Lessons Learned in the Attack on Canicatti

armored infantry and tank attack on the city of Canicatti, Sicily, with emphasis on certain aspects of small unit coordination. The attack was made by CCA, 2d Armored Division, on 12 July, 1943, after it had pushed inland approximately 25 miles, following an amphibious landing at Licata on the south shore of Sicily two days earlier. I was commanding Co. B (medium tanks), 66th Armored Regiment. General Situation The terrain: Generally mountainous, with a four-milelong, open, rolling valley in the final approach to Canicatti. The ground provided excellent standings for tanks. The weather was sunny and dry. Hills flanked the valley and rose abruptly on the far side of the compactly-built city of 28,000. Farms and gardens extended all the way to the sharply-demarcated city edge. Information on the enemy: The enemy’s mobile reserves apparently had been more heavily disposed in the Gela sector to the east, permitting CCA and the 3rd Infantry Division - advancing inland on the west of this sector - to easily overcome local Italian and German delaying actions on 10 and 11 July. On the afternoon of 11 July, leading tank and infantry elements of CCA occupied a craggy ridge (see map) overlooking Canicatti and the intervening valley to the north. (Ridge A as to the right of a defile through which the road to Canicatti passed.) At this time, several enemy self-propelled antitank guns located in the valley, or on the foothills flanking the valley, knocked out three tanks as part of Co. G, 66th Armored Regiment, attempted to go down the forward slope of the ridge. Two German light tanks concealed on Ridge A had been discovered and knocked out by Co. G. As friendly infantry were consolidating on the ridge, they were shelled by enemy artillery. Both friendly and enemy air dive-bombed the strafed elements of CCA. We were several miles beyond the “bomb line,” but were surprised that our own air did not recognize American tanks and our yellow smoke identification grenades. All enemy fire was accurate and well-timed, but used so sparingly as to make location of their weapons impossible. After dark on 11 July, a patrol discovered that a volume of 32

Map outlines route of Co. H, 66th Armored Regiment, and G Co.. 41st Infantry Regiment, in attack on Canicatti, a small city in southwestern Sicily. In photo above, taken by Army *Signal Corps photographer prior to attack, SSG Tim McMahan. a member of author’s crew. awaits signal to move out from Ridge A. -July 12,1943 - / / I / / / I

I f 1 I HE fire delivered before dark by tanks of Co. H (which had replaced Co. G on the ridge) and mortars and assault guns of 3rd Bn., 66th Armored Regiment, had unwittingly knocked out or driven the crews away from four self-propelled guns in a small village one-half mile away, below us and to our immediate front, at the base of Ridge A. Information on Friendly and Supporting Troops: By the morning of 12 July, all of CCA was assembled, resupplied, and ready to attack Canicatti. All elements of CCA were well-trained but were new to battle. Morale was excellent, but some loss of control had resulted during the first sudden appearance of heavy enemy resistance. On 11 July, the day before the attack on Canicatti, I had reconnoitered for tank firing positions on Ridge A before shooting up the village at the base of the hill. During this reconnaissance, I had asked several infantry officers and men if they had spotted the source of the fire that had knocked out the three G Co. tanks. None of them had thought to observe for distant muzzle blasts or other indications of antitank positions, although they were present during the antitank fire and saw the tanks get hit. Their chief concern had been to locate machine guns or other weapons threatening the infantry. Although they were glad to have tanks help them, they did not seem to realize that there were ways of helping the tanks. Probably we tankers had failed in training to advise the infantry of our needs. The following paragraph is another example of this. During the above reconnaissance, my company was temporarily attached to the 41st Armored Infantry. The infantry commander was tentatively planning to employ my company in an attack on the village at the base of Ridge A. The tanks were to go around the right shoulder of Ridge A and attack the village from the flank. When I asked what the infantry was going to do, the answer was, “When we see that you have reached the village, we will come down and occupy it.” Not being satisfied with this, I asked three infantry small unit commanders how closely they would follow the tanks. Their attitude was that with our armor we could easily destroy all resistance in the village before they entered it. Darkness occurred at this time, and the attack was called off. We learned later that we had eliminated the four guns mentioned above. Special Situation As company commander of Co. H, 66th Armored Regiment (medium tanks), I received the following or-May-June 1987

The following excerpts are from a talk by Dr. Perkins delivered before an Oregon civic group.

ON JOINING THE 2D AD

"...My introduction to the 2d Armored Division was rather exciting. The first night In the bachelor officer quarters I woke up at 5 a.m., hearing a fantastic racket outside. I jumped up, looked out the window, and couldn't see anything, but it sounded like a hundred giant iron cogwheels rolling unclad down an iron roadway. I thought that all the war chariotsof ancient Troy had been rolled out. Of course, it wasa tank column going by ..."

