The Fine Art of Losing

In this short article, I shall undertake to discuss a number of matters, mostly unpleasant, pertaining to the fighting of a losing battle. It is more agreeable to write about victories, and those are the tales that find their way to the pages. But it is healthy, sometimes, to have a good look at the dirty end of the stick. United States forces operate on an offensive principle and feel that by vigorously carrying the battle to the enemy, the greatest gains are to be had. As a theory this is irrefutable, but I do suggest that some of our commanders have come to look upon it as a simple and infallible secret of success to be applied, like paregoric, in all ARMOR 33 cases. ‘l’he theory produced a succession of impressive victories in World War 11-when backed by a tremendous superiority of means. It is not too difficult to work up an enthusiasm for the offensive if one has three times the enemy strength in tanks and infantry, can lay down twenty-five rounds of artillery for each round one must take in return, and commands a hundred-to-one superiority in tactical aircraft. Of course it was not ever thus, but in the last few months of the war it was. In the limited field of my own observation there was, in the last phase in Europe, a pretty general disregard of the requirements of defense, and some startling arrangements were to be found battery positions and fire direction centers a few hundred yards behind a thin outpost line, 40mm Bofors casually disposed forward of the infantry battalion CPs, ammunition stocks so far up that the handlers could hear the burp pistols of the German patrols-and very frequently, no reserve position prepared or occupied behind the front line. Besides this, we neglected almost totally the practices of dispersal and camouflage, we drove streams of 6 x 6 trucks over supply lines in full view of the Germans, we flew cubs lazily up and down the front lines at three thousand feet, and when we heardfighter aircraft overhead, we didn’t even bother to look up. This is not criticism. The German forces by this time were so short of ammunition, equipment and manpower that they did not (with one notable exception) possess the capability of launching a sizable countereffort. Consequently, Allied troops were able to attack until they were quite worn out and then take a comfortable breather, confident that the battle would not be resumed until they themselves judged the time and place to be right. It is a great privilege thus to be able to call the play, but it leads to sloppy habits which will, in other circumstances, be a bit costly. It is unnecessary to point out that the next war will start with our having something less than a preponderance of ground-and-tactical-air combat strength. From this it is not wise to conclude that we cannot eventually gain preponderance in this field, but (unless strategic bombing can accomplish the whole job practically unaided) we must go through the whole cycle: an initial inferiority; after a period of Allied rearmament, a struggle on approximately equal terms (so far as individual combat units are concerned) to establish superiority; and finally, we hope, a supremacy which will be decisive. So it is not only the initial stage of the fighting which must concern us, but also Phase 11; in both of these phases we must be prepared to operate under unfavorable circumstances-the most unfavorable being that the enemy exceeds us locally in combat power and is possessed of a fervid desire to do us in. My principal qualification to write this article arises from having participated on the losing side of an important battle, at Sidi bou Zid, in early 1943. There is no glory in such an experience, but it is illuminating. Both sides in a severe engagement suffer losses, but the retiring side finds its normal battle difficulties compounded. We had very heavy battle casualties at Sidi bou Zid. In 34 ARMOR our withdrawal from that area, across the Tunisian desert and through Kasserine Pass, we had the usual, normal, percentage of mechanical failures among our vehicles. The difference was that the tank or halftrack or truck that threw a track or blew a bogie or clogged its fuel line stayed right there; it was set afire if there was time, otherwise it fell into the hands of the enemy. The number of vehicles totally lost on this account may become a serious matter.

A similar fate, all too often, befalls misplaced or “lost” vehicles and detachments. In an advance these are a nuisance to the commander principally because, by their confusion, they fail to repair to the spot where they are needed; in a retreat, the enemy will scoop up a lot of them. In this and other ways small units or parts of units simply drop from sight, without explanation, and the higher commander not only sees holes developing in his defense, but becomes acutely aware that he may be penetrated in some areas on which he has no reports at all.

Retreat Compounds Confusion The retiring force will leave behind a number of maps which betray part of its plans and dispositions; it will lose complete radio sets, codebooks and procedural data. So the attacker receives intelligence that gets better and better, more complete, while the retreating force finds that the situation grows progressively more obscure and misleading. A graphic demonstration of this, repeated again and again in the long advances, arose when a German column was unexpectedly intercepted by an American column. Almost in every case the American force lambasted the other. Our people were more alert, with their weapons loaded and their eyes peeled; for while our subordinate commanders were well informed of the situation-and particularly that they were part of a deep penetration-the German officers were almost always astounded to find us at their throats. The advance disrupted their communication nets, and their resulting ignorance aggravated the. general disaster.

An incurable Pollyanna may contend that the retreating commander gets some compensation in that he falls back upon his supply system, and shortens his line of communication-so he does, but in the course of it he leaves a goodly portion of the end product of the LOC, the supplies themselves, to the enemy for his use. Suggestions for the improvement of the logistic situation are always in order, presumably, but a general retreat is not usually a satisfactory solution. An examination of the matters above listed, plus a vivid memory of the rather terrible days of Sidi bou Zid, is discouraging-it brings to mind the Irishman who said of a particularly trying epidemic of influenza, “there’s people dying now that never died before.”* Of course there is no satisfactory solution-the very fact that one is losing ground is indication enough that the situation is partly out of control. I, nevertheless, have a number of points to make.

‘Somerville and Ross. Fueher Exwrienees of an Irish R. M