Battlefield Deception

Battlefield Deception by Captain Randall M. Scheffler An anitor brigade is iiiidegoiitg an AR TEP evahiatioit. nie mercise colt-sists of hvo battalions coiidiictiiig an attack against the other battalioris. A parl of one battalion 3 dcfeiirtsirv coil-figriratiori is a two-tank sectioii iit a stream bed aboiit 1,200 rireters from the point at wlticli opposing forces can first take it under ohsenatiori arid direct fire. niis position covers the cipected key roiite of the opposing force.

Wlieii tlie opposing force discowrs the tank section, it realizes that the section o).viis the k q piece of terrain alorig this a.ris. nie OPFOR stops aiid deplo),s a platooii to destrov the tank section. Wliile the opposing force is stopped, the defending bat-taliori deplojs agaiitst it arid destrow it. llte OPFOR is coiidiictiiig art attack. As part of its recoii, it discovers the dcfeiisirv positioiis OJ the visiting battalion. At dawi, the OPFOR attacks the Iiiill-douii tanks. As the OPFOR attacks, jlaitk fires from well-cariioiijlaged M I tanks arid aiitiar-mor missiles destrojl it. Both of these stories are good examples of what we all want to do in training exercises at home and at the NTC. Both are examples of leaders conducting good terrain analysis, and exploiting the correct advantages.

However, the real similarity of both of these true stories is that the opposing force deployed its forces against decoy targets!

Although history has many examples of the military use of deception, the U.S. Army lacks both the doctrine and equipment to practice it.

This article will briefly discuss the historical aspects of military deception, highlight the Army’s experience with deception, and sug-This decoy M1 is one of the prototypes issued to U.S. units in Germany. gest some ways in which maneuver battalions and companies can use deception and deceptive devices to enhance tactical success.

History

Deception has played an important part in military tactics since man first fought. In the days of the Roman Empire, when armies were essentially equal in size and weaponry, the operational art of an army’s commander usually made the difference in success or Failure. The successful use of deception was often decisive, and was considered a sign of a competent leader. With the advent of knighthood, war took on a diflerent flavor. Most military leadcrs considered deception to be an unfair tactic, a form of “cheating.” During the American Revolution, the American Army used deception skillfully to deal with a superior foe.

General I Washington took elaborate pains to mislead the British before his hril-liant surprise thrusts at Trenton and Princeton in 1777. But not until 167 years later did the US. Army organize a unit specifically trained and equipped for deception. In WW 11, large-scale deception came into its own. This was a war of lightning drives, elaborate intelligence agencies, and highly mobile reserves. It became more important and more difficult to strike the enemy where he was weakest. A natural result was an increasing in-tcrest in the more esoteric military arts of camouflage, counter-C3, and deception. The British engaged in large-scale deception with great enthusiasm, as did the Russians. The Battle of El Alamein, in October 1042, owed much of its success to a deceptive cover plan.

American military observers in the North African Theater heard of this deception and carried out some experiments along the same lines. In the first of these, conducted by the U.S. I1 Corps in Tunisia, a deception operation enabled the 1st Armored Division to hit the Germans 50 miles south of Medjiz el Bab when the enemy G2 thought lie had the division spotted 15 miles to the west.

Although this operation, as well as many others, was relatively successful, an ad-hoc group of officers with pick-up detachments handlzd all American deceptive elhrts. Some military leaders felt that deception could be strengthened and its employment widened by the formation of a dedicated, self-contained battlefield deception unit. The War Department activated the 23d Headquarters Specid Troops in January lY44, and by June, its first detachments were in "...In WW /I, large-scale deception came into its own.

This was a war of lightning drives, elaborate intelligence agencies, and highly mobile reserves.

It became more important and more difficult to strike the enemy where he was weakest ....I' action. In its one year of existence, the unit served with four U.S. armies in England, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, and Germany. A brigade-sized unit, the 23d had the organic asscts to plan and execute 21 deception operations, each lasting an average of live and a half days, with the longest lasting 11 days. Each operation required an average of 577 personnel, with the largest using the entire unit of 1,106 personncl.

