Lessons from the OPFOR

Lessons from the OPFOR by Sergeant First Class (P) Richard Wagner The OPFOR rules the roost at the

NTC.

This is the hard fact of life learned by all units that make the training pilgrimage to the high desert wastelands of Fort Irwin, California. Not even those units that have been through force-on-force with OPFOR two, three, four or more times can decisively defeat them every time. The answer to this somewhat sobering situation lies in the fact that OPFOR trains both ways-as a viable U.S. combat arms force and as the OPFOR that trains according to Soviet concepts, tactics and doctrine. Their vehicles are either genuine Threat vehicles or U.S. vehicles modified to resemble Threat vehicles (VISMODS). The OPFOR also has a very thorough and detailed knowledge of terrain in the Fort Irwin maneuver training area, which adds considerably to their battle successes over the visiting units. However, OPFOR was not organized and trained for the sole purpose of defeating the rotational units. Far from it. Everything that OPFOR knows is yours for the asking. The whole setup is a training scheme and you are expected to make some mistakes. You are also expected to learn from your mistakes because there will be no forgiveness when the steel flies in earnest. The following covers many, but not all, of the OPFOR lessons you can learn at Fort Irwin. It is suggested that the OPFOR tactics, etc., given here be carefully studied beforehand in relation to your own unit’s training program so that you will be better prepared when you go to the NTC. Learn all the nitty-gritty details and make your men learn them as well. Targets. OPFOR has found in its own training cycles that using live fire range targets that do not go down when hit not only forces the TC to keep track of what he has shot at, but it also keeps him aware of the necessity to keep track of those “hit” targets when he moves to a new firing position. This is may-june 1984 33 hard to do in the smoke and dust and nique -especially between a firing turmoil of the life-like, make-believe tank and its sensing wingman tank that battles at the NTC. It will be much har- is also shooting. They take turns sens-der in real life. ing each other’s rounds. When the OPFOR trains as an This isn’t as difficult nor as time con- “American” unit, it’s targets are set up suming as it seems. Your crews should in a Threat motorized rifle regiment learn to recognize each other’s voices array with the target lines about 500 on the radio and calls can be short and meters apart. The “American” unit to the point. OPFOR has developed an goes into combat at about 3,000 meters ad hoc radio code that doesn’t follow and the rows of targets periodically fall standard operating procedures as in unison and new, closer, rows pop taught in gunnery communications. up, simulating an advancing enemy But it works. force and teaching the TCs to keep For example: A tank fires at a target. track of the “hit” targets. When your If the wingman reports “target,” a hit TCs lose track of the “hit” targets, 1 has been made. Overs and shorts are they not only re-shoot them, they, similarly reported in simple direct needlessly expose themselves to words and phrases. If the shot is sensed “live” targets when moving to new to have gone over or short of the target fighting positions. Close examination 1 by one target dimension then “just often shows some targets with as many I over” or “just short” is radioed. More as 15-20 shot holes while others nearby than one target dimension over or were hitless. short brings the call “over” or OPFOR’s average rounds-per-kill, “short.” If the shot is sensed as having while firing the live-fire exercise as an badly missed the target by two or more “American” force, now stands at dimensions, “way over” or “way about 5.85, and the average rounds- short” tells the firing tank how much it per-kill ratio for rotational units is from has missed. 16.3 to 30+. So, keep track of what OPFOR’s talk-between-tanks philos-you’ve shot! ophy is simple: Make your crews talk to Communications. Talk between tanks each other! Keep it simple and get off is vital to survival on the battlefield and the net. Crews have “died” at the NTC OPFOR crews are drilled in this tech- because they didn’t talk to each other. 