The Second Cavalry in the Meuse-Argonne

The Second Cavalry in the Meuse-Argonne by Captain Ernest N. Harmon, Cavalry The two days following the St. Mihiel drive werespent at Menil-la-Tour, where the squadron underwent a general policing of both horses and men. On September 17, orders were received to march to the vicinity of Les Islettes en Argonne. The march was scheduled to begin daily at 9 p.m. and to continue until 5 a.m. Special precautions were to be taken to avoid hostile aerial observation. The march covered a distance of 125 kilometers and was to be completed in five nights. The squadron arrived at Rarecourt en Argonne on the 22d and went into camp within the woods near by. Troop B, which had been detached from the squadron during the St. Mihiel attack joined on the march. The weather was rainy and cold during the march, which made conditions very unpleasant for the men, as no fires could be built durng the day, nor could the men leave the woods to dry their clothes when the sun came out. The strength of the squadron on September 26, on entering the Argonne attack, was equal to the effective number of our horses, as all men not mounted on horses that could at least keep up with the column were sent to the headquarters of the regiment. Probably a quarter of our horses would have been placed on sick report in peacetime under garrison conditions, but we were anxious to enter the attack with as many men as possible. The squadron, consisting of 12 officers and 302 enlisted men, saddled at 2 a.m. September 26, and moved toward Clermont en Argonne. The sky was frequently illuminated by the flashes of our artillery bombardment. The noise grew deafening as we approached nearer. The whole aspect of the heavens was like that of a great electrical storm. Now it was pitch blackness; in an instant it became so light that one could see the tense faces of the troopers and the nervous attitude of our horses.

We were ordered to arrive at Aubreville at 6 a.m. and to follow the reserve infantry brigade of the 35th Division at 1,000 meters until we crossed the front line trenches and reached Cote 290. We were to remain under cover at the latter place until further orders. As the head of our column entered Aubreville, it came under artillery fire, directed at our batteries located on the edge of the town. Two men of Troop B were wounded. The squadron passed through the town and marched diagonally across “No-Man’s-Land’’ toward Cote 290, situated two kilometers northeast from Neuvilly. The passage by the horses through the trenches and wire was very slow and difficult. We jumped the horses over narrow trenches and by the use of our helmets prepared the broader ones so the horses could go down in and come upon the other side. Passageways had to be cut through the belts of wire. Fortunately, the enemy’s artillery was moving to the rear at this time, and with the exception of an occasional shell, we crossed without trouble from the enemy. The enemy harassed our position at Cote 290 all during the night, but we sustained no serious casualties. At 4:30 a.m. September 27, the squadron moved forward to Cheppy. We wormed our way through entanglements and trenches and now began to see the effects of the attack. Dead were lying about in groups, and at a crossroads a few hundred yards south of Cheppy were the mangled bodies of eight Americans, a corporal and his squad, killed by a single shell hitting the crossroad. The sight was a silent lesson to our men of the danger of standing on crossroads, where the enemy knew the range to every inch of the ground. As we entered Cheppy, the enemy began to shell the town, and the squadron took cover on a reverse slope south of the town. On the evening of the 27th, patrols of an officer and eight men were sent from each troop to the front lines. Two patrols took the right flank and two the left flank of the division. The patrols were to meet at the center of the division front line. Their mission was to ascertain the accurate location of the units of the front line and to name the units as they found them, for during the attack many units had become mixed together in line.

The patrols approached to points within 200 yards, in most cases, of the line under the cover of darkness and proceeded the rest of the way on foot. Considerable gas and H. E. was sent over by the enemy, which made the mission of the patrols difficult. For the next three nights these liaison officers? patrols were sent out, while there was continual daylight patrolling. Due to the technical information required, officers’ patrols were necessary and the amount of patrolling called for, both day and night, was very fatiguing to the officers. Cavalry troops in the field should have at least five officers with each German Light Tank, 19 18 troop, as the reconnaissance work expected of cavalry and the technical information required necessitate patrols led by officers. Our squadron furnished practically all of the combat liaison for the 35th Division; for, in addition to the liaison patrols, after the second day of attack we furnished strong combat patrols on each flank of the division, as well as on the flanks of the two attacking columns in the center. The squadron established its headquarters in a ravine just north of the Cheppy-Montfaucon road. Partial cover for the horses was found under the apple trees in the ravine, and some filthy German dugouts afforded cover for the men. Our patrols had many interesting experiences. Scarcely a patrol returned without some casualty from shell fire. The patrols were required to go out at all times, and the German artillery sniped at them with their 77’s. However, our men scorned the danger and rode about on their missions boldly, and even the doughboys hugging the ground admitted that our men were either ignorant of their danger or had lots of nerve. Cavalry that keeps moving fast from place to place can proceed with its missions without serious danger from artillery fire. It is only when cavalrymen move slowly and with too much caution that they are in great danger from anything. The only severe casualties we had in any one unit was when that unit, either from orders or through an error of its leader, was caught tied down to the ground in one locality. On September 29, we received a general order for an attack all along the line. Our mission in this attack, which was to begin at 5:30 a.m., was to cover the flanks of the division and prevent small bodies of the enemy from getting through between the flanks of our division and the division on our right and left; also to keep liaison with those divisions. To accomplish this mission, a troop was assigned to cover each flank of the division, with the remaining two troops as a reserve in rear of the line.

