Light Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Role

' 2 s airrent(.. demonstrated in SWA, the erid of fighting niay signal the start of very toiigli niissioris. This platoon's qperieitce in the peacekeeping role following JUST CilUSE highlights importarit Iessoiis." - Ed. I am a platoon leader in A Troop, 2-9 Cavalry, the only ground cavalry troop in the 7th Infantry Division (Light). On a two-month deployment in Panama, we caught the last days of Operation JUST CAUSE, but we spent most of our time in Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. PROMOTE LIBERTY was the follow-on to Operation JUST CAUSE and focused on stabilization of the country and aid to the new government. During PROMOTE LIBERTY, we had a significant peacekeeping (PK) role.

Our experiences in Panama taught us many lessons that we, as a platoon, feel would be generic to light cavalry in a PK role. This article is about lessons learned, important skills needed, and significant leadership challenges we faced. Hopefully, these lessons should provide thought points for other junior leaders, officers, and NCOs. Should some of these points hit home, then units need to determine which of these areas their people, especially junior leaders, have already been schooledltrained in, and then fill in the gaps with their own training. Certainly, as Armor branch restructures itself to keep pace with the changing world situation and changing Army, this type of mission will become more and more common for its members.

DeploymenVDuties in Country At the time of our deployment, our troop at Fort Ord was structured with three platoons and a headquarters section. Each platoon had six HMMWVs with a S O cal./TOW mix. We deployed as a troop, separated from the aviation and headquarters troops, which make up the rest of the squadron. Airlift restrictions (lack of airplanes) limited us to taking only three vehicles per platoon and a small headquarters slice. We left our SOs and TOWS at Fort Ord, taking only our M60s because we didn't want to appear overly aggressive.

Panama was cooling down, and apparently headquarters felt that the introduction of such weapons systems might send the wrong signal. The lesson learned is don't expect to go in country with all of your assets. External restrictions, especially in a high visibility and politically volatile situation, such as an intervention, may dictate you enter a zone already severely reduced in combat effectiveness.

Once in country, we were attached to different infantry battalions and brigades. For the most part, they made maximum use of our mobility. With our self-sustainability, ability to iiiove ourselves quickly to remote areas, and our ability to cover large operational zones, commanders quickly realized what an excellent economy of force unit alight cavalry troop can be in this type of mission.

Throughout the deployment, the threat consisted primarily of criminal activity in the villages and towns, and suspected guerilla activity in the interior. While there was always that threat of a guerilla strike, policing criminals and dealing with everyday problems of the people was by far the largest reality. We always had guerrillas in the ARMOR - MayJune 1991 back of our minds, but they rarely surfaced when military forces were present. At all times we talked to the people - who were very friendly and receptive - trying to glean information. Our work was made difficult by the fact that we worked in conjunction with the Panamanian Police. The people do not trust them, and when they were in our vehicles, the people would not give us any information.

Our types of missions covered a wide spectrum, as did the type of terrain in which we found ourselves working. One day, we would be conducting mounted and dismounted patrols through city streets, the next day mounted and dismounted patrols through countryside, mountainous terrain, or double- and triple-canopy jungle.

The first two weeks focused on security missions north of Panama City, patrolling suburbs and barrios to control the criminal element that had gained strength and weapons in the absence of authority following the invasion. We also spent time looking for and raiding weapons caches, questioning the people for information on Noriega's men or drugs, enforcing curfew, and pursuing leads. While these first two weeks mainly found us in the city and the barrios, at one point our platoon of three vehicles found itself on a mountain road, with jungle too thick to turn around, looking for 30-40 guys spotted earlier with AK-47s. The troop was spread very thin. For the close quarters (village and jungle) in which we found ourselves during the first two weeks, the M60 was probably the best weapon. this, we were tasked with reconning the entire province. As with the first two weeks, each platoon worked independently, conducting three-vehicle patrols. Often out of commo range, the platoons were basically autonomous. We worked as a troop only when more strength was necessary to conduct a raid on a suspected weapons cache, or to pursue information regarding armed men. Our missions in Cocle took us on long patrols over poor roads and rough terrain. Here, the S O cal. would have been best, along with the TOW day and night sights (we did take the TOW night sight from Ord, and used it hand-held). We often worked deep in the interior, where there were only Indian natives. Just as often, we worked in the various villages and towns closer to the Interamerican Highway, which crossed the province near the coast. In these villages and towns lived the more wealthy Pana-manians, and often there were some who spoke English.

Any Spanish-speaking capability we had was invaluable, as were any medical personnel we had with us who could help the people in the interior where doctors were non-existent. When the word went out there was a medic present, it was not uncommon to see lines of women with children waiting hours to be seen. In summary, we spent the seven weeks of field time performing a wide scope of missions. Each person and vehicle performed approximately 3,500 miles of patrols, throughout savannah, mountain, swamp, jungle, plain, and urban terrain.

The last five weeks took us out of the city and into the interior. We were working out of Rio Hato, once the home of Noriega's elite, the Macho de Monte. Our basic troop mission was security of Cocle Province (60x90 km), and as part of Lessons Learned and Areas Deserving Special Emphasis: 1 --*..

