The Seventh Cavalry Brigade in the First Army Maneuvers

, Commanding the Seventh Cavalry Brigade As early as December, 1938, information was received to the effect that at least part of the Seventh Cavalry Brigade would engage in the First Army Maneuvers which were scheduled to take place during the month of August, 1939. Whether or not the Brigade would participate in its entirety was predicated upon the amount of funds which were to be made available. Later on in the winter, it was announced that the whole brigade would take part in the maneuvers and that the maneuver area would be in the vicinity of Plattsburg, New York, instead of at Pine Camp as planned originally.

As plans for the maneuvers progressed, it was found that the funds allowed the First Army for gasoline and oil expenditures would be insufficient to permit the track and half-track vehicles of the Brigade to march overland to and from the maneuver area, but that an ample allotment for rail movements did exist. Therefore, it would be necessary to ship the above vehicles by rail.

During the first part of June, two Brigade Staff Officers made a reconnaissance of the proposed route of march from Fort Knox to the maneuver area. Enroute, the suitability of roads was determined, camp sites were selected and arrangements made for the purchase of supplies. While in the maneuver area, the Brigade Commander, who had flown to Plattsburg, and these officers selected the camp site which the Brigade was to occupy during the maneuvers. Although the First Army Supply personnel were not present at Plattsburg so far in advance, it was found possible also to make preliminary contracts for gasoline and oil to be supplied during the maneuvers, and to make arrangements with the railroad authorities for the unloading of the track and half-track vehicles upon arrival at Plattsburg. 16 ARMOR Since the railroad loading facilities at Fort Knox were inadequate for such a movement, it was decided to load all vehicles to be shipped in Louisville. Accordingly, on August lst, 112 Combat Cars from both cavalry regiments, 21 half-track Machine Gun Personnel Carriers of the 1st Cavalry and 28 half-track vehicles of the 68th Field Artillery with the eight 75-mm Howitzers belonging to the two half-track batteries, were marched to Louisville and loaded for shipment on 77 flat cars. The next day, August 2d, the Brigade commenced ita march overland to the Plattsburg area with all of the wheeled vehicles, and with the personnel of its track and half-track vehicles carried in trucks. There was a total of 480 vehicles in the column; and the total distance of 1,010 miles was completed in six marches. The strength of the Brigade was approximately 2,300 officers and men. The following was the itinerary: August 2d - Fort Knox to Hamilton, Ohio - 188 August 3d - Hamilton, Ohio, to Ashland, Ohio -August 4th - Ashland, Ohio, to Erie, Pennsylvania August 5th - Erie, Pennsylvania - Layover. August 6th -Erie, Pennsylvania, to Rochester, New August 7th - Rochester, New York, to Pine Camp, August 8th - Pine Camp, New York, to Black Brook, miles.

miles.

- 166 miles.

York - 164 miles.

New York - 172 miles.

New York - 145 miles.

Terrain of the Maneuver Area The Maneuver Area was a strip of land approximately 20 miles from east to west and 30 miles from north to south located west of Lake Champlain. The eastern portion along Lake Champlain was gently rolling country gradually sloping away and upward into the Adirondack Mountains to the west. The mountainous section which constituted about two-thirds of the area, was heavily forested and extremely rough and broken. Three more or less parallel river valleys - the Ausable, Salmon and Saranac ran east and west through the area. All in all this country, with its extremely limited amount of free maneuverable area, surrounded as it was by dominating mountains, and with its numerous rivers and lakes, constituted about as difficult a locality as could have been chosen for mechanized operations.

Units Participating The following units participated in the 1st Army Maneuvers: Provisional Blue Corps: 1st Division 18th Infantry Brigade 7th Cavalry Brigade: Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 1st Cavalry 13th Cavalry 68th Field Artillery 12th Observation Squadron 19th Ordnance Company, Maintenance Co. E, 5th Quartermaster Regiment, Mainte-Detachment Medical Corps Co. E, 1st Engineer Regiment (attached for 97th Observation Squadron 2d Battalion, 25th Field Artillery. nance Maneuvers only).

I corps:

I1 corps: Miscellaneous Army and Corps Troops: 26th Division 43d Division 27th Division 44th Division 10 1 st Cavalry lOlst Signal Battalion 197th Coast Artillery (AA) 212th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) 29th Ordnance Company 8th Photo Section 1st Radio Intelligence Company 51st Signal Battalion.

