Soviet Forward Detachments

The Soviet Forward Detachment by Joseph R. Burniece Introduction Over the last few years the experiments, developments, and combat possibilities of the Soviet operation- .a1 maneuver group (OMG) have captured the imagination and attention of many Western analysts. Often overlooked, but of equal importance, is the past and present development of the forward detachment (FD), forerunner of the OMG. Historical Background Most readers are probably well-acquainted with the conceptual developments of the Soviet OMG. For our purposes, we might briefly recall that the OMG was developed from a WW I1 predecessor known as the mobile group. That formation was usually a standard division-sized tank corps of some 150 tanks, six battalions of infantry, and supporting arms. The mobile group designator was then assigned for the course of an operation. Generally, one mobile group was assigned to a rifle army (today a combined arms army) of three to five infantry divisions, in the first echelon. Its assignment was as the mobile element designated to assist the first echelon achieve its objectives and, where possible, simultaneously push deeper into the enemy rear area to break open the front. At that point, a second echelon might be committed to continue the combat and create a major breakthrough in preparation for a mobile operation. As the war continued, the Soviets became ever more adept at mobile group operations until by 1944, few operations lacked such formations. In that same time frame, the Soviets recognized that major combat formations to either flank of an operation involving mobile groups could often benefit from, and in some cases match, the performance of the forces on the primary axis through the use of smaller, local mobile elements fielded by the first echelon rifle divisions themselves. These mobile forces were known as forward detachments. The Forward Detachment in WW I1 The forward detachments in the early (1942-43) stages were often hastily trained or ad hoc formations created by drawing upon divisional resources. First came selection of several of the younger officers, who had demonstrated initiative and leadership, to lead the FD. The activity and demands of the FD were expected to exceed those normally expected of the rifle battalion in the line, so the most trained, aggressive, and resourceful battalion was often assigned. Since nearly the entire rifle division was on foot while supplies and heavy weapons were transported by horse and wagon, the troops of the FD were often assigned to ride on the back of assault guns or tanks assigned to the division for the current operation. Support arms, to include mortars, air defense weapons, communications and logistics elements, were in like manner hastily organized and equipped or supplied on a catch-as-catch-can basis. As the war progressed, the Soviet field commanders at every rank became more adept and aggressive. Simultaneously, equipment - particularly tanks, assault guns, and infantry mortars/artillery - became more plentiful as Soviet factories recovered from the dislocation brought about by the German invasion and moved into high production with the influx of raw materials and Lend-Lease aid. By 1944, the FD became a fixed feature of most rifle divisions as well as tank and mechanized corps (Figure 1). Continuing war experience had created the additional trained leaders and troops to create supplemental FDs. As one FD was committed to an axis of advance, suffered attrition, or fell out exhausted, a new FD would be organized and sent forward to continue the advance into the depth of the enemy operational area. From the middle of 1944, every operation had numerous FDs. For example, in the Crimean operation of that year, no fewer than 11 FDs were detailed from formations of the 2nd Guards Army first echelon alone. In the Lutsk-Rovno and Mogilev offensive operations, the 13th and 49th [Rifle] Armies each detailed eight detachments within their operational zones. Furthermore, corps and army detachments were detailed in addition to the FDs of the divisions constituting those senior field organizations. The more experience gained with the FDs, the more clear became the lesson that greaternumbers of FDs 12 substantially improved the operational performance of the parent formations. Forward Detachments in the 1970s As both the Soviet Union and NATO fielded and enlarged their stocks of tactical and theater nuclear weapons, the Soviet Army intensely studied the means to best exploit nuclear fire strikes. As the most mobile and, theoretically - given the correct choice of aggressive commanders - the most skilled battalions, FDs of the past were expected to fulfill two very valuable functions. First, the FD was tasked as previously to drive deeply into the enemy rear area, to overrun enemy artillery positions and