Not all of the deception operations planned and executed by the American Army during WW I1 were planned by this one deception unit. One of the most famous was "Operation Fortitude," a strategic-level operation involving entire armies. This deception, in the months prior to the Normandy invasion, reinforced German suspicions that the landing would occur at Calais, rather than on the Cotentin Peninsula. The Germans believed the ruse, allowing the Allies to land the largest invasion force in history at Normandy.

Technological advances, particularly in intclligence-gathering capabilities, became highly developed during WW 11. Although these advances continued in the postwar ern, many military lcaders considered the use of deception to be of only historical interest. Most military minds thought that surprise would be impossible during future battles. This seemed to be the general consensus during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and until quite recently in the modern Army. Although the Army conducted deception operations, they were primarily at the small unit level.

Army leadership has recently revitalized interest in deception as a means of influencing combat operations at both the operational and tactical Icvels.

Goals of Deception On the modern batllefield, deception must clearly support the commander's mission by adding a degree of combat effectiveness and survivability, thus ultimately gaining the tactical advantage. Deception, while supporting all of the principles of war, adds a degree of combat effectiveness to our operations and survivability to our forces and facilities. In the context of effectiveness, deception can be employed to: 0 Gain surprise by creating the fog of battle, and by capitalizing on it, strike the enemy at a time, place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared.

0 Assist in achieving the obiective, by giving the coniniander additional alternatives, flexibility, and freedom of action to carry out his mission.

0 Allow the commander to economize his forces, or to mass unnoticed or unrecognizcd at the decisive times and locations on the battlefield. 0 Add a degree of security lo our combat operations hy causing the cnemy to orient his intelligence, fire and maneuvcr, and support activities away from our true operations. Deception and operational security are mutually supporting battlefield activities.

In revitalizing the Army’s bat-tleficld deception, the planners had to ensure that leaders using this new capability would be able to not only plan and exccute deception during wartime, but also during peace and war transition periods. This implied that Army planners at all levels would consider using deception without constraint.

Deception must be targeted against the appropriate enemy decision-maker and be usable within any tcchnological, political, military, psychological, climatic, or geographical environment. Furthermore, deception must be applicable to high-intensity conflicts as well as country-unique, politically-sensitive, low-intensity conflicts.

Levels of Deception of the unit. These independent operations include actions to achicve local tactical advantage. In the first case, the maneuver battalion receives a tactical mission. In most cases, the mancuver unit that receives the mission in support of the deception operation will do so on an unwitting basis. In WW 11, the 23d Headquarters was able to conduct deceptions on an autonomous basis. This is no longer the case with the 19-man deception elements fielded at division level. The commander will have to decide if the risk of allocating some assets to sup-porl a deception operation is worth the potential payoff. Later, I will discuss the use of emerging technology to minimize the required assets. In the latter case, whcn mancuver units conduct independent deccp-lion operations, the primary target is still the enemy decision-maker, but additional emphasis nceds to placed on influencing the enemy executor, the soldier who is actuitlly in contact. This individual can he an enemy tank TC, a tank or BMP gunner, or the recon element scout. Battlcficld dcception ohjcctivcs clearly change, depending on the echelon of command. At the division, the cornmandcr is concerned with the close battle. At the least, deception supports the division commander’s mission by increasing survivability of his forces and by gaining localized tactical advantage. At best, deception supports the attainment and maintenance of operational initiative, favorable loss exchange ratios, and achievement of surprise.

At the maneuver hattalion and company Icvel, deception can titkc one of two forms; a unit mission in support of the division’s deception operation, or independent operations. which add to thc survivabilitv In considering whether or not to conduct a deception operation, it niust be remembered that deception planning must support the accomplishment of the commandcr’s mission, and must be closely in-tegratcd with the operations of all the force’s clcmcnts.

