Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting

Virtually all branches of the U. S. Army generated lessons learned as a result of Operation DESERT

STORM, particularly Armor. The ideal tool for desert combat, Armor met with extreme success in Iraq and Kuwait. With the lessons we learned there, we have the potential to be even more successful, not just in the desert, but in any environment. One battle, in particular, showed us -the 1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment -a score of strengths, as well as areas for improvement. On the night of February 26,1991, we fought against the 29th Brigade of the Iraqi Tawakalna Division in what we now call the Battle of 73 Easting (or the Battle of the Tawakalna). The Tawakalna, part of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard, was established in a blocking position in an attempt to allow retreating Iraqi forces to their rear an escape to the north. It turned out to be a costly attempt for the Iraqis.

Much thought went into the organization of 1-37 Armor prior to that night battle. When we arrived in theater in December 1990, Battalion Commander LTC Edward L. Dyer made the decision to exchange some equipment with theater reserve in order to better equip our scouts and first sergeants for their missions. The scouts initially had three MI13 APCS and three M901 ITVs. We turned in the ITVs and in return drew six HMMWVs from theater reserve.

These six HMMWVs, plus the first sergeants’ HMMWVs from B, C, and D companies, were given to the scouts and organized into three sections, each with three HMMWVs. Each vehicle had an M-60 machine gun mount and a crew of three scouts, one with an M16A2 rifle, one with an M203 grenade launcher, and one manning the M-60. Thus organized, the scouts had a lower profile and were better suited to provide intelligence to the commander and to avoid decisive engagement with the enemy. Each of the first sergeants in companies B, C, and D then received an MI13 AF‘C, providing them with armor protection on the battlefield.

It also became apparent that the M577 was an unsuitable vehicle for a TOC during offensive operations. TOC personnel found they could operate more efficiently out of a HMMWV with lapboards. They used the battalion commander’s vehicle, which had a three-net capability. In early February 1991, 1-37 Armor reorganized into an armor heavy task force. We exchanged N1-37 Armor for C/7-6 Infantry. LTC Dyer chose not to task-organize further into company teams, because, if we had to clear trench systems of large numbers of dismounted troops, he wanted our infantry concentrated under one command.

On the afternoon of February 26, TF 1-37 advanced east as the right flank task force in the 3rd Brigade wedge, and as flank task force for 1st Armored Division. TF 7-6, a balanced task force, led the brigade, and TF 3-35 covered the left flank. Our mission was to attack in order to destroy the Republican Guard Medinah Division at Objective Bonn. At about 1600, we received in-flight reports from the brigade’s air scouts who spotted about fifty tanks and other vehicles in revet-ments along our axis of advance 35 kilometers west of Objective Bonn. We obtained six-digit grids that outlined their battle position and distrib-ARMOR - uted this information down to tank Commander level.

The discovery of such a large and previously undetected enemy force in our sector came somewhat as a surprise. Before the ground war began, our S2 kept us informed daily of all shifts of major units, BDA inflicted by the Air Force, and other pertinent information. His sources included Air Force reports that were usually less than 24 hours old, and aerial photographs that enabled him to template enemy positions down to individual vehicle fighting positions. Our superior intelligence gave us an enormous advantage on February 25 in our fight with the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division, and in 1st and 2nd Brigades’ Battle for AI Basayyah. For both of those battles, all vehicle fighting positions, bunkers, buildings, and obstacles were templated and exact numbers of vehicles known.

Before Operation DESERT

STORM, the Tawakalna had been templated about fifty kilometers northeast of their position on February

26. They had recently moved out of the northern position, making our previous information inaccurate. The enemy’s new templated position straddled the operational boundary between 3rd Brigade, IAD, and 2nd Brigade, 3AD (Map 1). USAF A-10 strikes pummeled the position, and 2nd Brigade, 3AD began to attack with artillery and illumination in its sector to the south. Third Brigade approached to within 10 kilometers of the position.