headquarters, disrupt communications, and delay the forward or lateral movement of enemy reinforcements. Secondly and perhaps a moreimportant role, was to seek out, or drive for under mission order, any of the local nuclear weapon storage and launch sites. It was furthermore expected that proper employment of the FD could ensure rapid and effective exploitation of nuclear fire strikes by Soviet forces. Whether awaiting the outcome of a nuclear strike and the follow-on combat of the NATO survivors by Soviet/Warsaw Pact first echelon forces, or in some instances initiating forward movement through previously identified weak sectors in the NATO lines prior to the nuclear strike and general engagement, the FD as a battalion-sized formation was seen as the tool to once again facilitate the forward movement of the parent division. Once again, the FD would most likely consist of a tank-based battalion formation with attached infantry, air defense, and artillery assets tailored to the situation, and as limited by the available resources, Soviet Analysis of NATO Defenses Critical analysis of the NATO defenses over the years has provided the Soviets with the clear understanding of the limited numbers of Western combat troops in the Central European Theater. Although relative parity in tactical and theater nuclear weapon forces has

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Fig 3 resulted in a reported general reluctance on the part of the Soviets to continue discussions of their employment in a future war, the similar relative abundance of chemical weapons, for which the Soviets are best prepared, or the often-promised, soon to be fielded “smart” weapon technology of NATO, pre-disposes the Soviets to believe that the battlefield of the future will be much like that postulated in the 1960s for the nuclear battlefield. With resources scarce and flanks usually not just open - but wide open - in the projected initial encounters on the inner German border, the Soviets apparently believe the conditions in Central Europe for NATO will be analogous to those of the German Army in 1944 and 1945. In those times, when the Germans lacked the troops and equipment to prepare more than one major defensive line, the FD could, as noted, rapidly find a gap to penetrate and plunge deeply into the enemy rear area. Supporting Assets for the Forward Detachment Stemming from discussions and debates in the 1970s, the expanded support requirements for a battalion organization performing the role of FD in many ways reads like that of the larger OMG. Of paramount concern to the Soviets is the establishment and maintenance, under all circumstances, of a strong and reliable communications systems. With it, the FD may rapidly move, change direction, halt to repel an enemy counterattack, or strike off on an entirely new mission. It can receive and, in some instances, specifically lend support. Without it, the FD is essentially a powerful but “blind” boxer. It may still move and attempt to complete its mission, but has no means other than the limited re- .

13 May-June 1987

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9 12.7-mm M Me8 4 45-mm AT Gun. 6 8 2 - m m M ~ n 4 12.7-mmMGs Soviet Forward Detachments - 1945 A t o r m d d.bch-ofthiityp.mafomud by Om. Bdoborodov in Auguat. 1946t0~8i#tlh. 3ooa, Rith DMmon. 26th Riffs Cotpa, puah mpidty torward to byp... Jawner Unit. in MMchuM. connaissance assets immediately at hand to identify either potential trouble or very real disaster. Intelligence on the enemy and his movements is perhaps the second most critical facet for the reasons already cited. As the forward-most combat element of the Eastern forces, the FD is in the position to require both the most timely information and intelligence - including especially available air reconnaissance photos and reports as well as intercepted radio traffic - and to provide such intelligence on NATO forces, deployments, and situations as it can, given the situation. Air defense is considered a role as much for the Soviet air force as for ground-deployed air defense weapons. Once again, in order to successfully maintain a combat air patrol of MiG-21, MiG-29, MiG-31 or HIND-E over the FD, to defeat our * attack helicopters, a reliable communications net is mandatory. Given the intended high-speed movement of the FD and the high probability of encountering NATO combat elements - and, particularly, NATO close air support aircraft - in the first five days of a major offensive, Soviet tactical air support is critical. If discussions of similar problems confronting the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies on the employment of the larger OMG are relevant, it may be that NATO air power is currently the greatest concern to the FD planners. The Forward Detachment in the 1980s The value of the FD has traditionally been recognized