On account of the expansion requirements of the Air Corps, there was no combat aviation of any kind available for the maneuvers. Only arms and equipment as authorized by the Tables of Basic Allowances were used. No assumptions were permitted.

After the amval in the maneuver area, the period August 9th to 20th inclusive was spent by the Brigade in establishing camp and conducting Troop, Squadron, Regimental and Brigade problems. In addition, the Brigade gave demonstrations for the 1st Division, the 4, “4, “%I,,I.- %6rst Army Maneuver Area 18th Infantry Brigade, and the 26th, 27th, 43d and 44th Divisions.

Corps Exercise August 21st and 22d Two separate Corps Exercises were held simultaneously on August 21st and 22d. One exercise was confined to the western half of the maneuver area and the other to the eastern half. Elements of the 7th Cavalry Brigade participated in both problems. In the Western Portion The 18th Brigade, with the mission of preventing the advance of hostile force into the Saranac and Salmon Valleys, opposed the 1st Division (Motorized). By 900 a.m. 21 August, the 18th Brigade was heavily pressed. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (less the 13th Cavalry, reinforced), on being made available to the Commanding General, 18th Brigade, made a rapid 18-mile march from its assembly area via Elsinore, and attacking at 1O:OO a.m., secured the high ground north of Redford, closing the Saranac Valley to the hostile advance. TWO batteries of the 68th Field Artillery were attached to the 25th Field Artillery to augment the artillery support of the 18th Brigade. Initially, mechanized reconnaissance elements only operated on the south of the 18th Brigade, the bulk of the Mechanized Brigade being held on the north flank.

During the afternoon, it was found that the hostile main effort had developed on the south and was push-Soviet T-26 Light Tank, 1 9 3 2 ing east along the Salmon River Valley. The Commanding General, 7th Cavalry Brigade, was directed to leave a strong detachment in the Saranac Valley to hold the line Clark Hill-Picketts Comers and to move rapidly with the remainder of the command and check the hostile advance on the south flank. After initial successes around Peasleyville, the situation became stabilized at dark. About midnight, persistent infiltration by the enemy through the wooded rough slopes flanking the valley threatened our artillery position, and the Brigade withdrew four miles to the east to a delaying position which it was occupying at the termination of the exercise. From this position, it was prepared to counterattack to the south. In the Eastern Portion During the same period, the 13th Cavalry, with a battery of field artillery and detachments of engineers, air, maintenance and Medical Corps attached, was operating with the I1 Corps against the I Corps. The mission of each Corps was to secure a bridgehead over the Saranac River.

The 13th Cavalry (reinforced) with the lOlst Cavalry attached, was released from its assembly area west of Schuyler Falls, one hour after the infantry was allowed to move. It quickly overran advance hostile motorized elements and seizing the high ground northwest of Beckwith School, held this dominating terrain until relieved by friendly infantry sent forward in trucks. It then moved to the northwest and operated against a hostile force which was supported by tanks in the vicinity of Woods Mills.

After dark, the regiment withdrew into a night bivouac. At dawn, it moved again to the north and located the hostile main effort advancing southwest against the I1 Corps which had succeeded in securing crossings over the Saranac River and was marching to the north. One squadron was dispatched immediately toward Woods Mills to assist friendly infantry in delaying the hostile advance at that point. The remainder of the regiment, consisting of one squadron of combat cars, part of the Machine Gun Troop, the Mortar Platoon, with one battery of field artillery and a regiment of horse cavalry (less 1 squadron) attached, made a coordinated surprise attack against the exposed west flank of the hostile marching column just as the exercise terminated.

Army Exercise - 23-25 August, 1930 General Situation: Without going into all the background, the General Situation for the Army Maneuvers was as follows: A Black Army of two Corps which had penetrated to the west shore of Lake Champlain was preparing for further advance to the west. The Blue 18th Brigade, which had been gradually falling back in front of the Black Force, was reinforced by the highly motorized 1st Division and a Provisional Corps was formed. At the start of the maneuver, the 18th Brigade was near Saranac and the 1st Division in the region south of Redford. The Corps decided to march to the east and 18 ARMOR attack to gain the high ground on the line Woods Mills

- Mt. Etna. The Corps moved out at 1200 noon, 23 August. Elements of the 1st Division in motors were soon near Peasleyville.