REMEMBERING COMPANY H, 66TH ARMOR

"...Company H...was a famous company directly descended from a tank company in W I. One of the members of old Co. H, during WW 1, was a Corporal Roberts, who won the Medal of Honor when his tank rolled over into a shell hole full of water and he shoved his crew out before he drowned. Camp Roberts in California was named for him. We. had one other Medal of Honor winner in Company H, after I was in it; Captain James Burt got it in Aachen, Germany ... Company H was a great outfit. The 1st Sergeant was only the third 1st Sergeant since WW I, Sergeant Nethken. We had some very tough old professional sergeants, some of whom had reserve commissions. One of our maintenance sergeants became a colonel before I made captain ..."

LIVING WITH TANKS

"...If it was cold and rainy, it was just miserable. You had to choose between sleeping on the ground in a bedroll to try to keep dry and warm or sleeping in the tank, draped over some of the equipment in great discomfort, often getting cold and chilled. In the Sherman tanks, it wasn'tquiteso bad forthefirsttwo hoursofthenight becausethegreat final drive housing with the transmission housing gearbox had 50 gallons of oil in it. That oil stayed warm for a couple of hours, so you could at least sleep for a while without getting too cold ... Those Sherman tanks cost $60,000 each. Compare that with $2,200,000 today ..."

MOVING OUT

"...The last attack I was in was the biggest, the attack on Canicatti, Sicily. Perhaps a hundred of us tanks moved off some hills and woods down intoa rollingvalley. Theground was reallyshaking.Thetrees were vibrating. The leaveswere trembling. And my heart was hammering my ribs.. ."

ON EARLY TANK DIESELS

"...For awhile in 1941 we had radial, 9-cylinder Guiberson diesel engines, the most powerful engine for its weight then in use. But they were very hard to start in very cold weather. They had a pipe that came into the crew compartment from the initial firing cylinder. You'd crank the engine just past the top of compression on that cylinder, put a blank shotgun shell in a chamber at the end of the pipe in the fighting compartment, closethe chamber, pull the trigger, and the gun would fire and spin the engine. In cold weather, they wouldn't start very well ..."

