How to Fight the Difficult Terrain

A familiar scene is again repeated. A company team of well-trained, motivated soldiers has worked hard to prepare a defensive position. They have good defensive ground; they know when and where the enemy will attack and they are ready. Soon, reports from the task force scouts charge the command net with excitement and anticipation. A motorized rifle regiment equipped with T-72s and BMPs is headed right down the high-speed avenue of approach, just as expected. The U. S. forces are quickly engaged in a fierce battle. Command and control breaks down as the defenders are forced to fight for their lives against the steamroller attack of the enemy. The team commander tries to break contact and move to his next position. However, the enemy seems hardly to hesitate as it bypasses and breaches the barriers designed to buy the displacement time. The US. forces are destroyed as they attempt to move or are overrun. And so ends another day at the NTC. Many articles have been written on this subject. Usually they explain in great detail what should have happened. The fact that the participants knew exactly what should have happened as well or better than any observer is often overlooked. The question becomes not what the principle or theory is, but rather how do we make it happen. The phrase “how to fight” takes on a lot different meanings when someone is doing everything he can to kill you. Detailed planning, coordination, timing, and preparation are keys to success in the defense. Armor leaders learn how to plan a defense using METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available) analysis and the six defensive planning steps: Define avenues of approach (mounted, dismounted and air). Select tentative positions and tasks. Task organize (type and size of unit to cover avenues of approach). Allocate space (to include firing, hide, alternate and supplemental positions). Plan obstacles and fire control graphics (target reference points, engagement areas, and obstacles). Record positions and orientations (execution matrix). Most company commanders understand troop leading procedures, METT-T, and all the other thinking aids provided. The problem comes in application. The inexperienced leader will try to apply the school solutions to tactical problems presented during tactical instruction simply because he hasn’t been exposed to any other solutions. Unfortunately, our enemies seldom react the way we envision them reacting on a terrain board. During the approach march, the enemy can analyze terrain and intelligence from reconnaissance elements to determine the U. S. defensive plan. Based on a knowledge of specific or probable U. S. positions, the enemy commander can quickly adjust his plan to attack down a less likely avenue of approach. The defending team commander needs flexibility built into this plan to anticipate all the options available to the attacking enemy commander. He must develop a defensive option for each of the enemy commander’s possible moves. The team should occupy to defend against the primary avenue of approach and prepare positions to defend against other less likely avenues of approach. The most critical point of the battle is the repositioning of defensive forces. The team commander must clearly see the battlefield at this time. This does not mean he is at a vantage point where he can