34 may-june 1984 Movement to Contact. The movement to contact must be carefully planned. Danger areas along the route must be identified and contingencies planned and discussed with your staff. Danger areas, among other things, are any area where the task force becomes more vulnerable to OPFOR fires and areas of suspected OPFOR occupation. Read your map-study and familiarize yourself with the terrain you are going to cross. Establish control measures for your movement to contact, to include checkpoints, intermediate objectives and phase lines. Remember that the terrain will affect your task force disposition. Most tasks forces at the NTC lead with their scouts and give them a route reconnaissance mission along the avenues of approach. In open terrain, such as that at the NTC, one task force tried a different tactic. The commander selected several OP locations overwatching the avenues of approach. This worked well and is worth considering when your turn comes. Using scouts as a forward screen provides security for the task force. However, you have to give your scouts enough advance time so that they can use proven movementlreconnaissance techniques which they must use if they ’ are to do their job and survive. Your scouts must cross the LD well ahead of your lead elements. If you don’t give them the time and distance they need, your scouts will not be able to use good movement/reconnaissance techniques and still stay far enough ahead of your lead elements that are, or should be, traveling in overwatch. Reconnaissance. The most important platoon in your whole battalion is your scout platoon. Period. That’s it. If you don’t know where the enemy is, or what he is doing, you are in trouble from the start. Good pre-movement reconnaissance is the key. OPFOR scouts reconnoiter every move their units make. And they do it in detailed, trained and pre-planned drills. OPFOR scouts will find your obstacles and will breach them if they can. They will locate your prepared positions and will set up routes around them. They will get into your rear areas and mark out (on their maps) ambush sites. An OPFOR motorcycle scout will often be “attached” to each of your maneuver companies and he will stick with that company like he belongs to it. When the company moves, he moves. When it reaches a new position, he’s right there with his radio reporting on you. One evening, an OPFOR battalion scout, on a Soviet VISMOD BMP and wearing distinctive uniform, made his way through all the defensive obstacles into a rotational unit’s rear area and asked directions to the battalion TOC. He was led to the TOC by an unsuspecting soldier. Imagine the surprise in that TOC when his main gun tube came poking through the tent flap. Kill the OPFOR scouts. OPFOR scouts are just that - scouts. Their mission is to discover where you are, what you are doing and report it. They are not fighting forces, per se, but if they’re cornered they will fight to the death. OPFOR scout kill rates run to about 6-1. If you insist on using your scouts as a fighting force, you are going to get them killed and you will be hurting. Fighting units take casualties and dead scouts are no good to you. However, if you force your scouts to fight, at least give them something to fight with. Give them a FIST NCO forward observer, give them at least two 4.2 mortars, attach at least two tanks to them. Give them GSR and back them up with extra PRC 77s. However, you will be better off in the long run if you don’tfightyour scouts. OPFOR scouts are by no means unbeatable. They are just thoroughly trained. But that doesn’t always save them. One rotation unit assigned two tanks to its scout platoon and massacred the OPFOR scouts the first time they met. Good scouting can lead to a quick kill. “American” scouts spotted an OPFOR battalion moving to contact. They called up two companies, set up a “v” ambush, and ruined that OPFOR battalion! Your S2 must realize that the OPFOR is as dangerous as a real, live enemy and not just a part of his own unit play-acting. The OPFOR trains and fights to win and must be treated very seriously. Your scouting reports must be quickly collated and the information passed on - up and down the chain, as fast as possible. OPFOR units habitually move at a speed of 3 kilometers per minute which leaves little time for pondering over your scout’s reports. Your S2 must act quickly and decisively. Mutual support. Never allow your units to become so separated that they cannot mutually support each other.

