The "Brave Rifles" at the NTC

Introduction The recently completed NTC rotation of the 3d ACR provides an interesting update on the viability of regimental cavalry in a simulated mid- to high-intensity battle environment. This experience provides a valuable perspcctive on cavalry organization, doctrine, and training. The Regiment deployed to the NTC organized as follows: ture was significantly enhanced with two attack helicopter troops from the 278 ACR of the Tennessee National Guard. (This augmentation resulted in the conliguration authorized by J series).

In accordance with its mission-essential task list (METL), the regiment requestcd training in the following missions while at the NTC 0 Night Road March 0 Relief in Place 0 Defend in Sector Observations: The first comment addresses the viability of the cavalry organiiation. This first fully-instrumented evaluation of regimental cavalry on a simulated modern battlefield represented an important opportunity. Could the 3d ACR master the challenges posed by its METL? In overall terms the answer was a firm 'yes.'

The lixed task organization and structure of a cavalry regimcnt, with its organic slice of combat, SABER SQUADRON

JEDl SQUADRON

2/D/5-62 ADA (Vulcan) 43d Engr Co 1st GSR Section FAC Team 2 FST/Maint Trp MULESKINNER SQN

S&T Troop 3/3 ACR

Maint Troop (-) 1/D/5-62 ADA (Vulcan) Med Troop C Co/lst Engr/l ID FAC Team 3 E Trp/278 ACR F Trp/278 ACR AWM Det/4 ID SPT SODN/3 ACR

AG Troop 89th Chem Co 3d GSR Section 181.4 Ord Dat (.

2-18 FA (R to 2-34 FA) D/5-62 ADA (CM(-)

Stinger Plt (-)/3 ACR Fire Uniff2-1 ADA Det 7/602d TACARlW Signal Plt/4 ID 66 MI Co (-) (The aggregate strength of the unit as deployed was just over 4,000 troopers.) combat support, and service support assets, proved to he flexible and sustainable. The comments that follow address hoth observed strengths and weaknesses.

They point out both the capability of rcgimen-tal cavalry and some potentially necessary modifications to its organization, doctrine, and In terms of equipment, the red-0 Forward Passage of Lines training. ment is organized in an interim. I-serics configuration with Allill tanks and MI13 scout vehicles. The aviation squadron was organized on n prc)visional basis from the currently authorized air cavalry troop and the regimental headquarters aviation section. This provisional struc-0 Counterattack The first major comment should 0 Defend a Battle Position address the impact of the 0 Movement to Contact/Hasty At-provisional fourth (aviation) squadron and the relatively new sup-0 Zone Reconnaissance port squadron. Despite the incomplete status oC its force modern-During a ICday rotation, the regi-ization, the fourth squadron proved men1 train4 to all of these missions. invaluable. First and foremost, it tack i 'I... The fluidity with which the OPFOR changed its operational concepts is a testament to their legendary training level." functioned as the regimental commander's eyes and ears, screening forward and to the flanks of the regiment. It provided invaluable information which enabled key adjustments prior to actual contact with the enemy. Critical decisions regarding FASCAM employment, prioritization of fires, and employment of the regimental reserve could all be made, for the most part, after the enemy had shown his hand, hut before the OPFOR could seize control of the battlc. Accordingly, the commander retained the initiative, working within the enemy's decision cycle to employ limited combat multipliers at the critical place and time to shape the battlefield. The additional attack helicopter troops provided in the new squadron organimtion also proved their worth. Using the two troops from the 278 ACR as the regimental reserve, the 3ACR was able to reinforce the key area on the battlelield with mobile, effective firepower. Although the limited ability of NTC instrumentation makes a complete assessment of the effectiveness of the two troops impossible, their presence at the critical time subjectively changed the flow of the battle in the 3ACR's favor several times.