Visibility worsened, due to a sand-s t m mixed with rain. Thermal sights effectively cut through the haze, but identifying vehicles by type beyond 1500 meters was virtually impossible. 193O-2ooO Direct support artillety (3-1 FA) began to prep the enemy’s position in 3rd Brigade’s sector using 155-mm DPICM. The brigade changed to a Battle of 73 Easting 1930-2000 26 FEB 91

Easting \ El 1.0 k m w I 3 AD 88 Eastlng line formation, bringing TF 1-37 up with TF 7-6. TF 3-35 remained in the rear as the brigade reserve. In addition, Task Forces 1-37 and 7 4 both brought their teams/companies on line. TF 1-37’s scouts moved to the right flank to Screen and maintain coordination with 3rd AD. Enemy dismounted troops to the front opened fm with machine guns but were ineffective. TF 7-6 responded by engaging enemy vehicles at long range with Bradley-mounted TOWS.

Throughout the war, direct support artillery and close air support were effective weapons for the deep attack. In desert environments, we must be prepared to use these assets primarily at brigade level. Of course, we will continue to tfain artillery call-for-fm, at least down to the tank commander. One cannot overemphasize the value of rehearsal. Days of battalion-level battle drills in the sandstorms of Saudi Arabia paid immense dividends in Iraq. Even before the ground war began, we were accustomed to operating at night and in bad weather, with few halts and no terrain features to guide on.

Combat leaders must be skilled navigators, but even the most expert navigator had little chance of knowing his location, calling accurate indirect fm, or reporting enemy locations and obstacles in the unchanging nothingness Map 1 The enemy’s new templated position straddled the operational boundary between 3rd Brigade, 1 AD, and 2nd Brigade, 3AD.” of southern Iraq. Therefore, we had to use GPS (Global Positioning System) and LORAN (Long-Range Navigation) devices. AU together, TF 1-37 had 26 individual navigational devices. Three went to each tank company, six to the infantry company, four to the scouts, and one each to the mortar FDC, the TAC, TOC, LNO, S4, S3, and battalion commander. We had an adequate number of devices, considering the openness of terrain and the ease of guiding on someone who was navigating with a LORAN or GPS.

Such systems would even have value on European terrain, expediting and providing greater accuracy for maneuver, indirect fire, and reports. In Operation DESERT STORM, there was no need to distribute the devices down to tank platoon leader level, but in Europe, we should because of the increased probability that tank platoons will operate out of visual contact of someone with a LORAN or GPS. If such systems do become more widely available, leaders must remember that a GPS is not a substitute for traditional methods of navigation. We ARMOR - Maydune 1992 should continue to stsess standard land navigation techniques.

2000-2030 TF 7-6 was set at the 68 North-South grid line, oriented toward the enemy position 2.5 kilometers to the southeast (Map 2). TF 1-37 was on TF 7-6’s right flank, orienting directly east on the same position. TF 1-37’s combat trains were at the 63 grid line, five kilometers to the west, while company combat trains continued to bail the companies.

Meanwhile, the pace of the fight began to accelerate. D/1-37 observed enemy troops 900 meters to its front advancing in 3-5-second rushes, and destroyed them with coax. TF 7-6 and TF 1-37 reported additional troops and vehicles at 20004000 meters. They destroyed these targets with coax, TOW, 25mm, and tank main gun fire. Four unidentified vehicles fled to the east of the enemy’s position and were not engaged, due to the extended range (4.04.8 kilometers). Meanwhile, 2nd Brigade, 3rd AD began a ground attack in the adjacent sector to the south.

Direct support artillery ceased fire on the objective, while MLRS rockets began hitting deep targets to the east. Thud Brigade called OH-58Ds forward to determine battle damage, and TF 7-6 fired illumination rounds to improve surveillance of the objective.

The Bradley has proved to be a capable weapon system. Not only was its TOW an effective tank killer, but its 25-mm gun was also capable of destroying or disabling most Iraqi tanks and PCs.

After the battle, we discovered that our artillery did not hit the intended ARMOR - May-June 199: Battle of 73 Easting 2000-2030 26 FEB 91

I E 1.0 krn 73 Eestlng Y Map 2 Battle of 73 Eastlng 2030-2230 26 FEB 91

I N 1.0 krn H!

