A Survey of Soviet Armor

A Survey of Soviet Armor by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Davison

I. Introduction When Hitler’s armies lunged across the borders of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the Red Army became the center of hopeful world attention. It has remained so ever since with the rather significant exception that hope has been replaced by apprehensiion. The remarkable performance of the Red Army in sustaining the initial punishing blows of the blitzkrieg, in applying its strategic concept of defense in extreme depth, in refraining from piecemeal commitment of its strategic reserves, in retaining its organizational unity despite initial wholesale surrenders and tremendous losses in men and materiel, and in turning imminent defeat into a final successful counteroffensive and victory over Germany’s finest troops - all this bears evidence that the Nazi defeat in Russia is not to be explained away merely by a group of whining German generals passing the buck to Hitler’s intuition. Acceptance of the German rationale might lead us to underestimate the true strength of the Soviet Army. It must be understood that, from the early 1930’s on, the Politburo took the threat of war seriously. The messianic vision of international communism entertained by the Bolsheviks demanded that Soviet Russia be armed against the inevitable capitalist attacks. Preparations for war were no less intense than they were in Nazi Germany. The five year plans developed the industrial base. Dispersal of industry was put into effect. The psychological preparation of the Soviet people was commenced through propaganda and agencies for the defense training of civilians. Increased emphasis was placed on Russian nationalism or “SOviet patriotism” to give the moral driving force to total mobilization. Marxian propaganda was subordinated to national unity and patriotic appeals. The army was I British Matilda Mk II. 1939 increased, discipline tightened, officers corps strengthened, training improved, weapons developed. All this prepared Russia for the Nazi onslaught. As the events of 1941-42 proved, the preparations were not complete and it was the timely intervention of General Winter plus some carefully hoarded reserves which gave the Soviet Army a much-needed period of grace. Nevertheless, the foundation had been laid and the sources of strength existed. It remained for the Soviet high command to marshal and apply the strength with proper strategy, tactics, and technique. What was achieved in the armored field is the subject of this investigation.

It is necessary first to insert a word about the sources of information used for this paper. The paucity of authoritative detailed information on the current Russian scene is well known. Since there are no Soviet Congressional Records or Drew Pearsons available for consultation, researchers without access to classified information are reduced to poring over the Russian press, propaganda publications, government releases, radio announcements, and belles lettres. Then by drawing on their extensive knowledge of past Soviet behavior, they can amve at some sort of interpretation. These evaluations are then used by other evaluators, errors are compounded and realities become more tenuous. Most of the writing is on high level matters and eschews the worm’s-eye view. This general field plus a clutch of propaganda articles written by Russian army officers during the war for foreign consumption represents the source material. I have a very definite feeling that my crystal ball is cloudy but I hope that more astute observers will endeavor to correct my errors and to elaborate the somewhat skimpy fabric of my presentation.

11. Tactics

A. Prewar Concepts In 1925, Frunze succeeded Trotsky as War Commissar. Frunze was acutely aware of two fundamental facts bearing on the Soviet military strength. First, the capitalist countries enjoyed a considerable industrial head start. Until the Soviets could overcome the capitalist lead, the Red Army would be deficient in equip ment at the outset of any war. Second, Russia in the vastness of her territory possessed a considerable source of strength. Space could be traded for time. But this same space afforded opportunity for maneuver on a vast scale. There could be no static war of position because the tremendous reaches of the Russian territory would soak up troops like a sponge and still there would be room for maneuver. Thus, Frunze visualized maneuver warfare conducted by a mobile army imbued with the spirit of the offensive.’ The new Field Service Regulations published in 1936 summed up the Russian concept as follows: “Modern technical means of reducing the defense (above all. tanks. artillerv. aimlanes isolate him, to encircle him completely and finally destroy him.” This was the point of departure in developing the doctrine of the various arms. Early thinking on the employment of the tank placed it in two roles. The doctrine distinguished between tanks for support of infantry and tanks for “distant action.” The latter were to be independent tank formations employed for extended maneuver and operation against the enemy’s rear areas, in particular, communications centers, reserves, and artillery positions. However, tactics and technique for the “long-distance” units were not worked out in detail. In 1941, at least half of the total tank strength was in infantry support units indicating a conservative attitude towards large independent armored formations.2 That this attitude was destined to change after the war began is reflected in a statement attributed to the future Marshal of Armored Forces Rotmistrov speaking as a colonel in 1939: “Tanks must be employed in masses. The best opportunity for a tank commander is to be in command of large groups - a brigade, a corps, an army. Those are splendid instruments in an offensive. A concentration of a thousand tanks - that is the dream of every tank commander.”3