GETTING HIT AND GETTING OUT

"...We had an evacuate-tank drill and could evacuatean entire crew in five seconds. When my tank was knocked out, everybody came out through the turret. An armor-piercing projectile happened to get a freak hit on the muzzle of my cannon, which saved our lives, because it would have gone right through the tank if it hadn't hit the muzzle. It tore the whole gun loosefrom thegun mount, richocheteddown, hitthe hull, and turned the whole front slope plate of the tank red hot, so the driver and machinegunner were not abouttoget out through their own hatches ..." ders about 1000,12 July: My company was to move out at 1230, as a covering detachment, leading the attack of CCA on Canicatti. Three rifle platoons of Co. G, 41st Armored Infantry, were to ride on my tanks. Our mission was to contact the enemy, develop the situation, and if possible, seize and hold the roads leading into the hills at the far side of Canicatti. I was to decide during the attack whether t o go through or around the city. My tentative plan was to go through the city, as steep hills bordered the sides and rear of the city. The balance of the assault echelon, composed of 3rd Bn., 66th Armored Regiment, minus Co. H, and 3rd Bn., 41st Infantry, minus Co. G, was to follow my company by bounds, giving support as the situation developed. The infantry was mounted in halftracks. Two battalions of armored artillery were to give continuous support. The platoon leaders and I had radio communication with both the FO and FDC. An air bombardment of Canicatti preceded the attack. No detailed reconnaissance reports of the terrain or enemy were available. In view o f my mission and our heavy support, I decided t o advance on a broad front to screen a mile-wide zone of advance. The platoons were to support each other when possible but were to rely upon fire and maneuver within platoons for security and continued advance if part of the company was held up by bad terrain or resistance. We agreed that the tank-mounted infantry would dismount when resistance was encountered and assist t h e advance of the tanks. For liaison, the infantry company and platoon leaders were to ride on the tank company and platoon leader's tanks. No other means o f liaison or communication were arranged. Orders were issued to the tank and infantry platoon leaders early enough to allow plenty of time for additional visual reconnaissance and assignment of the infantrymen to tanks. The Action This account o f actions during the attack includes chiefly inci- 34 dents involving the infantry-tank coordination. Many other details are omitted: The attack proceeded for two or three miles against very light resistance. Some enemy artillery then fell on elements of the supporteche-lon of CCA which was just leaving Ridge A. When Company H had approached within three-quarters of a mile of Canicatti, reconnoitering by fire on a broad front, accurate enemy artillery fell on each platoon of tanks. None of the tanks was hit, but most of the infantry were forced to dismount and take cover. I moved the tank platoon I was with to the right for better defilade, but the enemy artillery followed us. Some of the enemy artillery then shifted back to other attacking units. At this point, I was ordered to move on into the city. As it was impossible for me to regain contact with the dismounted infantry, and as it seemed necessary to evade the enemy artillery, I ordered the tank platoons to move at top speed to positions nearer the city without trying to pick up the infantry. It was then seemingly apparent that infantry should not have been placed on the leading waveof tanks. If mounted on the following tanks, they probably would have ridden farther forward. Company H reached the edge of the city without loss. Two of my platoons were out of my sight most of the time, but we had good radio contact. To achieve our mission, we had to go through the city without infantry support, so I ordered each platoon leader to take a separate street and move fast, in a staggered column formation, firing all weapons. Each platoon had previously been assigned roads to secure on the far (upper) side of the city. We knew that we decidedly needed in-May-June 1987 fantry support, but had no way of contacting the company that had been with us. The lesson learned here was that several methods of infantry-tank liaison should have been established to meet varying situations. As we entered the city, we were still hoping that the 3rd Battalion, 41st Infantry, would catch up with us in their halftracks. We were told later that they had dismounted when the first artillery fell near them and had walked one and one-half miles to reach the city. This greatly delayed the arrival of infantry in the city. I believe the unnecessary dismounting took place because they had been instructed to “Dismount at the first resistance.” It should have been specified what type of resistance would necessitate dismounting. As their halftracks had received no direct fire, they could have remained mounted. An incident of minor importance occurred at this time. I read that Co. G, 66th Armored Regiment, following close behind us, had one tank hit by an artillery shell. As the tank burned, its crew, taking cover near the tank, received some fire from friendly infantry. The tank may have been difficult to identify in flames, but we wondered if our infantrymen either were not familiar enough with the distinguishing features of our tanks or were careless in identifying vehicles. Although Canicatti was thought to be filled with snipers, there was no resistance to the first tanks to enter the city. We tried to follow the back streets and fired all our weapons at windows, balconies, roof parapets, and street intersections. When the platoon I was with reached the upper (northwest) edge of the city, my tank drew fire from some large-caliber antitank guns located 2,500 yards away on a ridge overlooking the city. The only protection available for my tank was the partial concealment of a bushy tree ahead of me. Several HE shells missed my tank before we reached concealment, but I happened to see the muzzle blasts of three of the enemy weapons. Only two or three other tanks were able to get into protected firing positions. When we all opened fire again, we may have put the guns I had spotted out of action, but other weapons outside our field of view kept firing and knocked out my tank, wounding. two of us. AS my crew and I ran 100 yards back to the edge of the city, we were fired upon with HE, and by machine gun fire from a short range. Soon after this, I met an infantry officer and several men who had stayed on our tanks throughout the whole attack. I asked them to work forward and help us spot some more antitank guns, but they said the machine gun fire would prevent it. I suggested that they follow closely behind two of my tanks through an olive orchard, first to point out the machine gun positions to us, and then to help us locate the antitank guns. Their answer to this was that the tanks drew too much fire for them. My next thought was that they could follow at a distance, or off to one side, but this would not have been effective because the infantry had no tracers, radios or other means of designating targets to us. The significant fact here was that in the middle of a battle we were arguingaboutpoints and techniques that should have been developed and practiced in training. The enemy positions were eventually taken by coordinated tank-infantry-artillery attacks late 12 July and early 13 July. These attacks were well-coordinated on a big scale, but there was very poor liaison between small infantry and tank units. Thirteen tanks of Co. G, 66th Armored Regiment, had to hold the top of one hill all night without infantry support, partially surrounded by German infantry. A company of the 41st Infantry was ordered to find the tanks and join them after dark, but they failed in this, apparently because there was no means of direct communication between the two units. The infantry probably would have been subjected to some of the hand grenades and antitank mines rolled down the hill in the dark (detonated by offensive grenades in place of fuses), and small arms fire directed at the Germans by the tank crews anyway. The reason for this is that the infantry would have had no means of telling the tankers where they were. The lessons learned above are self-evident. The points of view are those of a tank officer. The infantry, too, must have had many criticisms of the poor coordination and our lack of understanding of their difficulties. The fault was in our training. In many combined arms exercises and firing problems, the tanks and infantry had attacked a common objective, and our coordination was good in those planned exercises. The tanks and infantry each used their own methods of advance over the most suitable terrain for each. But we had not developed a technique of working together in small infantry-tank teams for situations where the infantry and tanks would have to help each other to advance. We did not know how to help each other overcome the unforeseeable difficulties in reaching intermediate objectives. The experiences in Sicily led to a greatly improved understanding between infantry and tanks in the division. 1943 Photo

UORRIS H. P E R K I N S ,

H.D., was a captain in corn-nand of Co. H, 66th Armored qegiment during the Canicat- :i action. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the Purple Heart. Prior to going overseas, he had attended the tank maintenance course at the Armored Force School, Ft. Knox, and from April 1944 to October 1945 was an instructor, Tactics Division, Armored School, Ft. Knox. He was promoted to the rank of major and left the Army after the war to attend medical school. He resides in Portland, Oregon. 36