The attack was to start from Baulny Ridge, and our troops were to be in position near Charpentry at 4:30 a.m. The ground was traversed with belts of barbed wire, some high and other nearly invisible, being about ten inches high. The ground was rolling, a series of parallel ridges, and to move forward we must go over the tops and down the valleys. The artillery of the enemy had perfect observation and, at times, seemed to blow the tops of the ridges off the map. The narrow valley between Charpentry and Cheppy had been heavily shelled with gas all night preceding the attack. The concentration of the gas was not sufficient at 4:30 a.m. to affect the horses, but was heavy enough to require the wearing of the gas masks by the men. Just below Baulny, many of our horses got into the low wire in the darkness and several were badly cut up. A few incidents of this day’s fighting will give the reader an idea of the character of the fighting and of the practically impossible conditions that we, as cavalry, were required to work under. The attack began at 5:30 a.m. Troop B covered the right, Troop F the left, Troop H the center, and Troop D was held as resewe near Charpentry.

Troop D was discovered at daylight by the enemy airplanes. No cover was available. All the surrounding terrain was taken up by the divisional artillery and infantry reserves. Enemy artillery immediately opened fire on the troop. The troop opened in a checkerboard formation, but finally withdrew down the valley toward Cheppy, as its presence merely drew the enemy’s artillery fire on our infantry reserves in the vicinity, and it could accomplish nothing where it was located. Troop F moved out at 530 a.m. in line of section columns with 75 yard intervals. It passed over a ridge and descended into the Aire River valley. At once the German artillery, from a ridge of hills about 3,000 meters to the west, opened fire on the troop. There was no cover available; the German observation balloons were plainly visible down the valley, and the troop was within effective artillery range. To proceed down the valley was sure annihilation; to return back over the ridge was nearly as bad. The only course open was to cross the river toward the hostile batteries and get on the reverse slope of the high ground rising from the river bottom.

The enemy were bracketing in range. The river was narrow, deep and with almost perpendicular banks. There was a narrow bridge about 200 yards downstream and the troop was ordered to cross at a gallop. Although the Germans shifted their fire on the bridge at once, yet so swift was the movement of the troop that all crossed with the loss of only one man and three horses hit. The troopers dismounted and led their horses up the sides of the steep slope bordering the river. An enemy observation balloon kept their position. However, the slope afforded perfect protection, under cover of which the troop was defiladed from the enemy’s shell-fire. Realizing that a troop was too large a force to maneuver under the conditions, and that the two American divisions on either bank of the river were being fought to a standstill, the commander directed that the troop be taken back to the squadron commander as soon as the barrage lifted, while with 20 men he moved north, under the protection of the slope, in a reconnaissance toward Apremont. The patrol rode to within 500 yards of Apremont, when it was fired on by a machiengun in the town. The town was in possession of the enemy, although at that moment the 28th Division was attacking it from the plateau above the river bottom. Three prisoners were captured by the patrol at this time. Messages were sent back, giving the progress of the 28th Division and the information that the river bottom was clear of the enemy.