The support squadron also proved its worth. Through its efforts, the regiment's 4,000 men and its equipment were fed, fueled and supplied. The still growing material management center (MMC) proved capable of managing the regiment's requirements. The regimental staff felt the impact 01 this organization. The work of the support squadron enabled the regimcntal S1 and S4 to locate in the TOC and serve as logistic planners rather than managers. They had not felt the full impact of this shift in job responsibilities until this field exercise. Consequently, the flow of events and information from the line squadrons, and from the support squadron to the regimental staff required redcfini-lion to manage the service support system.

From an organizational standpoint, I must address one piece of equipment. This exercise marked the debut of the MlAl at the NTC. It proved to be a devastating weapon systcm ideally suited for cavalry operations. Its speed and flexibility enahlcd commanders on several occasions to operate within the OPFOR's decision cycle. Even when a mistake was made in their initial employment, leaders could frequently recover and reposition the tanks before it was too late. The other factor that had a significant impart on all tactical out-conies was the lethality and range of the 120-mm gun. Its simulated effect through the MILES system proved to be a dominant factor on the battlefield. The effectiveness of the 120-mm gun was also obvious during the live-fire portion of the exercise. Rounds-per-kill were lower and percentage of hits was appreciably higher thim expected. On several occasions the enemy simply could not close within the stand-off envelope of the MIA1 to destroy 3ACR formalions. Consequently, he quickly shifted his tactics to try and deny the MIA1 that stand-off capability. The Iluidity with which the OPFOR changed its operational concepts is a testament to their legendary training level. We cannot lightly dismiss the impact of this discovery concerning the MIA 1's reach. The three-km killing umbrella of the MLA I proved essential to scout survivability. All too often, when the regiment mistakenly decoupled tanks and scouts, the scouts died swiftly.

As the armodcavalry community continues to debate the role of tanks in divisional cavalry, it should not forget this discovery. 3ACIR scouts pcr-forming recon and security functions had limited survivability unless they operated with their associated tanks. The difficulty of maintaining this formation on the battlefield argues against the flippant response that tanks can be task organized into a cavalry structure when needcd. Despite great effort, it was a continuous challenge to maintain effective tank/scout coordination.

The first important question was how the regiment dealt with the "recon/counter-rec(n" challenge. As the regimental task organization listing shows, the regiment deploycd -without any infilntry augmentation. All the regiment had to cope with the dismounted threat were 5-man scout squads and Cman tank crews. The regiment decided to cope with the counter-recon battle with this philosophy. At change of mission, the regiment posted an aerial screen across the 3ACR sector to deny the enemy early access to the 3ACR battle area. Simultaneously, thc line squadrons focused on establishing their defense in the main battle area (MBA) along the FEBA. Major elements from the front line and the reserve were not siphoned off to fight the counter-recon Light. Instead, the focus remained on the principal assigned mission. At night, a ground screen composed of one or more scout plittoons relieved the aerial screen. When enemy recon elements penetrated the 3ACR sector (and they did), they faced additional challenges. First, the regiment positioned in depth to deny the enemy quick access lo MBA units. Confronted with distances of up to five kilometers bctween defensive belts, the enemy's ability to focus his recon was stressed.

Next, the regiment planned artillery on suspected or known recon OP positions and avenues of approach. Artillery proved moderately successful in blinding the enemy's eyes and blunting major dismounted penetrations. Thus, while not an overwhelming success, the regiment's limited counter-recon battle parried the enemy's main recon efforts and preserved key resources for the principal mission - defense of an assigned sector. enemy contact and enemy strength and disposition."

As we shift our focus to other doctrinal issues, an interesting problem developed when the regimcnt undertook successive missions of movement to contact and zone recon. FM 17-95 provides slim guidance regarding combat organization for each of these missions. An early regimental defeat was at least partially attributed to failure to tailor combat formation to unique requirements of respective missions. A squadron initiatcd a movement to contact with three troops abreast and the tank company following in the center or the sector. A small spoiling attack by the encmy on a flank focused the squadron's Iimitcd reserve (thc tilnk company) on that flank, while a major breakthrough occurred on the opposite Ilank.