for its inherent ability to act as a ‘‘reyd” or raiding force. Of battalion size or larger, (Figure 2) the FD constitutes a force with firepower similar to that of the standard NATO mechanized combat battalion which would theoretically be encountered on any given 3-5 km frontage in Central Europe. Free to operate outside of, but in coordination with, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact main forces rate and axis of advance, the FD has the wherewithal to elect to engage in combat or decline and seek another path further into the rear of the enemy defenses. Avoiding battle is a primary facet of the FD mission. Even given that, the FD has usually been a standard tank or motorized rifle battalion organization augmented with artillery and communications assets, the FD role is one of finding a way deep into the rear in numbers (Figure 3). Combat near the line of departure would simply reduce the power and effectiveness of the FD at the crucial moment deep in the rear area - if it even managed to amve there after combat. By avoiding combat, and selecting the most propitious axis for advance, the FD may - and usually in exercises (and history) does - increase its mobility relative to its sister battalions in the Soviet line wearily thrashing their way forward through the tough Western defenses common to NATO. Unshackled from the responsibility to maintain strict coordination and overlapping front lines with units on either flank, the FD, like the larger OMG, can move much more rapidly with the same amount of equipment and troops, given its freedom of maneuver. The desire on the part of Soviet STAVKA (high command) is certainly that any and every motorized rifle and tank battalion could perform as a FD. In theory, of course, this would be true, given the relative equipment and training equivalency of all Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) formations. In reality, this simply isn’t the case. More important than training of the troops, equipment available, and desire on the part of senior command components, is the realization that one of the most important, indeed vital elements of the Soviet FD is the extremely important and often hard-to-come-by qualitative element of junior officer command skill. In a national system which frowns upon deviation from the norm and views with suspicion in peacetime any overt display of originality, the personality requirements for the commander of the FD mission calling for exactly that individual role presents a formidable challenge. As difficult as it may be then to find a number of gifted junior officers to entrust with the role of FD commander, the more pertinent question is where will the relief FDs be found? With offensives requiring up to 800-km drives from Central Europe to the English Channel, and assuming combat in any number of circumstances and locations along that route, it stands to reason (as the Soviets well recognize) that FDs will of necessity have to be replaced from time to time. 14

Since the number of qualified junior officers and staffs possessing the initiative and training to perform in the role of FD is probably limited in the Soviet society, it may well be a case that those few qualified are given even greater responsibility. That is, rather than limiting the effectiveness of the superior command staff by restraining resources, actions could be taken to “increase their effectiveness” by increasing the size and number of combat attachments in order to create an even larger FD with greater fighting and staying power. This latter possibility was brought up as early as 1966 by then Colonel I. N. Vorob’yev, Soviet Army, as he postulated the future of FDs. Blitzkrieg Regiments and the Operational Forward Detachment According to Vorob’yev, the size of the FD could grow in order to increase the impact of the individual FD on the enemy defenses. The larger the FD, the greater the ability to overcome small (company to battalion)-sized NATO blocking forces which might attempt to obstruct forward movement and thus reduce Army momentum. It is possible that Vorob’yev’s arguments were not only soundly understood, but steps may have been taken to implement the means to make FDs more powerful and, therefore, more independent. In 1977, General George Keegan, USAF, identified a series of seven Soviet formations in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, which were at that time termed “blitzkrieg regiments.” According to General Keegan, these formations exhibited much greater firepower, while also displaying a considerably increased logistics capability. The latter would be of great importance for deep, long mission penetrations, while the former would certainly emphasize the importance of the FD to the army commander seeking a means to lever forward his four or more divisions. As larger formations the FD, or blitzkrieg regiments, would by definition fit progressive conceptual arguments for the eventual development of “operational forward detachments” (OFD). Though nom-Figure 2 I j -3 36 BMP-l/Zs 13 T-64fl-728 18 2S1 122-mm How. 6 M-1943 120-mm or 82-mm Vad& M ~ m n (ground mount1 + Optional Nuck.r/Ch.miul C.p.biliitY 2 AT-4 SPIGOT ATGMa 2

