Strengthening the Armor FIST

Strengthening the Armor FIST by Captain Mark E. Vinson The concept of the armor FIST, a Field Artillery team attached to provide fast, accurate fire support for armor units, clearly doesn’t work. Part of the problem is training emphasis and inadequately trained manpower, and part of the problem is organizational. But as the man at the other end of the radio - the artillery officer - will tell you, the present armor FIST cannot provide adequate artillery support now, much less in the future as we implement new doctrine and train to use new weapons. In this article, I hope to explain why this problem has developed and how it might be rectified but, first, let me explain that I didn’t always feel this way. It was only after I arrived at the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course that I heard serious criticism of the armor FIST concept. I then realized that my earlier, hopeful, opinion was based oh ignorance - of fire support and how it should be used, and of the armor unit’s responsibilities to the system. The history of the armor FIST is short. Developed in 1975 as a result of the recommendations of the Close Support Study Group (CSSG), the intent was to optimize fire support for maneuver forces.] From this concept came the team itself, but the organization of fire support teams differs in various types of units. The armor FIST, for example, consists of only four personnel mounted in a tracked carrier. In contrast, the infantry FIST adds three additional forward observer (FO) teams, one for each platoon.2 One serious weakness of the armor FIST concept is this lack of forward observer teams. In their place, the armor unit’s forward observers are the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. It is the forward observer’s job to do the majority of the calls for fire on targets of opportunity, exactly the type of targets you’re likely to encounter in an AirLand Battle-style war of movement. But remember the typical work load of an armor platoon leader or platoon sergeant is leading their platoons and fighting their own tanks. Add to these duties the tasks, knowledges and skills of a forward observer, which include: Calls for fire. 0 Adjustments of fire. Calls for and adjustment of illu- 0 Calls for suppression and immedi- 0 Knowledge of ammunition and Understanding of registration. Final protective fires. Coordination of close air support and naval gunfire. In addition to these, the FO must keep abreast of the general fire support mination and smoke. ate suppressive fires. fuze capabilities.