Under the conditions of the problem, the 7th Cavalry Brigade arrived at Black Brook at 12:OO noon, 23 August, and came under the control of the Provisional Corps. The mission given the 7th Cavalry Brigade was to march to the northeast prepared to attack the hostile left (south) flank or rear.

As to the operation of the 7th Cavalry Brigade in the Army Maneuver, it is thought that it would be more interesting for this account to come from a source other than a member of the Brigade. Major Rufus S. Ramey, Cavalry, an instructor at the Command and General Staff School, was detailed by the War Department for duty both as an umpire and as an observer, and has kindly given his consent for the following extract from his report to be quoted in this article: “It had been anticipated that Black would make a strong thrust north of the Saranac. Since a river crossing in the vicinity of Elsinore was required as a training exercise, it became necessary to stop, arbitrarily, the rapid advance of elements of the 18th Infantry Brigade north of the Saranac. Immediately south of that river, however, the Black lOlst Cavalry moved rapidly to the west, gained contact with the 18th Infantry Brigade and very effectively delayed its advance throughout the afternoon. “On its front, the 1st Division made very effective use of motorized detachments by way of the Salmon River Valley, Patton School and Calkins School, at which point junction with the 7th Cavalry Brigade was established about 230 p.m., 23 August. “In its front, the 7th Cavalry Brigade reconnaissance elements quickly made contact with Black motorized detachments in the vicinity of CLINTONVILLE, to the north thereof and near HARKNESS: and developed the fact that the CLINTONVILLE-HARKNESS defile was effectively blocked by demolitions, where Black had apparently concentrated his antitank efforts. However, the parallel trails to the east and west of this defile, over COLD SPRING MOUNTAIN and ARNOLD HILL were neglected and permitted the mechanized cavalry to debouch into the more favorable terrain to the northeast of HARKNESS.

“While reconnaissance elements had cleared the CLINTONVILLE-KEESEVILLE defile of hostile motorized and antitank detachments and were operating well to the north toward LAPHAM MILLS, the Mechanized Brigade Commander determined late in the afternoon to concentrate his effort to the northeast towards PERU and eventually against the South Flank and rear of the hostile main force. The afternoon had seen a succession of isolated actions against enemy delaying detachments operating in the almost continuous defiles of this section.

“Shortly before dark on the 23d, the 13th Cavalry was moving to the northeast of COLD SPRING MOUN-U. S. Christie Tank, 1932 I TAIN and covering the brigade right flank by detachments in and north of KEESEVILLE. The 1st Cavalry, by a double envelopment, was successfully occupying PERU. At this time (about 8:OO p.m.), the Commanding General, 7th Cavalry, by means of staff officers, directed that the combat elements withdraw at once, and move without lights, to concealed bivouacs in the general area; CLINTONVILLE-ARNOLD HILLRJ 984-ROGERS for reservicing, rest and feeding in preparation for the following day’s operations. The bivouac area was outposted and liaison with 1st Division maintained.

“Instructions had already been given by messengers for kitchen and fuel trucks to proceed to the bivouac areas when orders were received (as the troops were arriving in the bivouac areas) directing the Brigade to move to the west, thence to the north flank (north of the SARANAC RIVER) prepared for new operations at daylight 24 August. This movement called for the assembly of the Brigade over difficult mountain trails, a night march of some 60 miles, all without lights, and after some 9 hours of strenuous operations. “Previous orders were countermanded and new orders carried by staff officers. Assembly of march serials was completed and the march initiated at 11:15 p.m. (preceded by reconnaissance) with an amazing lack of confusion and minimum of delay. “About 2:OO a.m., 24 August, the Brigade was halted in march column between REDFORD and SILVER LAKE; kitchen and fuel trucks joined organizations to provide a hot meal and refuel. The march was resumed about 2:45 a.m. over a narrow road along the SARANAC, which was rendered hazardous by frequent temporary bridges and fills on a road which flanked the river.