Dersonallv observe the enemy for--smoke screen at the engagement -flank units holding? Has the battle mations. -Rather, he must have trained observers in key positions that can tell him to what avenues of approach the enemy has committed himself and in what strengths. While he still has good command and control of all his elements, he must quickly shift his forces to counter the actual enemy thrust. In the direct-fire portion of the battle, the point where the defense plan must be implemented, the commander must have planned well, accurately read the anticipated battle, and be able to meet the threat. If he does this, he will now have a chance to defeat the enemy. During the direct fire battle, the battalion commander experiences a loss or degradation of command and control. He should expect this situation. Given the speed and violence of the enemy attack, the forces in contact are locked in a life-or-death struggle, and fire commands from the team commander to his crew, have priority over spot reports to his battalion commander. During the fight, each tank will have to take out as many enemy vehicles as it can, and as quickly as possible. The enemy forces must either be destroyed or forced to recoil from a furious attack by fire. A commander can’t afford to have each tank fire two rounds and move. This action only results in a loss of time and firepower needed to break the enemy attack. Units must use techniques to improve vehicle survivability rather than shift firing positions. It must maintain a high volume of fire. A passive technique is a good turret defilade firing position. In preparing the firing position, use good natural camouflage and ensure that any berm or spoil is previously knocked down. If a tank does not have a thermal capability, lay a trigger line. The smokewill slow the enemy down and may disrupt his formations. It may also confuse him. As enemy vehicles break out of the smoke, they will be silhouetted, making excellent targets. Use the same technique with thermal capability for an added advantage: engage enemy vehicles while they are in the smoke without compromising friendly positions. After the enemy has been repulsed or destroyed, command and control will begin to improve. A unit can compensate for the loss of key leaders by having a code word that will place the entire team on one frequency. This allows the team commander to shift individual vehicles or squads within the position as required. If the defensive plan calls for the steam to displace to a subsequent battle position, the team will need time to recover damaged equipment and wounded men. This must be done before the enemy recovers or his second echelon arrives. There are some useful techniques to keep the enemy off balance, but only if the team has previously done a good terrain analysis. The devious use of mines is one technique. Mines should be buried at the ends of obvious barriers, or on bypasses. Placingmines in positions the enemy will use for cover, or as firing positions, (e.g. wadis) is also effective. If there is little time to prepare the defense or engineer assets are scarce, the shrewd placement of mines and barrier materials becomes even more critical. Use caution in determining disengagement criteria. Leaving too early negates the effort used to prepare the position. Waiting too long can be fatal. The commander must make the decision to move based upon the changing situation. Are gone as anticipated? Disengagement criteria such as “fire two rounds and move,” are useless if the firing unit engages prematurely. Event-oriented criteria, such as “disengage, when two enemy tanks breach the tank ditch” could cause the abandonment of a good defen-sibleposition with only two enemy tanks left alive. All defensive positions are unique -none are like the examples in the book. Someone has to defend the difficult terrain between the imagined good positions occupied by flank units. Based on the uniqueness of a postion, a unit can use techniques that vary from the norm to maximize terrain. In a mixed team, these techniques may take the form of overlapping platoon positions within the team battle positions. If there is an excellent individual tank position within an infantry platoon position, it’s better there than next to the other three tanks in the platoon occupying a poor position, as long as the platoon itself operates as a team. In an infantry team position, a tank platoon could be spread across the position, intermingled with the infantry platoons. This does not violate unity of command if the tanks remain under the positive control of the platoon leader. Although this technique requires closer coordination between platoons, it provides dispersion and increases the mutual security within the position. The best way to.yisualize a de-fenseis to think of it as an ambush, not a fortress. Try to set up the ambush to shoot the enemy in the back, or the next best thing, in the flank. The solution that first comes to mind is to position forces on the flanks of an avenue of aDDroach to 30 ambush the attacker as he enters the kill zone. This method depends on terrain and the available force. This may be appropriate at the task force level, but is not normally feasible to the team commander, unless part of a larger plan. Another method that could be used by forces occupying linear positions is to fire to the oblique into kill zones directly in front of adjacent units while using the terrain to their front to mask their fires from the enemy. This solution can be used within a team position, or it can be integrated with flank units. This techniqueis not without risk, however. While the enemy can be engaged at long range by a flank unit, he won’t be engaged until he is relatively close to the masked defender, making a withdrawal of the defender difficult at best, unless the attack is repulsed or destroyed. The use of!oca1 counterattacks to mass fires on enemy elements that SUCceed in reaching the defensive line is an added benefit of this solution. The reverse slope defense is particularly effective if the terrain supports it. Using a hill mass that the enemy must crest to make defensive positions provides security from early detection of friendly positions. Attacking the enemy on the forward slope with artillery disrupts his formation and causes him to crest the slope while buttoned up, seriously reducing his vision. Barriers at the crest can further canalize him into designated kill zones. This method also negates suppressive fires from ATGMs. Night security is problem that plagues all units. It becomes more acute the longer a unit is in a position. Security can. be increased by running guard duty within the team. Have a platoon leader from one platoon and a platoon sergeant from another platoon serve shifts as officer and sergeant of the guard. This technique facilitates asleep plan and ensures that leaders are involved in security. When a platoon leader troops the line to check security, not only will he ensure people are alert, but he will learn the detailed disposition of the whole team, not just his own platoon. This knowledge could prove critical should he need to take command of the team. Conducting combat operations at company team level is both a science and an art. The scientific portion comes through a study of weapons’ characteristics, doctrinal material, and the lessons of history. The art of war is harder to master. A leader needs to use his intellect and leadership to make things happen. No amount of study can prepare him for the battle that he and his men will fight. Only practice and the confidence gained from leading a well-trained, cohesive, unit can provide the experience needed to understand the art of war. Modern warfare is too often considered to be a contest of technology-vs-technology. The team commander is concerned with technology, but his primary concern should be the human element. Aggressive, well-trained, motivated teams win battles. The way to develop a combat-ready team is to train as though each tactical problem is real, thereby instilling the warrior spirit in each member of the team.

SON, commissioned from southwestern Oklahoma State University, Weather-ford, is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Coursesand theCom-bined Arms and Services Staff School. Heservedasan aeroscout in 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, at An Khe. RVN; as a tank platoon leader and S3 air in the 3d Battalion, 35thArmor, at Bamberg, FRG; as a scout platoon leader in 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, at Fort Hood, TX; and as a BMO and tank company commander in 1 st Battalion, 73d Armor, at Fort Irwin, CA. He is currently assigned as an instructor at the Armor School.