B. WWII - Offense During the course of the war, a fairly consistent picture developed of Soviet employment of tanks in the assault and breakthrough of a prepared defensive position. At any rate, rather more writing has been devoted to this phase of armor in the attack than to the conduct of the “rat-race’’ after the breakthrough has been made. The assault and breaching of the enemy position is a combined arms operation in which the infantry is the decisive weapon. Soviet doctrine stresses the detailed prior planning of the operation. The various units to be employed in the operation are brought together beforehand for combined training under conditions closely simulating those of the actual operation. Training is climaxed by CPXing the conduct of the proposed battle. Extensive reconnaissance is used to develop details of the terrain and of the enemy positions. Such information is incorporated in the training of units preparing for the attack.

The actual attack is preceded by an air and artillery prepartion extending through the depth of the position. The Soviet Army delights in massive artillery preparations delivered in great weight and for a prolonged period. However, even though this is their preference, Russian military writers emphasize that the attack preparation must not be stereotyped and they offer as an alternative a rolling barrage commencing at the time of attack or an attack without preparation using artillery and air as the battle develop.^ Of concern to Soviet commanders is the problem of marrying-up the tanks and infantry in the initial attack position. Coordination should be such that the tanks are “ I -and mechanized units, when used on a mass scale)# not held up once they amve at the attack position. make it possible to organize a simultaneous attack on Obviously, the tanks would be the center of considerable the enemy throughout the whole depth of his position, to enemy attention. German PzKpw I Light Tank, 1935 The initial wave of the attack, coming in close on the heels of the artillery preparation, consists of heavy tanks accompanied by infantry on foot. The primary mission of the heavy tanks is to destroy known AT guns, to force the disclosure of unlocated AT guns, and to deal with any enemy tanks that appear upon the scene.

The second wave, following at approximately 500 yards according to one account, is composed of medium tanks each carrying some ten infantrymen. Each team of tank and infantry has been allotted a bunker, weapon position or other objective in the enemy position. The mediums pass through the first wave when the AT opposition has been eliminated. They may assist the heavies in dealing with the AT defense. A third wave, similar in composition to the second, attacks enemy positions in depth and is prepared to exploit the success of the second wave. Infantry on foot follows the second and third waves to consolidate their gains thus freeing the tankborne infantry to continue with their assigned tanks.5 Light tanks, if employed, follow behind the mediums and are use? after a breakthrough is made to secure the flanks and conduct reconnaissance. Once the tank-supported infantry has succeeded in breaching the enemy position, armored formations are passed through and encirclement of the enemy is sought. Illustrative of this type of action is the highly publicized November offensive in 1942 at Stalingrad which resulted in the capture of Von Paulus and his army.

In this action, the XXVI Tank Corps (roughly equivalent to our armored division of World War 11) passed through a breach opened by a combined arms attack and moved some 75 miles through enemy territory to a juncture with a similar spearhead. The operation was characterized by the usual detailed preparations, including hours of night driving for the tank crews across the steppes learning to negotiate ravines and gullies in the dark.

The tank corps passed through the infantry in two columns traveling cross country. They immediately plunged into the tremendous space of the steppe where compass navigation was required. No effort was made to maintain a line of communications to the rear. Presumably ammunition trains accompanied them and one writer specifies that German supplies were to be used for refueling.‘j No halt was made the first night and only short ones thereafter. Once well into the enemy rear they had no compunctions about using vehicular lights at night. As a matter of fact, if one can believe the Russian military writers, this is a common practice in the Soviet armored force.

The final objective was a bridge across the Don River which was to be secured intact. This was accomplished by using an advance detachment consisting of five captured German tanks and three captured trucks transporting sixty tommy-gunners. This force secured the bridge and held off the Germans until the main body of the rnrns arrived.