A rK mission will not be a free-fire, multiple-target environment as a European heavy threat scenario "Our possible encounters almost always included innocent civilian presence on the battlefield. Any threat would be wearing civilian clothes and be difficult to distinguish from the general populace." might be. In Panama, the conduct of operations was affected by strict Rules of Engagement (ROE) placed on the occupying American force. Our possible encounters almost always included innocent civilian presence on the battlefield. Any threat would be wearing civilian clothes and be difficult to distinguish from the general populace. We had to designate marksmen on each vehicle to ensure controlled fire.

When on a patrol or roadblock, the senior person was required to decide when the lock-and-load. warning-shot, and fire-to-kill criteria were met as laid out in the ROE. Often, this would be a sergeant vehicle commander or patrol leader. Without positive control over the element, it would be easy for a tense situation to escalate beyond control.

Due to the number of civilians, the heavy use of suppressive fire was impossible, and recon by fire was not an option. Selective and highly accurate fire was the only choice. Also, because of the number of civilians and because of the distance we were working from our parent elements, artillery support was non-existent. At times, we had close air support on a one-and-a-half-hour string, but even then, total loss of commo when deep in the interior made that anon-entity. Only once did we actually have an AC-130 on station above us, and a general had to approve its use.

In field problems, movement is rarely restricted, and platoons can ARMOR - MayJune 7997 maneuver abreast almost at will. In Panama, movement was restricted to the roads. Almost all of the property bordering the roads is fenced, and because we were there to "win their hearts and minds," we wouldn't go maneuvering through their farms. Once engaged, this restriction would go out the window, but up to that point, it is one worth noting. It is known that one of the essentials in low-intensity conflict is domination of key roads and cities. That knowledge, coupled with being restricted to tight roads due to consideration for private property, led to predictable routes and limited maneuverability on our part - prime ambush situations. Training in action drills, fighting from the march, hasty target designation, and dismounting fire teams would be helpful here.

In Panama, recon ops were slow and thorough. Always on our own, there was never the need to move quickly to clear an area for units behind us. The missions were usually to move to a previously unpatrolled area and to see what was there, what the people's attitudes were like, etc. Against the small elements that were suspected to be in the area, a very slow and detailed recon was essential. Often, this would include driving up every little dirt road, dismounting along river beds to look for signs of camps, and stopping and talking to many people, etc. An example of this detail was a mission near La Chorrera. There, we, along with a battalion-sized mix of light and mech infantry, spent three days searching a 15-by-20-km area for six men with AK-47s who had fired on an infantry patrol. The enemy wore civilian clothes, and we suspected that they often used the riverbeds when they moved. It took constant mounted and dismounted patrolling, to include screening, to cover our portion of the area. Due to the number of civilians walking or driving on the roads, we had to conduct most of our patrols in service drive, making it easier to hide from us or ambush us.

Skills As cavalry, we were often the first into an area, and many times the only unit to ever be in the area. This meant that we were expected to have and to perform all types of skills to adequately clear and gather intelligence on an area, to pursue suspected or known enemy or criminals, and to follow up leads on weapons caches, drugs, etc.

We constantly used MOUT skills in Panama. Units iizzist receive MOUT training. Contrary to the "MOUT School" training we had exposure to at Fort Ord (which, in a nutshell, says, clear every room with a frag grenade and blow holes in roofs and walls for entry), the MOW training we receive needs to be taught from a peacekeeping perspective. There needs to be civilian decoys in some of the rooms, and entry and room clearing techniques need to be tailored to minimize damage and innocent casualties. Nine out of ten times, you'll be chasing ghosts, and the house or building will be filled with women and children and no weapons or drugs.

Dismounted patrolling skills also proved critical. To properly clear an area, look for caches, or pursue suspects required dismounted patrols for many kilometers into a jungle, up a riverbed, or through city streets, slums, or villages. Junior leaders need to receive a lot of exposure to dismounted patrolling. Against small groups of dismounted guerrillas or criminals who know the area, it is impossible not to dismount and still execute your mission effectively. Should you be able to get your hands on squad radios (PRC-l26s), they could be very useful. Also, work on SOPS for quick dismounting. You may have to leave a vehicle and chase someone through streets without having had time to discuss it. You need to know where your buddy and vehicles will be.

Aside note along the lines of dismounting is vehicular crewing. Our TOSrE only gives us three-man crews. In Panama, four-man crews proved a must! You have got to be able to leave a gunner and driver with the vehicles as they follow the route of the dismounted patrol. This means to have a dismounted patrol of more than one man, there needs to be at least two people from each vehicle available. For the present, stacking crews might be the answer. For the future, the TO&E needs to be revised.

Each crew should be capable of performing maintenance well above operator level, and of improvising temporary solutions to problems. At times, being able to do so enabled ARMOR - May-June 7997

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Posters played apart in winning hearts and minds. us to return to base when otherwise we would have been stuck out overnight in a possibly hostile area, awaiting a mechanic's arrival. We were also able to assist the mechanic who was trying to support a whole troop's vehicles with limited resources. In peacetime, drivers should have maximum exposure to their vehicles while maintenance is being performed on them at all levels.

