Riders on the Storm A narrative history of the 1-4 Cav’s campaign in Iraq and Kuwait - 24 January - March 1991

G-Day, 24 Feb 91 For Operation DESERT STORM, the division’s mission was to destroy lead elements of the Iraqi 26th Inf Div, establish a breachhead, pass the 1st UK Armored Division, and on order continue the attack (Figure 1). The division placed its cavalry squadron under the operational control (OPCON) of 1st Brigade for the operation’s initial phase. At 0420 hrs, we began our zone reconnaissance north of PL Vermont, which was the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. First Brigade arrayed 1-4 CAV on the left, TF 2-34 in the center, and TF 5-16 on the right. On our left flank, 312 ACR assigned us a liaison officer, CPT Delgado. The squadron collocated the field trains with the lOlst SPT Bn.

We moved forward in zone and remained tied in with TF 2-34. The scout weapons team (SWTs) reconnoitered forward and maintained contact with our flank units. By 1000 hours, we sat along PL Plum with no enemy contact. At that time, the Forward Area Support Team (FAST) began refuel operations under the control of the command sergeant major and the HHT commander. This operation took little more than an hour.

During refuel operations, CW3 Winters’ SWT flew over the Iraqi positions to our front. This single act caused several Iraqis to surrender. By 1030 hrs, B Troop had taken 21 prisoners. The B Troop first sergeant consolidated the prisoners at the refuel site. The command sergeant major, HHT commander, and flight operations personnel assisted in the evacuation of this group of prisoners, which included several officers. At the same time, CPT Tovsen’s SWT, who relieved CW3 Winters’ SWT, engaged and destroyed an AML scout car. Due to the lack of any significant resistance, MG Rhame ordered the division to continue the attack at 1500 hrs. An intense artillery barrage began at 1430, TF 2-34 and 5-16 began breaching operations at 1500 hrs.

The squadron consolidated near Attack Position Dragoon, in preparation for our passage through the breach.

At 1530, 1st Brigade ordered the squadron to follow 1-34 AR through the breach, clear OBJ 15K and secure PL Colorado. A and B Troops passed through the breach at 1630, and began to collect several enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). The Iraqis surrendered as soon as we approached their positions. A Troop received some indirect fire at the breach site, but continued to drive north.

During the squadron’s movement forward, we did not search all of the bunkers, fearing booby traps. The squadron placed a higher priority on controlling the friendly forward line of troops and preventing fratricide between friendly flank units. The squadron was along PL Colorado by 1730, then tied in with 1-34 AR on the right. We could not tie in to any 1st Brigade unit on our left, due to the brigade commander’s desire not to move TF 5-16 during darkness. TF 5-16 would attack OBJ 12K the following morning.

After dark, the A Troop CP captured roughly 80 EPWs, numerous weapons, and assorted equipment. The squadron captured an additional 34 prisoners, and destroyed four trucks, an AML, and three AT guns (105mm). Total number of enemy Breaching the Iraqi Defenses EaA

3. Screen PL Colorado killed is unknown. Total distance covered was 35 km. We rearmed/ refueled that night.

COMMENTS: DPICM on the battlefield posed severe problems for dismounts and wheeled vehicles. This made refuelbearm operations extremely hazardous, especially at night. The bomblets injured personnel and destroyed tires. SWT teams were invaluable for reconnaissance operations and maintaining contact on our flanks. The Global Positioning System greatly enhanced navigation.

I ta Figure 2. G + I 25 Feb 9

1. Screen of Breachead

2. Move to Attack Position 1 --: I G+1,25 Feb 91 -Cloudy/Overcast First Brigade ordered the squadron to move our screen line NE to screen the Corps Restrictive Fire Line (RFL) no later than O900 (Figure 2). TF 5-16 seized OBJ 12K at 0800. We tied into 1-34 AR to our right and TF 5-16 to our left. While the division passed the 1st UK Armored Division and an artillery brigade forward, we maintained the screen and destroyed the enemy equipment abandoned in the area. The B Troop engineers destroyed several bunkers and ammunition stockpiles on OBJ 15K.

At 1500, the division ordered the squadron to prepare for Contingency Plan (COP) Jeremiah 11. 1-4 CAV came under division control and occupied attack positions A and B along PL New Jersey at 1900. At 2000 the squadron commander briefed COP Jeremiah 11, which required the squadron to conduct a zone recon forward of the division, as it moved to contact. During that evening, refuelhearm actions were reduced due to the extremely hazardous conditions posed by DPICM and CBU bomblets.

