Armor in the Team

Armor in the Team by Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams During WW 11, the ground army operating jointly with the Tactical Air Force in a series of brilliant campaigns destroyed one of the best trained and equipped armies the world has yet produced. This success was achieved despite the far greater battle experience of the German Army, their development and exclusive operational use of large rockets, their operational use of jet aircraft, and the widely accepted superiority of their armored equipment, notably tanks. Post-war writing and discussion have not entirely clarified the apparent contradiction between results and the superiority of German arms. In fact, so much has been written and widely publicized about the mistakes in leadership, the errors in procurement, and the inferiority of equipment that - victory the fact - appears to be - victory by “luck.”

WW 11 was not won by “luck.” While mistakes were made and much can be learned through examination of past errors, there is a wider field for learning through study of the principles, the factors and the techniques which contributed to the decisive victory by American arms in WW 11. Many factors have contributed to the success of American arms, but the greatest of all is the fundamental principle of teamwork. Teamwork is a positive and tangible result of a blending of forces, each in its proper proportion, each exploiting its outstanding capabilities and complementing the limitations of others to produce a concerted effort toward the achievement of the ultimate objective.

The necessity for teamwork is understood by all from the veteran rifleman, who knows what tanks and artillery can do when they all work together, right up to the top where Army, Navy, and Air have been joined to achieve a concerted effort. In WW I, the ground combat team consisted principally of infantry, engineers, and artillery. WW I1 added one other member to this team -armor.

The objectives of the field armies of WW I1 were seized by a combat team of infantry, armor, engineers, and artillery supported by a proper balance of service units. Tanks became essential to the successful operation of infantry divisions. Mechanized cavalry units as economy forces filled the great gaps in mobile operations providing security and reconnaissance for the major elements. In Africa and Europe, the armored division became a full member of the ground team, placing in the hands of the field commander the means for rapid seizure and holding of decisive objectives of great tactical, and often strategic, importance. In the ground team, armor is the arm of mobility, armor-protected firepower, and decisive shock action. Mobility in armor is attained not only through the wide use of tanks, full-tracked personnel camers, and self-propelled artillery, but also through the extensive organi-may-june 1985 31 French Light Tank, with Trench-Crossing Tail zation of mobile service support at all echelons of command. The extensive use of radio communication supports mobility and permits effective command control in the most fluid operations. The separate battalion type of organization permits the greatest flexibility and latitude in the commitment and control of armored units in a war of movement. Mobility permits the rapid concentration of firepower at the point of decisive action. The characteristic of “armor-protected firepower” permits the maneuver of armor under fire of machine guns, mortars, and artillery and the effective return fire of crews within the armored vehicles. Mobility and firepower produce shock action. Shock action is a psychological effect achieved upon the mind of the enemy soldier or leader when fear or apprehension replaces judgment and common sense. Armored action achieves this to a decisive degree as shock action travels with an ever-broadening effect from the frontline soldier to his division, corps, and army commanders. An understanding of the charackristics of armor is only the foreword to the employment of armor. The successful application of the principle of teamwork to the employment of armor in the ground team requires the assignment of objectives and missions which will utilize to the maximum the distinguishing characteristic of armor. This applies with equal importance to tank units organic or attached to infantry divisions, the armored cavalry regiment (light), and the armored division.

In the infantry division, tank units are provided to support the rifleman in the accomplishment of his mission in both offensive and defensive operations. The word “support” does not imply a position to the rear or defilade within the division zone of action. Nor does support imply the availability of a tank or tank section to each small group of riflemen in the division. Tanks, organic or attached to the infantry division, should be employed at the decisive point of action in the greatest numbers possible. The mobility of tank units will permit rapid concentration at the decisive point of action. The plaintive wail of the indecisive and unimaginative who fancy, like the ostrich with his head in the ground, some security by equal distribution of strength throughout the depth and breadth of the division zone, must be ruth lessly resisted. If tanks are to make the contribution in the infantry division of which they are capable, then they must be employed to the maximum advantage of mobility, armor-protected firepower, and decisive shock action. This means in many cases preserving the tactical integrity of the tank company and tank battalion and providing for it the necessary infantry, engineer, and artillery support.

The armored cavalry regiment (light) is another armored formation differing somewhat in equipment and organization from the tank battlaion or the armored division. The armored cavalry regiment (light) is the most mobile of armored units. It lacks the heavy gun firepower of tanks or the armored division. The self-contained organization of its platoons, companies, and battalions and the extensive use of radio communication make it admirably suited for deployment over broad frontages as a security force to permit the concentration of other forces at the decisive points of action.. The armored division is the largest armored formation. It is in itself a force of combined arms. The armored division provides the corps or army commander with the means to seize rapidly and hold distant and decisive objectives. In defense, it provides depth to the corps and army sector and the most effective means of countering penetrations of the defensive organization. The armored division is a decisive weapon. It is assigned the ultimate objective of the next higher commander. The opportunity for the employment of the armored division in offensive operations is frequently created by infantry divisions. This technique results in overcoming initial obstacles to secure terrain from which the launching of the armored attack will permit the use of armor’s mobility and firepower. The minimum controls are placed upon the operations of the armored division. Phase lines, intermediate objectives, and boundaries restrict the mobility of armor. Armored action is fast moving, and unnecessary controls only cause delay and jeopardize the successful accomplishment of the corps mission. The armored division should be given and should use mission type orders. It is unrealistic for the corps commander to assume that he can visualize the circumstances in which the armored division will find itself three days hence and one hundred miles behind the enemy lines. It is even more unrealistic for him to visualize that he will be on the spot at the time to make appropriate decisions. The greatest possible latitude should be permitted the armored division commander in the movement, formation, and disposition he makes to accomplish his mission. Only then will the mobility and flexibility of armor be fully utilized. The armored division in conjunction with Tactical Air is the principal means available for the destruction of large enemy armored formations. Therefore, a realistic view should be taken in the conduct of the defense. A line of defense as such has no strength. Strength in defense comes in depth which permits maneuver of forces not engaged to create a favorable balance of forces at the point of penetration. Depth should be considered in terms of miles and not in yards. The armored division should not be employed in the line for the primary purpose of making a continuous line. The most effective use of the division in the corps and army team is its employment in a position in depth where it can maneuver properly for the purpose of destroying penetrations.

The armored division is a teammate of Tactical Air. The flexibility of formation and the ability to con-32 may-june 1985