Fire Support Team Vehicle (FIST-V) situation while keeping the FIST updated on what his platoon is doing. I’m sure that most FOs are not totally proficient in all of these areas. But more important is the realization that what they cannot do proficiently must be done by the FIST, complicating what is already a difficult FIST assignment. The armor FIST is composed of a FIST chief (1st Lt), a fire support sergeant (E-61, a fire support specialist-driver (E-4) and a radio-telephone operator (RTO), an E-3. The team’s primary jobs are to keep the armor may-june 1984 39 company commander advised on fire support matters, to coordinate calls for fire support from their subunits, to help integrate indirect fire support in the maneuver battle plan, and to call for, adjust, and direct the fire itself.3 The FIST is tasked to stay close to the unit commander and to rely on the armor company forward observers - the platoon leaders and sergeants - to see the battlefield. To nutshell the two problems, the platoon leaders and sergeants are already too busy to perform these additional duties adequately and if the duties are assumed by the FIST, their normal jobs of coordinating and integrating fire support won’t be done well, either. It is my experience - and the experience of the field artillery officers I’ve discussed this with - that both problems actually develop all too often. To determine how serious the problems were, I conducted a survey of all FA officers then attending the two FA advanced courses at Fort Sill. The survey included 40 officers, three-quarters of them with experience in Europe. More than 80 percent felt that the average tank platoon leader or platoon sergeant was not proficient as a forward observer. Then they were asked to rate the “average” tank platoon leader or platoon sergeant on each of the duties mentioned earlier. (The tasks were taken from FM 6-30, The Field Artillery Observer.) The majority of artillery officers rated the average platoon leader or platoon sergeant as satisfactorily, although marginally proficient, in only two tasks, the call for fire and the call for immediate suppression. The remaining essential tasks were rated unsatisfactory by the majority. Asked why they thought the armor leaders were not proficient in the tasks, most said they didn’t think there was enough formal training of the tasks and that there was also a lack of reinforcement training in the units. After obtaining copies of the programs of instruction (POIs) for the ANCOC, AOBC, and AOAC courses at the Armor School, an analysis indicated that they were pretty thorough. The ANCOC POI called for 4 hours of instruction in field artillery, 3 hours on the call for fire, with a 4-hour practical exercise on an observed fire trainer and an exam. Similarly, the AOBC POI includes 2 hours of instruction on the field artillery, with 4 hours of instruction on the call for fire, a 4-hour practical exercise on an observed fire trainer, and a 3- hour, performance-oriented exam on the observed fire trainer. The use of an observed fire trainer is to the school’s credit as it will reinforce the training and aid in retention of the instruction. The AOBC POI has been definitely improved since 1978, when most of the instruction was in the classroom, as opposed to performance-oriented training. But in my case, as I’m sure is the case with most armor officers, there was little reinforcement training once I reported to an armor battalion. To be exact, I observed just two classes on forward observer procedures in 3 years. One class taught the illumination call for fire just prior to a night tank gunnery exercise, and the second class was given prior to a Tank Table IX, to teach platoon leaders the call for fire on a preplanned target. I remember thinking at the time that I should know these procedures alread- y, but that I had forgotten how to properly request any indirect fire support. Without command emphasis and the constant need to use these procedures, I had lost my proficiency. I had become what is known in Field Artillery circles as an “untrained observer”. I could call for fire, but not quickly or properly, and therefore not very effectively. Improper calls for fire require more time to process in the fire direction center (FDC), and this means reduced responsiveness and effectiveness. I never received any formal or informal training from a FIST, although my survey indicated that most of the FISTs were occasionally called upon to give classes to the tankers. This is possibly because most of the FISTs surveyed were only attached to an armor company for field exercises. But quite beyond the matter of continuing training and practice, the major factor that degrades the platoon leader’s ability to act as FO is that he is too busy with other duties. During contact with the enemy, when he should be performing his duties as forward observer, he is busy fighting his platoon. Is he capable of controlling his platoon fires, maneuvering his platoon, issuing and executing orders, and reporting to his commander, while also taking the time to call for fire and registering the results?4 It’s very unlikely. He is more likely to ignore his FO duties, especially if he can’t call for fire or request immediate suppression properly. During field exercises, when there are no rewards for properly calling for fire, it is especially naive to expect the platoon leader to perform his FO duties without command emphasis. Partly as a result of this training inadequacy, the FIST becomes the sole player in the fire support game. Control of calls for fire becomes centralized and inflexible. According to the field artillery officers surveyed, the FIST chiefs received all calls for fire and forwarded them to the battalion fire support officer (FSO). The platoon leader rarely called the FSO or firing battery directly. In fact, the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants rarely sent anycalls for fire. The FIST usually developed his own, based on a spot report intercepted on the command net. With trained, full-time FOs, the FIST should have three options for the transmission of calls for fire: He can have FOs call for fire directly to any fire support assets available. This method requires well-trained FOs and well-developed SOP’S. The FIST can also assign a specific fire support asset - 81-mm mortar, 107-mm mortar, field artillery - to each FO. 0 The most centralized method requires all FOs to call the FIST first. The FIST then assigns a fire support asset to the FO.5 Under the current armor FIST system, a fourth non-doctrinal method has been established. This method requires the FIST to make all calls for fire personally. It’s pretty obvious this is not likely to be very effective in combat. Instead, the FIST has become an ineffective middleman because he’s probably not in a position to adjust fires, nor will he be able to do any target damage assessment without calling forward. The Lessons of 1973 Yet another weakness of the present FIST system is that it is not designed to meet the increasingly effective and proliferating threat of manportable antitank weapons. This weakness goes back to the conclusions of the Close Support Study Group, which discussed a Soviet-bloc-style threat in a European environment. The threat is described as an overwhelming “proliferation of armored, mobile targets; massive enemy indirect fire support; large numbers of enemy fighter aircraft over the battle area; a very effective air defense system; and a complete spectrum of electronic warfare capabilities”6 These are all valid considerations, but what is glaringly missing is mention of the proliferation of antitank weapons, which had proven exceedingly effective. One of the prime lessons of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 was the need for responsive suppression and close support from artillery units.’ 40