Total distance traveled was 10 km. The field trains remained with lOlst SPT Bn - 25 to 30 kms distant. The squadron XO, in conjunction with the S-4 and HHT commander, decided to continue the FAST concept. This was a fortuitous decision, given events to come.

COMMENTS: 1:25O,OOO overlays allow too much margin for error among units from different divisions. 1:25O,OOO maps must be accompanied by a list of points that define boundaries. 1:100,000 maps would be better.

G +2, 26 Feb 91, CloudyFiainy During the night, the 1st UK Armored Division to our south had significant enemy contact. In order to give the 1st UK maneuver room and prevent fratricide, the division’s zone was cut half of its width (brigade-size zone). 3d AD was to our north, with 4-7 CAV as the flank unit.

The squadron departed from its attack positions at 0315 to occupy PL Omaha before the division’s LD time of 0500. The squadron led the division’s movement in zone (Figure 3). We encountered no initial enemy resistance, only scattered pockets of enemy, who gave themselves up as we approached. The troops disarmed and passed several EPWs to the rear. A Troop encountered a series of enemy bunkers and trench networks that the Iraqis abandoned. Visibility was very limited (500-600m).

By lo00 hours, we closed on the rear of 2 ACR along PL Abilene. 2d ACR was conducting an attack east of PL Abilene from north to south against what they believed were elements of the Republican Guards Tawakalna Division. During the zone recon, A-25 encountered and destroyed an abandoned T-62 and a ZSU-23-4.

At 1400, the squadron commander met with the CG, who gave the directive to contact 2d ACR and coordinate the night forward passage of the division. MAJ Burdan, the S-3, coordinated the passage. Additionally, we established and maintained contact with 4-7 CAV of the 3d AD. The passage began at 2130. The squadron’s mission was to pass the division’s combat elements, then screen the division’s north flank during the attack to OBJ Norfolk. Total distance traveled was 120 km.

Morrison, HHT commander, directed two critical refuel operations. He timed these to minimize disruptions of the squadron’s momentum or the Division Movement to Contact G+2 26Feb91

2. Screen PL Abilene

3. Flank Screen division’s movement. All units completed refueling within one hour. The squadron finished the day’s action with full fuel tanks, prepared to continue the advance forward. At 1700, CPT Morrison returned to field trains vic PT7709 to refuel the M978s. He began a hazardous night movement with 1SG Colangelo and five M978s to link up with the combat trains. Total distance: 60 km, with an uncertain enemy situation. The division and 2d ACR demonstrated remarkable discipline during the forward passage of lines. Poor visibility kept the squadron from fully utilizing the air scouts. We had rain and fog in the morning and a dust storm in the afternoon. G + 3, 27 Feb 91, Cloudy/Ground Fog We started moving to the division’s northern flank at 0130. The squadron positioned fuel forward to top off the tanks before our movement east to OBJ Norfolk. The division stouued at OBJ Norfolk. ARMOR - MayJune 7997 -The squadron set at the 70-85 north-south grid line.

The squadron commander in HQ66, the S-3 in HQ63, the FSO and ALO in HQ34 went forward at approximately 0400 to inspect the screen lie in preparation for continued operations (See Figure 4). B Troop reported engaging and destroying a T-55 to its front. As the command group a p proached the screen line, HQ63 spotted a T-72 at close range in turret defrlade, with turret traversing. Upon backing up, HQ63 acquired the T-72 and an additional tank, a T-55, as well as numerous dismounts. Keeping the tanks under observation, the command group requested assistance from a B Troop tank. After maneuvering to the T-72's right flank, the B Troop MlAl destroyed the tank. HQ63 destroyed the T-55 with 25mm through the turret and hull. Upon destroying the tanks, the numerous dismounts in the area took cover. The command group displaced, as B Troop acquired additional T-72 tanks in the same vicinity. B Troop commander sent 2LT Lowndes with two M3A2s and two MlAls to search out and destroy the tanks. B Troop reported spotting a red and green star cluster, followed five minutes later by artillery fire on their positions. The troop went to MOPP 4 and tested for the presence of any chemical agents. Artillery also landed near the combat trains and A A A A A

..

- _ - _

FAST. The area had not been cleared by 2d ACR.

While in MOPP 4, 2LT Lowndes' sections maneuvered and engaged five tanks. SSG Robinson killed two tanks with TOWs, and SGT Mar-bach killed three tanks at point blank range with his tank's main gun. Upon completion of this engagement, B Troop's test for chemical agents was negative. B Troop commander gave the "all clear." At 0515, the squadron commander pulled the screed line back because of contact with the T-72s in prepared positions. The squadron commander and S-3 decided to attack the positions once all the squadron's forces were set (Figure 5). At 0615, the squadron attacked the enemy position, with A and B Troops on line. First Platoon, A Troop was the first with contact, and destroyed two T-72 tanks with TOWs. As A Troop continued the -.