Also, due to the extensive distance we operated from our troop and its medic, a strong grasp of first aid by every man was imperative. Medics were hours away, and MEDEVAC Creativity was always useful, and often necessary to improvise and overcome the lack of resources available. For example, we found that the mine detectors not only served to help locate weapons caches, but also served to show the people that we were serious and that it was better to just tell us where the weapons were buried. Also, for the missions we performed across Cocle Province, basic skills are still very important. The ability to quickly recon and classify a route was at times essential due to the length of some routes. Lack of a close parent/support unit meant when you intimidate them by rolling into their town with full cam0 paint, kevlar, flak vest, and weapons leveled. The signal it sent was that we were afraid of the people and didn't trust them. What they needed was to forget about the militant terror image they had been haunted with for so long, and begin rebuilding. their nation. As a leader, finding the medium ground between safety of your men and developing a low-key, working, trusting relationship with the people was always a challenge.

The third major leadership challenge, and by far the most difficult, unit need to be schooled in low-intensity conflict and PK scenarios, problems, and skills. Units must then take articles- such as this one, from people who were there, and fill in the gaps. The ultimate responsibility is with the unit, though branch schools need to stay on top of the latest experiences and ensure their teaching covers the lessons learned. These types of missions will only become more common. Junior leaders must receive early these points and potential problems to ponder, so they have plenty of time to prepare themselves and their units for this type of deployment.

Leaders have got to be put into highly stressful training environments. Work with restrictive ROE and deal with the command and controi problems that result.

Operate with no indirect fire support, limited mobility, and less than ideal tactical conditions. Leaders need to be forewarned that, due to the number of civilians and subsequent number of your own people hovering around for fear of an incident, they will be micromanaged from the highest levels.

Units need to train with MILES laser systems and civilian decoys; train for highly restricted, -precision marksmanship; train alternatives to indirect fire. Train to fight from the march, and to conduct detailed recon where the objective is only a one- or two-man OPFOR. Train those skills that will be predominant emphasized in a PK role, to include MOUT, and dismounted patrolling. So much of the heart of preparing and training for this type of mission lies in the creativity of the unit. One final point worth noting. Your men may resent the ROE. The ROE in Panama was restrictive, but it served to make us aware of the danger to innocent civilians. After a week in country, we came to get to know the people, and Lo realize what super people they are. We really got to like and respect them, and we would have felt very bad had any of them been killed by lack of discipline or preparedness on our part. On the other hand, to lose one of our men due to inaction or restrictions would not be easy to live with. It is a fine line you will tread in this type of mission. Overall, the best advice we can give you is to be flexible. If you are employed the way we were, you will not be expected to perform strictly "cavalry" missions. Your firepower, mobility, and self-sustainability will have your parent unit using you in many varied economy of force missions. The PK mission we took part in as alight cavalry troop/platoon epitomized the fact that a 29D must be the jack of all trades. This article is the product of platoon AARs covering the entire deployment, and, hopefully, it will provide some junior leaders, NCOs, and officers, some points of thought and some possible options to prepare for this type of role. To prepare for a PK role, NCOs and junior officers in armor/cavalry need to have exposure to the following ideas, and should be offered training options in preparing for the mission.. Extensive ROE will restrict a unit's ability to perform. 0The threat will be few, far between, and will probably look the same as the general populace.. Heavy fire, and indirect fire, may be either nonexistent or heavily restricted.

0You may have to deploy with few of your ma.jor combat assets. 0 Often politics will outweigh your ability to fight your platoon. 0 Maneuver will be severely restricted, and predictable to the enemy.

0Operations will often be very slow, and very detailed.

Interaction with the populace will be a must.

Tactical maneuver may be sacrificed for safety.

0The extensive presence of innocent civilians will cause most of your operations and actions to be carefully planned, executed with tight command and control, and often performed at more risk to your life than normal.

MOUT is a must, with civilian decoys.

Four-man crews are a must. 0Every soldier must be fluent in combat first aid!

Drivers/crews should be able to perform maintenance above operator level, and to improvise.

Every

NCO/junior officer should be able to communicate quickly and effectively with air assets. oCommo, and commo improvising/fhg, must be second nature. 0The basic cavalry skills, with an emphasis on reconnaissance and engineer skills, are still essential. 0 Be aware that significant leadership challenges will face you. primarily the. need for tight discipline, the balancing of safety of men versus appearance to the populace, and the need to keep the level of alertness up among the men. First Lieutenant Erick A. Reinstedt graduated from West Point in 1988. He has attended the Air Force SERE program in Colorado; Jungle Operations Training School at Ft.

Sherman, Panama; and AOBC and the Scout Platoon Leaders Course, both at Ft. Knox, Ky. He is currently a platoon leader in A Troop, 2-9 Cavalry Squadron (Recon), Ft.

Ord, Calif.

ARMOR - May-June 7997