Deception is central to the offense. Supporting attacks are made in pat to mislead the enemy about the attacking force’s plans, thus giving the main attack a bctter chance or success. In the offense, deception increases the enemy’s uncertainty about target acquisition and how the situation is developing. Decoys can be very important during daylidit. when the enemy has the opportunity lor visual observation. At night, thcre is some protection from visual observation, but night observation devices can be used to detect activities. The multi-spectral close-combat decoy (MCCD), which is now in limited quantities in U.S. Army units in Germany, not only orfers a technically correct visual image in daylight, but also has a realistic thcrmal signature. MCCDs will eventually he carried on every combat vehicle, as part of the vchicle’s B11. The deception story (the information provided to the enemy to accomplish the deception) should reach the deception target in a nian-ner that convinces him that it is true. IC the enemy puts pieces of information together himsclf, like pieces of a puzzle, he is far more likely to believe that the deception story is true. If we cannot hide all our preparations for offensive operations, we can use deception to cause the enemy to misinterpret them. If decoys and other deceptive displays are to he successful, the security of the deception area is of the utmost importancc. To accomplish this, it may be necessary to establish a security force to prevent friendly and hostile personncl Crom penetrating the display. The distance of the security perimeter from the display will detcrniinc the fidelity required on thc outer cdges. It is a good idea to site real equipment on the perimeter of the display. Deception is central to defensive operations. In land warfare, all Cor-ces on the defensive scek to deceive the enemy itbout the location of the forward line oC own troops (FLOT), as well as its actual location. Deceptions are also conducted to conceal the location of those forces not on the FLOT, and to hide intentions. v , V I

-t Setting Out Decoys ...

Decoy tanks, such as the Mi above, include provision for thermal signatures and may later simulate main gun firing. The entire tank decoy is contained in the pack below, seen with its portable generator.

Current decoy development includes plans for most Army equip ment, including realistic helicop ters, generator trailers, and trucks, like the one at left.

Deceptions can cause the enemy to waste artillery ammunition and to misusc rcconnaissance assets. Onc of the covering force’s objectives is usually to deceive the enemy on the location of the main defensive sector. The covering force seeks to mis-direct the enemy’s attack, to cause him to deploy his forces preniature-ly and to delay the execution o l his plans. Small elements may use dummy positions, decoys, and notional activities to cause the cnemy to waste time by deploying and attacking it position, prepare him for unnecccssary offensive action, and render his force vulnerable to counterattack. As in offensive operations, it is essential that the operi-Lion avoid the use of patterns. Defensive patterns that we traditionally execute are: troops arrive in an area, dig in, clear fields of lire, and thcn camouflage their positions. Patterns such as these must be concealed in the true dclcnsive position, and exposed in the lake position.

Vehicle tracks are of particular concern. From reconnaissance activities to the arrival of troops, consideration should be given to the tracks created by personnel and vehicles. Where tracks are unavoidable, they should continue past the true destination to a logical but unused tcrmination area.

a302A54 E7m BAT-D ELEMENT

%3B Med Main!

3 1 V cOmm?l Maim 52D Gen Main!

I PLNSlOPS SECTION

COMMS SIG TEAM

PHYS SIG TEAM

ELEC SIG TEAM

Sec Chief (SWO) 971A Team Chief 97630 Team Chief 19D30 Team Chief 98530 ** Comms Spec 97620 ** CmbtEng 12830 **ElecSpec 97620 SeC NCOIC 31640

** Elm Spec 97630 **IndSpec 96830 ** Vis Spec 96030 ** Cmbt Anns 1 lB30/19K30 *** Cornms Spec 97610 ** Cmbt Arms 13630 ** Cmbt Arms 1 lC30/19K30 ** VisSpec MD20 *** Elm Spec 97610 Figure 1 Division Battlefield Deception Element Assigned Maintenance Personnel ** Official Job Tle is BAT-DE NCO *** official Job Title is BAT-DE Spec Transitional operations pose a significant challenge for the mancuvcr unit. These operations should not be without the use of deception. During retrograde operations, deception is necessary to reduce the inherent vulnerability or the unit moving to the rear. Whcn a unit withdraws, deception can help maintain secrecy of movement and aid in achieving surprise in unit disposition.

Some deception measures include: Requiring radio silcnce for displacing units and maintaining a normal radio pattern along the old FLOT.

Conducting limited objective attacks in areas away from the retrograde unit to divert the enemy's attention.