By 0715, the squadron had reached its lit of advance, as A and B Troops continued to destroy enemy vehicles in the area. The command group went back into the area where the troops had encountered the tanks earlier in the morning. Both the T-72 and the T-55 were destroyed. HQ63 noticed another T-72 in hull defilade with an Iraqi in the turret. When the enemy dropped down inside the tank, HQ66 destroyed the tank with a TOW at 150m.

The squadron commander called off the attack at 0830 hours after it appeared all enemy elements in the area were destroyed. For two hours the squadron had methodically moved and destroyed 11 tanks, artillery pieces, fuel, and cargo trucks. We refueled our tanks while waiting for the division to resume the attack. The brigade commanders and CG discussed in detail their fuel status and expected rates of advance before halting for resupply. ARMOR - MayJune 1991 Figure 6.

K Division Attack Eastward G +3 27 Feb 91 1 and 2. Flank Screen; 3, Cut Road At 0930, the squadron resumed the moving flank screen (Figure 6). A Troop led the screen, followed by B Troop. During the extremely fast-paced move, A Troop destroyed 23 tanks, 25 APCs, and numerous bunkers, many of which appeared abandoned. Additionally, A Troop disarmed and pushed south more than 100 EPWs.

At 1330, the CG ordered the division to continue the attack NE of PL Berlin to prevent the Iraqi Army from retreating from Kuwait City north to Iraq. The brigades’ objectives were to the northeast.along the main Basra-Kuwait City highway. The squadron would continue to screen the division’s north flank, north of 2d Brigade.

The squadron arrived at PL Berlin at 1230, where it conducted refuel operations. HQ 66 then noted vehicle movement on a ridgeline 500m from the squadron. The S-3 ordered B Troop to send a team to investigate. 2LT Karns led the scouts and tankers from B Troop and destroyed one BMP, one BTR, and a rocket launcher that were attempting to flee the area.

At approximately 1300, the combat trains passed through what appeared to be an unoccupied defensive position. Seven enemy soldiers surrendered to CPT Harmon and the combat trains. The EPWs indicated that there were more Iraqi soldiers in the surrounding bunkers too injured to walk. CPT Stokes and the maintenance section used the AMV to clear the immediate vicinity, while LT Butler and Dr. Hanson, with escorts, proceeded to the wounded in the bunkers and treated their wounds. The combat trains stopped, passing ground ambulances from 4-5 FA, which evacuated the wounded. The trains continued forward at 1430 to establish contact with the squadron ground elements.

The attack continued at 1430. SWTs reconnoitered forward and to our flanks. Mr. Perkins’ SWT engaged and destroyed several armored vehicles while supporting the squadron’s moving flank screen. The squadron passed a heavily fortified, but unoccupied, defensive position. The position had reinforced (concrete) berms, trenches, and bunkers. The squadron lost contact with division, but relayed through 2d Bde our position and objective coordinates. At 1500 hrs, the TOC, led by the squadron executive officer, MAJ Wimbish, which was moving with 2d Brigade, departed into hostile territory to link up with A and B Troops. Enroute it by- \ passed numerous fortified areas, captured three enemy tanks, and disarmed 93 Iraqi soldiers.

Upon approaching our objective at 1630, the squadron commander directed B Troop to establish a screen line west, and A Troop east of the Basra-Kuwait City highway (Figure 7). A SWT under CPT Peters, scouted ahead of A Troop and reported personnel and vehicles moving northward as well as what appeared to be a bunker by the road. As A Troop approached the road, it observed several vehicles and many personnel moving north along the main road. The squadron commander ordered A Troop to secure the road lOkms south of the Kuwait-Iraq border and cut the line of communications. Upon receipt of the order, CPT Pope ordered 1st Platoon to lead, followed by 2d, 3rd, mortars, and trains.

At approximately 1700, 1st Platoon reported contact with numerous enemy dismounts, tanks, and APCs along the highway (Figure 8). The Iraqis appeared to have stopped before continuing north. Unlike the previous vehicles, the enemy either manned or attempted to man their equipment.

As the enemy spotted 1st Platoon, several vehicles attempted to move north. One T-55 attempted to traverse on A14, which immediately Figure 7.

Attack to Cut the Road to Basra 1600 27 Feb 91 /!/ ARMOR - May-June 7997 U Figure 8.