Conversely, don’t bunch up. The terrain will be the determining factor m deciding how far apart your elements can operate. It is difficult to maintain mutual support as well as proper dispersion, but it must be done if your lead elements are to survive their initial contact with OPFOR. Train for it. You should maintain sufficient distance from your lead elements so that only they will come under OPFOR fire on contact. But, you must be close enough to support them. When moving in bounding overwatch, keep your FIST FO with the “. . . OPFOR scouts are by no means unbeatable. They are just thoroughly trained. But that doesn’t always save them. . . 9 ) bounding element. If he is up front where he can see what is going on, he can call down suppressive fires. Prearrange your priority targets with your artillery and mortars. With target data established from the map, they can lay down quick fire on demand. Priority targets are automatically shifted forward as your task force advances. Search and Traverse. In short, look around. Don’t keep everybody’s head up and locked. Everyvehicle must have one man, preferably the loader on a tank, or the gunner in other vehicles, as an air guard, whether you are on the move or stopped. OPFOR has noted that few training units do this and it o f t e n m a k e s t h e i r ( O P F O R ’ s ) approach much easier. Each vehicle must have an assigned area of search. Center vehicles orient to the front, flank vehicles to their flanks 35 may-june 1984 and the rear. Main guns andlor .50 Cali-foot square, shiny white map board ber machineguns must be oriented on hanging on the turret telling the whole the vehicle’s search sector. world where you are. Such constant searching is tiring, but it must be done. OPFOR rewards searchers for initial sightings. Do the same for your troops. Watch your rear! Always have the rearmost vehicle travel with its tube over its rear deck. You will likely avoid an OPFOR ATGM through your grill doors. Another point. Make your searching soldiers use optics. Eyeballing won’t do Chokepoints. OPFOR loves ’em! it. Training units tend to bunch up at And, at the same time, train your chokepoints and OPFOR watches over soldiers to keep the crew junk off their chokepoints like you wouldn’t believe. turrets. Maps, binoculars, etc., are re- Get your ATGM teams out and crack flectors and can be seen for miles, and down on your all around search pro-OPFOR looks for them. Look at it this cedures. Don’t bunch up at a choke-way. Your men are in BDUs and your point or you won’t have anything left. tank is camouflaged to blend with the If you run into a chokepoint, get the desert terrain. But you’ve got a two- word out - fast, so that your trailing 36 may-june 1984 “. . .Passing through an obstacle is as important a maneuver as passing through a chokepoint. Don’t bunch up. . . . 9 9 units won’t bunch up, but can halt and deploy. Obstacles. These are crucial elements in the defense and OPFOR knows it. Some American units don’t. Obstacles must be as complex as time will allow-and they must be defended! Breaching and moving through an obstacle must be done quickly. And you have to overrun the obstacle and establish your security lines on the far side before you can be certain that the obstacle is overrun. Passing through an obstacle is as important a maneuver as passing through a chokepoint. Don’t bunch up. Don’t abandon your obstacle breaching teams to their fate. Your security forces must protect them. Multiple breaches should be made if possible. A team of soldiers with shovels can quickly collapse the walls of an antitank ditch enough so that tracked vehicles can get through. But don’t fill the ditch in; that wastes time. Remember. If you put up obstacles, you know the OPFOR is going to try to breach them. If they can’t do it in daylight, they’ll be back that night. OPFOR operates with a persistence that can be demoralizing. You must not, ever, lower your guard. The placement of your obstacles is of prime importance to your defense. Most rotational units put their obstacles perpendicular to the line of approach. OPFOR puts theirs at oblique angles to the line of approach. This makes the obstacles harder to find and they enjoy mutual covering fires. Don’t place your obstacles too far forward. Site them close enough to your main battle positions so they can be defended. When OPFOR breaches your obstacles, call down your artillery family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) to close the lanes. Battle Positions. Select battle positions with a background not silhouetted against the sky. OPFOR does, and more often than not their vehicles aren’t seen until it’s too late. Try to select positions over rocks and vegetation to keep the dust down when firing. And don’t forget - an open field of fire, visible to the attacker, will be covered by him. Past experience has shown that rotational units have to rehearse, again and again and again, the techniques of getting into and out of battle positions. OPFOR’s primary requisite for selecting a battle position is to ensure a good way out. OPFOR insists that its crews select battle positions that can be backed out of unseen by the attacking force. Training units have learned the hard way that too many crews are killed by a flank shot when they back out of their positions. Battle