The study group also addressed the problem of broader frontages, 5-10 kilometers per battalion task force.* But an armored FIST cannot handle all calls for fire from a unit so spread out. It certainly cannot be expected to adjust fires for a whole unit. The armor platoon leader must either act as his own forward observer in such cases or artillery support will be ineffective. The weakness of our present armor FIST concept will become even more serious as the pace of battle operations increases. The new tactics that call for speed and mobility in both the offense and the defense increase the need for supporting fire to cover such moves and provide suppression.9 Again, this points to the need for FOs at the platoon level or leaders to initiate the calls for fire. Our field artillery assets are scarce and must be used at all times to take maximum advantage of what we have.10 Routing all calls through the FIST employs these assets inefficiently. It would be far better to allow the FIST to coordinate fire support, “a far more complex task than ever before”.ll With the introduction of a new family of fire support equipment and maneuver vehicles, the forward observer has become an even more critical link.12 He is crucial to optimum use of the TACFIRE digitalized gunnery system and to the new family of laser-guided munitions.13 The digital message device (DMD) provides forward observers with a way to send fire missions to the supporting field artillery battalion quickly and accurately. TACFIRE is already in use in some units and the DMD is the access into this system. If the platoon leader doesn’t use the DMD he cannot interface with TACFIRE. But, I cannot envision a platoon leader having the time to operate a DMD. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants also require additional training on the newer varieties of field artillery munitions available. This whole new array of weapons - scatterable mines, cannon-launched guided projectiles, improved smoke rounds and improved conventional munitions14 - increase the complexity of the forward observer’s task, if he is to do this task properly and gain maximum advantage from the weapons available. Can he fight his tanks and act as FO with this more complex menu of possibilities available? Again, I doubt it. At this point, it might be interesting to analyze why the CSSG came to the conclusion that the armor FIST did not need dedicated platoon FOs but that platoon leaders could assume those responsibilities instead. The first reason given was that tank platoons already have heavy, close-in immediately available firepower, the main guns on the platoon’s tanks.15 But the tank is primarily a tank killer. I doubt we will have the luxury of shooting main gun ammunition at known or suspected infantry or antitank positions, given the size and composition of the main gun basic load and the expectation of facing a large number of enemy hard targets. Main gun effectiveness is also limited by range: the tank would be at a disadvantage against a Sagger team which could engage it at 3,000-meters. The second reason given by the CSSG was that there is no place for a forward observer to ride if he accompanies the tank platoon. A separate tracked vehicle was thought impractical because of cost. An FO riding one of the platoon tanks would have to split his time between his tank crew duties and his FO tasks.16 A separate tracked vehicle would be expensive of course, but how much are we willing to pay for adequate fire support for armor units? As for the objection that the FO would have to divide his time between crew and FO duties, what is the platoon leader being asked to do now? He is tank commander, platoon leader, and an FO. in the CSSG is that armor units will typically have infantry attached, with their FOs.17 But this still doesn’t solve the tank platoon leader’s problem since the infantry FO is under the control of the infantry platoon leader. While the infantry FO could provide some assistance, the system will only work when infantry and tank units are cross-attached, which is not always the case. 0 The CSSG also noted that the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have AN/VRC-12 radios providing a quick means of calling for fire.18 However, when the platoon leader calls for fire, he must leave either his platoon or company command net, for quite a while if he is adjusting fire. I do Another point made in justification may-june 1984 41 not think it’s a good policy for either the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to leave either of these nets for the period necessary to carry out a fire mission, except in an emergency, like an immediate suppression mission. Some Solutions First, if we are to improve the system as it now stands, we must increase and improve training. Realistic indirect fire requirements must be incorporated in FTXs and ARTEPs. They must have command emphasis. The battalion commander, the FSO, company commander, and FIST all need to work together to emphasize the active use of indirect fire during any field training. . . Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should also get some realistic FO experience on a periodic basis by practicing calls for and adjustment of fire whenever the battalion mortars or the direct support battalion FA are live-firing. Commanders need to coordinate with the FA battalion or the mortar platoon leader and schedule the training. With enough prior coordination, the 14.5-mm FA trainer, which uses subcaliber ammunition, can be requested from the FA battalion. Indirect fire requirements can also be worked into live-fire Tank Tables X and XI1 (section and platoon qualification) more realistically. Too many units force the platoon leader to call for fire on a preplanned target at a set time from a FA battery or mortar platoon already laid on the target. This may be safe, but is much too canned and easy, perpetuating the myth that the platoon leader can proficiently call for fire when he needs it. The platoon leader should be told what fire support is available and then be let alone to use it, as long as he does use it. Emphasis should also be placed on the use of smoke and suppressive fires. The safety officer must clear all calls for fire to insure that no one gets hurt, but other than that, the platoon leader should be free to use his fires as he sees fit. But he should be critiqued afterwards on how well he made his choices. Another improvement to training might result from permanently attaching FSOs and FISTS to the armor battalions. Aside from training, some organizational solutions are also possible. I would put a dedicated artillery FO in the loader’s position on the platoon leader’s tank. It would not take long to train him for his loader’s duties. The benefits of having an artillery FO with each platoon will certainly outweigh the disadvantages of splitting his duties between loading and directing fire or the disadvantages of a platoon leader fighting his tank, leading his platoon and directing fire simultaneously. Communication will be a problem of course, unless an additional radio is added to the platoon leader’s tank. The FO could then use his DMD to call for fire. When the FIST DMD is fielded, the FOs will be able to relay calls for fire through the FIST with great speed. If the FOs are using PRC-77s, the FIST DMD can be used to increase the range of the call for fire, since the FIST has an ANIVRC-46. If the mortars and FA are close enough, fire requests can be sent directly by the FOs. The platoon leader’s VRC-12 is available as a backup, but it should be left free so the platoon leader can operate on the platoon and company nets. Another alternative would be to add one more FO vehicle to each armor FIST, for a total of two FO vehicles. The CSSG found this alternative too expensive.19 While a highly mobile, less expensive armored vehicle would address that objection, a signature similar to the other company vehicles is U.S. Department of the Amy. Fire for mect. Training Circular 6-40-4. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. U.S. Department of the Army. Fire Support Operations in Brigade-Size Unifs. Training Circular 6-20-3. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Offce, 1981. Footnotes Close Support Study Group, Close Support Sfudy. Final Report. (Unpublished report, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, 1975). p. 1. U.S. Department of the Army, Fire Support Operations in Brigade-Size Units, Training Circular 6-20-3 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981). pp. 7-9. TC 6-20-3, pp. 9-10. U.S. Army Armor Center, The Abrams Banalion TRADOC TT 71-1/2. Fort Knox, Kentucky : U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Combined Arms Team, (Unpublished student text,TCA DD, April 1982), pp. 2-5. USA TRADOC, 1982, p. IV-I - IV-5. 6 CSSG, p. 4. LTG (RET) David Elazar, “The Yom Kippur War”. In Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Con-fricf. ed. Louis Williams. (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975). p. 248. 8 CSSG, p. 4. CSSG, p. 4. 10 CSSG, p. 5. I 1 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 CCSG, p. 6. vital. l4 Ibid. A second FO vehicle would allow the armor FIST to split into two elements, with the FIST chief in one vehicle and the fire support sergeant in the other. :i E:GG, P.F-1-1. 17 CCSG, p. F-l-2. 18 Ibid. 19 CCSG, p. F-2-3. In the offense, one;ehicle would stay with the lead platoon while the other remains in overwatch. In defense, they could be separated for the widest possible coverage. The FIST chiefs vehicle would stay as close as possible to the company commander’s vehicle. These are just a few ideas that could be developed further. The important thing is to realize that a problem does exist and that positive corrective action is needed as quickly as possible. Training in units should be upgraded immediately. In conclusion, if you are an armor commander and you do not think you have a problem with your fire support training, then you are either truly exceptional or you have not taken a good, hard look at your platoon leaders’ and platoon sergeants’ capabilities as forward observers and the overall effectiveness of your FIST. Bibliography Close Support Study Group. Close Support Study, Final Report. Unpublished report, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, 1975. Elazar, David LTG (Ret). “The Yom Kippur War”. In Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict. Ed. Louis Williams. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975. U.S. Army Armor Center. The Abrams Batfalion TRADOC TT 71-112. Fort Knox, Kentucky: USA

TRADOC, 1982.

U.S. Army Field Artillery School. Combined Arms Team, Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques. Unpublished student text, T CA DD. April 1982.

C A P T A I N M A R K E. VIN-

SON was commissioned in Armor from the U.S. Military Academy in 1978. He has served as an M60A1 tank Platoon leader, and as an M1 tank company executive officer in the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2d Armored Division. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Field Artil- l e r y O f f i c e r Advanced Course. He is currently HHC commander of the 3d Battalion, 63rd Armor, 3d Infantry Division, FRG. 42