One could look across the river valley onto the plateau on the farther side and could see the attacking line of the 35th Division going into battle. It was an inspiring sight. The men were running forward in successive waves about 500 yards apart. A line of small tanks, with wide intervals, were on line with the attacking wave. The German artillery were pounding the plateau, and the air was filled with the smoke of the bursting H. E. and dust. Now a tank would be hit; now a shell seemed to swallow a line of doughboys, and all the while one could hear the incessant “tack-tack” of machineguns. Just above where our patrol was covered, the 28th Division were advancing on Apremont. By raising one’s head above the bank, one could see down the attacking line as it moved forward. The German batteries were pounding unmercifully the plain over which they were advancing. Across the river, under the steep hill upon which rested the town of Baulny, Troop H could be seen, dismounted, hugging the reverse slope for cover. There was nothing they could do. The main attack was only a few hundred yards in front of them, and their presence in the open simply drew more artillery fire on our infantry. Surely cavalry was out of place in a battle where the line moves forward only a kilometer in a whole day, while the enemy has the high ground and his aerial observation is perfect. The patrol moved south from Apremont and joined the squadron at Charpentry, being again the target of artillery, by the fire of which three men were badly wounded. Only by rapid gaits and maneuvering were our cavalry patrols able to live at all under the fire they went through. On the right flank, Troop B kept liaison with the 91st Division. This troop also got caught under a barrage and was saved serious casualties by a quick movement under cover. Several messages were sent in of importance. Among them was the accurate location of a German battery that had been inflicting losses on the right flank of the 35th Division. On one occasion. a strong combat patrol succeeded in outflanking a machinegun nest that was holding up the extreme right of the line. It drove the enemy out by dismounted rifle fire, having reached the flanking position mounted. At nightfall the troops returned to Cheppy. Many important messages were delivered and practically all the liaison to the flanks was performed by the cavalry patrols. Many of our horses were hit and, in cases, the escapes of the troopers were miraculous. In fact, the men felt safer mounted than when on the ground and their experiences seemed to justify this idea. Our morale was not of the best. Our infantry reserves received many casualties from shell fire directed at our patrols and we were not a welcome addition to their attack on this account.. In the evening, four officers’ patrols were sent out, as usual. Our horses showed signs of the lack of forage and of the hard work. The ration at this time was one-half of the regular allowance of oats and one-third that of hay.

The attack was renewed the next day, the squadron having the same mission as on the previous day. Troop D was detached from the squadron about noon this day and was sent to the 5th Corps, to act as advance military police and traffic control in the vicinity of Montfaucon. Before leaving the sector, the captain of Troop D led a patrol to the center of the 35th Division line and returned with information of our artillery fire and the lack of liaison between units. He found a portion of the line in which men of four regiments were mixed together, with no officer in command. The captain took charge until an officer from brigade headquarters was sent to relieve him. The main body of the squadron was kept under cover this day, having learned that patrols were of more value at this stage of the fighting. A patrol from Troop F, led by a lieutenant, was badly shot up in Apremont, nearly every man, including the officer, being hit. Practically the entire liaison to the flanks and within the division combat line was furnished by our patrols this day. The squadron retired to a position near Charpentry about 3 p.m.

That evening the 35th Division fell back and dug in on Baulny Ridge. Due to severe losses during the day’s attack, especially in officers, the line had become confused. Several of the officers of the squadron assisted the division staff officers in restoring cohesion in the line. The 1st Division relieved the 35th Division late that evening. The squadron was attached to the 1st Division and was ordered to remain at Cheppy, ready to move at a half hour’s notice. The 1st Division had excellent organization and no liaison was required of us at first. The division headquarters stated that they had hopes of breaking the line, and in such an event wanted us to be in readiness to go through and keep contact, as we had done at St. Mihiel.

The weather was cold and rainy; the service had been nerve-racking, under the constant shell fire and night patrolling. For a few days after the 1st Division took over, we had a lull in our activities. Our wagons came up from the rear with needed supplies, and the horses were given especial attention as to shoeing, etc. Horses that were wounded or run down were evacuated at this time. There was no opportunity for grazing. The saddling up and moving out in the darkness caused many saddle sores, on account of poor adjustment of equipment and the emaciated condition of the horses. As the horses were evacuated, the troopers were sent back to regimental headquarters, 20 kilometers in rear. No replacements for horses could be had and our strength was diminishing from lack of mounts. On October 4, we received orders to send mounted detachments to establish liaison between the P. C.’s of the 1st and 32d Divisions. Small patrols were ordered to report to the commanders of the infantry brigades for use in establishing liaison between brigades and advanced elements on the flanks. It was evident that the division commander realized the impossibility of using cavalry at this stage and found use for us as mounted messengers only in small numbers. From October 4th to the 9th, the squadron remained at Cheppy, sending out the required patrols and detachments. These patrols were led by officers. The men and horses were changed frequently, thus giving every one a rest. The patrols at the brigade P. C.’s were constantly under fire as they carried messages to the regiments on line and to the rear. The fact that we were used in this duty shows that, with all our methods of liaison, the mounted messenger is still the reliable means of communication when you have men that are not afraid to ride through the fire. Our men upheld the traditions of cavalry in this respect. On October 9, the division continued the attack. The duty of our squadron was as follows: “The C. 0. Cavalry Squadron will send suitable mounted patrols, each commanded by an officer, to report to the C. O.’s of the infantry brigades for liaison work to the front rear and laterally.” On the 10th of October the squadron moved out of Cheppy and advanced to Montrebeau Woods, just in rear of Exermont. From the latter position, in addition to the officers’ patrols already engaged since the 4th, three additional strong patrols, each led by a captain, were sent out. The patrol from Troop B maintained liaison with the 28th Division, on our left, during the day. The captain of Troop H led a mixed patrol of 50 men from B and H Troops, and reported to the P. C. of the 2d Infantry Brigade. The brigade commander said that there was little he could use cavalry for at this time. The patrol was finally ordered to select a position of cover for its horses near the Cote de Chatillon, and to proceed dismounted, and to hold a position in advance of our infantry line, sending patrols to reconnoiter and keep contact with the enemy during the night. It was expected that the enemy might fall back during the night, leaving only a small force on the front line to cover the withdrawal. If this was done, it was very logical for cavalry patrols to keep contact with any such movement, since airplanes could not detect a night movement. Such movements by the enemy were made during the Argonne attack at different times, but on this particular occasion the enemy did not retire, but instead reinforced this part of his front line. During the night, a patrol of four men, led by a lieutenant, reconnoitered the vicinity of Sommerance. The patrol was fired on and lost one man, captured. This man broke away later and got back to our infantry lines, giving information of the enemy in that locality. The Germans shelled all areas just in rear of the front lines all during the night. The main patrol, led by the captain of Troop H, escaped annihilation by a miracle. Their position was suddenly concentrated on by H. E. shell and gas, with the result that practically two-thirds of the horses were either killed, wounded, or gassed, and there were also many casualties among the men. The position occupied was on the actual front line held by the infantry. During the entire barrage, with no cover available, the cavalrymen not being equipped with intrenching tools, the traditional discipline and courage of the regulars came to its own, as the outfit stuck to its mission without a murmur. The next day the captain left an officer and eight men with the brigade P. C. and returned with the remainder of the patrol to Montrebeau Woods.