So much for the general employment of Soviet armor on the offense. However, there are some interesting details of Soviet tank technique worth noting. The observations that follow are derived either explicitly or implicitly from articles by Russian officers written for US. consumption and perhaps should be well salted before swallowing.

There are repeated references to tank battles with the Germans in which the Soviet tanks attack firing their cannon as they move. The Russians call it more effective than stationary fire which they don’t care for because the enemy then has a standing target at which to fire. They are singularly reticent about how they obtain accuracy with the tank gun while moving, making only this rather smug comment: “Fire from moving tanks naturally requires high skill and training of crews.’’7 This is, of course, a degree of proficiency only attainable under the dictatorship of the proletariat and quite beyond the reach of the decadent capitalist. In fact, the Soviet tanks on occasion carry the “charge” to the point where they are completely intermingled with the opposing tank formation. Numerous citations for decorations carry accounts of ramming German tanks in order to disable them.8 Another point of interest is the use of observation posts by Soviet tanks in an engagement. It would appear that the tank unit commander uses the OP as the point from which he controls the action of his units. In the early days of the war when sometimes entire battalions were without radios, control from the OP was achieved by motorcycle messenger or liaison tank. If the OP is still part of the scheme, presumably control is now by radio.

In summary, Soviet use of armor on the offense calls for a massive stroke by tank-saturated infantry followed by breakthroughs of highly mobile armored formations striving for encirclement link-ups while the mass of infantry mops up behind them. A graphic description of such an advance is given by General Manteuffel, a panzer commander in the East, when he said, “The advance of a Russian army is something that Westerners can’t imagine. Behind the tank spearheads rolls on a vast horde, largely mounted on horses. The soldier carries a sack on his back, with dry crusts of bread and raw vegetables collected on the march from fields and villages. The horses eat the straw from the house roofs - they get very little else. The Russians are accustomed to carry on for as long as three weeks in this primitive way when advancing. You can’t stop them like an ordinary army, by cutting their communications, for you rarely find any supply columns to strike.”g

C. WWII - Defense The basic Soviet defense strategy in World War I1 is well known. It was essentially one of trading space for time in which to complete mobilization and the assembly of forces for a counteroffensive. It was a costly strategy because the German offensive was launched through the productive heart of prewar Russia. Some dispersal of industry had been accomplished in the five I I German PzKpw Ill. 1939 year plans prior to 1941 and transplanting of factories took place during the retreat, but the agricultural economy of the German-occupied areas suffered great loss from the scorched-earth policy of the Russians. In implementing their defensive strategy, the Soviet Army disposed its troops in great depth. The May 1942 issue of Fortune speaks of a Soviet Corps being disposed, according to the situation, on a 5 to 12 mile front with a main defense zone 9 to 12 miles in depth. While these figures are somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that defense in great depth is firmly rooted in Soviet tactical doctrine.

Large armored formations are held in army or “front” reserve for use in counterattacks against successful enemy breakthroughs. In the event of breakthrough there is no general withdrawal along the line. Units adjacent to the breach refuse their flanks. Reserve units are disposed against the flanks while others attempt to contain the point of the enemy spearhead by occupying previously prepared secondary positions. If these moves are successful, the large armored units in reserve counterattack, preferably against the flank of the breakthrough.

Within the defensive position, infantry-support tanks may be employed in dug-in positions in forward areas if other antitank means are considered insufficient. However, the preferred employment is to hold them in mobile reserve. The reserve position is selected so as to place the Soviet tanks athwart the probable line of advance of the enemy armor. The tanks are placed in camouflaged positions to cover with flanking fire the obvious tank routes through the position. When the enemy attacks, the Soviet infantry allows the enemy armor to pass through their position. The Soviet infantry then engages the enemy infantry in order to separate them from their armor. Soviet tanks ambush the penetrating enemy vehicles. A mobile reserve is maintained to either exploit or reinforce the defensive battle.10 Soviet defensive doctrine calls for the tanks to organize for an attack from any direction and to conduct constant reconnaissance of the area surrounding the position. This is vital where the great expanse of land and the tremendous length of the fighting front make for conditions of highly fluid and mobile warfare. Armor on the defensive carefully and expertly camou-flages its tanks. If the ambush system is to be used, sectors of fire and control arrangements are carefully laid out beforehand.