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2 ZSU-23/4 SPAGa Soviet Forward Detachments - 1980 The FD depicted ia rspnmt.thn oi ~IIOOO whkh might ha bmnd at division and army level (NATO carp. level). It ia organized around s motorired rifle battalion and wpporting wsapons. A tank battalion could alw wwaasthe baseorganizationsl.tructure. anditisoftensuggened thatsuchuni~would.erveba.tforauch. misaion. Larger (regiment) level FDa, aimilar in atrunurn. may be cmand as well. inally controlled by division, it is possible that such otherwise inex-plicable formations as the fifty-tank “reserve” battalion of the motor rifle division is not half so much a tank reserve as a very vital connector between tpe divisional tactics and the operations of the army. In concert‘with airborne and airmobile-inserted infantry elements, the FD or OFD, of whatever size, is expected to drive fast and deep into the enemy rear area. In this combination, it should be expected that great confusion will arise on the part of NATO forces. This is exactly as desired by the Soviet commander. With greater confusion on the part of the enemy usually goes greater mobility on the part of friendly forces. Greater mobility in turn usually begets lower casualties and a greater willingness on the part of the junior commander to “mix it up” with NATO tactical field forces. If this should occur, it is almost to be assumed that the pace of advance of forward Soviet/ Warsaw Pact formations will quicken, given the limited number of NATO forces readily at hand in the opening stages of a potential future conflict in Central Europe. If the rate of advanceincreases, it is very probable that intermingling of tactical combat formations will in turn increase. The result in Soviet eyes, would most likely be that NATO could not employ tactical nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons - which, in turn, would assist in speeding up the advance of operational forces (divisions), since their tactical densities would remain the same at battalion level but would be very concentrated by comparison at division level as the breakthrough of the NATO line was effected. The most significant problem for NATO forces may be that the FD (as is the army OMG) is expected to operate considerably in advance (as much as 30-100 km) of the parent conventional Army formations. The Forward Detachment and Advanced Guard Given the strategic value of FDs to the Soviets, one of the interesting problems facing NATO commanders is finding a means to identify them. With the possible exception that in a rare event a given Soviet/ Warsaw Pact battalion-sized combat element may strive mightily to avoid combat when it would otherwise seem most reasonable to en-May-June 1987 gage (say a NATO combat-reduced mechanized company), the odds would seem rather slim that a FD would be recognized as such. Size, as noted, would also seem to offer little assistance in this regard. Very simply, the FD role, as any role, is little more than a mission assignment for a particular battalion and its affiliated supporting elements. This is also certainly the case for the mission assignment of a battalion within aregiment to act as advance guard. Since, theoretically, any Soviet battalion, tank or mechanized, may be assigned either the FD mission or the advance guard mission, and both formations will include attached supporting arms as available or mission oriented, it may be that the more critical FD escapes to complete its mission as outnumbered NATO battalions seek combat with any elements seemingly willing to come to terms. The problem becomes more acute as we consider the hypothetical situation in which the advance guard for three Soviet/Warsaw Pact regiments advancing in line are suddenly activated as FDs, to be replaced by follow-on battalions assigned as the new advance guard. Or, in a more sinister vein, the problem of NATO dealing with perhaps a division-sized OMG which, once in the rear area, spawns battalion-sized FDs on lateral axes to confuse, confound, disrupt, and ultimately encircle and entrap NATO forward elements. It is very possible that the only fair means to recognize the more important role of the FD will be either by the absence of reconnaissance detachments left far to the rear (an unlikely and probably highly suspect method given the likelihood of FDs receiving some form of reconnaissance elements), or by radio intercept of mission orders and reports, also a rather unlikely event, given traditional Soviet respect for