and south to Cagny in the general direction of Falaise. Before the assault, 7,000 tons of bombs were dropped on German emplacements, cratering the area and creating a moonscape surface, not unlike the battlefields of the First World War. This hampered the progress of his tanks. Colonel Baron Hans von Luck, Prussian regimental tank commander of the 21st Panzer Division, veteran of the Polish, Dunkirk, Russian, and North African campaign?^ now faced elements of Montgomery's unsupported armor with four 88-mm antiaircraft guns. He persuaded a recalcitrant AA crew to use their guns to pick off the advancing tanks, one by one, at close range. Within minutes, von Luck, with his four 88-mm guns, had knocked out 16 Shermans."

Von Luck saw no infantry advancing with the armor and was not concerned with small arms fue taking out his gunners.= This action, Operation GOODWOOD, was a disaster, with the Germans still holding the high ground at Bourgebus Ridge, as the British suffered 5,537 casualties and lost 400 tanks, 36 percent of their armored strength in France?6 Questions quickly arose in SHAEF headquarters regarding Montgomery's competence. Eisenhower was angered and dismayed with Monty's performance, and recrimination raged uncontrolled among both his British and American staff members to send Monty packing. But Re made the political decision to keep him, a decision most military men found difficult to A Bridge Too Far -What Could Go Wrong, Did In spite of his incompetence, Monty remained in command of 21st Army Group. Sequestered alone in his captured van, he contrived the plan for Operation MARKET-GARDW. ARMOR - MayJune 7992 Three airborne divisions would be dropped to secure five bridges along a single road, 64 miles long, from De Groote to Amhem?' The three divisions would be relieved by a double column of tanks (Guards Armored Division) forging northward to arrive at Amhem in no more than two das.2 Murphy's Law prevailed. The tanks had no mom to maneuver. The: te& on each side of the mad was marshy and unfit for tanks?'

As a consequence, the Germans picked off the advancing armor like ducks in a shooting gallery, causing delay after delay. The tanks arrived at Amhem seven days too late?' The plan amply illustrated a complete abscence of understanding of the use of armor even in its most rudimentary aspects. The casualties reflected how appallingly bad the plan was; more than 17,000 in the nine days of Operation MARKET-GARDEN?^

Was Montgomery the Victim Of Ossified Doctrine?

Traditionalism, drummed into the intellectually limited33 Montgomery as early as the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and the Staff College at Camberley, proliferated and was exacerbated by the British military establishment. Montgomery'straining did not include tank tactics or strategy, other than peripherally, because the British Army traditionalists did not consider it acceptable. Tanks were to be used only reluctantly as close support mobile artillery for advancing infantry?

Montgomery was permitted only a passing acquaintance with armor and had no training whatsoever in high mobility warfare. While his credentials were considerable as an infantry commander, he knew nothing of armored warfm. The cost in human life and treasure for his incompetency is beyond estimate and will never be known.

Notes 'Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The FMI Years Of The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976. (New York. 1986). p. 727. 'lbid.. p 693. 'Hamilton. Nigel. Monty: The Making ofa 'lntenriew with Colonel B m Hans von %obertson. Terence, Dieppc: The Show and 'Ibid,. pp. 461469. 'Villa.

Brian Loring. Unauthorized Action, Mountbanen and the Dieppe Raid. (Ontario. 1989). pp. 264-267. Villa is convinced that Mountbatten acted on his own to aciivate the Dieppe raid. that he had neither the approval of Brooke or Churchill. The king ultimately insulated his cousin fran his earned criticism. 'Bameg Correlli, The Desert Generals, (New Yo&, l%l). p. 218. 'lbid.. pp. 223-226. ''Some historians believe this was the most serious mistake that Churchill committed. Auchinleck was a highly Rspected soldier with a track record in the desert, while Montganery knew nothing of desert warfare. Ihe 'Auk' had just stopped Rommel and his Afrika Kop and won the first battle of El Alamein only to be relieved because he lacked the charisma and flash Churchill needed to flaunt a military victory.

"Montgomery did not like Auchinleck. was critical of him. and gave him no credit for anything. For that matter. Monty did not get along with any of his peen. His subalterns, however. considered him messianic and bought his nar-cissistic behavior as reflecting genius. '*Ellis. John, Brute Force. Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War, (New York. "D'Este. Carlo. World War I1 in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. (Chapel Hill, North Cam l i.

1990). p. 77.

General. (New York. 1981). pp. 353-354. Luck. July 18. 1987. the Glory. (London, 1963). p. 79. 1990). pp. 256-288.

I4Bameg pp. 235-250. ''D'Este.

Carlo, Decision in Normandy. (New York. 1983). p. 63n. "hwning.

David, The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generak at War. 194045, (New York:. 1977). p. 177.

"Ambrose. Stephen E.; Eisenhower: %Mer andf'residcnt. (New York, 1990). pp. 137-139. "Hastings, Max, Overlord: D-Day and the Bank for Normandy. (New York. 1984). p-113. DEste. Decision in Normandy, p. 129. "D'Este. Decision in Normandy. pp. 129-130. mlbid., p. 146. *'Downing. pp. 177-180.

PBotting, Douglas, The Second Front. (Alexandria, Va.. 1978). p. 57. The scale model of Sword Beach indicates several points where ARMOR - exits could have been readily made. The sea-wall could have been blown by the a n m dos to permit passage of tanks. and more than likely with less hazard because of the absence of land mines. =Van Luck. Hans, Panzer Commander, (New York, 1990). It is most rewading to find a man stil alive (age 77) who had participated in so many campaigns in the Mediterranean and European theatres.

Hastings, p. 234.?ntewiew with Colonel Bamn von Luck. %astings. p. 236.

27Ambrose. Stephen E., Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Amy. Presi&nt-Elect, 1890-1952. (New Yorlc. 1983). p. 320. gRyan, Cornelius, A Bridge Too Far, (New Yo& 1974). p. 10. There are several fine accounts relating the events of the nine days of MARKETGARDEN. In my opinion, Ryan's is the most thorough. stbid.. p. 166.?bid.. p. 30. "lbid.. p. 564.

"Hamilton. Nigel. Master of the Banlcficld, Monty's War Years 1942-1944. (New York, 1983). p. 137.

"Fraser.

David. Alan Bruoke. (New Yo&. July 18. 1987. %.id., p. 599.

1982). p.

112-121.

David Craig left college to enlist in the Army in December 1942, began active service in February 1943, and served as a combat infantryman in France until wounded in September 1944. He was awarded a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart for meritorious conduct in combat and was medically discharged in May 1945. He received a BS degree from Butler University in Indianapolis in 1947. After retiring from a career in real estate, he earned a Master's degree in history from the University of New Orleans in May 1989. He now teaches history on occasion at Tulane University as well as other schools and writes for military periodicals.