In the event of a daylight withdrawal, the tanks are expected to cover the extrication of the infantry. The tanks then move back by leapfrogging units to the rear. However, night withdrawals are preferred. The underlying principle of Soviet defensive action lies in their firm conviction that a battle is never lost as long as there exists even the slightest means of resistance. Bypassed units do not surrender; they fight on and, when fuel and ammunition are exhausted, the men join the guerrilla units.

D. Operations at Night Most of the Soviet Union lies north of the 50th parallel. During the winter, major operations are handicapped by the short period of daylight. Consequently, the technique of night operations became highly developed during the war, the general principle being that the infantry would penetrate the enemy defenses during the day and the tanks would pass through at night. Such an operation requires extremely careful preparation. The Russians emphasize detailed prior planning and training by the units involved. Reconnaissance is carried out to select routes, locate obstacles, and remove mines. Drivers are taken over the selected routes at night up to the enemy positions. For the attack, moonlight nights are preferred so that the tanks and accompanying infantry can maintain their orientation. The infantry assists in keeping the tanks on course and in designating targets. Formations are echeloned in depth making movement and control easier. According to one writer, such a formation also gives the enemy an impression of much greater strength because it is more difficult to estimate at night the strength of a unit deployed in column rather than in line.11 Tank-infantry cooperation is even more important at night than in daytime. Under no circumstances, the Soviets feel, should the tanks and infantry become separated. Upon arriving on the objective, the infantry organizes the new position while the tanks are withdrawn to a rear assembly area.

Thus with tremendous quantities of tanks (30,000 armored vehicles per year 1943-4512) and by rotation of units, the Soviet Army can maintain the tempo of its offensive around the clock.

E. Operations in Winter The Soviet Army reckons that its armor can operate effectively for 10 months out of the year in central and north Russia. There is a period of from 6 to 10 weeks at the beginning and end of winter when General Mud commands the battlefield and tank operations are extremely difficult.

Maintenance and driving seem to be the major problems in winter operation. Formations in snow must be echeloned to avoid tracks of preceding tanks. Extra wide tracks and grousers assist in negotiating deep snow. Drivers are trained to make their turns wide and smooth. Drifts and snowbanks may be broken through at high speeds.

During rest periods or when in reserve positions, special precautions must be taken to protect men and machines. Tanks are dug-in up to the base of the turret (implying the use of TNT on the frozen ground), a trench is dug between the tracks and a portable stove set up. Tanks are covered with paulins and camouflaged with snow. Engines are turned over three to four times a day to insure easy starting. The crew gets shelter and warmth under the paulin.

Tactics in winter dictate careful terrain reconnaissance to avoid snow-filled gullies, ravines, and depressions. Ski-troopers are attached to the tanks - 4 to 5 skiers per tank - to carry out forward reconnaissance in difficult or unknown terrain. In the attack armored sleighs carrying 6 to 7 infantrymen are towed by the tanks. It is claimed that this scheme had definite value in reducing infantry casualties in the opening stages of the attack by carrying the infantry rapidly into close contact with the enemy.13