positions must be occupied from the rear and while your leaders select the positions, your other vehicles stay in hide. Battle positions should be surveyed from the front. If you can see it, so can OPFOR. Every TC must practice moving into and out of his battle position. Don’t forget your flanks. Approve all troop positions before they are dug. Nothing makes soldiers madder than having to dig new foxholes. Also, on the subject of digging, OPFOR has noted that most training unit foxholes are too shallow, too wide and too obvious. OPFOR has also noted that rotational units often fail to site their machineguns so as to lay down final protective fires across the platoon front. Instead, they select straight-ahead fire sectors. Like most other weapons, machineguns are most effective when tiring from flank positions. Train your crews to stay off the top of the terrain or every OPFOR weapon in sight will shoot at them. OPFOR crews are trained to deploy in depth, at different elevations and positions, and they always work with a 2-tank team, or a tank-BMP team. A lone tank is a dead duck! Everytime! Movement means survival. Do you want a highly ‘school-trained’ crew that can sit in one spot, fire ten rounds and kill 10 vehicles and then die in their tracks, or do you want a crew that can move, shoot up its basic load, kill ten or eleven OPFOR vehicles, and show up at its next fighting position - yelling for more ammo? Flank fires. Your flanks are your most vulnerable points. OPFOR observers report that more than 60 percent of their kills come from flank fires. It is not at all unusual for one or two OPFOR tanks or ATGMs on a flank to ruin an entire attacking unit. But, this works both ways too. A rotation unit’s TOW platoon once severely mauled an OPFOR regiment with flank fire. If you can set up flank fires from both flanks, you’ve got the battle almost won. This forces the OPFOR to orient in three directions, a practical impossibility. But, never forget that this is also a favorite OPFOR tactic. OPFOR has long noted that attacking units habitually position their weapons to cover long-range frontal fire zones. Weapons positioned in front of an approaching enemy are easy to acquire and kill, but flank weapons are harder to find and engage, and often enjoy the advantage of reverse slope cover; i.e., fire, reverse down the slope, pop up and tire again, etc. Shooting. When you train in gunnery go back to the basics. Use that telescope! You won’t always have your sophisticated electronic sighting equipment. The telescope is quicker and accurate enough for force-on-force shooting. The telescope, combined with TRPs at known ranges, is deadly. What do you shoot first when the OPFOR attacks? His T-72s. They represent only 30 percent of his total force, but they account for 65 percent of the kills the OPFOR inflicts. Practice section, platoon, and company fire control and distribution. MILES foxholes. OPFOR flatly states that hastily dug, uncamouflaged fighting positions, the so-called MILES foxholes, are not fighting positions-they are dying positions. They are easy to spot because of the light colored earth thrown up. OPFOR gunners look for these piles of freshly turned earth and they lock onto them. When one of your vehicles moves into such a position - zap! Besides, the MILES foxhole berm wouldn’t really stop an APFSDS round on its way to - and through, your tank anyway! Many rotational units bring too many bulldozers with them. OPFOR regards this as ridiculous - and they should know. All you need, says OPFOR, are the two ’dozers that your brigade is authorized. You don’t need eight or ten of them Attack. OPFOR has noted that many of the rotational unit attacks have failed because they get stopped or slowed at an obstacle with most of the unit’s vehicles and men exposed to tire. This is precisely what obstacles are for. Training units rarely look for, and breach, obstacles before they attack. OPFOR always does. Training unit maneuvering in the attack often leads to a frontal attack of one company against an OPFOR battalion. This is murder, pure and simple. may-june 1984 37

OPFOR attacks with a regiment against a company. On the other hand, one training unit engaged an attacking OPFOR force with long-range frontal fire from one company, sent the other companies out to the flanks and destroyed that OPFOR unit. Rotational units have learned the hard way, time and again, that OPFOR destroys AT weapons before it attacks. The preferred tactic is the destruction of AT weapons by long-range AT fire. Approximate kill ranges for typical OPFOR MILES AT weapons run from 1,680 meters for the T-72% 125-mm main gun to 3,000 meters for a Sagger or BMP. The M60 MILES, however, can kill out to 3,100 meters and the TOWis lethal to 3,200 meters. Smoke and Night. If you plan a night attack, you can confuse the OPFOR as to your exact intentions by moving a lot of vehicles around your sector. It is hard to pinpoint vehicles by sound alone. Also, excessive vehicular movement in your sector will keep the OPFOR in a high state of alert, and that tires out his troops. When your attack is under way, your mounted force should be positioned to fire from a different angle (flank) than your dismounted force. This is a standard OPFOR tactic. Smoke really obscures at night but, during daylight, smoke can