A Troop Cuts Basra-Kuwait City Highway 1700 27 Feb 91 m s! destroyed the Iraqi tank. Farther north, A15 destroyed the lead BMP, effectively blocking the road. With the road now blocked, CPT Pope instructed 1st and 2d Platoons to move northeast across the road, destroying all enemy vehicles in their path.

As 1st and 26 Platoons continued to engage vehicles, each platoon began to gather a greater number of EPWs. The A Troop commander ordered 2d Platoon to establish an EPW collection point vicinity of his M3A2. At approximately 1830 hrs, elements of all platoons began to deliver EPWs to the collection point. During this time, all elements were still engaging vehicles and equipment. Eventually, A Troop collected about 450 EPWs. By this time, night arrived, and the situation became even more confusing. With the majority of enemy vehicles destroyed, the commander ordered a section from each of 1st and 2d Platoons to move north and establish security northeast of the troop area.

As the scope of the task facing A Troop became too great, the squadron commander ordered B Troop to abandon its screen line and move to assist A Troop. The squadron proceeded to set up a hasty defensive position, preparing for either a possible enemy counterattack from the north or a large armored force attempting to break out to the north. Both A and B Troop’s temporary EPW holding areas continued to grow. The TOC informed 2d Brigade of our position, situation, and enemy assessment. We were informed that the VI1 Corps commander halted the division’s attack due to the presence of the 1st UK Armored Division to the south. Once the division halted, 1-4 Cav was not only the sole controller of this key highway, but also the easternmost unit in VII Corps.

Enroute, CPT Morrison and CPL Hall captured eight Iraqi soldiers. In addition, CPL Hall later singlehandedly captured 20 heavily armed Iraqi soldiers.

With the combat trains in position, maintenance, support, and HQ personnel began to secure the area and take additional prisoners walking up the highway. The combat trains assumed control of the EPW site in order to allow A and B Troops the manpower to better secure the squadron’s perimeter.

The medical platoon immediately set up the aid station to treat the wounded EPWs, and summoned the Jump Aid Station from the TOC. MAJ Hansen, CW3 Harston, and 2LT Butler worked diligently to treat more than 200 Iraqi casualties. Fortunately, an Iraqi and a Kuwaiti doctor provided much needed assistance. Working throughout the night, this team of professionals saved many lives. Little water or food was available because of the ex- * I-- & I:.--A alert all night. Discipline and mission focus prevailed; we sustained no friendly deaths or injuries. Squadron engineers and soldiers from the combat trains and field trains handled EPWs in an exemplary manner. Squadron medical personnel and the squadron chaplain treated EPWs as if they were their own. FLT OPS, FARP personnel and the support platoon worked all night, repositioning units for future operations. TOC personnel remained calm and in control, while maintaining the vital communications link to the division. Air troops worked all night preparing the aircraft for an early morning launch.

It became obvious upon examining the EPWs that the Iraqis themselves mistreated many of their own countrymen. Some were old men of 50 or 60; others, boys of 13 or 14 years of age, pulled from the streets of Basra and pressed into the service. They had been students, artists, writers, and teachers. The squadron was lucky that we cut the road to Basra during a period of limited visibility. We were 30 kilometers in front of our division, with an Iraqi division 12 kilometers to the north. Hill 4.66 was a SCUD site (located beside the airfield), and enemy personnel found on the hill had a commanding view of the squadron’s positions. G +4, 28 Feb 91 The division placed the squadron under the operational control of 2d Brigade at 0600. We captured about 1,400 EPWs and 700-900 weapons and demolitions. We air evacuated 15 injured Iraqis. We could not get additional rations, water, or blankets for the EPWs, but we gave them what we could. It was announced that a cease-fire would go into effect at 0800, later changed to 0723. Second Brigade linked up on the ground with A Troop at about 0900 hrs (Figure 9). One infantry company, 2-16, was to help guard POWs. Engineer ACES built a POW berm. We pushed out the screen in accordance with the 2d Brigade plan and consolidated. There were no squadron casualties. We hit three mines, placed enemy KIAs in body bags, and continued to police up enemy weapons for destruction. Final count was 2,098 EPWs, 1,400 weapons, munitions, and many destroyed vehicles. COMMENTS: Because of the large quantity of unexploded munitions on the ground, no movement was allowed after sunset. G+5, 01 Mar 91 At 0240 the squadron commander received an urgent call from the CG to move into Iraq and secure the Sahan Airfield (QU550370) for the upcoming cease-fire negotiations. Our mission was reconnaissance; we were not to get decisively engaged (Figure 10). The squadron went to REDCON 1. We were instructed to delay our LD until 0615 and received an Apache Company OPCON. Our plan was to move two ground troops abreast, preceded by air recce to the objective, which was 10 kilometers north of the Iraqi-Figure 9 360-Degree Defense on Basra-Kuwait City Highway G +4 28 Feb 91 Kuwaiti border. The AH-64s were in a holding area at the TOC, with the company commander monitoring the squadron command net from within the squadron TOC itself. The squadron commander moved with B Troop, S-3 with A Troop. A SWT flew in front of each troop under squadron control. They provided the squadron with an initial picture of enemy units. The squadron crossed the Line of Departure at 0615 hrs, and within one hour, had already bypassed or crossed numerous vacated bunkers and trenches. We observed and reported numerous T-72s, T-555, MTLBs, AMXs, and ZSU-23-4s in the area surrounding the airfield and made face-to-face contact with Figurelo. G+5 i M a r 9 The Capture of Safwan Airfield