Easting 1 AD Mw 3 AD I 68 Easting Map 3 6 I I ENEMYPOSmON

2OOO HOURS, FEBRUARY m, 1991:’ a I a 73 IED

AD 3 AD El w M Map 4 m e artillery strike was eflecfive psychological/y. During the strike, the lraqis believed they were under air attack, fled from their vehicles, and sought shelter in their underground bunkers Most didn’t realize they were under ground attack until it was too late. Many were killed by direct fire as they attempted to remount their tanks.” target. In fact, the entire barrage struck an empty area of desert several hundred meters beyond the enemy positions. The difficulty of gauging distance in the desert, in addition to the poor visibility conditions, made artillery range adjustment difficult. Nevertheless, the artillery strike was effective psychologically. During the strike, the Iraqis believed they were under air attack, fled from their vehicles, and sought shelter in their underground bunkers. Most didn’t realize they were under ground attack until it was too late. Many were killed by direct fire as they attempted to remount their tanks.

2030-2100 Third Brigade Commander COL Daniel Zanini instructed TF 1-37 to sweep across the objective and halt 3 kilometers past the far side. TF 7-6 would lift fires and remain set in overwatch (Map 3). 1-37’s company trains and TOC would also remain set as the tanks advanced on line. The infantry company followed lo00 meters to the rear of the tanks in order to police up any troops the tanks missed. We advanced at a slow 5-10 kph rate. By 2100, at least eight enemy vehicles were burning.

Forty-five tanks assaulting on line can wreak havoc on the enemy, but are difficult to control during limited visibility and combat conditions. We had rehearsed this play, known to us as “Dragon’s Roar,” several times in Saudi Arabia, and we used it in our battle with the 26th Infantry Division on February 25. These experiences greatly simplified execution during the battle, as did continual cross-talk between companies and platoons. Some commanders opted to use a company commanddirected nets, rather than platoon nets, and in some cases this expedited command and control. In other cases, it merely added to the confusion. When using a company commanddirected net, if individual tanks encounter problems or observe something that other tanks do not, you have the potential to have 14 or more people on one net, and command and control is lost. On the other hand, if an operation is simple enough that a lot of feedback is not expected, a commanddirected net will allow the commander instant access to each crew, speeding information flow and response to his order.

The commander must carefully assess his unit and the specific situation before he decides to use a commanddirected net.

Another measure we took to facilitate command and control was to use filtered light. While could then use the flashlights for signaling.

21 00-21 30 The attack continued toward the east. To our front we faced dismounted troops in trenches and numerous armored vehicles in defilade, consisting predominantly of T-72s and BMP-1s. We fired at most of the vehicular targets at ranges of 2200-2800 meters, but engagements beyond 3000 BMP-1 armor pmved no match for M1 A1 or Bradley fire. in Saudi Arabia, we removed taillight covers on all vehicles, mounted colored flashlight filters on the inside, and remounted the coven. The lights served not only to identify a vehicle’s location, but its unit as well (the color of one taillight identified the vehicle’s brigade: the other, its battalion). More than one filter was used for each taillight, in order to make them almost invisible to the naked eye, but they appeared as bright as a beacon with night vision devices. One company took the idea a step further and stacked filters in their flashlights until the light was invisible to the naked eye but visible with PVS-7s. They meters were not uncommon. One MlAl on the move hit a BMP with a HEAT round at 3250 meters. The longest shot with a confirmed kill was 3750 meters. The Iraqis returned fm, chiefly with small arms and machine guns, but also with T-72 main gun and/or dismounted antitank missile teams. Apaches joined in the fight off the flanks of TF 1-37. Five dismounts surrendered to D/1-37.

There were a lot of gunnery lessons here. First, because one of the MlAl’s advantages is its stand-off ca-ARMOR - pability. we should consider long-range gunnery training. Our current tank gunnery tables are adequate training for European terrain and should be retained. However, we need to add long range tables specific to desert gunnery. In addition, we need to incorporate high fidelity friendly targets into gunnery and penalize tanks that shoot them.