Alter that lesson, the regiment adopted different formations for movement to contact: a troop forward, followed by two troops abreast. and thcn the tank company. This discussion serves to indicate that FM 17-95 must imitate the rather detailed guidance provided for cavalry troops in FM 17-97 regarding possihlc movement formalions. The guidance currently in FM 17-9s for movement lo contact is scant; i.e. "the formation used will dcpcnd on METT-T but the major considerations are the chance of Another major doctrinal issue we continually confronted was artillery organization for combat. The intricacies of the non-TACFIRE regiment intcrface with a TACFlRE direct-support battalion were addressed in the final weeks before deployment. We assessed and reassessed the relationship between the troop mortars, the organic howitzer battery, and the DS artillery battalion. Based upon the regiment's NTC experience, the following lessons emerged: The organic howivzer battery should be OPCON to the DS battalion whenever regimental centralimtion is desired (i.e., for defensive operations). However, the batteries should revert to their respective squadrons during decentralized missions, such as offensive operations or recon. The overriding factor, as always, must be METT-T.

"Thunder up, lightning down' was unworkable as away ol directing artillery and mortar fires. Apportioning fire missions in accordance with random calls for tire from scattered scouts and FISTS proved singularly ineffective. Instead, the troop FIST proved most effective when he was employed as a fire planner and to control the ground troop's mortars. In that role, the FIST'S location proved absolutcly critical. He must have immediate access to the commander and he also must be fully able to see the battlefield. Squadron "... Clearly, the NTC is the Army's most precious training asset." fire support assets - the howitzer batteries - were only effective when massed in accordance with the squadron commander's intent. The internal structure of the regiment is the final doctrinal issue I will address here. The first concern is air-defense. In conjunction with the 11th ADA Brigade, the regiment enjoyed a significantly enhanced air-defense protection concept. A hatlery composed of two Virlcait platoons and a Cltuparral platoon augmented the organic Stingers. Wherever possible, Stingers were under armor in either FIST or Ll'rtlcair tracks.

The Chaparral platoon operated far forward in mobile mode - liequently right behind the tank company. A Hawk fire unit with 2 FAARS augnented this. In combination, all of these assets made a formidable packet. EiIch system synergistically cn-hanced the regiment's ADA umbrella. Armoring the Stiitgm is essential to their survivability. However, the intcrim Ti of placing them with the Pillcarts proved unsatisfactory -the Army needs a better answer. The Chaparral platoon proved devastating when employed forward to counter the Hind threat. The Hawk system reinforced everything with its long-range identification and dclivery capability. This cvolv-ing ADA system employment holds great promise to enhance the survivability of an ACR in amid- to high-threat environment.

From the perspective of niobiIity/countermobility, the regiment relearned some old lessons. First, mobility operations are combined arms in nature and not simply engineer opcrations. The regiment's ability to synchronize all assets to support mobility operations is both a training and doctrinal issue. The critical doctrinal issue is the inadequacy of engineer assets currently allocated to the regiment. Given the extreme frontages associated with cavalry missions, the one organic engineer company is grossly inadequate. For this rotation, an additional combat cnginecr companysup-ported the regiment. Its contribution to the 3ACR proved two points. First, that an engineer company pcr squadron is essential. Second. that a habitual association with supporting engineer assets must be maintained. The critical integration of engineer operations with maneuver is not a last-minute coordination to be effected just prior to employment.

This NTC rotation revealcd that the 3ACR had a major deficiency in scouting. Far and away our most ef-fcctive scouts were the aviators. Oh-viously, they enjoy significant advantages when compared to their ground countcrparts. However, the entire dissimilarity in their el'l'cctive-ness cannot be solely attributed to this dilference. Our scouts seemed to be deficicnt in critical skills such as land navigation, terrain associa-lion, and enemy idcntification. Next, our scouts got killed because their niovemcnt techniques got them in trouble. Too many died in kill zones, which indicatcd a lack of appreciation for the encmy's prohable location and capability. Finally, they showed limited capability in effec-tivcly employing their principal killing systems - the TOW and Dragon. The TOW system was scl-dom used, and Dragons were not volley-fired to optimize their efec-tiveness.