hide you or give you away. Not even heavy smoke presents any real problems to a highly-experienced OPFOR attack. OPFOR has a viable limited visibility contingency plan and uses it. OPFOR experience has shown that whenever “American” units come under smoke, they usually stop. Rarely has a limited visibility plan been used by these units. The prime rule when you’re under smoke is - do something. OPFOR rarely uses defensive smoke. Offensive smoke, and plenty of it, is the name of their game. If OPFOR smokes you, do something! Pull back, go upwind, or move forward. Any movement is better than none because if you stop when smoked, OPFOR knows exactly where you are. OPFOR considers the smoke generating button the most dangerous button in any vehicle. Self-generated smoke pinpoints you exactly to the OPFOR gunners, and tank crews who indiscriminately use their smoke generating buttons usually die for it. Remember, the use of smoke requires a knowledge of the terrain, wind and weather and whether or not the tactical situation really calls for smoke. OPFOR has learned that a temperature inversion layer in the atmosphere (a common occurrence in that part of California) will hold smoke tight against the ground. Your weather people can predict an inversion layer for you. One more smoke point. If your movement will take you through a valley, be assured that OPFOR will smoke you. OPFOR habitually smokes valleys. They aren’t trying to hide from you, they’re just confusing you. At nighttime, you should use chemlights to mark your target reference points (TRPs). But, beware! Tank battalion OPFOR scouts will destroy them, steal them, or move them around if they can. One good way to prevent this is to break open the chemlight and pour the contents on a rock. If you use blackout markers, you are setting yourself up for a kill because OPFOR scouts can see them 8-9 kilometers away. OPFOR never uses blackout markers or interior dome lights (they shine through the vision blocks like beacons) or flashlights. They are trained to function in the dark. OPFOR scouts will sit out, night after night, just looking for your lights. Delay/Defend in Sector. In order to effectively delayldefend in sector YOU must have a mobility advantage over the OPFOR. This involves a combination of obstacles throughout your sector, improvement of your movement routes and the reconnaissance and rehearsals of routes and subsequent battle positions by your leaders. The de-layldefense in sector mission requires a lot of preparation time, something always in short supply. If you plan a delay action you must have a backup force ready to take up the fight. Many such disengagements are begun too late; the OPFOR is practically on their heels. If the OPFOR is within 2,000 meters, your battalion TOC cannot get the word to the forward units in time to disengage. And if your vehicles begin their movements when the OPFOR is within 1,000 meters, they’re dead. As one OPFOR observer put it, “Put out the lights, boys. The party is over.” Permission to disengage must be prearranged so that the forward units will automatically pull back when the OPFOR reaches a predetermined line. When you are disengaging, all your guns must be laid to the rear - all the way back to your next position. Also, crews must learn instant vehicle recognition. Not so much on a vehicle-type basis as on a “theirs” or “ours” basis. Finally. You have to pull out your infantry first. If you lose your infantry, your armor will soon be helpless. Other tactics and drills. If you persist in moving through a “kill zone” that is littered with “dead” American veh- 38 may-june 1984 icles, you will get killed as sure as the others. If you accidentally run into a kill zone - get out of it - fast. Don’t try to bull your way through. OPFOR will simply sit back and kill everything you send in. Train your crews to reload their turrets when they withdraw from a battle position. A fighting vehicle that arrives at its new battle position with empty turret ammo racks doesn’t hack it. Misfires are a fact of life and have to be dealt with. The TC must announce “misfire” on the radio, then pull back and clear it. When he leaves his battle position, his flank tanks must engage his close-in targets. As soon as the misfire is cleared, he pulls back up into position and resumes fire. Reloading vehicles while parked on a grade is hard to do, but it must be practiced. A lot of units at the NTC have been caught short by OPFOR in precisely this situation. Summary. Intensive training in every phase of armored warfare before you get to the NTC is your key to survival. Train to more difficult standards than you ever have before. OPFOR does. And never forget - - - The battle is the payoff.

S F C (P) RICHARD WAG-

NER enlisted in t h e Army in 1964 and is a graduate of the BNCOC and the ANCOC and of the first master gunner course at Fort Knox in

1975. H e served with the 11 th Armored Cavalry in Vietnam and the 3-8 Cavalry in Germany. H e was senior instructor at the M60A7 tank commander’s course at Vilseck from 1972 to 1974. H e is currently assigned to the Directorate of Evaluation a n d S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , USAARMC, Fort Knox, as a master gunner where he is a director of instructors for the Reserve component tank commander’s school at Boise, Idaho.