Tactical Weaknesses Seen at the NTC

by Lieutenant Colonel Peter F. Manza Despite much improvement, Rotating units seem to have Reached a plateau...

The emphasis on "winning" at the NTC has inspircd major, positive changes in our training philosophies and the improved readiness of the force. Yet, to even the casual ob-sewer, our forces have reached a plateau of effectiveness through the continued failure to address fundamental issues of battalion and brigade tactics. I will address these issues as an ex-regimental commander and my opinions arc certainly open to criticism, based upon this limited view.

The artillery system Does not work It is broke, hecause the maneuver commandcr does not control the resource, is out of the communications link for call for fire, and is subject to passing the problem off, instead of fixing it. Failure to hit the OPFOR with sufficicnt artillery is a significant weakness of the force, and only the maneuver commander can solve the problem. We can look for some solutions lo the OPFOR, which do not employ automiition or secure radio: 0 Pass calls for fires over the command net as spot reports. Centralize authority lo deny the engagement of a target at the hattalion Icvcl. Sounds like the pre-lYSOs, but it works!

Make the subordinate commandcrs plan their fires with the FISTS and hold the commanders responsible for the execution. The FIST must then rehearse the fire plan with the maneuver commander and mark engagement areas. The S2 must also call for tires through other means the commander provides - scout platoon, rcconnaissance clcments, FIST teams, etc. This places the responsibility for long-range fires (those outside of the battalion direct-fire engagement areas) in the hands of the man responsible for the area of interest.

Have the battalion fire coordination elements report fires in progress, rounds expended, and planned fires. This systeni backs up breakdowns in communicntions. allows for allocation of itssets, and assures tinicly fires when necdcd. 0 Use FASCAM in the offense to pin forces down (target p1.t 'I oon defensive positions). segregate apart of the battlefield. or deny likely avenues of approach by 11 rescrve force. Look at the holes dug by the defender; this simple technique will tcmplate the dcfense in suflicient dctitil to execute accurate fire plans, to include FASCAM. The 104th Armorcd Brigade was the master of the FASCAM in the attack. FASCAM used in the offense does not have to be covered by fire in ordcr to confuse, delay, or segregate. The maneuver commander is the key to fixing the system, not the artillery, for he alone controls the planning and the means to execute. Keep a reserve Although our doctrine at battalion level certainly does not encourage this, four tanks can break the attack, and a tank company loose in the rear of a defender destroys the will to fight. A reserve force provides flexibility, a resource to 78 ARMOR - May-June 7989 gain the initiative, and a force capable of executing deception plans. However, its probable locations in the defense must be as well planned as any othcr, to include engineer support.

We still don't use -Our infantry well lacking are definitive missions during offensive operations. Engineers walking at night are ef-fcctive in clearing passagcs and lanes, and marking hreaches for maneuver forces. Combined with a disniounted infantry attack, they gain mutual support.

Although commanders at the NTC have identified our use of infantry as a problem, little has bccn accomplished. Infantry platoons, cross-trained as security elements and reconnaissance elements, are one of the better missions Ibr continuous operations, particularly in the desert. The M2 platoon, much like the BMP-equipped OPFOR unit, provides a suitablc force capable of varied mounted and dismounted operations, which can supplement or replace the battalion scout platoon. Security operations conducted by infantry platoons are the backbone of the OPFOR security during defenses. They are used in the regimental security zone for ambushes, flank security during movement to contact, as advance guards, and in any number of missions where the BMP's mix of weapons can be effective. The U. S. infantry platoon does not appear to operate well in such independent missions. Apparently, problems are caused by poor training, inadequate doctrine, and a lack of mission.

Getting more from Our engineers Engineer support must involve more than digging lighting positions for comhat vehicles. The excuse of inadequate equipment for offensive operalions is weak at best. What is The attacking OPFOR Still has the initiative In the defense, we still appear to he too smart lor our own good. On nu nierous occasions, the dcfendcr's decision point is equated to some mythical decision point of the attacker.

In almost all instanccs during a regimental attack, the decision as to which of two avenues of attack to use was made nine hours before H-hour. Intelligence updates only confirmed the choice, deception plans and infantry attacks made the choice possible, and finally artillery preparations were time sensitive and could not be changed within two hours of attack.

The real issue in the conduct of the defense is initiative. The defender must do something to get the initiative away from the attacker. The 3rd ACR, in defending SIBERIA, was the master of this principle by defending forward behind Thc Whale, where the regiment had to enter the engagement area piecemeal. This truly took the initiative away from the attacker. Deception incorporated into the defense is essential, and must be apart of the plan to be believable. Resupply operations are the usual indicators of real and deception p h s. The 9th Infantry Division's rotation was a classic example of using deception operations, and much can be lcarned from its approach to executing operations that combined deception, maneuver, and attack by lire. The risk is high, but the payoff has the potential to iniprove sccurity for thc forcc and gain the initiative.

Weaknesses persist in Reconnaissance and securify Apparently, thcre is an intrinsic weakness in reconnaissance and sccurity cywrations in the U. S. Army. First, the introduction of trucks in the scout platoons will not solve the basic doctrinal problem of what tltc scorrl ylatoort is to do. In the regiment, the issue is simple -do reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance platoon always lost when it had to fight. This was particularly true when it had to light to gain intelligence. In reality, it fought to gain access to an area for reconnaissance. When the niission was supported by other arms, particularly dismounted infantry, the introduction into an area of operations by the reconnaissance platoon came after the light. Our contention was that the regimental reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with all trucks (BRDM). This is easy to say, considering that the regimental battalions/conipanies were prepared to conduct sccurity operations themselves, and are not dependent upon the scout platoon or the counter-reconnaissance effort of the battalion as we currently execute our doctrine. The U. S. Army must solve the basic doctrinal problem and as-ARMOR - 19