“At SARANAC, regimental and similar commanders joined the Brigade Commander who issued instructions calling for the following: “The Brigade to march via PICKETTS CORNERS to DANNEMORA. From there the Brigade, less the 1st Cavalry, reinforced by a battery of artillery and platoon of engineers, to march on RAND HILL; the 1st Cavalry to turn north at DANNEMORA, move via LEDGER CORNER on the line WEST BEEKMANTOWN -BEEKMANTOWN where it would report arrival and receive orders (a further wide swing of about 30 miles). “On resumption of the march there occurred one of those contretemps which can so easily occur at night with all troops and especially with fast moving columns. A guide stationed at a crossroads near PICKETTS CORNERS became confused and directed part of the column on the wrong road. It was some time before the error was discovered and as a consequence the planned operation was delayed for more than one hour. Elements of the Brigade which had taken the correct route reached DANNEMORA at 515 a.m., but it was after 6:OO a.m. before the remainder of the column arrived.

“The unfortunate delay had two immediate consequences. Information was received about 6:30 a.m. that Black troops were crossing the SARANAC on two bridges to the west of ELSINORE and CADYVILLE respectively and that there was a large truck movement in the same vicinity. (This was the 43d Division, the Black Army reserve, which was undertaking an envelopment directed against the north flank and rear of the Blue position.) The 13th Cavalry moved east from DANNEMORA in the direction of the hostile river crossing. About 2 miles east of DANNEMORA, progress was effectively halted by hostile demolitions and antitank dispositions hastily provided after daylight. Earlier, an armored car platoon had been in possession of the defile at CR 1161 (over CANFIELD BROOK), but for some reason had been withdrawn. As a consequence, the advance of the 13th Cavalry for the next two hours was a succession of limited objective flanking actions against antitank dispositions in a continuous defile. Combined trains and service parks were halted at DANNEMORA whence they operated until late in the afternoon of the 24th.

“By 9:00 a.m., the 13th Cavalry had succeeded in pushing to RAND HILL, but was held up by a Black battalion strongly supported by artillery. The 1st Cavalry was ordered to assist by flanking action from the east, then resume its advance.

“Following the combined attack to complete the occupation of RAND HILL, a terrain feature which dominated the entire northeast of the SARANAC, the 1st Cavalry was directed to seize the high ground about 2 miles northeast of WEST PLATTSBURG in order to assist the movement of the 13th Cavalry to the southeast (in a zone immediately east of SANDBURN BROOK). There was another purpose behind this plan

- to clear the area in order to permit the movement of the fuel trucks which were urgently required for the replenishment of fuel.

“By the middle of the morning, it was apparent that the entire area north of the SARANAC was infested with Black antitank detachments ranging from single 75mm guns supported by infantry to entire batteries supported by battalions of infantry. These detachments were installing road blocks and completing assumed demolitions at the frequent defiles. From this time to the end of the maneuver, the impression was gained that Black efforts were directed more to protection against the mechanized cavalry than to any offensive action. Actually, it is believed that close to fifty percent of the Black 75-mm artillery was dispersed as antitank guns in his rear areas. By 10:30 a.m., the Blue Mechanized Cavalry was deep in the Black rear area, moving rapidly from north to south across the rear installations.

“By 12:30 p.m., 24 August, the main body of the 1st Cavalry had reached the road: MORRISONVILLE-PLATTSBURG, with reconnaissance elements south of the SARANAC (which was readily fordable in a great many places southeast of MORRISONVILLE). About 12:30 p.m., the 1st Cavalry surprised a Black tank ARMLPR British Medium Vickers Tank, 19*-company going into what would have been an excellent ambush. In the ensuing action, the hostile tanks were ruled out. Undoubtedly, this head-on engagement would have been costly to both groups of vehicles. “By this time (shortly after noon the 24th), the Mechanized Cavalry Brigade had been continuously in action since 1:00 p.m. the preceding day. Only part of the units had had one hasty meal. Necessary refueling and maintenance had been most, limited. All ranks, but especially combat vehicle drivers, were fast approaching exhaustion though still filled with admirable enthusiasm and aggressiveness. Accordingly, orders were dispatched to withdraw all elements of the Brigade well to the north to the vicinity of WEST CHAZY for rest, reorganization and refueling. (Actually, it is believed that this move was in conformity with the desires of the Maneuver Director in order to prevent the complete collapse of the remaining scheduled exercises - the extension of the Black envelopment combined with a night attack, Blue night withdrawal, and a daylight attack by Black on the 25th.)