The second major training lesson was the inefficiency of our fire-support systems. Obviously, major systcms train-ups were required to familiarize the regiment with its DS artillery battalion, a unit never previously associated with the regiment. We soon overcame these obstacles. What remained a problem was an inability to integrate artillery with maneuver, a problem that seemed to stem from failure to integrate the lire-support system with maneuver element training. A training program based only upon battery ARTEPs is totally unsatisfactory. Battery ARTEPs are "stand-alone" excreises, which stress a technical capability not necessarily integrated with a tactical unit and scheme ol maneuver. They have great value as a first step because they develop and measure the ability to put steel on target. The next stcp must be combined artillery-maneuver operations. The final goal is obvious - accurate target effect, in accordance with a commander's intent, in spite of the complications inherent in combined arms operations. As the regiment works to overcome the deficiency, a major focus will be on the troop FISTS and squadron fire-support oflicers. If they remain unable to integrate artillery and mortar concepts of operations to support the maneuver commander, the problem will remain unsolved.

Proper use of another combat multiplier, the MI conipany, had a niiijor impact on the outcome of several battles. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) wits critical to the 3AC'R. This involved more than the habitual concerns of NTC training units.

Obviously, decision-support matrices worked for the ACR, just its they would for any mechanized force. What was singularly important to the regiment was the integration of its organic MI company into all phases of operations. The regimental T( IC support platoon continually provided the regiment and squadrons with timely, high-caliber work. The OPSEC: plittoon provided some well-tinied deception efforts. The EW intercept platoons were critical to early identification of enemy moves. What made these skills particularly valuable was a concentrated training program stressing the early inclusion of the regimental S2 and MI company commander in operational planning, and the regimental CO's insistence thitt the MI company commander and/or the S2 interrupt command radio nets to provide timely summaries and analyses. Perishable intelligence was seldom lost or disregarded because of a bureaucratic process. This training effort measurably enhanced the rcpi-ment's combat power at critical moments.

Conclusion Both the regiment and the Army have much to learn from this NTC experience. The value of fixed task organization certainly is applicahle to mechanized and iirmor units. The lethality and flexihility of the MU2 also bodes well lor the entire mechanized community as we seek to subvert the Threat's swift pace of attack. The lesson learned by 3d ACR scouts who "de-coupled" from their tanks suggests that the J-series divisional cavalry organization is fa-pcricnce with the dismounted and recon threat suggests that counter-recon can be at least partially handled with some artillcry and attention to the basics of local defense. tally flawed. The 3d ACR CX-The extraordinary value of an aviation squadron lirmly linked to the regimental commiinder as his eyes and ears was readily apparent. The potential for an exponcntial improvement in this capability, with modernized aircraft such as the OH-58D, is ohvious. As a related point, the swift deployment and integration of the two attack helicopter troops of the 278th ACR is a strong positive stittemcnt concerning the combat readiness ol a key National Guard ACR.

Conversely. the rcgiment's inability to kill with the TOM' and Dragon is a disturbing point to consider when planning missions such as NATO defense. This is obviously but one aspect ol the previously expressed concern regarding scout training. ARMOR - The extraordinary value of the NTC training experience as a foundry for leadership, doctrine, and organi7a-tion mandates its continued budgetary support despite the fiscally constrained future.

It is simply inconceivable that the Army may be unable to fully resource its most rigorous peacetime training challenge. A newcomer departs the NTC with an overriding respect for the entire NTC establishment - from the tireless and omnipresent operational controllcrs to the tenacious and deadly OPFOR. Those who do come into contact with the operations group are similarly impressed with those dedicated few who plan and administer such a comprehensive operation. Clearly, the NTC is the Army's most precious training asset.

Major Steve Speakes was commissioned in Armor from USMA In 1974 and his initial assignment was in the 3d ACR. Following AOAC. he was assigned to the 3d ID, where he sewed as a tank battalion S3 and as a mech brigade S3. After a tour at the Pentagon on the Jolunt and Army staffs, he completed C&GSC. He is currently assigned as the 3d ACR's regimental S3.