radio security. Conclusion Ultimately, it seems the problem NATO faces as regards FDs is greater than that posed by the similar, but more powerful, OMG. Unable to ascertain with any degree of certainty that a Soviet tactical element is or is not a FD, or that it might not become one, each such unit encountered near or, to the immediate rear of NATO forward positions will of necessity have to be eliminated. As difficult as this will certainly be, it is not beyond the capability of our forces if we use the inherent initiative, ingenuity, and drive of our junior officers and NCOs to arrest the movement of the enemy and maneuver quickly and decisively to shatter each enemy element in turn. It will, however, require an aggressive, well-trained integrated air and ground tactical force prepared for non-stop maneuver and engagements. The question is: Do we now possess the skill and determination to succeed in this task? References Armstrong. MAJ Richard, USA, “Fighting the Threat Advance Guard,” ARMOR, MayJune 1982. Baxter, LTC William P., USA (Ret.); Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics, Presidio Press, 1986. Bunce, SFC Peter L., USA; “The Soviet Reaction to a Flank Threat,” ARMOR, November-December 1985. Dick, C. J.; “Soviet Battle Drills,” Znternational Defense Review, VOL XVIII, No. 6, 1985. Donnelly, C. N.; “Soviet Tactics for Overcoming NATO Anti-Tank Defenses,” Znternational Defense Review, VOL XII, No. 7, 1979. Donnelly, C. N.; “Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army,” Znternational Defense Review, VOL XI, No. 9, 1978. Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. and Hoeber Amoret-ta M., editors; Selected Readings from ‘Military Thought’- 1963-1972, Volume5,Part I. Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. and Hoeber Amoret-ta M., editors; SelectedReadings from ‘Military Thought’- 1963-1972, Volume5, Part 11. Eshel, LTC David M. IDF (Ret.); “The Development of Soviet Motorized Infantry,” Born in Battle Magazine, No. 12, 1980. Glantz, LTC David M., USA “August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945,” Leavenworth Papers, No. 8, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June, 1983. Glantz, LTC David M., USA, “August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria,” Leavenworth Papers, No. 7, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February, 1983. Isby, David; Weapons and Tactics of the SO-uiet Army, Jane’s Publishing Incorporated 1981. Ivanov, S. P., chief author; The Znitial Period of War, Moscow, 1974, translated by U.S. Air Force. Monteverde, Roberto and Tamaio, Maurilio; “The Soviet Combined Arms Reinforced Battalion,” Military Technology, No. 10, 1985. Patrick, Stephen B.; “Firefight - U.S. and Soviet Small Unit Tactics,” Strategy & Tactics, No. 56, MayJune, 1976. Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F., editors; The Soviet Art of War - Doctrine, Strategy & Tactics, Westview Pres, 1982. Simpkin, BG Richard E., British Army (Ret.); Red Armour - An Examination of the SOviet Mobile Force Concept, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1984. Soviet Army Operations, IAQ-13-U-78, Department of the Army, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, United States Army Intelligenceand Threat Analysis Center, Arlington, VA, April, 1978. “Soviet Tactical Limitations,” Strategy & Tactics, No. 71, November-December, 1978. “Soviets Forming Seven New Blitzkrieg Regiments in East Germany, asserts GEN George Keegan,” Znternational Defense Review, VOL x, No. 6,1977. “The American and Soviet Rifle Company,” Strategy & Tactics, No. 69, July-August, 1978. The Soviet Army, Operations and Tactics, FM 100-2-1, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1984. The Soviet Army, Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support, FM 100-2-2, Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1984. The Soviet Army, Troops, Organization and Equipment, FM 100-2-3, Headquarters, D e partment of the Army, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1984. Vigor, P. H.; Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1983. Waccheman, Helmut; “Beating the Odds,” Combat Weapons, Fall, 1985. JOSEPH R. BURNIECE is currently co-director of The Foundation, a conservative Washington, D.C.-based defense and budget think tank founded in early 1986. Mr. Burniece was for the previous three years a consultant with the Project on Military Procurement. Holding a B.A. in History from the University of Minnesota, he has spent seventeen years studying military history, tactics, weapons, and technology. At one time part owner in a defense-related business involved in developing training systems for NCOs and officers, Mr. Burniece has also served as a contract administrator and small business consultant in the areas of profitability, productivity, and performance. ~ 16