“The 7th Cavalry Brigade completed its assembly in the WEST CHAZY area late in the afternoon in a torrential rain, trains joined units, all elements re-‘ fuelled, the area was outposted, much needed rest was gained, and plans were announced for a resumption of the advance early the 25 August. “The plan of operations for the 25 August provided: “The Brigade to advance to the south, force a crossing of the SARANAC, seize the high ground as far as the SALMON RIVER, then turn to the southwest to strike the Black left flank and rear.

“Regiments to advance abreast in more than one column, the 13th Cavalry on the right; advance guards to cross the outpost line at 500 a.m.; reconnaissance detachments to move at 200 a.m. “One Combat Car Troop 13th Cavalry to follow the 1st Cavalry as reserve.

“Trains to assemble and await orders in Bivouac area (vicinity of WEST CHAZY).

“The advance to the south was initiated as planned. By daylight, reconnaissance elements had crossed and were south of the SARANAC. North of the SARANAC, the main Brigade columns encountered frequent antitank 75-mm guns and groups of machine guns which were promptly reduced by flanking maneuver and by artillery fire. By 6:30 a.m., the 1st Cavalry was crossing the SARANAC at the bridge immediately northeast of BM 294 (about 5 miles southwest of PLATTSBURG). Shortly afterwards, the 13th Cavalry encountered serious resistance at the bridge at MORRISONVILLE (consisting of two batteries of 75-mm guns and machine

- guns) which was being reduced when the exercise terminated. Here at MORRISONVILLE, the 1st Cavalry surprised and captured important Black Army headquarters installations. The 1st Cavalry and reconnaissance elements were moving to the south of the SARANAC deep in the Black rear. The exercise was terminated shortly after 7:OO a.m., 25 August. 20 ARMOR “Since the 7th Cavalry Brigade assembled promptly and marched immediately across the Black rear in returning to the base camp at BLACK BROOK, an opportunity was presented to observe Black protective dispositions in his rear areas. In addition to the bridge defense at MORRISONVILLE, there was a large concentration of all arms just north of BECKWITH SCHOOL with 75-mm guns disposed for antitank defense. A similar dispostion was observed northwest of SCHUYLER FALLS and frequent 75-mm guns and infantry detachments obseved as far south as PERU. This is mentioned to indicate the psychological effect of the mechanized cavalry as well as to emphasize the dispersed nature of the Black antitank defense. “The following comments on the Army Exercise are deemed important: “The rapid night march of the 7th Cavale Brigade, without lights, from the south to the north flank, demonstrated the great strategical mobility and value of the unit.

“Continuously demonstrated was the serious need for a reconnaissance and support echelon for the Mechanized Cavalry brigade - to consist of reconnaissance elements and a fire support group of machine gun and rifle units. Such a composite unit would provide the necessary brigade reconnaissance elements, protection for trains, and required mobile fire support. “Night movement of the Brigade without lights (except for concealed indirect rear wheel illumination) demonstrated that rates as high as 15 miles per hour on fair roads (except in dust) is feasible. “While the total lack of suitable antitank weapons exercised a decided influence, yet one lesson stood out -that was the necessity for careful coordination of antitank protection and the maintaining of mobile antitank units. Piecemeal demolitions, road blocks and dispersal of antitank means is entirely ineffective. “The rapidity of mechanized cavalry action, the speed with which units energetically lead may disperse against targets of opportunity, was recognized by the Brigade Commander who guarded against such action by assignment of successive objectives and frequent phase lines from which units reported, then advanced therefrom only on Brigade orders. “Experience in these maneuvers demonstrated the need for a greater number of trained assistants in the operations section of Brigade Headquarters who may be used as liaison officers. The kaleidoscopic change of the situation in mechanized cavalry operations makes necessary the dispatch of orders, frequently by officer messenger. Also, adequate, timely and correct appreciation of the existing situation can be gained only through staff officers’ conferences with advance commanders and reports of observations.