111. Organization The Russians were extremely careful throughout the war to prevent disclosure of any organizational details of their army. Press releases and military articles were written with only rare reference to units below the army or “front” (army group) level. Although corps, brigades, and divisions might be named, details of their composition were not given. However, sufficient information has been assembled by various means to indicate the general scheme of armored organization. The fact that much of the information is contradictory in detail perhaps indicates that the Soviets were not inflexible in their organizational concepts and that throughout the war they adapted their formations to the experience they gained as the war progressed. Major General Katukov, a Russian tank officer, has this to say on organization: “At the beginning of the war, the Red army tank troops were organized into divisions. Battle experience has shown, however, that these units were unwieldy and inconvenient for managing. The tank divisions have since been broken up into small units and re-formed into brigades that are more pliable on the battlefield.”14 Berchin and Ben-Horin place the strength of the tank brigade at the beginning of the war at 270 tanks. They note that during the Finnish War a heavy tank brigade consisted of three heavy tank battalions, each having 35 heavy tanks and 15 light tanks. They do not menton any infantry component in the brigade.’5 In May 1942, Fortune magazine also placed the brigade at 270 tanks. The Red Army was calculated to have 25 tank brigades some of which had motorized infantry attached to them. General Guillaume, French Army, indicates that the tank brigade in common use during the war was composed of three battalions of 21 tanks each - again, no infantry element. In place of the armored division had appeared the armored corps. The early armored corps contained two tank brigades and one infantry brigade.16 By the end of the war the normal armored corps had been increased in tank strength from two brigades to three.17 No strength or composition is given for the infantry brigade of the corps but since, in the case of the tanks, battalions are the components of the brigade, a safe assumption would have the infantry brigade consist of three battalions. Thus for each brigade of 63 tanks, there would be one motorized infantry battalion. The armored corps had a total of about 200 tanks, 100 ar5llery pieces, 24 antitank guns, and 28 antiaircraft artillery pieces. In 1943, self-propelled guns were furnished to large armored units. By the end of the war, there was a ratio of one SP to two tanks. It is not indicated whether this was in addition to or at the expense of the tank strength. With respect to infantry support tanks, Fortune of May 1942 states that normally each infantry division had attached to it a battalion of 45 tanks. In the normal three division corps there was a tank brigade of 135 tanks.

The three major tanks employed were the T-34, the KV-2, and the Stalin. The T-34 medium was considered the primary exploitation weapon. Initially it was armed with a 76mm gun but this was later raised to an 86mm weapon. This was a 30-ton vehicle. The KV-2 was a 52-ton tank mounting a 76mm gun. It was designed primarily for infantry support. In 1943, it began to be replaced by the Stalin. Guillaume describes the Stalin as a 57-ton tank armed with a 122mm gun and three .30 caliber machine guns. Its Diesel engine generated 600 horsepower and it had 3.85-inch armor. Its ground pressure of 11.6 lbs/sq. in. outclassed the German Tiger with 17.7 pounds and the Royal Tiger with 12.8 pounds.18 German commanders in the East were unanimous in their praise of Soviet tanks. Rundstedt said: “The Russian heavy tanks were a surprise in quality and reliability from the outset .... Their T-34 tank was the finest in the world.” Manteuffel, who also fought both in the East and the West, felt the Stalin tank to be the best tank he saw anywhere during the war.l9 IV. Training The Soviet citizen entering the army is not the military innocent to be found in the reception centers of our country. In the first place, he is thoroughly accustomed to regimentation, having been exposed to it from the time his mother stuck him, at the age of four weeks, in the community nursery of the collective farm and went back to her allotted place behind the plow. As soon as he entered school, he came under the jurisdiction of the junior affiliation of the Young Communists known as the Octobrists. He began learning how to march in formation and became acquainted with Soviet discipline. Whether he progressed from the Octobrists into the Pioneers and thence to the Komsomol (Young Communists) or failed to advance in the party auxiliary, he still would come into contact with the Osoaviakhim.

This civilian agency was designed to teach rudimentary military skills to the people such as rifle marksmanship, grenade throwing, and partisan tactics. Thus military preparedness and the art of war were to be part of the daily life of the civilians. A second influence in the tanker’s training was the MTS or Motor Tractor Stations of the collective farm system. An integral part of Russian agricultural plan is a high degree of mechanization. Tank recruits from this source had the mechanical technique and skill which is readily transformed into the specialized requirements of an armored unit. may-june 1 985 Once in the army the individual soldier lived under a rigid training schedule based on the maxim of Catherine the Great’s famous general, Alexander Survorov -“Hard on the training ground, easy on the battlefield.”20 During the war, an average day went something like this: reveille 0600 followed by physical training exercises, breakfast 0700, training 0800-1300, dinner 1300. Afternoon programs varied but one afternoon a week was devoted to political education. Supper was at 1700. The evening was devoted to discussion of the day’s news by the political commissar. Occasionally entertainment programs were provided in the evening. At 2200 lights were out and the men in bed. Soldiers had approximately 30 minutes of their own time a day. In unit training the Soviet Army took advantage of the vast range of climate and terrain available to them in their huge temtory. Conditions range from the constant cold and scanty vegetation of the far north through the more temperate area of far-reaching belts of coniferous forests to the great spread of the ocean-like steppe in the south. There are mountains and deserts, huge lakes and wide rivers, and great maneuver areas unrestricted by farms and cities. The army takes advantage of these conditions through a device called “route training.”21 Under this system, units are constantly on the move. Detailed and exact schedules are drawn up indicating the arrival time at various training areas, the training to be performed, location of bivouacs, etc. Stress is placed on precise adherence to the time schedule. Variation of terrain and climate enhance the training. Separation from barracks life hardens the men. Tank crews learn to operate under a great variety of conditions, particularly those of difficult driving.