AFV identification definitely was difficult. Gunners could easily acquire targets, but could rarely identify vehicle type past 1500 meters. Part of the problem was the sandstorm, but many soldiers pointed out that we need sights with higher magnification. The M60-series tank had a 13-power sight, and the MIA1 definitely has a higher quality fue control system than the M60. A 20-power sight would be ideal. This, or an IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) system, would greatly assist The MlAl’s fue control system dominated the battlefield. Boresights held for 300 kilometers of travel with only MRS updates needed. Despite the non-stop nature of operations, very few fire control systems malfunctioned. Even our main gun ammunition appeared quite sophisticated when compared with the pig-iron sabot rounds the Iraqis used We had no problem knocking the turrets off T-72s almost every time. In the offense, gunners should be in charge of the turret, acquiring and engaging targets, while the TC controls his vehicle or subordinate unit. If tank commanders and platoon leaders spend too much time looking through their GPSEs, they get tunnel vision and can’t see where their tank or platoon is going in the big picture. During defensive operations, the TC will have more opportunity to assist the gunner with acquiring and laying the gun on targets, but on the move, the us.

One of B Company’s M1 Als hit by enemy fire awaits recovery. TCI must keep his attention on the overall situation.

Lastly, the concept of the “fighting XO” worked. Keeping the company XO forward and talking to the task force commander, while the company commanders stayed on their internal nets, proved effective.

2130-2200 We fought a close battle on the objective. As we maneuvered around burning vehicles and bunkers, we lost four tanks to enemy fire. The fvst was D-24, which was struck in the left side. The explosion kilIed the engine and injured the loader and gunner.

Tank

Commander S K Anthony Steede immediately began the evacuation of his crew. On the ground, he maintained radio communication via an extra-long CVC cord. While Gunner SGT James Kugler led the men to the safety of another tank, SFC Steede remounted the vehicle and attempted to restart it. Unfortunately, the engine was severely damaged and he was forced to abandon the tank. At about the same time, a tank from Company B took a hit in the rear. The engine quit, and all power controls ceased to function. Tank Commander SGT Christopher Rhett said later, “From my perspective I knew it wasn’t a mine. It definitely felt as though we were hit.”

SGT Tracy Sells, the gunner, added, “It rattled our cages. In fact, it knocked the TC and loader up in the air and back down again.” As a precaution, the crew immediately engaged the Halon fire extinguisher system, which put out any existing fire.

Suddenly, the tank was struck again. The crew evacuated and took cover about 50 meters away as the tank caught fire. Eventually, they were able to flag down a passing tank from Company D for assistance. On the right flank, Company C had problems of its own. The first tank hit, C-12, was disabled, but the crew escaped uninjured and took cover under the front slope. Nearby, 1st Platoon leader, 2LT Albert Alba, saw the explosion and made his way to the scene. He directed suppressive machine gun fires on the suspected enemy position and, upon spotting an undamaged BMP-1 in the immediate area, destroyed it with a sabot round. His loader, PFC Michael Hamouz, dismounted and ran to (2-12 to offer assistance.

Suddenly, the company commander’s tank, also in the area, was struck. As the crew attempted to dismount, the tank was hit by a second round, throwing the commander and his loader from the turret to the ground. The crews from the two disabled tanks ran to 2LT Alba’s tank. When all eight crewmen were safely on board, Alba hastily employed smoke, executed a Sagger drill, and left the area. He soon rejoined the rest of Company C to the east. ARMOR - MayJune 1992 I..

The Abrams is a rugged Upon hearing that the CO had beem hit, 1LT Jeff Fuchs, Company C executive officer, immediately assumed command of the company until the commander's return, 20 hours later. Secondary explosions of burning Iraqi vehicles threw shrapnel and other debris in all directions as pillars of flame rose to a ceiling of black smoke.

Virtually all enemy vehicles in the area were destroyed, but dismounted troops remained hidden in trenches and bunkers. Companies C and D both reported receiving small anns fire from their rear as they swept toward the east. Fortunately, physical clearing of the trenches wasn't necessary, the Iraqis surrendered in force and came forth voluntarily. But if the infanby had been ordered to dismount from its Bradeys to clear the trenches, and if our previous artillery attack had been on target, friendly forces would have h d to contend with unexploded CBUs (cluster bomb units) and DPICM bomblets from air and artillery slrikes, in addition, to Iraqi bullets.