“While the maximum mobility and effectiveness of mechanized cavalry is only obtained in favorable terrain, the broken terrain of the PLATTSBURG area demonstrated that terrain must be difficult in the extreme to constitute a complete barrier to mechanized units. I U. S. “Superfast” Chkxie, 1932 “The umpiring of mechanized cavalry operations is a difficult problem. In this maneuver, umpires were provided down to include the squadron. It is believed necessary that sufficient umpires be provided with mechanized cavalry to include the troop unit because of the many isolated actions which develop in reconnaissance and in maneuver against antitank dispositions. “Similarly, umpire communications with umpire headquarters and contact umpires is a difficult problem in mechanized cavalry operations. Pigeons were used by the senior brigade unit umpire as a means of communication with Umpire Headquarters. “In conclusion, it is desired to pay tribute to the high degree of training and leadership demonstrated during the operations of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The enthusiasm, the devotion, and efficiency of all ranks and units, displayed throughout an arduous period of one month, was an inspiration. The existing mechanized cavalry brigade is an extremely well-trained unit which, in the First Army Maneuvers, forcibly demonstrated its effectiveness in mobile exercises - though operations were often in terrain far from favorable to the exploitation of mechanized cavalry capabilities.” During the maneuvers, Mayor La Guardia of New York City made a request for the presence of the Brigade at the New York World’s Fair. This request was approved by the War Department and on August 28th, three days after the close of the Maneuvers, the Brigade, including its track and half-track vehicles, commenced its march of 350 miles to New York City where it was to camp just outside of the World’s Fair. En route it passed through West Point where it was reviewed and inspected.

The entire column of over 600 vehicles was received in New York City by the Mayor and Lieutenant General Drum. From the George Washington Bridge, it marched down the west side of New York, north up Broadway and Fifth Avenue and over the Queensboro Bridge. Leaving the camp at the World’s Fair at 1:00 a.m., September 8th, after again loading its track and half-track vehicles, the Brigade reached its home station, Fort Knox, on the 13th of September. During the last 36 hours of the march, the Brigade travelled 390 miles. This included a short bivouac at Hamilton, Ohio, and five-hour halt in Jeffersonville to unload its track vehicles and reorganize. The last 40 miles of the journey were made by the Brigade with all its vehicles.

Upon arrival at its home station, the Brigade, exclusive of maneuver operations, had marched a distance of 2238 miles in 15 marching days.

Mechanized Cavalry is a highly technical weapon, and in order to function efficiently, requires experienced, well-trained personnel in all grades. Due to its high mobility and great radius of operation, its supporting troops must be familiar with its tactics and technique. This familiarity can be attained only by constant combined training.

Mechanized Cavalry is a powerful striking force capable of operating effectively even over very difficult terrain. It is also capable of making long strategic moves rapidly, under cover of darkness, and without lights.

A Mechanized Cavalry Brigade should be employed as a combat team in order to realize the full value from its air service, ground reconnaissance, combat car, machine gun and artillery elements. It is a mistake to divide the Brigade and a greater mistake to divide the regiment which is the basic combat unit. Mechanized Cavalry should be assigned to those missions of mobile combat which aremost important to the success of the Army. Its successes or failures are capable of affecting the operation of the entire Army. Mechanized Cavalry must be preceded by adequate reconnaissance, both ground and air, in order to locate obstacles, ambushes and anti-mechanized weapons. Likewise, it must be covered by security detachments to prevent surprise and provide freedom of action when hostile forces are encountered. Mechanized Cavalry must leave roads and move cross country when within the range of hostile artillery. Mechanized Cavalry should not be assigned the mission of holding extensive sectors during darkness, particularly in terrain which severely restricts vehicular maneuver. It should be relieved at dusk and withdrawn for the purpose of feeding the personnel and the refueling and maintenance of vehicles. Under cover of darkness it should then be moved to a point from which it can launch an offensive blow at daylight. The personal rather than the mechanical factor controls the limit of endurance.

Mechanized Cavalry gains surprise by:

Secret marches at night without lights. By the use of feints and demonstrations while the direction of the main effort is kept concealed. By rapid movement even though observed. Time and space factors often do not permit the enemy to make or change dispositions in time to counter a mechanized thrust.

Mechanized Cavalry, due to its great fire power, rapidity of action and striking ability, has a decidedly adverse effect on the morale of other ground troops who realize the comparative ineffectiveness of their small arms fire against rapidly moving armored troops. Not only infantry regiments and divisions, but the rear areas of Corps and Armies must possess adequate means for anti-mechanized defense. In order to provide for defense against the threat of the Mechanized Brigade in the recent maneuvers, the Black Army was forced to use its organic artillery. This resulted in the supporting fire of many battalions being lost to the front line units at times when their fire support was sorely needed.

When infantry is equipped with adequate means for anti-mechanized defense, and makes dispositions which would afford protection against mechanized attacks from any direction, such as a cordon defense, it is in danger of losing its mobility and becoming defen-.