In the forward areas of the combat zone rigorous training continues unabated for reserve units. Conduct of special operations is emphasized -attack of fortified positions, raids, river crossings, etc. The Russians were quick to correct their mistakes of the early period of the war. They improved and intensified their training based on the experience they had gained. General Kleist, CG 1st Panzer Army, had this to say of the Russian soldier: “The men were first-rate fighters from the sta rt.... They became first-rate soldiers with experience. They fought most toughly, had amazing endurance, and could carry on without most of the things other armies regarded as necessities. The staff were quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became highly efficient.”22

V. The Soviet Soldier Who is the man who mans the tanks of the Soviet Army? In the camp of the most extreme Red-baiters, he is depicted as a brutish lout, a fatalistic Asiatic barbarian, raping, looting, and swilling his way across the Eurasian continent under the cynical guise of “liberator.” Less than ten years ago, we were calling him a noble ally, a valiant patriot standing defiant before the Nazi scourge, fighting for his home, his family, and his country. The Kremlin says he is the superior product of a supenor system, more intelligent, more efficient, and’ more cultured than the slaves of the capitalist war-mongers - in essence, the Soviet Patriot. Disregarding the extremes of judgment, it is evident on the record that he is a capable soldier. His very way of life has made him hardy and used to adversity. This is good because it enables him to fight without Coco-Cola, US0 shows, food-service inspectors, and rear-area empires. He is accustomed to harsh discipline although it does not necessarily follow that he is always amenable to it or incapable of breaches of discipline - after all, there is a revolutionary tradition in Russia. He is young -the Soviet population has a high proportion of young people. He loves his country and his land and, as for his government, well, it may be a hard life under the dictatorship of the proletariat but the sacrifices of today will bring the perfect society of tomorrow. And even if he believes that tomorrow may be beyond his reach, it is still better to be a Soviet citizen, however grim lifemight be, than it is to be a capitalist slave. In any event, in the new Soviet social hierarchy, the soldier occupies a favored spot. The Bolsheviks have made many concessions to insure that the army remains a loyal political instrument. While many of the privileges and benefits of higher social status are reserved for the officers, the soldier is not ignored. We might not think his position very enviable but relative comparisons are dangerous. What is famine to us might be a feast to someone else.

With regard to the technological skill of the average Soviet inductee, the evidence indicates that the army suffers by comparison with the West. This can be understood in terms of the industrial time-lag in Russia. General Deane noted the surprise of Russian soldiers observing the unloading of special purpose trucks at an American shuttle-bombing base when it became evident that any American selected at random could drive any of the vehicles. A Russian would require special instruction to be able to drive more than one type.23 However, this gap is being closed under the influence of forceddraft industrialization and intensive mechanization of agriculture.

In Soviet Russia, in order to maintain its people at mobilization pitch and to extract maximum effort from them, the state deliberately creates and fosters an atmosphere which is designed to make each citizen feel that he is personally building the socialist state. For the Soviet soldier this means the defense of the fatherland. Daily the danger of capitalist encirclement and attack is pointed out to him in which the United States is the main antagonist. This same line was used during the war to inspire Soviet hatred of the Nazis. Added to the natural Russian love of home and land, it resulted in a battlefield performance grudgingly admired even by the Germans. The Voelkischer Beobachter of July 1, 1941 stated: “The Red Army men are fighting like madmen, to the point of absolute exhaustion.” And again on July 4, the paper wrote: “Our army has this time met an enemy who is defending himself with persistent obduracy, regardless of losses, and who does