Speculation continues concerning what shot our four tanks. The three most probable answers are T-72 main gun, dismounted antitank missile, or Apache-launched Hellfire missile. The fact that Apaches were operating to our rear and a witness's reports of high round trajectory support the friendly fire theory. However, ballistic reports suggest that 125-mm HEAT rounds produced the damage on some of the tanks. Visual examination of others reveals an obvious sabot hole. Overall, the physical evidence implies the friendly fm possibility cannot be excluded. that T-72 fire took Out OW tanks, but I! tank. Within days, we re- f-l covered three of the four disabled MlA2s with an A "beheaded" T-72, destroyed by 1-37 AR at 73 Eastmg. With parts we had on hand M-88 recovery and enough time, two of those could have been driven off the battlefield. Only one of the tanks was a catastrophic loss.

More important, the Abrarns is a survivable tank. After our four tanks were disabled by enemy fire, ten crew members emerged almost unscathed and the other six had non-life-threatening injuries. One oftdiscussed protective feature of the MlAl that is worth mentioning is the commander's hatch. In the open-protected position it provided excellent protection against raining shrapnel while still allowing clear 36Odegree visi- MIA1 fire blew off the deck of this BMP-1. bility. every tank is a must. When we ctossed the objective, our combat trains were still several kilometers to our rear. Without personnel immediately available to stabilize casualties, their status could have been much more critical.

We already train tank crew evacuation, but we also need to address actions after evacuation. Soldiers should have more than just their personal weapon and Kevlar when they hit the ground. Their rucksack should be packed so that the soldier can survive on his own for a period of days, and should be easily removed. In addition, an extra-long CVC cord should be hooked into one of the crew stations so that dismounted crews can main-A combat lifesaver on tain radio communication without remounting the tank and drawing enemy fire.

Lost leader drills proved their worth to Company C. They should be incorporated into all field exercises. Finally, the use of DPICM and CBU use must be addressed in the operations order. Due to the large number of unexploded bomblets, an area attacked with DPICM or CBUs should be considered a minefield capable of killing dismounted troops and disabling wheeled vehicles. We must take p t care when considering the use of DPICM or CBU in the attack, as this may preclude or make more hazardous the use of dismounted infantry to clear the objective. ARMOR - MayJune 1992 “Our biggest problem was transport tu the rear. We put prisoners in whatever was available: Bradleys, trucks, scout HMM WVs, engineer MI 13s, even ACE buckets.” 2200-2230 Iraqi troops surrendered in large numbers to our infantry, and soon we had over 100 EPWs. 1-37’s combat trains rejoined the tanks to the east and MEDEVAC procedures commenced for casualties.

Commanders need to consider command and control of the combat trains when separated from the line platoons. In addition, first sergeants don’t need to be on the battlefield in HMMWVs; they should have armored vehicle protection.

EPW operations need more thought. Our biggest problem was transport to the rear. We put prisoners in whatever was available: Bradleys, trucks, scout HMMWVs, engineer M113s. even ACE buckets.

At 2300, the infantry reported the area clear, and at 0050 the next mom-ing, the brigade reformed and continued the attack east. Final BDA for TF 1-37’s sector of the Battle of 73 Easting included 21 T-72s, 14 BMP-1s. two 57-mm AA guns, one T-62, and an MTLB destroyed, and over 100 EPWs. Our personnel status was zero KIA, ZCTO MIA, six WIA. TF 1-37 added two m m successful battles to its history by February 28th. When the war ended, we found ourselves a few kilometers inside liberated Kuwait.

We can attribute the success of 1-37 Armor, and the U. S. Army in Operation DESERT STORM, to many things, not the least our flexibility and ability to adapt training and other operations to ever-changing situations. We must apply lessons learned from DESERT SHIELDbTORM to current training if we want to maintain an advantage on the battlefield because, next time, our enemy may not give us time to train in his backyard. In March 1991, the officers of 1-37 Armor had a chance to go back over the 73 Easting battlefield to conduct officer professional development and discuss lessons learned. ARMOR - Second Lieutenant Richard

M. Bohannon is a 1990 Distinguished Miliiary Graduate of Texas A&M University, and holds a B. S. degree in Biochemistry. He is also a graduate of the Army Airborne School and the Armor Officer Basic Course. During Operation DESERT

SHIELD/STORM, he served in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait with 1-37 Armor as a M1A1 tank platoon leader. Since then, he has been a liaison officer for 1-37 Armor and is currently the executive officer for HHC, 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID, Germany.