1. Zone Recon, 2. Capture of Ai ARMOR - May-June 7997

Iraqi units in the area. The squadron commander moved to the point of contact and approached their defensive position. The enemy had an armored brigade in prepared positions, with three battalions abreast and one in depth defending north of the objective. The squadron commander then ordered B Troop to abandon its as- signed OPs and move to the line of contact. Additionally, the squadron commander dismounted his M3 and con- fronted several Iraqis. At approximately 0900 hrs, an Iraqi col- onel arrived in A Troop's sector. CPT Pope dismounted his vehicle and began to explain to the Iraqi colonel that he must move his unit out of the area. The colonel refused to move his force without instructions from his higher HQ. The Iraqi officer asked CPT Pope if he knew that he was in Iraq. CPT Pope replied that, yes, he knew that he was in Iraq, and that his unit was there to secure the site for ceasefire negotiations. The Iraqis had as- sumed the talks were to be held in Kuwait City. Additionally, the colonel seemed offended that the American soldiers were giving his people food and responded by directing his men to prepare food and hot tea for A Troop. The A Troop soldiers drank the tea while the colonel departed to confer with his superiors. At approximately 1020, the colonel returned and stated he still did not have orders to leave the area. CPT Pope told the colonel that in order to prevent a confrontation, he must leave the area now. At roughly the same time, a flight of A-10s flew overhead, and CPT Pope told the Iraqi that the aircraft would attack if he did not leave. At this point, the squadron commander arrived and reiterated to the Iraqi colonel that he must leave the area. The colonel finally relented and ordered his unit to leave the area In a separate incident, the S3, Mkl Burdan, was approached by an Iraqi captain and a major and asked if he knew that the squadron was in Iraq. They seemed totally surprised 'at our sudden appearance. The S-3 smiled and replied yes. He told them they needed to leave the area and then asked them what unit they were from. The major smiled this time and replied "Iraqi Army!" He refused to identify his unit. The Iraqis then drove away in a state of consternation. Meanwhile, in the B Troop sector, CPT Bills put together a small contingent of armored vehicles, three Bradleys and two tanks, which moved in an inverted "V" toward the Iraqi defense. 1LT Danussi, the XO, led the contingent toward a gathering of Iraqi soldiers. Once the formation came to a stop, CPT Bills dismounted and approached the Iraqi officers and soldiers. The major then sent for his battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, who spoke broken English. His first comment to CPT Bills was "Why are you in Iraq? Are you lost?" CPT Bills replied that he was here to secure the cease-fire negotiations site and that the Iraqis must leave the area in order for the talks to begin. The Iraqi officer refused to leave without instructions from higher. The enlisted soldiers were told to leave, leaving 15-20 officers surrounding CPT Bills. He started to hand out MREs. One was offered to the battalion commander but he refused to accept it, saying "Saddam feeds me well!" CPT Bills then returned to his screen line. A short time later, CPT Bills returned to meet again with the Iraqi commander. This time, the battalion commander was angry and asked 'Why are you Americans here?" The troop XO moved forward and established contact with an Iraqi armor battalion in their vicinity. As in the other sector, the Iraqis had to be persuaded to leave their positions and head north. The Iraqi of- ficer said they would leave in 30 minutes. CPT Bills was escorted back to his vehicle by the major and another soldier. He was dressed in a camouflage uniform, black leather jacket, scarf, beret, and AK-47. OII schedule, 30 minutes later, the Iraqi battalion began to pull out. By 1200 Trucks Bunkers

Tanks Arty

Radars

- -

-

Diesel fuel consumed from 22-28 Feb 91 = 25,900 gallons Total combat flight hours: 123.9

75.4

14.6

Total