When one unit replaces another, security and deccption play key roles in the success of the maneuver. The most common relief operations are the reliel' in place and passage of lines. During a relief in place, the deception story could portray the outgoing unit as remaining in place.

To do this, thc incoming unit will have to assume the normal pattcrns and signatures of the outgoing unit to provide continuity. Employ decoys and dummies for any equipment that is moved to the rear and not replaced in kind.

Deception events in a passage of lines are very similar to the relief in place. As a minimum, they stress secrecy and surprise.

In developing a deception plan, active and passive measures can present a significant element of the deception story.

Examples of some active measures are: 0 Relocation of troop units, real or simulated, to indicate strength, weakness, or - with specific types o l units such as CSS - a spccific type of operation.

0 Increased or decreased movement.

0 Increased air activity. 0 A supply buildup, real or simu-latcd, including combat trains, ARMOR - MayJune 1988 "...Certain measures which are essentially passive, such as restrictions on road movement and radio traffic, may actually be active deceptions because they are executed with the intention that the enemy will detect the decrease in activity ...." bridge parks, fortification materials, POL supplies, and transport. 0 Increased road and bridge maintenance.

0 Simulation of damage to roads and bridges.

0 Simulation of the light patterns of bivouacs, convoys and assembly areas.

0 Simulation of vehicle movement, artillcry fire, and other battlcfield noises. pcrsonncl replacement in a manner to prcclude evidence of an impending attack; control of reconnaissance and such other activities that normally provide evidence of an impending attack; and camouflage of equipment and installiitions. To assist divisional units in planning and executing deception, the division has a 19-man battlefield dcception element under a combat arms captain. A mix of military intclligence and combat arms MOSS comprises the unit. (Figure 1). Planned, dclihcrate security violations to afford the enemy sufficient opportunity to identify the display-0 Marking vehicles, equipment, and personnel to be identical to those of the simulated unit. 0 Displaying evidcnce of the peculiarities of the unit simulated. Certain measures that are essentially passive, such as restrictions on road movement and radio traffic, may actually he active deceptions because they are executed with the intention that the enemy will detect the decrease in activity. An intensification of security may characterize passive measures. The tactical force supported by the deception plan primarily implements them.

Typical passive measures are blackout; movement at night; movement by small units or segments using indirect routes; restriction of personnel to specific areas; removal of identifying markings on vehicles, equipment, and personnel; control of supply and This element works under the staM supervision of the G3 and not only plans deception operations for the division, but also assists brigade and battalion staffs in their own dcccp-tion operations. Assistance can range from training the starf in the techniques of deception planning to assisting companies and platoons to learn the best ways to employ their decoys and other deceptive devices. Additionally, the three signature sections of the dcception clement will have unique equipment to support deception operations, although the materiel is still under development. The equipment will be able to replicate the communications, electronic, and physical signatures of TOCs, logistical sites, and other critical nodes with an authentic and plausible signatures. As in any operation, the commander will have to weigh the cost of the operation with the potential payofl. Deception operations often have dispropor-tionatcly high payofl's.

Any article, book, or manual that purports to be a complete "how-to" oC deception misscs the point of I ARMOR - May-June 1988 deception. The most believeable deception is one in which the target sees things that he knows are consistent with our doctrine and capabilities. For this reason, much of the doctrine that outlines how to establish deceptive positions and intents already exists in our manuals.

CAPTAIN

RANDALL M.

SCHEFFLER was commissioned in the Military Police Corps from Marquette University In 1979 with a BA in Law Enforcement. Following assignments as a military police officer in Colorado and Korea, he requested a branch transfer to Armor In 1981. He has since served in CONUS in numerous positions, culminating in command of both Company A, 4-64 Armor, and HHC, 5-32

Armor, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. While at Fort Stewart, he participated in six NTC rotations, including two as a tank company commander, and one as an HHC commander. He is a graduate of MPOBC,

JOMC, the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course, and AOAC, and is currently assigned to the Army's Battlefield Deception Office at Fort Huachuca, AZ. He is designated to become the first OIC of the 3d Armored Division's Battlefield Deception Element, and departs for Germany in June 1988.