On the evening of the loth, the captain of Troop F reported to the P. C. of the 1st Infantry Brigade with a patrol of 20 men. He received orders to take the patrol and reconnoiter the condition of our front line between Fleyville and Sommerance. One battalion of the 28th Division had swung across the Aire River and covered a part of our division sector, and it was reported that there existed a gap in echelon between this battalion and the left flank of the 1st Brigade. The captain was directed that in case such a gap existed, he was to fill the gap and hold the line until morning using such additional forces from the cavalry squadron as he might find necessary. The patrol arrived at Fleyville at dusk. The enemy were shelling the town with gas. Fleyville was held by our infantry support line. Not caring to expose his patrol to the machinegun fire and shelling coming from the ridge north of the town, the captain placed the patrol in an apple orchard near Fleyville and, with one N. C. 0. and three men, proceeded dismounted to reconnoiter the line. Our lines were found to be intact. Liaison had just been secured by the left battalion of the 16th Infantry. The patrol entered Sommerance, held by the enemy, and were driven out without loss. The captain passed down the infantry line and reported to the battalion commander information obtained; then, gathering up the patrol at Fleyville, reported back to the brigade commander at 2 a.m. During the entire evening the enemy laid down a severe, harassing fire all along the line. The 42d Division relieved the First on the llth, and all during this day, and the following night, Montrebeau Woods, where we were bivouacked, received harassing fire. The squadron moved about continually within the woods to escape casualties. The usual patrols were sent to the 42d Division P. C.’s. The 42d Division had hopes like the First, that the line would break, and retained us for a possible use in such an event. At this time, we had less than 150 horses in the squadron. On the evening of October 16-17, the squadron was relieved, and it marched twenty kilometers to the rear, to Camp Mallory, near Rarecourt. After a brief rest of two days, the squadron was divided, Troop F going to Avocourt to perform military police duty for the 5th Corps, Troop H and’ Troop B to military police duty with the 1st Corps, in the vicinity of St. Menehould and Fleury. On November lst, a lieutenant and fifteen men from Troop F reported to the P. C. of the 1st Division at Beaumont. This patrol did excellent work in keeping contact with the German retreat from the 1st to the 1 Ith of November. The patrol reached Sedan ahead of any allied troops and were on the go day and night. When the attack was over, on the 1 Ith, ten of the fifteen men in the patrol had to walk back, as their horses were completely done for. They returned with seven horses, the remainder having been casualties, mainly from exhaustion, but in a good cause.

Here was a wonderful opportunity for cavalry. The corps commander told the lieutenant he wished he had a division of cavalry to send through on the morning of the 1st of November. It would have been a great opportunity for cur squadron, a greater chance than at St. Mihiel; but when the chance came it found us with the squadron separated and only a few horses left. We sent all we had, however, were in at the finish, and spared neither men nor horses to give what the cavalry is supposed to give when called upon.